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Abstract
The cloud model offers many useful services such as storage and computing solutions
that enrich our daily lives. However, there is a restriction in using the cloud’s optimal
potential since the client relies on trusting the cloud completely. This blind faith can
easily be exploited by the cloud by lying about computational results or deleting data;
making verification of results a desirable property to obtain a level of assurance while
relaxing the trust assumption.
Publicly verifiable computation (PVC) enables a computationally-limited client to out-
source computations to an untrusted server and to verify correctness of the returned
results. Servers providing such a service may be rewarded per computation, providing
an incentive to cheat by returning malformed results rather than devoting time and
resources to compute a valid result. In this thesis, we extend a previous approach using
attribute-based encryption (ABE) to enable a broader system model for PVC such that
servers may compute multiple functions and if found cheating, are revoked from the
system. We show that different types of ABE accommodate different system models
and ultimately show that dual-policy ABE unifies all ABE based PVC models into
a hybrid model which can flexibly switch between the models at the cost of a single
setup.
Proofs of retrievability (PoR) enable a client to outsource data to an untrusted server
and allow the client to request a proof that the data stored can be retrieved, which the
client can verify. We construct a somewhat practical scheme that enables the client to
request proofs of retrievability of multiple different-sized files with a single request. This
is achieved by using homomorphic properties to aggregate a proof into a small value.
Furthermore, using combinatorial and statistical tools we derive strategies obtaining an
assurance whether the server retains enough information to deliver the original data.
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This chapter provides an overview of this thesis. We provide motivation for
the undertaken research and present the structure of this thesis.
1.1 Motivation
Cloud service providers are continuously gaining importance over the last few years.
They offer various services in numerous application domains such as storage, computing
services and key management services. The huge success of the cloud model is based
on offering various benefits such as flexible scalability, accessibility and easy manage-
ability to companies and individuals to employ cloud services in a cost effective manner.
The combination of Software-as-a-Service and the increasing use of mobile devices being
employed as general computing devices give rise to a considerable difference in compu-
tational power between cloud service providers (or servers) and clients. Thus, there is
a tremendous desire for clients to outsource the evaluation of complex functions to an
external server. Servers providing such a service may be rewarded per computation,
and as such have an incentive to cheat by returning malformed computational results
rather than devoting their precious resources and time to compute a correct result.
Thus, this enables servers to offer computational services to more costumers within the
same time frame and potentially increase their rewards.
For example, nowadays it is natural that a company may operate a “bring your own
device” policy, enabling employees to use personal smartphones and tablets for work.
Due to resource limitations, it may not be possible for these devices to perform complex
computations locally. Instead, a computation is outsourced over some network to
a more powerful server (possibly outside the company, offering Software-as-a-Service,
and hence untrusted) and the result of the computation is returned to the client device.
In formal terms, this means given a function F to be computed by a server S, the client
sends her personal input x to the server S that should return the computational result
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F (x) to the client. However, there may be an incentive for the server to cheat and thus
return an invalid result y to the client that does not correspond to the actual compu-
tational result F (x). The reason for such a behaviour may be that the server is simply
too busy or may not wish to devote any resources on performing computations, and
thus wishes to convince the client to accept a malformed result. Therefore, the client
has a natural desire to obtain some assurance that the returned result is indeed correct.
This problem, known as verifiable outsourced computation (VC), has attracted a lot
of attention in the research community recently. VC schemes provide a solution of
the above problem and enable a client to outsource computations to a powerful server
while providing her with the possibility of verifying the correctness of the computa-
tional result. The underlying efficiency requirement for VC schemes simply expects
that outsourcing and verifying of the computation take less time than computing the
function from scratch. Usually, VC schemes use an amortised notion of complexity for
the client, i.e. the client may perform an expensive pre-processing phase, but after this
stage, she is required to run very efficiently.
Further activities in this area lead to the notion of publicly verifiable outsourced com-
putation (PVC). This notion follows the same principles as above but enables after
the pre-processing any client to delegate and verify computations since these actions
simply rely on the public information of the system. PVC has the same efficiency re-
quirement as VC. PVC also uses an amortised notion of efficiency that requires a single
client to invest in the expensive pre-processing while enabling many other clients to
benefit from her initial effort, and thus amortises this expensive step over the number
of clients within the system. Therefore, PVC can be seen as a more practical scheme
accommodating multiple clients outsourcing function evaluations to a server but not
necessarily on joint inputs.
Those VC and PVC solutions can be seen as a contribution towards ensuring that an
untrusted server has returned a correct result or otherwise can be detected cheating.
Yet another popular application domain within the cloud model is the storage domain.
Here, cloud service providers offer a scalable and very cost effective storage solution
compared to, from an organisational point of view, building an own data storage centre,
or from an individual client’s perspective, owning several hard drives. Thus it is very
tempting to use this storage service. However, an enormous drawback is that cloud
service providers do not provide provable storage guarantees about the outsourced data.
A solution towards achieving provable storage guarantees is the notion of proofs of
retrievability (PoR). Here the guarantees are formulated in terms of a verifiable state-
ment whether or not the client’s outsourced data is authentic and retrievable. The first
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property expresses that the client wants to be able to verify that the received data is
correct whereas the latter property reflects the need to assure that no data loss has
occurred on the cloud storage provider’s side.
In this thesis, we propose solutions to enhance current PVC and PoR notions in terms
of practicability and functionality.
1.2 Organisation of Thesis
Chapter 2. This chapter contains the preliminaries and will establish the notational
conventions that will be used throughout this thesis. All the necessary primitives and
notions of security can be found in this chapter.
Our contributions are then presented in the remaining chapters.
Chapter 3. In this chapter we consider the setting of publicly verifiable outsourced
computation (PVC) for which it has been shown that key-policy attribute-based en-
cryption can be used. We propose extensions and improvements to the current PVC
proposal in order to accommodate a more practical framework and enable a server to
compute multiple functions rather than only being certified to compute a single func-
tion. This is achieved by a simple encoding trick and further the chapter provides a
method to revoke misbehaving servers from future evaluations within the system.
Chapter 4. This chapter considers the problem in which an untrusted server holds a
data set in such a way that any client can ask the server to compute a function on any
input portion of the data set. We provide a solution to this problem by introducing
a scheme called verifiable delegable computation (VDC) and argue that this system
model is a reversed system architecture compared to our proposal in Chapter 3. We
give a provably secure construction based on ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryp-
tion and discuss relevant security models. Furthermore, we observe that this notion
has some natural applications to verifiable queries on remote databases and verifiable
parallel processing using the MapReduce framework.
Chapter 5. In this chapter we use the already introduced system models from the
previous chapters and define an umbrella scheme called hybrid PVC. This scheme only
requires a single setup stage in order to provide a flexible outsourced computation
solution. Furthermore, we briefly introduce another mode of publicly verifiable com-
putation that extends the proposal from Chapter 3 enabling us to enforce graph-based
access control policies over the delegators, servers and verifiers. We give a provably
secure construction based on dual-policy attribute-based encryption showing that all
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introduced system models are captured within this general framework and discuss rel-
evant security models for the different modes.
Chapter 6. This chapter investigates the application of PVC techniques developed in
this thesis to the realm of verifiable searchable encryption (VSE). We introduce a VSE
scheme based upon ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption that permits a user
to verify that search results are correct and complete. Our scheme also permits verifi-
able computational queries over keywords and specific data values, that go beyond the
standard keyword matching queries to allow functions such as averaging or counting
operations.
Chapter 7. In this chapter we turn our attention to the setting of providing prov-
able data storage guarantees, i.e. verifying whether a server still retains the client’s
outsourced data. A possible concept achieving such guarantees is known as proofs of
retrievability (PoR). We propose extensions and improvements to the current PoR pro-
posals in order to accommodate a more practical framework checking whether multiple
files are retained simultaneously. Thus, we overcome limitations of previous schemes
which were only able to check a single file at a time. We discuss different strategies a
client can use in order to obtain a verifiable statement about the retrievability of all
her outsourced data from a server, and also evaluate the performance of our proposed
scheme.
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This chapter introduces the necessary notation and discusses in detail vari-
ous cryptographic primitives and security notions that will be used through-
out this thesis.
2.1 Preliminaries
2.1.1 Notation
Let us fix all necessary notations that are used in the remainder of this thesis. The set of
integers is denoted by Z, the set of all non-zero integers is denoted by Z? = Z\{0} and
we denote the set of natural numbers in the natural way as being the set of non-negative
integers N = {n ∈ Z|n > 0}. We denote the set of consecutive integers {i, . . . , j} by
[i, j], the set {1, . . . , n} will be written as [n] for n ≥ 1, and ∅ denotes the empty set.
If X is a set, we denote the power set of X by 2X which is the set of all subsets, and
|X| denotes its size. A partially ordered set (poset) is a set L equipped with a reflexive,
anti-symmetric and transitive binary relation 6. In other words, for all x, y, z ∈ L it
holds that x 6 x (reflexivity); if x 6 y and y 6 x then x = y (anti-symmetry); and if
x 6 y and y 6 z then x 6 z (transitivity). We may write x < y if x 6 y and x 6= y,
and write y > x if x 6 y. We say that x covers y, written y l x, if y < x and no z
exists in L such that y < z < x. The Hasse Diagram of a poset (L,6) is the directed
acyclic graph H = (L,l) where vertices are labelled by the elements of L and an edge
connects vertex v to w if and only if w l v.
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If A is a deterministic algorithm, we use the notation y ← A(x1, . . . , xn) to denote the
action of running A on the given inputs x1 to xn and assigning the result y. Similarly, if
A is a randomised (probabilistic) algorithm, we simply write y
$← A(·) to denote A out-
putting the variable y. This notion can also be seen as sampling an output y from the
range of possible outputs of A according to an underlying distribution defined by the
input arguments. Equivalently, one may consider the algorithm A taking an additional
input r of random coins which determine the outcome of randomised choices during
the execution of the algorithm. Thus, more formally we would write y ← A(·; r) since
the explicit choice of r renders the algorithm A deterministic. Finally, if B denotes a
set, we write y
$← B to express sampling a value y uniformly at random from the set
B. The set of all finite binary strings is denoted by {0, 1}∗. For any two binary strings
a and b, we denote their concatenation by a‖b and a⊕ b denotes their bitwise XOR.
When considering cryptographic schemes in this thesis, we denote the message space
by M, the key space by K, the security parameter by λ ∈ N and its respective unary
representation as 1λ. The key space consists of all bit strings of length λ and it can be
increased to asymptotically increase the strength of the cryptographic primitive. We
denote by  the empty string or an empty list, ⊥ /∈ M denotes a distinguished failure
symbol outputted by an algorithm, and we abbreviate probabilistic polynomial-time
by PPT. Let F be a function then we denote the domain of the function by Dom(F )
and the range by Ran(F ). A function f from the natural numbers to the non-negative
real numbers is said to be negligible on its input if for every positive polynomial p there
exists an N such that for all integers n > N it holds that f(n) < 1p(n) . We denote an
arbitrary negligible function by negl.
A Boolean function F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} takes a string of n bits as input and outputs
a single bit result. We use the notation 1 and true, and similarly 0 and false, to
denote the outcome of this function. We denote by ∨ the binary OR operator, and
by ∧ the binary AND operator. If a Boolean function F evaluates to true on a set
of input strings I, we say that the set I is a satisfying set. Furthermore, it is possible
to describe F in terms of satisfying sets. In case this representation is used, we refer
to F as an access structure. A Boolean function is said to be monotonic if for all
sets S ⊂ T ⊆ [n], it holds that F (S) ≤ F (T ). In other words, increasing the size of
the set can only increase the value of F , or alternatively, replacing a 0 with a 1 in
the input can only increase the value of F . Finally, we denote by Fn the family of
n-ary monotone functions closed under complement. In more detail, if F ∈ Fn then
the complement function F = F ⊕ 1 also belongs to Fn. In case n is clear from the
context, we abbreviate Fn as F . A more formal treatment of Boolean functions and
their properties can be found in [44, 59].
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2.1.2 Provable Security
A central task in cryptography is to analyse whether a particular cryptographic scheme
is “secure”. However, this simple question is hard to answer. In the “dark ages” of
cryptography, security of a cryptographic scheme was assumed until someone broke the
scheme. At this point, one tried either to fix the scheme to make it “secure” again or
discarded it if the security issue could not be fixed. In the age of modern cryptography,
such an approach is not acceptable and thus we require rigorous techniques to analyse
and assess the security of a cryptographic scheme and protocol. Such techniques fall
into the realm of provable security which refers to a well-studied paradigm in modern
cryptography. On a high-level, the goal is to formalise a security property and prove
that the property holds – relative to definitions and assumptions – which corresponds
to an assurance that the scheme is secure. The approach uses ideas and techniques
from theoretical computer science as well as mathematics.
In order to formalise a proof of security, we require two necessary ingredients. The first
ingredient is to formalise precise security definitions. These specify concrete security
properties that cryptographic schemes are intended to achieve. A security definition
is normally expressed as an experiment (or game) presented in pseudo-code and is
designed to reflect potential security threats against the scheme as well as a realis-
tic system execution. The experiment is run by a computationally unbounded entity
known as the challenger C and played by a computationally bounded adversary A with
respect to a cryptographic scheme. The adversary is usually modelled as a PPT algo-
rithm which is called at relevant points during the execution of the experiment by the
challenger. Furthermore, A may maintain a state throughout the experiment which
reflects the adversary being called several times at different points during the execution
of the system. Security of a cryptographic scheme is usually defined in terms of the
adversary’s maximal winning probability against the formalised experiment.1 Thus, we
define a scheme to be secure if a class of adversaries have at most a negligible winning
probability (in terms of the security parameter) of winning against the formalised se-
curity definition. Otherwise, we say a scheme is insecure.
The second fundamental ingredient is the reduction proof technique which enables one
to prove that a cryptographic scheme is computationally secure. As mentioned above, a
security proof is conditional in the sense that we require to assume that some mathemat-
ical problem is hard. That is, security can rely on the assumption that the underlying
primitive, on which the scheme is built, is secure. The reduction proof technique then
enables one to prove that a cryptographic scheme is secure under this assumption. In
1Note that this sometimes varies depending on the underlying experiment. For example, IND-CPA
security is defined in terms of the maximal winning probability minus the probability of a random
guess.
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more detail, the technique boils down to present an explicit reduction that transforms
any efficient algorithm A that succeeds in winning against the security notion of the
scheme (“breaking”) into an efficient algorithm B that solves the underlying problem
that was initially assumed to be hard. A very good and detailed explanation of the
required steps for a proof by reduction can be found in [100, 130].
Throughout this thesis, we will construct concrete cryptographic schemes and provide
different security definitions that we model the scheme to be secure against. To prove
the security of the scheme we make intensive use of the above introduced reduction
technique.
2.2 Encryption Schemes
Encryption is mainly a technique in order to preserve the confidentiality of messages
exchanged between a sender and a receiver. The primitive we consider here is called an
encryption scheme. Such a scheme specifies a key-generation algorithm which produces
key material that the parties need to share. Furthermore, it specifies an encryption
algorithm, which provides the sender with an instruction how to process the plaintext
using the key to produce a ciphertext that is transmitted to the receiver. An encryption
scheme also specifies a decryption algorithm, which provides the receiver with instruc-
tions how to retrieve the original message from the transmitted ciphertext using the key
while possibly performing some verification as well. In this section, we begin to review
the definitions of symmetric encryption schemes and public-key encryption schemes.
2.2.1 Symmetric Encryption Schemes
A symmetric encryption scheme relies on a secret key k held by both entities, namely
the sender and receiver of a ciphertext. Note that we do not address here how both
entities came into joint possession of this key k, and thus assume that the key has
been shared in some way. More formally a symmetric encryption scheme is described
as follows.
Definition 2.1. A symmetric encryption (SE) scheme consists of the following three
algorithms.
• k $← KeyGen(1λ) : this randomised algorithm takes as input the security parameter
λ and randomly selects a symmetric key k from the key space K;
• ct $← Encrypt(m, k) : this randomised algorithm takes as input the symmetric key
k and a message m from the message space M. It outputs a ciphertext ct;
• m ← Decrypt(ct, k) : this deterministic algorithm takes as input the symmetric
key k and the ciphertext ct. It outputs the underlying message m encrypted in
the ciphertext ct.
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Note that we could extend the decryption algorithm to output a failure symbol ⊥ in
case it is presented with an invalid ciphertext.
Correctness of a symmetric encryption scheme requires that for all security parameters
and all messages, the decryption of an honestly generated ciphertext under a correctly
generated key will return the correct message. This is captured more formally as
follows.
Definition 2.2. A symmetric encryption scheme is correct if for every security pa-
rameter λ, every key k outputted by KeyGen(1λ), and every message m ∈ M, it holds
that Decrypt(Encrypt(m, k), k) = m.
There are many notions of security for symmetric encryption schemes and the relation
amongst them is discussed in [26]. The choice of security property of a symmetric en-
cryption scheme depends on the context in which the scheme is used as well as on what
information an adversary may observe in practice. In the following we present two
main notions of security for a symmetric encryption scheme, namely indistinguishabil-
ity against chosen-plaintext attacks and indistinguishability against chosen-ciphertext
attacks.
Indistinguishability against Chosen-plaintext Attacks
The most commonly discussed security notion, and the one that we use mainly through-
out this thesis, is indistinguishability against chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA).
This notion basically models that an adversary that is not in possession of the secret
key running in polynomial-time chooses two messages of the same length and has the
ability to request any encryptions of other arbitrary messages via accessing an encryp-
tion oracle. Then one of the two messages is encrypted, and the ciphertext is returned
to the adversary. The scheme is considered secure if the adversary is not able to dis-
tinguish which one of the two messages of its choice was encrypted. Informally, the
encryption scheme should hide all information about the underlying plaintext such that
a ciphertext does not reveal anything about which message was encrypted.
The IND-CPA notion for a symmetric encryption scheme is formally defined in Fig-
ure 2.1. The game begins with the challenger running the KeyGen algorithm to generate
a challenge key k and sampling a bit b uniformly at random. Next the adversary is
called with the security parameter as input, and it is given access to a “left-or-right”
(LoR) encryption oracle OLoR. The oracle inputs a pair of messages and first checks
whether the messages are of equal length. In case this check is positive then it chooses
one of the messages according to the sampled bit b and outputs the encryption of mb
under the challenge key k which is then given to the adversary. That is, if b = 0 then
the adversary receives an encryption of the “left” plaintext, and if b = 1 it receives an
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encryption of the “right” plaintext. Eventually, the adversary returns a bit b′ and the
game outputs 1 indicating that b′ corresponds to the bit b chosen by the challenger, oth-
erwise it returns 0. This also encompasses the adversary’s access to a simple encryption
oracle, since the adversary can simply query OLoR(m,m, k, b) to obtain Encrypt(m, k).
ExpIND-CPAA
[SE , 1λ]
1 : k←$ KeyGen(1λ)
2 : b←$ {0, 1}
3 : b′←$ AOLoR(·,·,k,b)(1λ)
4 : if b′ = b then
5 : return 1
6 : else return 0
OLoR(m0,m1, k, b)
1 : if (|m0| 6= |m1|) then
2 : return ⊥
3 : else
4 : return Encrypt(mb, k)
Figure 2.1: The IND-CPA experiment ExpIND-CPAA
[SE , 1λ]
Note that we can provide the adversary with a little more power by letting it choose a
whole sequence of pairs of equal-length messages. This approach is similar and has the
advantage of modelling attackers that can adaptively choose plaintexts to be encrypted
even after observing previous ciphertexts.
We define the advantage of an adversary to be the difference between the probability of
the adversary guessing the bit b correctly which indicates which message was encrypted
and the probability of a random guess.
Definition 2.3. The advantage of a PPT adversary in the IND-CPA game for a
symmetric encryption scheme SE is defined as:
AdvIND-CPAA,SE (1
λ) = Pr
[
ExpIND-CPAA
[
SE , 1λ
]
→ 1
]
− 1
2
.
We say that the symmetric encryption scheme SE is IND-CPA secure if for all PPT
adversaries A, it holds that
AdvIND-CPAA,SE (1
λ) ≤ negl(λ).
Indistinguishability against Chosen-ciphertext Attacks
Similarly to the above notion, one can consider the security notion of indistinguishabil-
ity against chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA) for a symmetric encryption scheme
as formally defined in Figure 2.2. In the IND-CCA notion the adversary is not only
able to obtain arbitrary encryptions of her choice, but also may request decryptions of
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ciphertexts of her choice. The adversary’s access to the decryption oracle is unlimited
except for the adversary is not allowed to request a decryption of the challenge cipher-
text as this would lead to a trivial win and thus is an illegitimate query.
In more detail, the IND-CCA game proceeds similar to the IND-CPA game presented
in Figure 2.1 with the difference that the challenger additionally maintains a set S of
ciphertexts that is initially empty. The “left-or-right” (LoR) encryption oracle OLoR is
modified in such a way that it additionally adds generated ciphertexts to the set S if the
input messages are of equal length and distinct. Furthermore, the adversary is given
access to a decryption oracle ODecrypt to which it can submit ciphertexts to recover
respective plaintexts as long as the submitted ciphertext does not correspond to the
challenge ciphertext in order to avoid a trivial win. More precisely, in case the queried
ciphertext corresponds to a previously generated output from the LoR encryption oracle
OLoR then the decryption oracle ODecrypt outputs an error symbol ⊥. Obviously, given
the decryption of the ciphertext, it would be possible to determine the value of b based
on which message is returned.
ExpIND-CCAA
[SE , 1λ]
1 : k←$ KeyGen(1λ)
2 : b←$ {0, 1}
3 : S ← ∅
4 : b′←$ AOLoR(·,·,k,b)ODecrypt(·,k)(1λ)
5 : if b′ = b then
6 : return 1
7 : else return 0
OLoR(m0,m1, k, b)
1 : if (|m0| 6= |m1|) then
2 : return ⊥
3 : else
4 : ct←$ Encrypt(mb, k)
5 : S ← S ∪ ct
6 : return ct
ODecrypt(ct, k)
1 : if (ct ∈ S) then
2 : return ⊥
3 : else
4 : return Decrypt(ct, k)
Figure 2.2: The IND-CCA experiment ExpIND-CCAA
[SE , 1λ]
Definition 2.4. The advantage of a PPT adversary in the IND-CCA game for a
symmetric encryption scheme SE is defined as:
AdvIND-CCAA,SE (1
λ) = Pr
[
ExpIND-CCAA
[
SE , 1λ
]
→ 1
]
− 1
2
.
We say that the symmetric encryption scheme SE is IND-CCA secure if for all PPT
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adversaries A, it holds that
AdvIND-CCAA,SE (1
λ) ≤ negl(λ).
2.2.2 Public-key Encryption Schemes
A public-key encryption scheme (PKE), or asymmetric encryption scheme, eases the
above problem of agreeing on a common secret key. Instead, each entity is now equipped
with two keys, namely a public key and a private key. An encryptor may use an entity’s
A public key to encrypt a message and send it to A. The entity A is now able to use
her private key to decrypt messages initially encrypted under A’s public key. Note that
the encryptor is not required to know the decryption key. In this setting, the public
key may be transmitted or published in the clear such that there is no need to initialise
secure channels before transmitting a message. The main difference between public-key
encryption and symmetric encryption is that the latter assumes complete secrecy of all
cryptographic keys, whereas the former requires secrecy only for the private key.
More formally a public-key encryption scheme is described as follows.
Definition 2.5. A public-key encryption scheme consists of the following three algo-
rithms.
• (pk, sk) $← KeyGen(1λ) : this randomised algorithm takes as input the security
parameter λ and outputs a key pair (pk, sk). We refer to the first of these keys
as the public key and to the second as the private key (or secret key);
• ct $← Encrypt(m, pk) : this randomised algorithm takes as input the public key pk
and a message m from some message space M. It outputs a ciphertext ct;
• m← Decrypt(ct, sk) : this deterministic algorithm takes as input the private key
sk and the ciphertext ct. It outputs the message m encrypted in the ciphertext
ct.
As in the previous section, we could extend the decryption algorithm to output a failure
symbol ⊥ in case it is presented with an invalid ciphertext.
Correctness of a public-key encryption scheme requires that for all security parameters
and all messages, the decryption of an honestly generated ciphertext under an honestly
generated key pair will return the correct message. This is captured more formally as
follows.
Definition 2.6. A public-key encryption scheme is correct if there exists a negligible
function negl such that for every security parameter λ, every key pair (pk, sk) outputted
by KeyGen(1λ), and every message m ∈ M it holds that
Pr[Decrypt(Encrypt(m, pk), sk) 6= m] = negl(λ).
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The main disadvantage of public-key encryption schemes is that they are significantly
slower than symmetric encryption schemes. However, it is not easy to detail an exact
comparison between both schemes since the relative efficiency depends on the concrete
scheme under consideration as well as their implementation details. In fact, to over-
come this problem, a symmetric encryption scheme is used in the public key setting
to enhance the efficiency for the public-key encryption of long messages. Such an en-
cryption scheme is called hybrid encryption and basically a message is encrypted using
the symmetric key (called data encapsulation mechanism) while the symmetric key
itself is encrypted under the public-key encryption scheme (called key encapsulation
mechanism). In other words, the public-key encryption scheme is only used in order
to encrypt a short symmetric key, whilst the more efficient symmetric key is used to
encrypt the larger message.
In the context of public-key encryption schemes it is also possible to define security in
terms of indistinguishability against chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA) and indis-
tinguishability against chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA). It is straightforward to
obtain those security notions by adapting the syntax from the public-key encryption
scheme (cf. Definition 2.5) into Figures 2.1 and 2.2.
2.3 Attribute-based Encryption
Attribute-based Encryption (ABE) is a public-key, functional encryption primitive that
allows decryption of a ciphertext if and only if some policy formula is satisfied. This
means that the encrypted data and the decrypting entity satisfy certain properties
formulated in terms of attribute sets. As such, ABE is also well-suited for the crypto-
graphic enforcement of attribute-based access control policies [93]. In general, we define
a universe U of attributes which represent labels that may describe entities or data.
We then form a set of attributes A ⊆ U and a policy (or access structure) A ⊆ 2U \ {∅}
and decryption is successful if and only if A ∈ A.
There exist several variants of ABE which we introduce in the course of this section.
These different notions mainly differ in the connection between attribute sets and access
structures to ciphertexts and decryption keys.
2.3.1 Key-policy Attribute-based Encryption
In key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE)[89], the decryption key is associated
with a policy and each ciphertext is associated with a set of attributes. In more detail,
each secret decryption key is associated with an access structure, that is some family
of satisfying attribute sets A = {A1, . . . , An}, while each ciphertext is generated using
the system-wide public parameters and is associated with a single subset of attributes
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A. Decryption succeeds if the decryption key associated with the access structure A
includes the attribute set under which the ciphertext was generated, i.e. if Ai = A for
some i ∈ [n]. In most schemes the access structure is considered to be monotonic.
This means that A′ ∈ A whenever there exists A ⊂ A′ such that A ∈ A. A notable
non-monotonic scheme was presented by Ostrovsky et al. [112].
Definition 2.7. A key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE) scheme consists
of the following four algorithms:
• (pp,mk) $← Setup(1λ,U) : this randomised algorithm takes as input the security
parameter λ and attribute universe U and generates public parameters pp and a
master secret key mk;
• ctA $← Encrypt(m,A, pp) : this randomised algorithm takes as input a message m,
an attribute set A and public parameters pp, and outputs a ciphertext ctA;
• skA $← KeyGen(A,mk, pp) : this randomised algorithm takes as input an access
structure A, the master secret key mk and public parameters pp. It generates a
secret decryption key skA for this access structure;
• pt ← Decrypt(ctA, skA, pp) : this algorithm takes as input the ciphertext ctA as-
sociated with an attribute set A, a secret decryption key skA generated under an
access structure A and the public parameters pp. The algorithm outputs a plain-
text pt which corresponds to m if and only if the attribute set satisfies the access
structure, A ∈ A, or else corresponds to ⊥ indicating that decryption failed.
Note that we refer to the access policies used in KP-ABE as objective policies.
Definition 2.8. A KP-ABE scheme is correct if for all messages m ∈ M, access
structures A ⊆ 2U \ {∅} and attribute sets A ⊆ U where A ∈ A, it holds that
Pr[(pp,mk)
$← Setup(1λ,U),
ctA
$← Encrypt(m,A, pp),
skA
$← KeyGen(A,mk, pp),
pt← Decrypt(ctA, skA, pp)]
= 1− negl(λ).
In general security for ABE schemes can be classified into the categories full (or adap-
tive) and selective security. The full security notion is the ideal notion we wish to
achieve. However, the selective security notion has usually been easier to formalise
and to achieve. The notions mainly differ in whether the adversary receives the public
parameters before or after outputting its challenge input choice. The selective notion
enables the client (or user2) to partition the system into queries that it must be able to
2We will use the terms client and user interchangeably throughout this thesis.
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answer and to queries it will not answer as some queries may be restricted in order to
avoid a trivial win for the adversary. Therefore, the challenger is able to embed secrets
for a reductive proof.
However, we do not provide the standard security properties for KP-ABE here as we
will be interested to use an extended version of KP-ABE supporting revocation which
we recap in Section 2.3.2. Note that it is easy to obtain the standard security proper-
ties for KP-ABE by “swapping” the access policy and attribute set in the IND-CPA
and sIND-CPA security notions for ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-
ABE) as defined in Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5.
2.3.2 Revocable Key-policy Attribute-based Encryption
The mechanism of revocation plays a central role in cryptography. In the setting of
attribute-based encryption, users may hold keys for the same functionality, i.e. being
provided with keys which grant certain access to objects. The revocation mechanism
disables the given functionality for a certain user or group of users. For example, if an
employee leaves the company and thus the internal system, it is necessary to revoke
the employee from the system in order to stop her from further accessing data. In the
framework of attribute-based encryption, either target specific attributes (to disable
certain policies within the system) or specific users (to accommodate changing user
populations) can be revoked. Throughout this thesis (e.g. in Chapters 3 and 5), we
focus on the latter case as we aim to prevent cheating servers from participating in the
system model at all.
Revocable ABE schemes can support two different modes [17]:
• Direct revocation allows users to specify a revocation list at the point of encryp-
tion. This means that periodic re-keying is not required but the encryptors must
have knowledge of, or be able to choose, the current revocation list.
• Indirect revocation requires ciphertexts to be associated with a time period (as
an additional attribute) and for a key authority to issue key update material
at each time period which enables non-revoked users to update their key to be
functional during that time period. A revoked user will not be able to use the
update material and thus their key will not succeed at decrypting ciphertexts
associated with the current time period attribute. With indirect revocation, users
only need to know the current time attribute during encryption, but increased
communication costs are incurred due to the dissemination of the key update
material.
In this thesis, we will make use of the indirectly revocable KP-ABE scheme given by At-
trapadung and Imai [17], itself a more formal definition of that given by
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Boldyreva et al. [35].
An indirectly revocable KP-ABE scheme defines the universe of attributes to be U =
Uattr ∪UID ∪Utime. In more detail, Uattr is the normal attribute universe for describing
ciphertexts and forming access policies, Utime comprises attributes for time periods,
and UID contains attributes encoding entity identities. More formally, an indirectly
revocable KP-ABE scheme is presented in the following definition.
Definition 2.9. An indirectly revocable key-policy attribute-based encryption scheme
consists of the following algorithms:
• (pp,mk) $← Setup(1λ,U) : this randomised algorithm takes as input the security
parameter λ and the universe of attributes U and outputs public parameters pp
and master secret key mk;
• ctA,t $← Encrypt(m,A, t, pp) : this randomised encryption algorithm inputs a mes-
sage m, an attribute set A ⊂ Uattr, the current time period t ∈ Utime and the
public parameters pp. It outputs a ciphertext ct that is valid for time t;
• skid,A $← KeyGen(id,A,mk, pp) : this randomised key generation algorithm takes
as input an identity id ∈ UID for a user, an access structure A encoding a policy,
as well as the master secret key mk and public parameters pp. It outputs a
decryption key skid,A for the user id;
• ukR,t $← KeyUpdate(R, t,mk, pp) : this randomised algorithm takes a revocation
list R ⊆ UID containing the identities of revoked entities, the current time period t,
as well as the master secret key mk and public parameters pp. It outputs updated
key material ukR,t;
• pt ← Decrypt(ctA,t, skid,A, ukR,t, pp) : this decryption algorithm takes as input a
ciphertext ct, a decryption key skid,A, an update key ukR,t and the public param-
eters pp. The algorithm outputs a plaintext pt which corresponds to the correct
message m if and only if the attributes associated with ct satisfy A and the value
of t in the update key matches that specified during the encryption of ct, or outputs
⊥ if the decryption failed.
Correctness of a revocable KP-ABE scheme is defined as follows:
Definition 2.10. A revocable KP-ABE scheme is correct if for all m ∈ M, all id ∈
UID, all R ⊆ UID, all A ⊆ 2Uattr \ {∅}, all A ⊂ Uattr and all t ∈ Utime, if A ∈ A and
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id /∈ R, it holds that
Pr[(pp,mk)
$← Setup(1λ,U),
ctA,t
$← Encrypt(m,A, t, pp),
skid,A
$← KeyGen(id,A,mk, pp),
ukR,t
$← KeyUpdate(R, t,mk, pp),
m← Decrypt(ctA,t, skid,A, ukR,t, pp)]
= 1− negl(λ).
The schemes [17, 35] use the Complete-subtree method to arrange users as the leaves of
a binary tree such that the required key-update material can be reduced from the naive
method of O(n − r), where n is the number of users and r is the number of revoked
users, to O(r log(n2 )). This approach works as follows for a revocation list R. For a leaf
node l ∈ UID, let Path(l) be the set of nodes on the path between the root node and l
inclusively. Then, for each l ∈ R, mark all nodes in Path(l). Define Cover(R) to be the
set of all unmarked children of marked nodes, and generate update keys for these nodes.
Note that the time parameter in the above algorithms could be a literal clock value
where all entities have access to some synchronised clock or network clock. In this
case, re-keying must occur at every time period regardless of whether a revocation
has occurred in the prior period. Alternatively, the time parameter could simply be a
counter that is updated when a revocation takes place and the KeyUpdate algorithm is
performed.
Attrapadung and Imai [17] defined several security notions for revocable KP-ABE
schemes. In this thesis, the security property we consider for a revocable KP-ABE
scheme is indistinguishability against selective-target with semi-static query attack (IND-
sHRSS) which is formally defined in Figure 2.3.
This is a selective notion of security where the adversary must declare at the beginning
of the game the set of attributes (t?, A?) to be challenged upon. The challenger runs
Setup and provides the adversary with the resulting public parameters. The adversary
must choose a target revocation set R which is the set of entities that should be revoked
at time t?. The nature of the semi-static notion requires that this revocation list is
chosen before the adversary is given access to the KeyGen and KeyUpdate oracles as
specified in Figure 2.3.
In order to prevent trivial wins, for a key generation query, the adversary may not
query for any key skid,A where the target attribute set A
? satisfies A and the identity
is not revoked at time t?. If the adversary would be allowed to query for this, it would
hold a secret decryption key and would receive key update material (as the identity
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ExpIND-sHRSSA
[KP-ABE , 1λ,U]
1 : (t?, A?)←$ A(1λ,U)
2 : (pp,mk)←$ Setup(1λ,U)
3 : R←$ A(pp)
4 : (m0,m1)←$ AOKeyGen(·,·,mk,pp),OKeyUpdate(·,·,mk,pp)(R, pp)
5 : if (|m0| 6= |m1|) then return 0
6 : b←$ {0, 1}
7 : ct?←$ Encrypt(mb, t?, A?, pp)
8 : b′ ← AOKeyGen(·,·,mk,pp),OKeyUpdate(·,·,mk,pp)(ct?, R, pp)
9 : if b′ = b then
10 : return 1
11 : else return 0
OKeyGen(id,A,mk, pp)
1 : if (A? ∈ A) and (id /∈ R) then
2 : return ⊥
3 : else KeyGen(id,A,mk, pp)
4 : return skid,A
OKeyUpdate(R, t,mk, pp)
1 : if (t = t?) and (R 6⊆ R) then
2 : return ⊥
3 : else KeyUpdate(R, t,mk, pp)
4 : return ukR,t
Figure 2.3: The IND-sHRSS experiment ExpIND-sHRSSA
[KP-ABE , 1λ,U]
is not revoked) for the challenge time period and thus could successfully decrypt the
challenge ciphertext.
Similarly, for a key update request, the adversary is prevented from learning an update
key ukR,t? for the challenge time period t
? for a less restrictive revocation list R than
the challenge list R. Otherwise, the adversary could obtain an update key which could
be combined with a queried secret key to form a functional decryption key for a server
that the adversary claimed would be revoked.
As in a standard IND-CPA notion, the adversary outputs two messages and the chal-
lenger chooses one of them at random to encrypt and passes the resulting ciphertext
to the adversary. The adversary is again provided with access to the oracles and even-
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tually guesses which message was encrypted. The advantage of the adversary is given
in the following definition.
Definition 2.11. The advantage of a PPT adversary in the IND-sHRSS game for a
revocable KP-ABE construction KP-ABE is defined as:
AdvIND-sHRSSA,KP-ABE (1
λ) = Pr
[
ExpIND-sHRSSA
[
KP-ABE , 1λ,U
]
→ 1
]
− 1
2
.
We say that the indirectly revocable KP-ABE scheme is secure in the sense of indis-
tinguishability against selective-target with semi-static query attack (IND-sHRSS) if
for all PPT adversaries A, it holds that
AdvIND-sHRSSA,KP-ABE (1
λ) ≤ negl(λ).
We note that it is also possible to define a stronger, full notion of security whereby the
adversary may receive the public parameters and may query the oracles before selecting
the set of challenge attributes under the restriction that no such query would lead to a
trivial win. To the best of our knowledge, current known primitives supporting indirect
revocation in the KP-ABE setting only achieve the selective security notion as described
above.
2.3.3 Ciphertext-policy Attribute-based Encryption
Ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) [31] “behaves” conversely to
KP-ABE. Here a ciphertext is associated with a policy while the set of attributes is
assigned to the secret decryption key. More concretely, each ciphertext is associated
with an access structure, i.e. some family of attribute sets A = {A1, . . . , An}. Each
private key is computed using the system-wide public parameters and is associated
with a single subset of attributes A. Decryption succeeds if the ciphertext includes the
attribute set under which the decryption key was generated.
Definition 2.12. A ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) scheme
consists of the following four algorithms:
• (pp,mk) $← Setup(1λ,U) : this randomised algorithm takes as input the security
parameter λ and attribute universe U and generates public parameters pp and a
master secret key mk;
• ctA $← Encrypt(m,A, pp) : this randomised algorithm takes as input a message m,
an access structure A and public parameters pp, and outputs a ciphertext ctA;
• skA $← KeyGen(A,mk, pp) : this randomised algorithm takes as input an attribute
set A, the master secret key mk and public parameters pp. It generates a secret
decryption key skA for this attribute set;
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• pt ← Decrypt(ctA, skA, pp) : this algorithm takes as input the ciphertext ctA gen-
erated under an access structure A, a secret decryption key skA generated under
an attribute set A and the public parameters pp. The algorithm outputs a plain-
text pt which corresponds to m if and only if the attribute set satisfies the access
structure, A ∈ A, or else corresponds to ⊥ indicating that decryption failed.
Note that we refer to the access policies used in CP-ABE as subjective policies as the
access structure describes objects for which the key may be used to access.
Definition 2.13. A CP-ABE scheme is correct if for all messages m ∈ M, access
structures A ⊆ 2U \ {∅} and attribute sets A ⊆ U where A ∈ A, it holds that
Pr[(pp,mk)
$← Setup(1λ,U),
ctA
$← Encrypt(m,A, pp),
skA
$← KeyGen(A,mk, pp),
pt← Decrypt(ctA, skA, pp)]
= 1− negl(λ).
The security goals of a CP-ABE scheme are similar to those of symmetric and public-
key encryption schemes, namely the adversary should not be able to distinguish which
of the two messages was encrypted.
Note that different CP-ABE keys provide access to different classes of documents and
ciphertexts are not necessarily generated for a particular user but rather a class of
users. Therefore, it is important to consider in ABE schemes that users may not col-
lude with each other in order to decrypt a ciphertext which no one of them could
have decrypted alone. For example in the CP-ABE setting, consider two users as-
signed with the following attributes sets {Professor, Psychology} and {Student,
Computer Science} respectively, and the ciphertext was encrypted under the policy
(Professor ∧ Computer Science). Both users now should not be able to combine
their attributes Professor and Computer Science in order to decrypt the ciphertext
as neither of them satisfy the policy. To model collusion between clients into the se-
curity notion we provide the adversary with an additional KeyGen oracle such that it
can request multiple decryption keys for different attribute sets. We require that all
queried attribute sets do not satisfy the adversary’s challenge policy because then the
adversary could trivially win against the security game as it would hold a valid key and
could decrypt the challenge ciphertext itself.
Full IND-CPA Notion
The first security property we consider here is the full notion of indistinguishability
against chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA) for a CP-ABE scheme represented in
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ExpIND-CPAA
[CP-ABE , 1λ,U]
1 : A? ← {∅}
2 : Q← 
3 : (pp,mk)←$ Setup(1λ,U)
4 : (m0,m1,A?)←$ AOKeyGen(·,mk,pp)(pp)
5 : if (|m0| 6= |m1|) then return 0
6 : for all A ∈ Q do
7 : if A ∈ A? then return 0
8 : b←$ {0, 1}
9 : ct?←$ Encrypt(mb,A?, pp)
10 : b′←$ AOKeyGen(·,mk,pp)(ct?, pp)
11 : if b′ = b then
12 : return 1
13 : else return 0
OKeyGen(A,mk, pp)
1 : if A /∈ A? then
2 : Q← Q ∪A
3 : return KeyGen(A,mk, pp)
4 : else
5 : return ⊥
Figure 2.4: The IND-CPA experiment ExpIND-CPAA
[CP-ABE , 1λ,U]
Figure 2.4. The game begins with the challenger initialising the challenge access struc-
ture A? and a list Q of queried attribute sets which is initially set to be empty. The
challenger then runs Setup and provides the adversary with the generated public pa-
rameters. The adversary now is equipped with access to a KeyGen oracle which returns
to the adversary a valid secret decryption key for its choice of attribute set A but only
if the attribute set does not satisfy the access structure A. Otherwise, if the attribute
set satisfies the access structure then the oracle returns ⊥ in order to avoid allowing the
adversary a trivial win. After a polynomial number of queries the adversary chooses
the challenge access structure A? and also returns two messages of equal length. Note
that in case the adversary returns messages of unequal length the game is aborted
immediately and A loses. The adversary also loses the game if the outputted access
structure A? is satisfied by any attribute set previously queried to the KeyGen oracle
OKeyGen and therefore appears in Q as the adversary has not found a valid attack target.
The challenger chooses a bit b uniformly at random and uses this to determine which
message will be encrypted under the challenge access structure A?. The adversary is
provided with the created ciphertext and is again allowed to access the KeyGen oracle
OKeyGen as before. Eventually, the adversary outputs a guess b′ of b to determine which
message was encrypted. If the guess was correct the adversary wins and the game
outputs 1, and 0 otherwise.
Definition 2.14. The advantage of a PPT adversary in the IND-CPA game for a
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CP-ABE construction CP-ABE is defined as:
AdvIND-CPAA,CP-ABE(1
λ) = Pr
[
ExpIND-CPAA
[
CP-ABE , 1λ,U
]
→ 1
]
− 1
2
.
We say that the scheme CP-ABE is IND-CPA secure if for all PPT adversaries A, it
holds that
AdvIND-CPAA,CP-ABE(1
λ) ≤ negl(λ).
Selective IND-CPA Notion
ExpsIND-CPAA
[CP-ABE , 1λ,U]
1 : A? ← A(1λ,U)
2 : (pp,mk)←$ Setup(1λ,U)
3 : (m0,m1)←$ AOKeyGen(·,mk,pp)(pp)
4 : if (|m0| 6= |m1|) then return 0
5 : b←$ {0, 1}
6 : ct?←$ Encrypt(mb,A?, pp)
7 : b′←$ AOKeyGen(·,mk,pp)(ct?, pp)
8 : if b′ = b then
9 : return 1
10 : else return 0
OKeyGen(A,mk, pp)
1 : if A /∈ A? then
2 : return KeyGen(A,mk, pp)
3 : else
4 : return ⊥
Figure 2.5: The selective IND-CPA experiment ExpsIND-CPAA
[CP-ABE , 1λ,U]
We also consider the selective IND-CPA notion (sIND-CPA) represented in Fig-
ure 2.5. The selective notion is similar to the full notion while the main difference
is that the game starts with the adversary selecting an access structure A?. Otherwise
the game proceeds similarly to the full version.
Definition 2.15. The advantage of a PPT adversary in the selective IND-CPA game
for a CP-ABE construction CP-ABE is defined as:
AdvsIND-CPAA,CP-ABE(1
λ) = Pr
[
ExpsIND-CPAA
[
CP-ABE , 1λ,U
]
→ 1
]
− 1
2
.
We say that the scheme CP-ABE is sIND-CPA secure if for all PPT adversaries A,
it holds that
AdvsIND-CPAA,CP-ABE(1
λ) ≤ negl(λ).
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2.3.4 Dual-policy Attribute-based Encryption
Dual-policy attribute-based encryption was introduced by Attrapadung and Imai [19].
This scheme combines both approaches of KP-ABE (enforcing objective policies) and
CP-ABE (enforcing subjective policies) such that both the ciphertext and the decryp-
tion key comprise an attribute set and an access structure. In more detail, the cipher-
text is associated with a subjective policy specifying which entities may decrypt it and
an objective attribute set describing the data, while the decryption key is associated
with an objective policy and a subjective attribute set. Finally, decryption is successful
if and only if both attribute sets satisfy their access policy, respectively.
Definition 2.16. A dual-policy attribute-based encryption (DP-ABE) scheme consists
of the following four algorithms:
• (pp,mk) $← Setup(1λ,U) : this randomised algorithm takes as input the security
parameter λ and attribute universe U and generates public parameters pp and a
master secret key mk which is kept private by the client;
• ctω,S $← Encrypt(m, (ω,S), pp) : this randomised algorithm takes as input a mes-
sage m, an objective attribute set ω, a subjective access policy S and the public
parameters pp. It outputs a ciphertext ctω,S;
• skO,ψ $← KeyGen((O, ψ),mk, pp) : this randomised algorithm takes as input an
objective access policy O, a subjective attribute set ψ, the master secret key mk
and the public parameters pp. It generates a secret decryption key skO,ψ;
• pt← Decrypt(ctω,S, skO,ψ, pp) : this algorithm takes as input the ciphertext ctω,S,
the decryption key skO,ψ and the public parameters pp. The algorithm outputs
a plaintext pt which corresponds to the correct message m if and only if the
set of objective attributes ω satisfies the objective access policy O and the set of
subjective attributes ψ satisfies the subjective access policy S, i.e. ω ∈ O and
ψ ∈ S. Otherwise, pt corresponds to ⊥ indicating that decryption failed.
Note we assume that the policies and attributes are implicit from the relevant keys and
ciphertexts. Otherwise, these can be given as additional arguments to the decryption
algorithm.
Definition 2.17. A DP-ABE scheme is correct if for all messages m ∈ M, for all
access structures O, S ⊆ 2U \ {∅} and for all attribute sets ω, ψ ⊆ U where ω ∈ O and
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ψ ∈ S, it holds that
Pr[(pp,mk)
$← Setup(1λ,U),
ctω,S
$← Encrypt(m, (ω,S), pp),
skO,ψ
$← KeyGen((O, ψ),mk, pp),
pt← Decrypt(ctω,S, skO,ψ, pp)]
= 1− negl(λ).
Selective IND-CPA Notion
Security for DP-ABE is defined similarly to the security notion of CP-ABE. The selec-
tive security notion is defined in Figure 2.6. As before, it is easy to define an adaptive
notion of security by providing the adversary with the public parameters before se-
lecting the challenge input. Note that the respective notions of sIND-CPA for both
KP-ABE and CP-ABE can be obtained by ignoring the relevant attribute sets and
access structures in the formalisation below.
ExpsIND-CPAA
[DP-ABE , 1λ,U]
1 : (ω?,S?)← A(1λ,U)
2 : (pp,mk)←$ Setup(1λ,U)
3 : (m0,m1,A?)←$ AOKeyGen((·,·),mk,pp)(pp)
4 : if (|m0| 6= |m1|) then return 0
5 : b←$ {0, 1}
6 : ct?←$ Encrypt(mb, (ω?,S?), pp)
7 : b′←$ AOKeyGen((·,·),mk,pp)(ct?, pp)
8 : if b′ = b then
9 : return 1
10 : else return 0
OKeyGen((O, ψ),mk, pp)
1 : if (ω? /∈ O) or (ψ /∈ S?) then
2 : return KeyGen((O, ψ),mk, pp)
3 : else
4 : return ⊥
Figure 2.6: The selective IND-CPA experiment ExpsIND-CPAA
[DP-ABE , 1λ,U]
Definition 2.18. The advantage of a PPT adversary in the selective IND-CPA game
for a DP-ABE construction DP-ABE is defined as:
AdvsIND-CPAA,DP-ABE(1
λ) = Pr
[
ExpsIND-CPAA
[
DP-ABE , 1λ,U
]
→ 1
]
− 1
2
.
We say that the scheme DP-ABE is sIND-CPA secure if for all PPT adversaries A,
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it holds that
AdvsIND-CPAA,DP-ABE(1
λ) ≤ negl(λ).
2.3.5 Instantiation of Attribute-based Encryption Schemes
In the instantiation of many ABE schemes a secret value is chosen uniformly at ran-
dom during either the key generation or the encryption and use a linear secret sharing
scheme to divide the secret over a set of attributes or clauses in a policy. Those schemes
then use Lagrange Interpolation to reconstruct the secret if and only if a satisfying set of
attributes is provided to the decryption procedure. Additionally, many ABE schemes
are built using bilinear maps which give rise to hardness assumptions based on the
Diffie-Hellman problem in bilinear groups.
In this section, we provide tools used in instantiating an ABE scheme as we introduce
a new ABE scheme in Section 5.4.
2.3.5.1 Linear Secret Sharing Schemes
Secret sharing is a basic and fundamental cryptographic tool that enables a secret s
to be shared amongst a set of entities in such a way that all authorised sets of enti-
ties can combine their individual share in order to reconstruct the secret value s. For
example, any k out of the n entities may form an authorised set and thus are able to
reconstruct the secret value. Any set of entities that does not form an authorised set
cannot learn more than their individual shares and thus cannot reconstruct the secret
s. A secret sharing scheme is linear if the reconstruction operation is a linear func-
tion of the shares and note that almost all known secret sharing schemes are linear [24].
We provide a definition of an access structure which is a collection of satisfying sets of
a Boolean formula. Beimel [24] provides an equivalent generic formulation as follows.
Definition 2.19. Let P = {P1, P2, . . . , Pn} be a set of parties (or attributes). A
collection A ⊆ 2P is monotone if for all B,C we have that if B ∈ A and B ⊆ C then
C ∈ A. An access structure (respectively, monotonic access structure) is a collection
(respectively, monotone collection) A ⊆ 2P\{∅}. The sets in A are called the authorised
sets and the sets not in A are called unauthorised sets.
A linear secret sharing scheme can be defined as follows [142].
Definition 2.20. Let P be a set of parties. Let M be a matrix of size l × k. Let
pi : {1, . . . , l} → P be a function that maps a row to a party for labelling. A secret
sharing scheme Π for access structure A over a set of parties P is a linear secret-sharing
scheme (LSSS) in Zp and is represented by (M,pi) if it consists of two polynomial-time
algorithms:
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• Mv $← Share(s, (M,pi)): this randomised algorithm takes as input s ∈ Zp which
is to be shared and the LSSS (M,pi). It randomly chooses y2, . . . , yk ∈ Zp and
sets v = (s, y2, . . . , yk). It outputs Mv as a vector of l shares. The share λpi(i) :=
Mi · v belongs to party pi(i), where we denote Mi as the ith row in M .
• {(i, µi)}i∈I ← Recon(S, {λpi(i)}pi(i)∈S , (M,pi)): this algorithm takes as input an
authorised set S ∈ A, the set of shares for this set {λpi(i)}pi(i)∈S and the LSSS
(M,pi). Let I = {i : pi(i) ∈ S}. It outputs reconstruction constants {(i, µi)}i∈I
such that the secret can be linearly reconstructed as s =
∑
i∈I µi · λpi(i).
Note that the set {(µi)}i∈I can be found in polynomial-time in the size of M [24, 142].
In Section 5.4, we will require the following important fact [142]:
Proposition 2.21. Let (M,pi) be a LSSS for access structure A over a set of parties
P, where M is a matrix of size l × k. For any authorised set S ∈ A, the target vector
(1, 0, . . . , 0) is in the span of I = {i : pi(i) ∈ S}. For all unauthorised sets S /∈ A, the
target vector is not in the span of I, and there exists a polynomial time algorithm that
outputs a vector w = (w1, . . . , wk) ∈ Zkp such that w1 = −1 and for all i ∈ I it holds
that Mi · w = 0.
In Section 5.4, we make use of Lagrange interpolation as the reconstruction algorithm
for LSSSs. The reconstruction procedure can be defined following Attrapadung and
Imai [17] in the following way.
Definition 2.22. For i ∈ Z and S ⊆ Z, the Lagrange basis polynomial is defined as
∆i,S(z) =
∏
j∈S,j 6=i
z−j
i−j . Let f(z) ∈ Z[z] be a dth degree polynomial. If |S| = d + 1,
from a set of d+ 1 points {(i, f(i))}i∈S, one can reconstruct f(z) as
f(z) =
∑
i∈S
f(i) ·∆i,S(z).
In Section 5.4, we especially use the interpolation for a first degree polynomial. In
particular, let f(z) be a first degree polynomial, one can obtain f(0) from two points
(i1, f(i1)), (i2, f(i2)) where i1 6= i2 by computing
f(0) = f(i1)
i2
i2 − i1 + f(i2)
i1
i1 − i2 .
2.3.5.2 Bilinear Maps and Hardness Assumptions
Most ABE schemes are instantiated over groups with efficiently computable bilinear
maps. Thus, we review the notions of bilinear maps and the hardness assumption on
which we base the security of our revocable DP-ABE scheme in Section 5.4. We follow
the formalisation in [17, 18].
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Definition 2.23. Let G and GT be multiplicative groups of order p, and let g be a
generator of G. A bilinear map is a map e : G×G→ GT such that:
1. e is bilinear: for all u, v ∈ G and a, b ∈ Z we have e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab
2. e is non-degenerate: e(g, g) 6= 1
We say that G is a bilinear group if the group action in G can be computed efficiently
and there exists GT for which e : G×G→ GT is efficiently computable.
Definition 2.24. Let G be a bilinear group of prime order p. The decisional q-bilinear
Diffie-Hellman exponent problem (q-BDHE) in G is stated as follows. Given a vector(
g, h, ga, g(a
2), . . . , g(a
q), g(a
q+2), . . . , g(a
2q), Z
)
∈ G2q+1 ×GT
as input, determine whether Z = e(g, h)a
q+1
. We write gi to denote g
ai ∈ G. Let
yg,a,q = (g1, . . . , gq, gq+2, . . . , g2q). An algorithm A that outputs b ∈ {0, 1} has advan-
tage  in solving the decisional q-BDHE problem in G if
|Pr[A (g, h,yg,a,q, e(gq+1, h))→ 0]− Pr[A(g, h,yg,a,q, Z)→ 0]| ≥ ,
where the probability is over the random choices of generators and groups g, h ∈ G,
a ∈ Zp, Z ∈ GT , and the randomness of A. We refer to the distribution on the left as
PBDHE and the one on the right as RBDHE. The decisional q-BDHE assumption holds
in G if no polynomial-time A has a non-negligible advantage in solving the problem.
2.3.5.3 Terminology for Binary Trees
A binary tree is a directed, rooted tree in which each node has at most two children
such that there exists a unique path from the root to each node. Let L = {1, . . . , n} be
the set of leaves of a complete binary tree. Let X be the set of node names via some
systematic naming order. For a leaf i ∈ L, let Path(i) ⊂ X be the set of nodes on the
path from node i to the root (including i and the root). For R ⊆ L, let Cover(R) ⊂ X
be defined as follows. First mark all the nodes in Path(i) if i ∈ R. Then Cover(R) is
the set of all unmarked children of marked nodes. It can be shown to be the minimal
set that contains no node in Path(i) if i ∈ R but contains at least one node in Path(i)
if i /∈ R.
2.4 Searchable Encryption
Searchable encryption (SE) is a cryptographic primitive that enables a client to search
over encrypted data that has been outsourced to an untrusted server. The untrusted
server receives a query to perform a search over the encrypted data on behalf of the
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client without learning information about the underlying plaintexts. The standard en-
tity population considered in SE consists of a data owner and a remote server. Here
the data owner is responsible to initialise the system and prepares her database to be
stored at the remote server. Depending on the motivation, sometimes the scheme also
accommodates a group of users (representing a multi-user SE scheme) that get autho-
rised by the data owner in order to form search queries over the data too.
The seminal paper by Song et al. [132] introduced a cryptographic solution to the
problem of searching on encrypted data. Goh [77] introduced a SE construction that
associates an index to each document in a collection which enables a server to search
each of the indexes for keywords. An index can be seen as a data structure that enables
a querier with a trapdoor for a word w to test whether the index contains w. The index
does not reveal any content about the documents without a valid trapdoor which can
only be generated by the data owner holding a secret key.
We review the definition of a (single-client, index-based) searchable symmetric encryp-
tion scheme following Curtmola et al. [57]. The model includes a user that wishes to
store an encrypted document collection D = (D1, . . . , Dn) on a server, while preserving
the ability to search through them. A document collection D is a subset of the set of
all possible documents 2∆ where ∆ represents a dictionary of d words. More formally
a SSE scheme can be defined as follows.
Definition 2.25. A searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) scheme consists of the
following four algorithms:
• k $← KeyGen(1λ) : this randomised algorithm is run by the user to initialise the
system. It takes a security parameter λ as input, and returns a secret key k such
that the length of k is polynomially bounded in λ;
• I ← BuildIndex(D, k) : this (possibly randomised) algorithm is run by the user to
generate indexes. It takes a secret key k and a document collection D as inputs,
and returns an index I;
• Tw ← Trapdoor(w, k) : this algorithm is run by the user to generate a trapdoor
for a given word. It takes a secret key k and a word w as input, and returns a
trapdoor Tw;
• D(w)← Search(Tw, I) : this algorithm is run by the server in order to search for
the documents in D that contain the word w. It takes an index I for a collection
D and a trapdoor Tw for word w as inputs, and returns the set of identifiers of
documents containing w denoted by D(w).
Definition 2.26. A searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) scheme is correct if for ev-
ery security parameter λ, every key k outputted by KeyGen(1λ), every word w ∈ D ⊆ 2∆,
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and every index I outputted by BuildIndex(D, k), it holds that Search(Trapdoor(w, k), I) =
D(w).
Security for searchable encryption is typically characterised as the requirement that
nothing is leaked beyond the outcome of the search. However, it is not straightforward
to achieve this notion of security. Curtmola et al. [57] point out that the above notion
can be achieved in its generality using the work of Goldreich and Ostrovsky on oblivious
RAM [78]. Most SE schemes leak additionally to the search outcome also the search
pattern as for example in [77, 132]. More accurately SE schemes try to formalise secu-
rity in terms of nothing is leaked beyond the outcome of the search, the search pattern
and the access pattern. The first notion of security in SE was introduced by Goh [77]
who proposed the notion of indistinguishability against chosen-keyword attacks (IND1-
CKA). This notion ensures that an adversary is not able to deduce any information
about the document’s content from its index. In other words this means for example
that given two encrypted documents of equal size and an index, then an adversary is not
able to decide which document is encoded in the index. Chang and Mitzenmacher [49]
introduced a stronger simulation-based IND-CKA notion that is a stronger notion com-
pared to IND1-CKA in the sense that this formalises that an adversary cannot even
distinguish indexes from two documents of unequal sizes. Additionally to this, Goh
introduced the IND2-CKA security notion that protects documents of unequal size like
Chang and Mitzenmacher [49].
Curtmola et al. [57] revisited the existing security definitions and provided a discus-
sion about previous security definitions not being adequate for SSE. They pointed out
that the security of indexes and the security of trapdoors are inherently linked. They
introduce two new adversarial models, a non-adaptive IND-CKA1 and an adaptive
IND-CKA2 notion of security, which are widely used as the standard security defini-
tions for SSE. Those security notions include security for the trapdoors and guarantee
that the trapdoors do not leak any information about the keywords other than what
can be inferred from the search and access pattern anyway.
Boneh et al. [36] discuss security in the public-key setting. In this setting, the security
definition guarantees that no information about the keywords is leaked unless the re-
spective trapdoors are available. Also other security definitions were introduced in the
literature for SE and a detailed overview can be found in [38].
The schemes in [36, 57, 77, 99, 101, 105, 115, 139] make use of an index in order to enable
the server to execute a search query over the encrypted data (documents). The work
by Chai and Gong [48] introduced a verification mechanism into the setting of SSE,
and thus enables a user to verify returned search results from a single keyword equality
query. Liu et al. [107] extend the model of Boneh et al. [36] to support verification of
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search results from a single keyword equality query, where the indexes are created using
a public key. Sun et al. [135] and Wang et al. [141] detail VSE schemes with enhanced
functionality, i.e. verifiable multi-keyword ranked search and verifiable fuzzy keyword
search, respectively. Gajek [71] introduced a dynamic SSE scheme using a novel crypto-
graphic tool called constrained functional encryption. Recently, Zhang et al. [147] show
that file injection attacks on the query of single-keyword and conjunctive SE schemes
can reveal the client’s queries in their entirety.
2.5 Digital Signatures
Digital signatures provide a proof of message integrity and authenticate data’s origin
(since keys can be associated to particular users). We require a message to be signed
using a private signing key owned by a particular entity, and in order to verify that the
signature was actually generated using the given signing key a public verification key
is used. If the verification process is successful then this shows that the contents of the
message have not changed since the signature was computed. We will use this primitive
(e.g. in Chapter 3) to provide a means of validating that the result of a computation
was computed by the claimed server and that it has not been maliciously altered. We
follow here the formalisation from [100].
Definition 2.27. A digital signature scheme SIG comprises the following three
polynomial-time algorithms:
• (sk, vk) $← Sig.KeyGen(1λ): this randomised algorithm takes as input the security
parameter λ and generates a signing key sk and a verification key vk;
• γ $← Sig.Sign(m, sk): this randomised algorithm takes as input a message m to
be signed and the signing key sk, and outputs a signature γ of m;
• δ ← Sig.Verify(m, γ, vk): this algorithm takes as input a message m and corre-
sponding signature γ to be verified as well as the verification key vk, and outputs a
decision δ which corresponds to accept if γ is a valid signature on m and reject
otherwise.
Definition 2.28. A digital signature scheme is correct if for every security parameter
λ, every key pair (sk, vk) outputted by KeyGen(1λ), and every message m ∈M it holds
Sig.Verify(m,Sig.Sign(m, sk), vk) = accept except possibly with negligible probability.
We define a signature scheme to be existentially unforgeable under an adaptive chosen
message attack (EUF-CMA) if an adversary, given polynomially many signatures on
messages of its choice, cannot create a message m? with a valid signature where m?
was not one of the messages the adversary was allowed to obtain a signature for. More
formally, this is captured in Figure 2.7.
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ExpEUF-CMAA
[
SIG, 1λ
]
1 : Q← ∅
2 : (sk, vk)← Sig.KeyGen(1λ)
3 : (m?, γ?)← AOSig.Sign(·,sk)(vk)
4 : if accept← Sig.Verify(m?, γ?, vk) and m? /∈ Q then
5 : return 1
6 : else return 0
OSig.Sign(m, sk)
1 : Q← Q ∪m
2 : return Sig.Sign(m, sk)
Figure 2.7: The signature experiment ExpEUF-CMAA
[
SIG, 1λ
]
Definition 2.29. The advantage of an adversary A running in PPT is defined as:
AdvEUF-CMAA,SIG (1λ) = Pr
[
ExpEUF-CMAA
[
SIG, 1λ
]→ 1].
A digital signature scheme SIG is existentially unforgeable under an adaptive chosen-
message attack (EUF-CMA), or just secure, if for all PPT adversaries A,
AdvEUF-CMAA,SIG (1
λ) ≤ negl(λ).
2.6 One-way Functions
A one-way function g is characterised by having the properties of being easy to compute,
but hard to invert. The first condition is given by the requirement that g is computable
in polynomial time. The second condition is formalised by requiring that it is infeasible
for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm to invert g (that is, to find a pre-
image of a given value y) except with negligible probability. This requirement will
be captured in the inverting experiment formally represented in Figure 2.8 where we
consider the experiment for any algorithm A, any value λ for the security parameter,
and the function g : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗. Note that it suffices for A to find any value of
w′ for which g(w′) = z = g(w) in the experiment.
The following definition specifies what it means for a function g to be one-way [100].
Definition 2.30. A function g : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ is one-way if the following two
conditions hold.
• (Easy to compute.) There exists a polynomial-time algorithm Mg computing g;
i.e. Mg(w) = g(w) for all w.
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ExpInvertA
[
g, 1λ
]
1 : w ← {0, 1}λ
2 : z = g(w)
3 : w′ ← A(1λ, z)
4 : if g(w′) = z then
5 : return 1
6 : else return 0
Figure 2.8: The inverting experiment ExpInvertA
[
g, 1λ
]
• (Hard to invert.) For every PPT algorithm A, there exists a negligible function
negl such that
Pr
[
ExpInvertA
[
g, 1λ
]
→ 1
]
≤ negl(λ).
2.7 Verifiable Outsourced Computation
Verifiable outsourced computation (VC) may be seen as a protocol between two
polynomial-time parties, namely a client C and a server S. A successful execution
of the protocol outputs a provably correct statement about the returned computa-
tional result F (x) by the server on an input x provided by the client. The motivation
for such protocols is based on the overwhelming success of resource constrained devices
that need to perform computationally intensive tasks and as such outsource the task
to a more powerful server which is likely to be untrusted. In many settings, the client
wishes to (or even must) ensure the correctness of the computational result to ensure
that no accidental or malicious errors have been introduced. A malicious server may
try to convince the client to accept a malformed result while not being detected, in
order to affect the client’s future behaviour or the server tries to spare computational
resources by simply returning a random result.
Some solutions have focused on an audit-based approach [25, 110] in which the client
either requires to recalculate some portions of the computations or employs multiple
servers to verify correctness. However, such an approach may be infeasible for the client
given that she is resource-constrained. On the other hand, employing multiple servers
is likely to increase the client’s cost tremendously, in addition to require assurance
that the servers do not collude. Other solutions may require specific secure computing
environments such as relying on trusted platform modules [95] being employed by a
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server or the client may receive a piece of secure hardware [50] that provides support
with the expensive computation. However, such solutions raise trust issues as the client
does not trust the hardware as well as increases the involved costs of employing them.
Interactive proofs [20, 81, 83, 138] also provide a solution to VC as well as the more
efficient notion of probabilistic checkable proofs (PCP) [13, 28] in which the client
verifies the proof by only checking a small number of random locations. Yet another
solution can be obtained using Micali’s computational sound proofs [108].
2.7.1 Non-interactive Verifiable Outsourced Computation
The concept of non-interactive verifiable outsourced computation was introduced by
Gennaro et al. [72]. In more detail, a VC scheme consists of the following three phases.
Pre-processing. The pre-processing is a one-time stage in which the client computes
some public and private information associated with the function F she wishes
to outsource. The client sends the public part to the server. This phase can take
roughly the time comparable to computing the function from scratch, but it is
performed only once, and its cost is amortised over all future executions.
Input preparation The client wishes the server to compute a function F on her
input x to receive the result F (x). Therefore, the client prepares some public and
private information associated with her input x and sends the public part to the
server.
Output computation and verification. Once the server has received the public in-
formation of F and x, it computes an encoded result which allegedly encodes the
computational result F (x) and returns it to the client. From this encoded value
the client can compute the value F (x) and verify its correctness.
SC
ekF
σF,x
θF (x)
Verify
Figure 2.9: Basic operation of a verifiable outsourced computation scheme
The operation of a verifiable computation scheme is illustrated in Figure 2.9.
Note that this is a minimally interactive (non-interactive) protocol. This requires that
there is only one round of interaction between the client and the server each time a
computation is performed and thus rules out approaches based on repeated probabilis-
tic challenge-response protocols. The crucial efficiency requirement considered in VC
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is that input preparation and output verification must take less time for the client than
computing the function from scratch (ideally linear time). Also, the output computa-
tion should take roughly the same amount as computing F itself.
Definition 2.31. A non-interactive verifiable outsourced computation (VC) scheme
consists of the following four algorithms3:
• (ekF , skF ) $← KeyGen(1λ, F ) : this randomised algorithm takes as input the secu-
rity parameter λ and the function F to be computed. It outputs a public evaluation
key ekF which the server will use to evaluate F and a secret key skF which is
kept private by the client;
• (σF,x, vkF,x) $← ProbGen(x, skF ) : this randomised algorithm takes as input an
input value x and the secret key skF to prepare a public encoded input σF,x and
a verification key vkF,x which is kept private by the client;
• θF (x) $← Compute(σF,x, ekF ) : this randomised algorithm takes as input σF,x and
the evaluation key ekF for F to compute an encoded version θF (x) of the function’s
output y = F (x);
• y ← Verify(θF (x), vkF,x, skF ) : this algorithm takes as input the encoded output
θF (x), the verification key vkF,x and secret key skF . It outputs a result y which
either corresponds to F (x) if θF (x) is valid (i.e. θF (x) is a correct encoding of the
output), or else corresponds to ⊥ if the result is incorrect.
Note that the function F used in the key generation algorithm is a function from the
family of admissible functions F for the VC scheme. Different VC schemes are able to
evaluate different families of functions F , e.g. Boolean circuits and arithmetic circuits.
A verifiable computation scheme should be both correct and secure. A VC scheme is
correct if the problem-generation algorithm produces values that allow an honest server
to compute results that will verify successfully and correspond to the evaluation of F
on those inputs. More formally this is captured as follows.
Definition 2.32. A verifiable computation scheme for a family of functions F is
correct if for any choice of function F ∈ F , every key pair (ekF , skF ) outputted by
KeyGen(1λ, F ) and for all input values x ∈ Dom(F ), if (σF,x, vkF,x)←$ ProbGen(x, skF )
and θF (x)←$ Compute(σF,x, ekF ) then y = F (x)← Verify(θF (x), vkF,x, skF ).
The main security notion considered in VC is the notion of verifiability. We say that a
VC scheme is secure in the sense of verifiability if a malicious adversary cannot convince
the verification algorithm to accept an incorrect output and we formally define this
3We change the notation relative to the literature and accommodate ours which we use throughout
this thesis.
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notion in Figure 2.10. In more detail, the game starts with the challenger running the
KeyGen algorithm to generate a key pair for a function F in the family of admissible
functions F . The adversary is provided with the public evaluation key ekF and access
to the ProbGen oracle OProbGen and returns an input x for which the challenger honestly
prepares an encoded input σF,x and verification key. This step is necessary to ensure
that the challenger possesses a valid verification key corresponding to the computation.
The adversary wins the game if it is able to produce an encoded output which is
accepted by the verification algorithm Verify but in fact does not correspond to the
correct result of F (x).
ExpVerifA
[VC, 1λ, F ]
1 : (ekF , skF )←$ KeyGen(1λ, F )
2 : x←$ AOProbGen(·,skF )(ekF )
3 : (σF,x, vkF,x)←$ ProbGen(x, skF )
4 : θF (x)←$ AO
ProbGen(·,skF )(σF,x, ekF )
5 : y ← Verify(θF (x), vkF,x, skF )
6 : if (y 6=⊥) and (y 6= F (x)) then
7 : return 1
8 : else return 0
OProbGen(z, skF )
1 : (σF,z, vkF,z)←$ ProbGen(z, skF )
2 : return σF,z
Figure 2.10: The verifiability experiment ExpVerifA
[VC, 1λ, F ]
Definition 2.33. The advantage of a PPT adversary in the Verif game for a verifi-
able computation scheme VC is defined as:
AdvVerifA,VC (1
λ, F ) = Pr
[
ExpVerifA
[
VC, 1λ, F
]
→ 1
]
.
We say that the verifiable computation scheme VC is secure for a function F if for all
PPT adversaries A, it holds that
AdvVerifA,VC (1
λ, F ) ≤ negl(λ).
Gennaro et al. [72] also consider the notions of input and output privacy. The former
notion models that an adversary is not able to distinguish from the encoded input σF,x
which input value x was encoded. Output privacy assures that θF (x) does not reveal
the actual output value F (x).
A trivial solution to the problem of verifiable outsourced computation is to redundantly
outsource the same computation to multiple servers and compare the returned results.
48
2.7 Verifiable Outsourced Computation
Then the majority of same results is assumed to be correct. Canetti et al. [43] follow
the above scenario but show in contrast that a client can efficiently verify the compu-
tation as long as at least one server is honest. Most VC schemes [10, 22, 23, 30] try to
improve on this solution to remove the redundancy, improve collusion resilience and to
use only a single server per computation. Gennaro et al. [72] proposed a construction
based on Yao’s garbled circuit [144] construction which provides a “one-time” verifiable
computation scheme allowing a client to outsource the evaluation of a function on a
single input. However, this approach is insecure in case the circuit is reused and thus
the cost of the pre-processing phase cannot be amortised as the cost of generating a
new garbled circuit is approximately equal to the cost of evaluating the function itself.
In order to overcome this problem, the authors propose using a fully homomorphic en-
cryption scheme (FHE) [74] to re-randomise the garbled circuit for multiple evaluations
on different inputs, but existing FHE scheme are expensive [42, 74, 131] and therefore
are currently impractical. Some works have considered approaches to accommodate
multiple clients who wish to send their respective inputs to the server that performs
the computation over the jointly formed inputs. In such a scenario the notions such
as input privacy become more important. Choi et al. [52] extended the garbled circuit
approach [72] using a proxy oblivious transfer primitive [111] to achieve input privacy
in a non-interactive multi-client VC scheme. Pham et al. [121] approach the problem of
verifiable outsourced computation differently and provide a game-theoretical treatment
in which they employ a weaker notion of security and develop optimal contracts for
outsourcing computations via an appropriate use of rewards, punishments and auditing
rate.
There is an issue with the verifiability in the above VC scheme [72] (which is also an
inherent issue in other VC schemes [52] and delegation schemes [54, 81]) where the
verifiability of the scheme holds only under the restriction that the cheating server
does not learn whether the verifier accepted or rejected previous computations. This
problem is denoted as the rejection problem. In more detail, as soon as the server
learns that the client has rejected a computation then the server is able to deviate
from the protocol and generate improper computational results such that by learning
the decisions of the client as feedback, it can learn some information about secret
verification keys that would enable future forgeries and therefore verifiability can no
longer be claimed. Goldwasser et al. [82] overcome the rejection problem by using a
designated verifier CS proof system and Fiore et al. [69] strengthen the VC scheme
from [72] to avoid the rejection problem by providing the adversary with access to a
verification oracle.
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2.7.2 Publicly Verifiable Outsourced Computation
Parno et al. [118] introduced the notion of publicly verifiable outsourced computation
(PVC) which enriches the functionality of VC with two new properties, namely public
delegation and public verification. A large part of this thesis deals with extending the
notion of PVC.
The PVC framework [118] is motivated in the setting of a scientific lab where the head
of the research team specifies the function to be evaluated over the gathered data whilst
the members of the research team decide on the specific inputs for each instance and
verify the result. The advantage of being able to publicly verify also enables patients
or other entities to ensure that the computational result is derived correctly.
The notion of PVC extends the prior notion of VC and includes multiple clients into
the system model. In more detail, a single client C1 performs the KeyGen algorithm to
obtain an evaluation key ekF which is given to the server, and publishing information
pkF are made available to any other client enabling them to encode inputs they wish to
be evaluated by the server for the specific function F . This means that only one client
needs to perform the expensive pre-processing phase. Each time the client prepares an
encoded input using the ProbGen algorithm it may publish her verification key vkF,x
enabling any other client to verify the computational output. Thus, outsourcing and
verifying computations rely only on public information. Hence, the KeyGen algorithm
needs to be only performed once per function rather than once per function and client.
Definition 2.34. A publicly verifiable outsourced computation (PVC) scheme consists
of the following four algorithms:
• (ekF , pkF ) $← KeyGen(1λ, F ) : this randomised algorithm takes as input the secu-
rity parameter λ and the function F to be computed. It outputs a public evaluation
key ekF which the server will use to evaluate F and a public key pkF which will
be used for input delegation;
• (σF,x, vkF,x) $← ProbGen(x, pkF ) : this randomised algorithm takes as input an
input value x and the public key pkF . It prepares an encoded input σF,x and a
verification key vkF,x which is used for verification;
• θF (x) $← Compute(σF,x, ekF ) : this randomised algorithm takes as input the en-
coded input σF,x and the evaluation key ekF for F to compute an encoded version
θF (x) of the function’s output y = F (x);
• y ← Verify(θF (x), vkF,x) : this public algorithm takes as input the encoded output
θF (x) and the verification key vkF,x. It outputs a result y which either corresponds
to F (x) if θF (x) is valid, or else corresponds to ⊥ if the result is incorrect.
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SC1 C2
Public
ekF
σF,x1
θF (x1)
σF,x2
θF (x2)
pkF , vkF,x1 vkF,x2
Verify Verify
Figure 2.11: Basic operation of a publicly verifiable outsourced computation scheme
The operation of a PVC scheme is illustrated in Figure 2.11. Note that in both the
definitions of VC and PVC the client is responsible to perform the KeyGen algorithm
for a single function F which may be expensive (roughly the cost of executing the
function F itself). However, the client is assumed to only possess limited resources and
is generally interested to compute multiple functions which makes the definitions to
some extent restrictive. The main changes in the definition of PVC relative to VC are
that KeyGen generates a secret key skF which in PVC will be made public and thus
enables any entity to outsource a computation of F , and that the verification key vkF,x
generated in ProbGen is published to allow any entity to verify a computational result.
The correctness of a PVC scheme follows similarly to the one of a VC scheme. A PVC
scheme is correct if an honest run of the protocol will verify successfully and correspond
to the evaluation of F on those inputs. More formally this is captured as follows.
Definition 2.35. A publicly verifiable outsourced computation scheme for a family of
functions F is correct if for any choice of function F ∈ F , every key pair (ekF , pkF )
outputted by KeyGen(1λ, F ) and for all input values x ∈ Dom(F ), if
(σF,x, vkF,x)←$ ProbGen(x, pkF ) and θF (x)←$ Compute(σF,x, ekF ) then y = F (x) ←
Verify(θF (x), vkF,x).
The security notion of public verifiability for a PVC scheme is defined in Figure 2.12.
Compared to Figure 2.10 which describes the notion of verifiability for a VC scheme, the
public verifiable setting does not require a ProbGen oracle as outsourcing computations
is solely based on public parameters and hence can be run by the adversary itself. The
adversary wins the game if it is able to produce an encoded output in such a way that
it is accepted by the verifier but in fact does not correspond to the correct result of
F (x).
Definition 2.36. The advantage of a PPT adversary in the PubVerif game for a
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ExpPubVerifA
[PVC, 1λ, F ]
1 : (ekF , pkF )←$ KeyGen(1λ, F )
2 : x←$ A(ekF , pkF )
3 : (σF,x, vkF,x)←$ ProbGen(x, pkF )
4 : θF (x)←$ A(σF,x, vkF,x, ekF , pkF )
5 : y ← Verify(θF (x), vkF,x)
6 : if (y 6=⊥) and (y 6= F (x)) then
7 : return 1
8 : else return 0
Figure 2.12: The public verifiability experiment ExpPubVerifA
[PVC, 1λ, F ]
publicly verifiable computation scheme PVC is defined as:
AdvPubVerifA,PVC (1
λ, F ) = Pr
[
ExpPubVerifA
[
PVC, 1λ, F
]
→ 1
]
.
We say that the public verifiable computation scheme PVC is secure for a function F
if for all PPT adversaries A, it holds that
AdvPubVerifA,PVC (1
λ, F ) ≤ negl(λ).
The presented notion of public verification allows a stronger notion of security since any
entity, including the server, is able to perform verification. Since this enables the server
to tell whether a result will be accepted or rejected by the client, it makes the rejection
problem in the context of PVC invalid. From a more technical point of view this is the
case as verification only depends on the public parameters and some instance specific
randomness generated by the client and not any long-term secret. Thus, obtaining the
result from a previous verification step on one instance does not provide any advantage
in breaking the verifiability on a different instance.
Some prior work [33, 81, 82] already introduced the property of public delegation
but are mostly in the random oracle model or rely on non-standard assumptions.
Parno et al. [118] have been the first who considered public verifiability. Since then the
concept has been widely used to publicly verify specific operations [68] and construct
an almost practical scheme [117].
In Section 2.7.3, we provide a detailed discussion on the basic principles of how to
construct a PVC scheme based on key-policy attribute-based encryption following
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Parno et al. [118].
Multi-function Verifiable Outsourced Computation
Parno et al. [118] introduced the notion of multi-function verifiable outsourced com-
putation (MFVC) which extents the original definition of VC [72] to efficiently enable
servers to evaluate multiple functions on a single input. In other words, a client encodes
a single input x independently from any functions, and then can request evaluations of
multiple functions upon it. This notion is useful in case the client’s data remains static
and she wishes to use it multiple times.
In more detail, compared to [72] where the function to be evaluated is embedded
in the system’s parameters, MFVC separates the generation of system parameters
and function parameters into different algorithms to allow the evaluation of multiple
functions on the same input instance.
Definition 2.37. A multi-function verifiable outsourced computation (MFVC) scheme
consists of the following five algorithms:
• (pp,mk) $← Setup(1λ) : this randomised algorithm takes as input the security
parameter λ. It produces the public parameters pp and secret parameters mk that
do not depend on any function to be evaluated;
• (ekF , skF ) $← KeyGen(F,mk, pp) : this randomised algorithm takes as input the
function F to be computed, the secret parameters mk and the public parameters
pp. It outputs an evaluation key ekF which the server will use to evaluate F and
a secret key skF used for verification which will be kept private by the client;
• (σx, vkx) $← ProbGen(x,mk, pp) : this randomised algorithm takes as input an
input value x, the secret parameters mk and the public parameters pp, which are
all independent of the function F . It produces an encoded input σx and a secret
verification key vkx which will be kept private by the user;
• θF (x) $← Compute(σx, ekF , pp) : this randomised algorithm takes as input the en-
coded input σx, the evaluation key ekF and the public parameters pp. It computes
an encoded version θF (x) of the function’s output y = F (x);
• y ← Verify(θF (x), vkx, skF ) : this public algorithm takes as input the encoded
output θF (x), the input specific verification key vkx and function specific secret
key skF . It outputs a result y which either corresponds to F (x) if θF (x) is valid,
or else corresponds to ⊥ if the result is incorrect.
A MFVC scheme is correct if an honest run of the protocol will verify successfully and
correspond to the evaluation of F on those inputs. More formally this is captured as
follows.
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Definition 2.38. A multi-function verifiable outsourced computation scheme for a
family of functions F is correct if for the generated parameters (pp,mk) outputted by
Setup(1λ), for any choice of function F ∈ F , every key pair (ekF , skF ) outputted by
KeyGen(F,mk, pp) and for all input values x ∈ Dom(F ), if
(σx, vkx)←$ ProbGen(x,mk, pp) and θF (x)←$ Compute(σx, ekF , pp) then y = F (x) ←
Verify(θF (x), vkx, skF ).
The security notion we consider for a MFVC scheme is multi-function verifiability which
we formally define in Figure 2.13. It proceeds similar to the security of a VC scheme as
represented in Figure 2.10. The main difference is that the adversary has additionally
access to a KeyGen oracle representing its capability to request keys for any arbitrary
functions it wishes to evaluate. The adversary wins the game if it is able to produce
an encoded output which is accepted by the verifier but in fact does not correspond to
the correct result of F (x).
ExpMultiVerifA
[MFVC, 1λ]
1 : (pp,mk)←$ Setup(1λ)
2 : (x, F )←$ AOKeyGen(·,mk,pp),OProbGen(·,mk,pp)(pp)
3 : (σx, vkx)←$ ProbGen(x,mk, pp)
4 : θF (x)←$ AO
KeyGen(·,mk,pp),OProbGen(·,mk,pp)(pp)
5 : y ← Verify(θF (x), vkx, skF )
6 : if (y 6=⊥) and (y 6= F (x)) then
7 : return 1
8 : else return 0
OKeyGen(F,mk, pp)
1 : (ekF , skF )←$ KeyGen(F,mk, pp)
2 : return ekF
OProbGen(z,mk, pp)
1 : (σz, vkz)←$ ProbGen(z,mk, pp)
2 : return σz
Figure 2.13: The multi-function verifiability experiment ExpMultiVerifA
[MFVC, 1λ]
Definition 2.39. The advantage of a PPT adversary in the MultiVerif game for a
multi-function verifiable computation scheme MFVC is defined as:
AdvMultiVerifA,MFVC (1
λ) = Pr
[
ExpMultiVerifA
[
MFVC, 1λ
]
→ 1
]
.
We say that the multi-function verifiable computation scheme MFVC is secure for a
function F if for all PPT adversaries A, it holds that
AdvMultiVerifA,MFVC (1
λ) ≤ negl(λ).
Parno et al. [118] provide a construction for MFVC based on KP-ABE with outsourcing
as introduced by Green et al. [90]. However, the given construction is publicly delegable
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but not publicly verifiable. This ‘drawback’ comes from the fact that in [90], giving out
skF enables the server directly to cheat about the evaluated function, i.e. the server
claims an output computed with F was the result of applying G. Parno et al. left it as
an open problem to overcome this issue to construct a publicly verifiable multi-function
VC scheme.
2.7.3 Construction of Publicly Verifiable Computation Schemes
Parno et al. [118] provide a PVC construction using key-policy attribute-based encryp-
tion (KP-ABE)[89] for outsourcing the family of monotone Boolean functions.4 In this
section we present the basic principles of their PVC construction as those principles
will be used throughout this thesis as a building block for our extended PVC proposals.
Parno et al. use the idea that the KP-ABE decryption functionality provides a proof
that a monotone Boolean function is satisfied (i.e. outputs 1) on a given input. We
recall from Section 2.3.1 that in KP-ABE, the decryption keys are associated with
access structures while ciphertexts are associated with attribute sets. Decryption is
successful if and only if the attribute set in the ciphertext satisfies the access structure
in the decryption key. This idea can be lifted into the setting of PVC by encoding the
function to be outsourced as an access structure and issue the server with a respective
decryption key. Input data can be encoded in terms of attribute sets and the encryp-
tion of messages result into ciphertexts which are associated with those attribute sets.
In order to outsource a computation F (x), Parno et al. select a random message m0
from the underlying message space of the KP-ABE scheme and encrypt it under the
attribute representation Ax that encodes the input x. A server is issued an evaluation
key to perform the computation in form of a KP-ABE decryption key for the access
structure encoding the function F . The server succeeds in decrypting the ciphertext
and recovering the message m0 if and only if F (x) = 1, which indicates that the access
structure is satisfied by the attribute set. In case that F (x) = 0 then this indicates
that the access structure is not satisfied by the attribute set and the adversary cannot
do better at finding the message m0 than a random guess.
5 In other words, if the
client receives the same message that she initially encrypted, she is fully convinced
that decryption was successful and F (x) = 1. However, if the client receives no answer
or ⊥ from the server then this could be the case because the server was truly unable
to decrypt and F (x) = 0, or because F (x) = 1 and the server intentionally refuses to
decrypt. Thus, this proposal can be seen as a protocol with a one-sided error.
4If input privacy is required then a predicate encryption scheme could be used in place of the
KP-ABE scheme.
5Note that in order for an ABE scheme to be secure, it is required that the message space is large
enough such that the server is not able to randomly guess and return the correct message with a
significant probability.
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To overcome the problem with the one-sided error, Parno et al. suggest to initialise
a second (independent) KP-ABE scheme and then following the same principles as
above and encrypting a different random message m1 under the same attribute set Ax
corresponding to x using the parameters of the second system. The server is now issued
an evaluation key in the form of a KP-ABE decryption key for the access structure
encoding the complement function F (x) = F (x)⊕1, which always outputs the opposite
result to F (x). Thus, exactly one of F (x) or F (x) evaluates to 1 and therefore exactly
one decryption was successful and the respective message is returned.6 The client is
able to observe which message was returned and therefore knows under which KP-ABE
scheme the message was encrypted which enables the client to determine whether F (x)
or F (x) was satisfied and thus learns whether F (x) = 1 or 0 respectively. A well-formed
and valid response from a server comprises the outputs (d0, d1) from both decryption
procedures and therefore is of the following form:
(d0, d1) =
(m0,⊥), if F (x) = 1;(⊥,m1) if F (x) = 0. (2.1)
Since KP-ABE is a public-key encryption primitive, this construction can be seen as
the “public-key” version of the initial proposal by Gennaro et al. [72]. Furthermore,
this construction enables any entity to create ciphertexts and hence the construction
achieves public delegability. On the other hand the construction can achieve public ver-
ifiability by employing a one-way function g, e.g. a pre-image resistant hash function.
In more detail, the client publishes a verification key for the outsourced computation
comprising the results of applying the one-way function to each randomly chosen mes-
sage m0 and m1. The server outputs a computational result (corresponding to exactly
one message) and on receipt of such, any entity can apply g to the returned message
and compare the result with the values in the verification key to verify correctness. We
want to stress that even a malicious server does not gain any advantage from know-
ing the verification key since it cannot invert the one-way function g to recover either
message. In Table 2.1, we provide an overview about the particular mapping between
abstract PVC parameters and KP-ABE parameters used in the construction.
As mentioned above, we need a particular encoding procedure that defines input data
for outsourced computations as attribute sets. However, Parno et al. did not specify
any details about the encoding procedure they may use in their scheme. Therefore, we
want to provide details about the particular procedure we use throughout this thesis
which also applies to the Parno et al. construction. In more detail, we define a universe
U of n attributes and associate V ⊆ U with a binary n-tuple where the i-th entry is
1 if and only if the ith attribute is in V . We call this tuple the characteristic tuple of
6Goldwasser et al. [80] call such a slightly modified ABE scheme two-outcome attribute-based en-
cryption scheme.
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Abstract PVC parameter Parameter in KP-ABE instantiation
ekF skAF
pkF Master public key pp
σF,x Encryption of m using pp and Ax
θF (x) m or ⊥
vkF,x g(m)
Table 2.1: Mapping between PVC and KP-ABE parameters
V . Thus, there is a natural one-to-one correspondence between n-tuples and attribute
sets and we write Ax to denote the attribute set corresponding to the input data x.
An alternative way to view this is to let U = {A1, A2, . . . , An}. Then, a bit string v of
length n is the characteristic tuple of the set V ⊆ U if V = {Ai : vi = 1}. A function
F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is monotonic if x 6 y implies F (x) 6 F (y), where x = (x1, . . . , xn)
is less than or equal to y = (y1, . . . , yn) if and only if xi 6 yi for all i. For a monotonic
function F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} the set AF = {x ∈ {0, 1}n : F (x) = 1} defines a mono-
tonic access structure.
Throughout the remainder of this thesis, we mainly refer to monotonic Boolean func-
tions. This is mainly due to the majority of the ABE literature considering monotonic
access structures. However, a notable non-monotonic KP-ABE scheme was given by
Ostrovsky et al. [112] which accommodates general Boolean functions and hence would
enable us to outsource the NC1 class of functions. The use of such a scheme in our
construction as well as in the one of Parno et al. should be straightforward since we
use the KP-ABE scheme as a black-box. However, we would need to slightly adjust
our encoding procedure for the input data since 0 values in the bit strings can affect
the outcome of the computation. In more detail, we define the universe of attributes
U to consist of 2n attributes {A0i , A1i }ni=1. Then, a bit string v of length n is the char-
acteristic tuple of the set V ⊆ U if V = {Aji : vi = j}. By applying De-Morgan’s
laws to a non-monotonic Boolean function it is possible to move any negations within
the function such that they only apply to the input variables. Hence a non-monotonic
Boolean function can be satisfied by choosing the 0 or 1 attribute appropriately in the
input attribute set.
2.8 Proofs of Retrievability
Proofs of retrievability (PoR) may be seen as a protocol between a polynomial-time
client and a polynomial-time server. A successful execution of the PoR protocol results
in a concise proof produced by a server that the user’s outsourced file F can be re-
trieved, that is, the server retains and reliably transmits file data sufficient for the user
to recover the original file F in its entirety. The motivation for a PoR scheme is the
overwhelming success of the cloud model which offers various benefits such as flexible
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scalability and accessibility of different cloud services in a cost effective manner where
in case of a PoR the client makes use of the cloud’s storage instance (e.g. Amazon
S3, Windows Azure) to which the client initially outsources her data. In this settings,
the client wishes to assure the correctness of the outsourced data to ensure that no
accidental or malicious errors have been introduced into the data. A malicious server
may try to change, tamper or delete the data whilst not being detected in order to
spare storage resources.
A simple solution to the above problem may be to download the whole file every time
the client wishes to check the data. However, this approach stands in contrast to the
goals of outsourcing the data in the first place and thus the client would lose all ini-
tial outsourcing benefits, as well as being very bandwidth intensive. The challenging
problem is to enable verification of the file F without explicit knowledge of the full file.
This problem was first described by Blum et al. [34] who explored the task of efficiently
checking the correctness of a memory-management program. Another solution [103]
may require a trusted security provider controlling the integrity-protection of files in
untrusted cloud storage providers. A PoR can loosely be seen as a proof of knowledge
(PoK) [27] conducted between a prover and verifier on a file F . The essential design
goal in a PoK is to preserve the secrecy of some short secret. However, in PoR, the
design is different as the verifier already learned the value F as the file was initially
outsourced by the verifier. Thus, the main challenge is to prove knowledge of F with
computational and communication costs substantially smaller than |F |. PoR are also
akin to other proof systems such as proofs of computational ability [146] and proofs of
work [96].
Proofs of retrievability were introduced by Juels and Kaliski [98]. Informally, PoR can
be seen as a cryptographic proof showing that the outsourced file is retained and fully
intact stored at a cloud service provider. In other words, a PoR aims to provide a
mechanism of proving that the file is intact and the client can fully recover it. More
formally this is captured in the following definition.
Definition 2.40. A proofs of retrievability (PoR) scheme consists of the following
procedures:
• (pk, sk) $← Setup(1λ): this randomised algorithm generates a public-private key
pair (pk, sk) and takes as input the security parameter λ;
• (F , τ) $← Store(sk, F ): this randomised file storing algorithm takes as input a
secret key sk and a file F ∈ {0, 1}∗. The file gets processed and the algorithm
outputs F which will be stored on the server as well as a file tag τ . The tag τ
contains additional information (e.g. metadata) about F ;
• δ $← [Verify(pk, sk, τ) 
 Prove(pk,F , τ)]: the randomised proving and verifying
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algorithms define a protocol for proving file retrievability. The prover algorithm
takes as input the public key pk as well as the file tag τ and the processed file
F . The verifier algorithm takes the secret key sk, public key pk and the file tag
τ . Algorithm Verify outputs at the end of the protocol execution a binary value
δ which corresponds to accept if the verification succeeds, indicating the file is
being stored and retrievable on the server, and reject otherwise.
Note that the above definition is adapted from Shacham and Waters [126] rather than
the original one by Juels and Kaliski [98]. For simplicity, let us denote the challenge-
response procedure [Verify(pk, sk, τ)
 Prove(pk,F , τ)] as PoRP.
A proof of retrievability scheme should be both correct and secure. A PoR scheme is
correct if the processed file F outputted by the store procedure will be accepted by
the verification algorithm when interacting with a valid prover. More formally this is
captured as follows.
Definition 2.41. A PoR scheme is correct if there exists a negligible function negl
such that for every security parameter λ, every key pair (pk, sk) generated by Setup,
for all files F ∈ {0, 1}∗, and for all (F , τ) generated by Store, it holds that
Pr[(Verify(pk, sk, τ)
 Prove(pk,F , τ)) 9 accept] = negl(λ).
Security of a PoR scheme is defined in the usual terms of an experiment in which the
adversary plays the role of the prover P. Intuitively, a PoR scheme is secure if any
cheating prover that convinces the verification algorithm that it stores a file F is indeed
storing the file. In other words, we wish to guarantee that, whenever a malicious prover
is in a position of successfully passing a PoRP instance, it must know the entire file
content. As in a PoK, we need to formalise knowledge via the existence of an efficient
extractor E that can recover the original file F given access to the malicious prover. We
first formalise the notion of an extractor and then formally define the relevant security
notion called extractability following the formalisation in [126].
An extractor algorithm E(pk, sk, τ,P ′) takes as input the generated key pair, the file
tag τ as well as a description of the machine implementing the prover’s role in the PoR
scheme and its output is the file F . The extractor is given (non black-box) access to P ′
and in particular can rewind it. Furthermore, we require that the algorithm is efficient,
i.e. E ’s running time needs to be polynomial in the security parameter.
Consider the following extractability game ExpExtractA,
[POR, 1λ] between a malicious
adversary A, an extractor E , and a challenger C.
1. The challenger initialises the system by running Setup to generate the public and
private key pair for all entities. The public key is provided to A.
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2. The adversary A is now able to interact with the challenger that takes the role of
an honest client. A is allowed to request executions to a Store oracle by providing,
for each query, some file F . The challenger runs (F , τ) $← Store(sk, F ) and returns
both outputs to the adversary.
3. Likewise, A can request executions of the PoRP scheme for any file on which it
previously made a Store query by specifying the corresponding tag τ . In the pro-
cedure, the challenger will play the role of the honest verifier V and the adversary
the role of the corrupted prover, i.e. V(τ, pk, sk)
 A. In the end of the execution
the adversary is provided with the output of the verifier. Furthermore, the Store
oracle queries and executions of PoRP can be interleaved arbitrarily.
4. The adversary outputs a challenge tag τ ′ returned from some Store query and the
description a prover P ′.
5. Run the extractor algorithm F ′ ← E(pk, sk, τ ′,P ′) inputting the challenge tag τ ′
and description P ′ where E gets black-box rewinding access to P ′, and attempts
to extract the file content as F ′.
6. If Pr[(V(τ, pk, sk)
 P ′)→ accept] ≥  and F ′ 6= F then output 1, else 0.
Note that we say a malicious prover P ′ is -admissible if the probability that it con-
vincingly answers verification challenges is at least , i.e. if Pr[(V(τ, pk, sk)
 P ′) →
accept] ≥ . Here the probability is over the coins of the verifier and prover.
Definition 2.42. We say that a PoR scheme, POR, is -extractable (or secure) if
there exists an efficient extraction algorithm E such that, for all PPT adversaries A it
holds that Pr
[
ExpExtractA,
[POR, 1λ]→ 1] is negligible in the security parameter.
Juels and Kaliski [98] present a PoR scheme which relies on so-called sentinels. In their
model, a file consists of blocks and a sentinel itself is an indistinguishable block which
will be hidden among regular file blocks in order to detect data modification by the
server. In more detail, the client challenges the server by specifying the positions of a
collection of sentinels and requests the server to return the associated sentinel values.
In case the server has deleted or modified a substantial portion of the file F , then
with high probability it will have also suppressed a number of sentinels. Thus, it is
unlikely that the server will respond correctly to the verifier. In order to also protect
against corruption of a small portion of F , Juels and Kaliski [98] propose to employ
erasure-correcting codes (ECC). In other words, the usage of erasure-correcting codes
can amplify errors in the stored file and thus it is more likely for the client to recover
the file even if erasures were introduced. We discuss the necessity and importance as
well as present a formal definition of ECC later in this section. A similar approach
of using erasure-correcting codes was proposed in an early PoR-like protocol of Lillib-
ridge et al. [106]. However, their main goal is slightly different compared to PoR as they
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wish to achieve an assurance of the availability of an outsourced file that is distributed
over a set of servers in a peer relationship. The Juels-Kaliski proposal only supports
a bounded number of PoRP executions after which the server has learnt all embedded
sentinels and thus requires the client to re-perform the initialisation procedure in case
she wishes to further check the file via a PoR. The authors also propose a public PoR
scheme using a Merkle-tree construction so that it can be verified by any external party
without requiring a secret key.
Another notable PoR construction was proposed by Shacham and Waters [126]. They
propose two PoR schemes, namely a private-key based and a public-key based scheme.
The former scheme builds on pseudorandom functions and is secure in the standard
model whilst the latter uses BLS signatures and is secure in the random oracle model.
Both schemes, however, uses homomorphic authenticators to yield compact proofs.
More details about the private-key scheme can be found in Chapter 7.
Following the initial PoR scheme, works have been developed that propose improve-
ments compared to [98]. For example, Bowers et al. [40] construct a PoR scheme which
tolerates a Byzantine attacker model. Dodis et al. [62] introduce the notion of PoR
codes which combines concepts in PoR and hardness amplification. Paterson et al. [119]
treat PoR schemes in the model of unconditional security where an adversary has un-
bounded computational power and they show that retrievability can be modelled as
erasure-correction in a certain mode. Armknecht et al. [11] proposed the notion of an
outsourced PoR scheme which enables a client to task an external auditor to perform
and verify PoR procedures on her behalf. The above approaches, however, are lim-
ited in the sense of being only able to handle static files. In contrast to the above
approaches, some proposals deal with the construction of dynamic schemes support-
ing efficient updates. Cash et al. [47] achieve dynamic updates using oblivious RAM
whereas Shi et al. [128] improve the performance by relying on a Merkle hash tree.
Stefanov et al. [134] consider updates where a trusted “portal” performs operations on
the client’s behalf. Recently, Guan et al. [92] explore the usage of indistinguishability
obfuscation for building a PoR scheme that offers public verification while the encryp-
tion process is based on symmetric key primitives. Other contributions [123, 127, 145]
deal with public verifiable PoR schemes.
Concurrently to the work of Juels and Kaliski [98], Ateniese et al. [15] proposed a close
variant of PoR called proofs of data possession (PDP). The main difference between
PoR and PDP is the notion of security they achieve. More precisely, a PoR provides
stronger security guarantees than PDP as a PoR assures that the server maintains full
knowledge of the client’s data whereas a PDP only assures that most of the data is
retained. Dynamic PDP solutions where proposed in [16] where the problem of dynamic
writes/updates was considered and [63] uses authenticated dictionaries based on rank
61
2.8 Proofs of Retrievability
information. In [58], Curtmola et al. propose a multi-replica PDP which enables a client
to efficiently verify that a file is replicated at least across k replicas by the cloud. Some
work appeared exploring the direction to extend works into the multi-server setting.
Bowers et al. [39] introduce a system called HAIL which enables a set of servers to
prove to a client that a stored file is intact and retrievable against a mobile adversary
that can progressively corrupt the full set of storage providers. In [41], Bowers et al.
present a scheme that enables the client to verify if her data is redundantly stored at
multiple servers by measuring the time it takes the server to respond to a read request
for a set of data blocks. Gritti et al. [91] introduce a third party enabling the client to
efficiently check the integrity of the data.
Erasure-correcting codes
Erasure-correcting codes (ECC) play a crucial role in the functionality of a PoR scheme.
As mentioned above, the use of erasure-correcting codes were introduced as a mecha-
nism to handle corruption of a small number of file blocks. ECC enable to boost the
detection probability and ensure that the server must possess sufficiently many blocks
to pass a PoRP procedure. Typically, this procedure consists of checking the authen-
ticity of λ random processed file blocks, where λ is the security parameter.
In basic terms, ECC is a process that adds redundant data to the original data in such
a way that a receiver may recover the processed data even when a number of errors
were introduced, either during the transmission of the file, or on storage. As a concrete
example, let us suppose a client wishes to outsource a file consisting of n blocks which
are erasure coded into m = n/ρ blocks for some ECC rate 0 < ρ ≤ 1, such that knowl-
edge of any n of m blocks suffice to recover the original file blocks. In other words, to
recover the file we require a reception efficiency of 1, i.e. we need to check as many file
blocks as the original file consists of. Thus, this means that the server needs to delete
more than (1−ρ) percent of the file blocks in order to incur actual data loss. However,
if the server deletes that many blocks, it will fail the above PoRP with overwhelming
probability and the adversary will be detected cheating with a probability of at least
(1− (1−ρ)λ). In more detail, the PoR scheme provides a probabilistic assurance about
the authenticity and retrievability of the data and thus about the outcome of the PoR
scheme itself.
We close this chapter with the formal definition of an erasure-correcting code following
the standard literature [94].
Definition 2.43. Let Σ denote a finite alphabet. An (m,n, d)Σ erasure-correcting code
is defined to be a pair of algorithms encode : Σn → Σm, and decode : Σm−d+1 → Σn,
such that as long as the number of erasures is bounded by d − 1, then decode can
always recover the original data. A code is maximum distance separable (MDS), if
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n+ d = m+ 1.
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This chapter deals with the setting of publicly verifiable outsourced com-
putation (PVC) for which has been shown that key-policy attribute-based
encryption can be used. We propose extensions and improvements to the
current PVC proposal in order to accommodate a more practical framework.
For this mode of computation, we introduce a distinguished entity that pro-
vides support to minimise the client’s computational burden regarding the
expensive pre-processing. We also investigate a simple mechanism to en-
able a server to compute multiple functions, and provide a method to revoke
misbehaving servers from future evaluations within the system. The results
of this chapter appear in [4].
3.1 Introduction
The cloud model has led to many benefits in various application domains such as stor-
ing and computing. Nowadays, it is also increasingly common for mobile devices being
used as general computing devices. Since users produce a vast amount of data there is
a natural desire to process and evaluate the data. However, since the mobile devices
cannot handle this task sufficiently well there is a need to outsource the evaluation of
the data to the cloud. Upon receiving a computational result from the cloud, the user
wishes to obtain some assurance about the validity of the result.
This problem known as verifiable outsourced computation (VC) has recently attracted
a lot of attention in the community and we summarised the concept in detail in Sec-
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tion 2.7. Verifiable computation enables a computationally-limited client to outsource
a computation to a computational powerful server and efficiently verify whether the
returned result was evaluated correctly. Publicly verifiable computation [118], on the
other hand, aims to provide a more practical scenario for VC. In PVC only one client
needs to perform the expensive one-time pre-processing stage and is able to publish
parameters (for a specific function F ) in such a way that any other entity can use those
parameters themselves in order to delegate the evaluation of F on their own input and
also to verify results. Thus, PVC can be seen as a multi-client system but the system
does not currently support multiple servers or multiple functions.
We believe that both requirements might be important to make current PVC schemes
“more practical”. In more detail, it may be desirable for a client to be able to choose
from a set of available servers per computation within the system. Certain different
individual computation requests may require different computational resources such as
a certain amount of processor cores or a given amount of RAM. Such specific require-
ments may only be fulfilled by a small number of servers within the system and clients
are flexible to choose the server depending on their needs related on the complexity
of the computation. A client may also require that certain computations can only be
evaluated on servers that are located within a specific geographical location. The mo-
tivation may be to minimise latency or the specific computation may be of sensitive
nature and thus may not leave the country of origin and therefore the client may be
even willing to pay a higher reward for using such a specific server. Having registered
multiple servers offering a computation service to clients within a PVC system, it seems
conceivable that the servers may compete against each other to reduce costs or may
bid on computations depending on their available resources. Thus, such behaviour may
be of particular interest for the client since this may reduce the involved cost of the
system and rewards dramatically.
In current PVC schemes the system is only initialised to evaluate a single function. In
case a client wishes to compute a new function, she is required to initialise a new inde-
pendent PVC system. This requires the client to invest a lot of her own resources each
time she needs to compute a new function. Since this is not acceptable in a practical
environment, we aim to enhance the system to accommodate handling multiple func-
tions in a publicly verifiable way to spare those resources for other tasks. Since PVC
can be seen as a multi-client system, it is also conceivable that many clients are largely
interested in outsourcing the same set of functions, albeit on different, client-specific
input data. Currently, it is likely that within a group of clients (e.g. a set of employees
within a company) there is a distinguished client responsible initialising the system
by running the expensive pre-processing and distributing the respective delegation key
and evaluation key to the other members of the group. However, given that the set of
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functions for different groups of clients may overlap, it seems required that each distin-
guished client invests the same effort to initialise the respective system for their group.
This effort is redundant as all distinguished clients just repeat each others work while
the workload has already increased as the client initialised a system to accommodate
multiple servers and multiple functions. The role of these clients become akin to an
authority of entities within the system. Therefore, we propose the introduction of a
separate trusted entity which we denote as the key distribution centre (KDC). The role
of the key distribution centre is to initialise the system and issue the evaluation keys
on behalf of all clients within the system.
Given that we have enrolled multiple untrusted servers within a PVC system, it may
well be desirable that cheating servers are prevented from performing further compu-
tations and as such being revoked from the system, as they are deemed completely
untrustworthy in case they were caught cheating. In the single-client VC scheme [72],
the client can simply choose to no longer delegate computations to the server. In a
multi-client setting, on the other hand, it is necessary that all clients within the system
are aware that a server is known to be not trustworthy and stop using it to spare their
resources. However, in both VC and PVC, to overcome the problem, we are required to
initialise a new system which requires the client to invest again her valuable resources
on the pre-processing. In our new PVC proposal, it is not desirable to initialise a new
system as other (potentially trustworthy) servers are also enrolled and can be still used.
Note that if any client would outsource a computation to a misbehaving server then
the verification procedure would still ensure that the errors are detected. However, we
wish future clients not to waste their limited resources by delegating to a ‘bad’ server,
and wish to disincentivise servers from cheating in the first place, as they know they
will be detected and revoked, and therefore incur a significant (financial) penalty from
not receiving future work.
Our main contribution in this chapter is to introduce the new notion of revocable publicly
verifiable computation (RPVC). Our scheme aims to achieve the following goals:
• we allow to enrol multiple servers within a PVC system;
• we allow the server to handle multiple outsourced functions within a single PVC
system;
• we introduce the notion of a KDC that is responsible for handling the compu-
tational expensive part and to issue evaluation keys for the functions. In case a
client detects a cheating server, the client may report to the KDC which in turn
is able to revoke the misbehaving server without having to initialise a new PVC
system.
We provide a rigorous definitional framework for RPVC, that we believe more ac-
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curately reflects real environments than previously considered in the PVC literature.
This new framework both removes redundancy and includes additional functionalities,
leading to several new security notions.
Related Work
In independent and concurrent work, Carter et al. [45] introduced a trusted third party
for a verifiable computation scheme as well. This more powerful entity is responsible to
generate garbled circuits for such schemes. However, the solution requires the entity to
be online throughout the computation and models the system as a secure multi-party
computation protocol between the client, server and third party. We do not believe
this solution is practical in general since it is conceivable that a trusted entity is not
always available in order to take an active part in computations.
For example, following the battlefield communications scenario by Gennaro et al. [72],
VC schemes are required where soldiers are deployed with lightweight computing de-
vices which gather data from their surroundings. The soldiers then send the data to
their regional servers for analysis and receive a result that needs to be verified. In this
scenario, the trusted party could be located within a high security base or governmen-
tal building generating relevant keys which are provided to the soldiers before being
deployed with the lightweight device. However, we believe it is rather infeasible for a
soldier to contact and maintain a permanent communication link with the headquarters
for the duration of a computation.
It seems a reasonable assumption and scenario that in a VC scheme there could be
many available servers offering computations but only a single (or a small number) of
trusted third parties. The third party could easily become here a bottleneck in the
system and limit the number of computations that can take place at any one time.
Organisation of Chapter
In Section 3.2 we introduce our new system model framework for our revocable PVC
scheme. This new model leads to new and extended security models which we discuss
and analyse in detail in Section 3.3. This is followed, in Section 3.4, by a discussion
about the technical challenges within our enhanced model and a concrete instantiation
for a RPVC scheme based on the revocable KP-ABE scheme. In Section 3.5 we present
detailed proofs of security for the achievable security notions. We conclude the chapter
in Section 3.6.
3.2 Revocable Publicly Verifiable Outsourced Computation
The aim of this section is to enhance the existing PVC system model to accommodate a
more practical system comprising multiple clients and multiple servers. We introduce
a single trusted entity known as the key distribution centre (KDC) that acts as an
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authority on entities enrolled in the system and thus makes entity management more
straightforward. Our model allows multiple servers to compute multiple functions in a
secure manner and we ensure that a server is not able to use an evaluation key for a
function G to return a valid computational result for F (x).
In the remainder of this section, we discuss in more detail the role of the key distribution
centre and discuss two system architectures which later lead to several new security
notions. We also provide a formal definition of revocable PVC.
3.2.1 Key Distribution Centre
Existing frameworks assume that a client or several clients run the expensive pre-
processing of a VC scheme and that a single server performs the outsourced compu-
tation. We believe that this is not adequate for a number of reasons, irrespective of
whether the client is sufficiently powerful to perform the required operations. First,
in a real-world system, we may wish to outsource the setup phase to a trusted third
party. In this setting, the third party would operate rather similarly to a certificate
authority, providing a trust service to facilitate other operations of an organisation (in
this case outsourced computation, rather than authentication). Second, we may wish
to limit the functions that some clients can outsource.
A distinguished client with additional computational resources to perform the expen-
sive pre-processing could act as the KDC. However, we consider the KDC to be a
separate entity to illustrate separation of duty between the clients that request compu-
tations, and the KDC that is authoritative on the system and users, and we minimise
its workload to key generation and revocation only.
It may be tempting to suggest that the KDC, as a trusted entity, performs all computa-
tions itself. However we believe that this is not a practical solution in many real-world
scenarios, e.g. the KDC could be an authority within the organisation responsible for
user authorisation that wishes to enable workers to securely use cloud-based Software-
as-a-Service. As an entity within organisation boundaries, performing all computations
would negate the achieved benefits from initially outsourcing computations to exter-
nally available servers.
We want to emphasise that the KDC is basically responsible to perform the expensive
pre-processing to reduce the client’s computational burden. The KDC is responsible
for providing each server with a set of evaluation keys enabling them to perform com-
putations for a set of functions. The client may request the computation of F (x) from
any server that is certified to compute F . The KDC also enables efficient revocation of
misbehaving servers as the update key material can be easily generated and distributed.
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3.2.2 Standard Model
The standard model is a natural extension of the PVC architecture of Parno et al. [118]
with the addition of a trusted key distribution centre. The entity population comprises
a set of clients, a set of servers and a KDC. The KDC initialises the system and gener-
ates keys to enable a verifiable computation service. It publishes the keys to delegate
computations for the clients, whilst keys to evaluate specific functions are given to indi-
vidual servers. Clients can submit computation requests to a particular server for their
respective inputs, and publish some verification information. The servers receive the
encoded input values and perform the computation to generate encoded results. Any
party can verify the correctness of the server’s output using the published verification
information. If the output is incorrect, the verifier may report the misbehaving server
to the KDC for revocation, which will prevent the server from performing any further
computations within the system.
KDCS1 S2 S3
PublicC1 C2
ekF,S1 ekF,S2
ekG,S3
σF,x1 θF (x1)
σF,x2 θF (x2)
σG,x3
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Revoke pkF , pkG
Verify
Verify
Figure 3.1: Operation of the standard model of a RPVC scheme
Note that the expensive KeyGen operation (pre-processing) is now run by the more
capable KDC, and many servers are able to use the generated keys to evaluate the same
function, whereas in previous PVC proposals each client would have been required to
run KeyGen to set up a system with its choice of server.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the entity population and their respective interaction within the
standard model of a PVC scheme.
3.2.3 Manager Model
The manager model, in contrast, employs an additional manager entity who “owns”
a pool of computation servers. Clients submit jobs to the manager, who will select a
server from the pool based on workload scheduling, available resources or as a result of
some bidding process in case servers are to be rewarded per computation. A plausible
scenario is that servers enlist with a manager to “sell” the use of spare resources, whilst
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clients subscribe to utilise these through the manager. Encoded results are returned
to the manager who should be able to verify the server’s work. The manager forwards
correct results to the client whilst a misbehaving server may be reported to the KDC
for revocation, and the job assigned to another server. Due to public verifiability, any
party with access to the output and the verification token can also verify the result.
This also enables the client to check whether the manager performed its duties correctly.
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Figure 3.2: Operation of the manager model of a RPVC scheme
The interaction between entities in this model is illustrated in Figure 3.2. The manager
and computational servers are shown within a dashed region to illustrate the boundaries
of internal and external entities, i.e. the entities not within the dashed region could all
be within an organisation that wish to use the external resources provided by the
manager to outsource computations.
Notice that the manager performs the verification operation and if the computation
is correct the manager forwards the result with an acceptance token to the client. In
case the verification procedure fails the manager reports to the KDC for revocation
and sends the client a rejection token expressing that within the current time period t
the computation failed.
Both models, the standard model and manager model, aim to enhance the existing
PVC model to reflect a more practical scenario. However, being in a publicly verifiable
setting enables any entity to verify a computational result and thus learn the output.
In some scenarios this may be acceptable whereas in others it is not desirable that
external entities can access the result, yet there still remains legitimate reasons for spe-
cific entities, such as the manager, to verify only the correctness of the result without
learning the actual value. Therefore, a notion of blind verification would be a desirable
property such that the manager (or any other entity) may verify only the validity of
the computation but is not able to determine the actual result of the computation.
The delegating client would create an additional (secret) piece of information called
the retrieval token which enables her to determine the result, and thus would provide a
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notion of output privacy. This additional piece of information could also be shared with
authorised (trustworthy) entities such that they may learn the result too. Parno et al.
also envisage that such a property may be useful in the PVC setting and provide a one
line remark that permuting keys and ciphertexts derived during ProbGen could provide
output privacy. Unfortunately, our system model cannot provably accommodate the
notion of blind verification but we believe that this is an interesting problem to inves-
tigate in future work.
In Table 3.1 we provide an overview which entities are responsible for running each
algorithm in “normal” verifiable outsourced computation (VC), publicly verifiable out-
sourced computation (PVC), the standard model of RPVC, and finally RPVC in the
Manager model.
Algorithm
Run by
VC PVC RPVC Standard RPVC Manager
KeyGen C1 C1 KDC KDC
ProbGen C1 C1, C2, . . . C1, C2, . . . C1, C2, . . .
Compute S S S1, S2, . . . S1, S2, . . .
Verify C1 C1, C2, . . . C1, C2, . . . M,C1, C2, . . .
Table 3.1: Overview of entity population in various VC models
3.2.4 Formal Definition
We now present a formal definition of all necessary algorithms for a RPVC scheme.
Definition 3.1. A revocable publicly verifiable outsourced computation (RPVC) scheme
consists of the following algorithms:
• (pp,mk) $← Setup(1λ,F) : this randomised algorithm is run by the KDC to estab-
lish public parameters pp and a master secret key mk for a family of functions
F ;
• pkF $← FnInit(F,mk, pp) : this randomised algorithm is run by the KDC to gen-
erate a public delegation key pkF enabling clients to outsource computations of a
function F ;
• skS $← Register(S,mk, pp) : this randomised algorithm is run by the KDC to enrol
a computation server S within the system by generating a personalised signing key
skS for S;
• ekF,S $← Certify(S, F,mk, pp) : this randomised algorithm is run by the KDC to
certify a computation server by providing it with an evaluation key ekF,S for a
function F and server S;
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• (σF,x, vkF,x) $← ProbGen(x, pkF , pp) : this randomised algorithm is run by a client
to delegate the computation of F (x) to a server. The client inputs her input value
x, the public delegation key and the public parameters. The algorithm outputs
an encoded input σF,x and a verification key vkF,x which can be later used for
verifying the returned computational result;
• θF (x) $← Compute(σF,x, ekF,S , skS , pp) : this randomised algorithm is run by a
server S using its evaluation key ekF,S, a signing key skS and an encoded input
σF,x of x. It outputs an encoding θF (x) of F (x);
• (y, τθF (x))← Verify(θF (x), vkF,x, pp) : this algorithm is run by any verifying party
(standard model), or by the manager (manager model), in possession of vkF,x and
an encoded output θF (x). It outputs the actual result y. If the result y corresponds
to F (x) it additionally creates a token τθF (x) = (accept, S) indicating that the
result was correctly computed. Otherwise, the result y corresponds to ⊥ and it
creates a token τθF (x) = (reject, S) indicating that the result is malformed and
S misbehaved;
• um $← Revoke(τθF (x) ,mk, pp) : this randomised algorithm is run by the KDC
inputting the token from the verification process. If τθF (x) = (reject, S), the
algorithm revokes all evaluation keys ek·,S of the server S thereby preventing S
from performing any further evaluations within the current system. The update
material um consists of a set of updated evaluation keys ek·,S′ which are issued
to all non-revoked servers. Otherwise, in case τθF (x) = (accept, S) then the
algorithm outputs ⊥ indicating that no update was necessary.
In some instantiations of a PVC scheme, it may not be necessary to issue entirely new
evaluation keys to each entity. For example, in our concrete instantiation (cf. Sec-
tion 3.4), we only need to issue a partially updated key.
Although not explicitly stated, the KDC may update the public parameters pp dur-
ing any algorithm in order to address any changes within the system. Those changes
can encompass of servers being added or removed from the system or a server may be
granted the ability to compute additional functions.
Note that in case we would employ the blind verification mechanism, as discussed in
Section 3.2.3, into the formal definition of RPVC we would be required to split the
verification algorithm into two sub-algorithms. Namely, we would divide it into a blind
verification and retrieve algorithm. As discussed before, blind verification would en-
able one to check only the correctness of the output without learning the actual result,
whereas the retrieve algorithm would then enable the client who initially prepared the
encoded input to retrieve the actual result using her secret retrieval token.
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We say that a RPVC scheme is correct if the verifying party almost certainly accepts the
returned result generated by a non-revoked server using a valid generated verification
key and encoded output given the non-revoked server used a valid generated encoded
input and evaluation key. More formally this can be represented as follows.
Definition 3.2. A revocable publicly verifiable outsourced computation (RPVC) scheme
is correct for a family of functions F if for all functions F ∈ F , all inputs x ∈ Dom(F )
and all non-revoked servers S, the following holds:
Pr[(pp,mk)
$← Setup(1λ,F),
pkF
$← FnInit(F,mk, pp),
skS
$← Register(S,mk, pp),
ekF,S
$← Certify(S, F,mk, pp),
(σF,x, vkF,x)
$← ProbGen(x, pkF , pp),
θF (x)
$← Compute(σF,x, ekF,S , skS , pp),
y ← Verify(θF (x), vkF,x, pp),
um
$← Revoke(τθF (x) ,mk, pp)]
= 1− negl(λ).
3.3 Security Models
In this section, we introduce several security models capturing different requirements
of a RPVC scheme. The introduction of the KDC, multiple servers and the ability
to compute multiple functions, and the subsequent changes in operation give rise to
several new security concerns. In more detail:
• Public Verifiability: since two (or more) servers may be certified to compute
the same function, it is important to ensure that servers cannot collude in order to
convince a client to accept an incorrect computational result as a correct result;
• Revocation: we must ensure that neither an uncertified nor a de-certified server
can convince a client to accept an output;
• Vindictive Server: we must ensure that a malicious server cannot convince a
client to believe that an honest server has produced an incorrect output;
• Vindictive Manager: we must ensure that, in the manager model, a malicious
manager cannot convince a client of an incorrect result.
Given those concerns, we define four notions of security for our RPVC scheme where
each is modelled as a cryptographic game. For the notions of public verifiability, revoca-
tion and vindictive manager, we need to define weaker notions of security which we term
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selective and selective semi-static, respectively. This restriction arises from the particu-
lar IND-sHRSS indirectly revocable key-policy attribute-based encryption scheme we
use in our construction that introduces similar constraints (cf. Section 3.4). In other
words, given the current primitives we use in our construction we cannot achieve full
security for all security notions, but we can achieve slightly weaker variants. However,
as we employ the KP-ABE scheme in a black-box fashion, if stronger primitives are
found it should be straightforward to change to them and finally achieve full security.
In the remainder of this section, we first present the ideal notions of security we wish
to achieve for a RPVC scheme. We then discuss the necessary modifications to define
the selective and selective, semi-static notions we are currently able to achieve.
3.3.1 Ideal Security Properties
In this section we discuss the ideal security notions we wish to achieve in our RPVC
framework. Even if it is not possible to achieve all of these notions with the current
primitives, we include them for completeness.
3.3.1.1 Public Verifiability
We extend the public verifiability game of Parno et al. [118] to formalise that multiple
servers should not be able to collude in order to gain an advantage in convincing any
verifying party of an incorrect output. More formally, that is that the algorithm Verify
returns accept on an encoded output θ? not corresponding to the correct output F (x)
of the computation.
Recall that Parno et al. [118] initially only considered the case where the adversary
is limited to learn only one evaluation key and one encoded input. This stems from
the fact that the system is initialised only for one server and one function. The mo-
tivation for this updated game is that there is a now a trusted party issuing keys to
multiple servers that may collude. Here each server is able to request evaluation keys
for multiple functions and must not be able to use an evaluation key for a function
G to produce a valid looking result for a computation request for F (x). Thus, in the
formal description of our game, we allow the adversary to learn multiple evaluation
keys for different functions and each is associated with different server identities (since
evaluation keys are server-specific in our setting to enable per-server revocation). Fur-
thermore, in our setting, it is likely that the set of servers evaluate many computations
on behalf of multiple clients simultaneously, and so we allow the adversary to collect
multiple encoded inputs by simply running the ProbGen algorithm.
In Figure 3.3, we present the ideal notion of public verifiability. The game begins with
the challenger setting up the system. The adversary A receives the resulting parameters
and is given oracle access to FnInit(·,mk, pp), Register(·,mk, pp), Certify(·, ·,mk, pp) and
Revoke(·,mk, pp) which we denote by O. All oracles simply run the relevant algorithm.
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ExpPubVerifA
[RPVC, 1λ,F]
1 : (pp,mk)←$ Setup(1λ,F)
2 : (F, x?)←$ AO(pp)
3 : pkF ←$ FnInit(F,mk, pp)
4 : (σF,x? , vkF,x?)←$ ProbGen(x?, pkF , pp)
5 : θ?←$ AO(σF,x? , vkF,x? , pkF , pp)
6 : (y, τθ?)← Verify(θ?, vkF,x? , pp)
7 : if (y, τθ?) 6= (⊥, (reject, S)) and (y 6= F (x?)) then
8 : return 1
9 : else return 0
Figure 3.3: The ideal public verifiability experiment ExpPubVerifA
[RPVC, 1λ,F]
This step models the adversary observing an existing RPVC system and corrupting
various servers to learn their evaluation keys.
Eventually, the adversary finishes its query phase to the oracles and outputs its choice
of challenge pair consisting of the challenge function F and challenge input x?. Note
that the adversary’s underlying goal is to convince the client of accepting an incorrect
result for the computation F (x?). The challenger will then run FnInit to initialise the
challenge function F and generate a challenge by running ProbGen on input x?, and
give the resulting encoded input to A. The adversary is again given oracle access and
eventually outputs θ?. It wins if the encoded output verifies correctly but does not
encode the value F (x?).
Definition 3.3. The advantage of a PPT adversary in the PubVerif game for a
revocable publicly verifiable outsourced computation scheme RPVC, for a family of
functions F is defined as:
AdvPubVerifA,RPVC (1
λ,F) = Pr
[
ExpPubVerifA
[
RPVC, 1λ,F
]
→ 1
]
.
We say that the revocable publicly verifiable outsourced computation scheme RPVC is
secure with respect to public verifiability if for all PPT adversaries A, it holds that
AdvPubVerifA,RPVC (1
λ,F) ≤ negl(λ).
In practical environments, a server may be interacting with multiple clients simultane-
ously and it could be that having multiple simultaneous interactions could provide an
advantage against any one of the computations. Thus, when modelling this scenario
as a game, we may wish the adversary would choose a polynomially sized set of input
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values to be challenged upon to model these simultaneous inputs and for the adversary
to win against any one of the inputs. We formalise this for the case of public verifia-
bility and present the notion of public verifiability with a polynomial sized set of input
values in Figure 3.4. In the following theorem, we show that this notion is polynomially
equivalent to the case where the adversary chooses a single challenge input as described
in Figure 3.3.
ExpmPubVerifA
[RPVC, 1λ,F]
1 : (pp,mk)←$ Setup(1λ,F)
2 : {(Fi, x?i )}i∈[n]←$ AO(pp)
3 : for i = 1, . . . , n do
4 : pkFi ←$ FnInit(Fi,mk, pp)
5 : (σFi,x?i , vkFi,x?i )←$ ProbGen(x?i , pkFi , pp)
6 : θ?←$ AO({σFi,x?i , vkFi,x?i , pkFi}, pp)
7 : (y, τθ?)← Verify(θ?, vkF,x?i , pp)
8 : if ∃i ∈ [n] : (y, τθ?) 6= (⊥, (reject, S)) and (y 6= Fi(x?i )) then
9 : return 1
10 : else return 0
Figure 3.4: The public verifiability experiment with polynomial sized set of input values
ExpmPubVerifA
[RPVC, 1λ,F]
Theorem 3.4. Let λ be the security parameter, and n(λ) ∈ N a function polynomial
in the security parameter. Then public verifiability where the adversary may target
an arbitrary set of n challenge inputs (Figure 3.4) is polynomially equivalent to public
verifiability where the adversary chooses a single challenge input (Figure 3.3).
Proof. It is trivial to show that security with multiple choices implies security with a
single choice, since an adversary with multiple choices could simply choose n = 1 and
output a single choice.
To see that security with a single choice also implies security with multiple choices we
can perform the following reduction. Suppose that RPVC is a secure RPVC scheme
when the adversary AS makes a single choice of challenge input. For contradiction, let
AM be an adversary with non-negligible advantage δ against RPVC when it can make
multiple challenge choices. We show that AS could use AM as a sub-routine to gain a
non-negligible advantage against RPVC even with just a single challenge choice. Let
C be the challenger playing the public verifiability game with a single challenge as in
Figure 3.3 with AS that in turn acts as the challenger for AM in the public verifiability
game with multiple challenges as described in Figure 3.4. It follows:
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1. C runs Setup and sends the resulting parameters to AS that simply forwards them
to AM.
2. AM makes oracle queries which AS passes to C and forwards the response to AM.
3. AM will return a set of n challenge input pairs {(Fi, x?i )}i∈[n].
4. AS chooses one of these input pairs at random, (F, x?) $← {(Fi, x?i )}i∈[n], and
sends this to C.
5. C returns the results of running FnInit and ProbGen on F and x? and then provides
further oracle access to AS.
6. AS can query the FnInit oracle for all other public keys pkFi as well as query the
ProbGen oracle for the remaining inputs {x?i }i∈[n] \ x? and returns the whole set
to AM. Since no other query was made between C generating the challenge and
these ProbGen queries, the system parameters have not changed and all challenges
are consistent.
7. AM makes oracle queries which AS again forwards to C, and eventually outputs
a challenge output θ?.
8. Let x?j be the challenge input corresponding to θ
?. In more detail, since AM
is assumed to be successful, the algorithm Verify(θ?, vkF,x?j , pp) does not return
(⊥, (reject, ·)) and hence θ? is a valid encoding of F (x?j ) for some x?j . If x?j = x?
then AS forwards θ? to C as its result. Otherwise, AS stops.
Hence,
AdvPubVerifAS,RPVC(1
λ,F) = Pr[x? = x?j ] ·AdvmPubVerifAM,RPVC (1λ,F) =
δ
n
.
Since we assumed δ being non-negligible, and as n is polynomial in λ, we conclude that
AdvPubVerifAS,RPVC(1
λ,F) is non-negligible. However, we assumed that RPVC was secure
against a single challenge and hence the adversary making multiple challenges with
non-negligible advantage may not exist.
Similar arguments hold for the other games, and henceforth we shall only consider
single challenges.
3.3.1.2 Revocation
The notion of revocation requires that, if a server is detected as misbehaving, meaning
that a server S returns a result such that the verification algorithm Verify outputs
(⊥, (reject, S)), then any subsequent computations by S should be rejected, even if
the result may be correct.
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The motivation here is that even though the costly computation and pre-processing
stages have been outsourced to the server and KDC respectively, there is still a cost
involved for the client to delegate and verify a computation. Our underlying aim is
to remove any incentive for a malicious server to attempt providing an outsourcing
service since the server is aware that no result will be accepted. In addition, we may
punish and further disincentive malicious servers by removing their ability to perform
computations and thus earn rewards. Finally, from a privacy perspective, we may not
wish to supply input data to a server that is known to be untrustworthy.
The ideal notion of revocation is defined in Figure 3.5. The game begins by declaring
a Boolean flag chall which is initially set to false and a list QRev in which servers
will be added in case they are revoked and removed from when re-certified. The chall
flag will be set to true when the challenge is created, and after this point QRev is no
longer updated. Thus QRev will comprise all server identities that are revoked at the
challenge time. The adversary wins if it can output a result ‘from’ one of these servers
and have it accepted in the verification stage.
The game proceeds in a similar fashion to the notion of public verifiability with the chal-
lenger running Setup to initialise the system and providing the public parameters to the
adversary. The adversary is given oracle access to FnInit(·,mk, pp), Register(·,mk, pp),
Certify(·, ·,mk, pp) and Revoke(·,mk, pp) which we denote by O. All oracles simply
run the relevant algorithm except for the Certify and Revoke oracles which additionally
maintain the list of revoked entities. The formal details are specified in the respective
oracles in Figure 3.5. After the adversary has finished this query phase, it outputs a
challenge function F and challenge input x?. The challenger runs FnInit for the chal-
lenge function and sets the chall flag to true. It then generates the challenge by
running ProbGen on x? and gives the resulting parameters to the adversary along with
oracle access again. However we want to emphasise again that since chall is set to
true, QRev will no longer be updated. Eventually, the adversary outputs a result θ
?
and wins if Verify successfully accepts the result (either correct or malformed) for a
server that was revoked when the challenge was generated.
Definition 3.5. The advantage of a PPT adversary in the Revoc game for a revocable
publicly verifiable outsourced computation scheme RPVC, for a family of functions F
is defined as:
AdvRevocA,RPVC(1
λ,F) = Pr
[
ExpRevocA
[
RPVC, 1λ,F
]
→ 1
]
.
We say that the revocable publicly verifiable outsourced computation scheme RPVC is
78
3.3 Security Models
ExpRevocA
[RPVC, 1λ,F]
1 : chall = false
2 : QRev ← 
3 : (pp,mk)←$ Setup(1λ,F)
4 : (F, x?)←$ AO(pp)
5 : pkF ←$ FnInit(F,mk, pp)
6 : chall = true
7 : (σF,x? , vkF,x?)←$ ProbGen(x?, pkF , pp)
8 : θ?←$ AO(σF,x? , vkF,x? , pkF , pp)
9 : (y, τθ?)← Verify(θ?, vkF,x? , pp)
10 : if (y, τθ?) = (y, (accept, S)) and (S ∈ QRev) then
11 : return 1
12 : else return 0
OCertify(S, F ′,mk, pp)
1 : if (chall = false) then QRev ← QRev \ S
2 : return Certify(S, F ′,mk, pp)
ORevoke(τθF ′(x) ,mk, pp)
1 : um←$ Revoke(τθF ′(x) ,mk, pp)
2 : if (um 6=⊥ and chall = false) then QRev ← QRev ∪ S
3 : return um
Figure 3.5: The ideal revocation experiment ExpRevocA
[RPVC, 1λ,F]
secure with respect to revocation if for all PPT adversaries A, it holds that
AdvRevocA,RPVC(1
λ,F) ≤ negl(λ).
3.3.1.3 Vindictive Server
This security notion of vindictive server is primarily motivated in the context of the
manager model where a pool of computational servers is available to accept a ‘job’
but they are distributed by the manager such that the client does not know a priori
the server identity to which the job was assigned. Since an invalid result can lead to
revocation, this reveals a new threat model (particularly if servers are rewarded per
computation). A malicious server may return incorrect results but attribute them to
a different server identity such that a potentially honest server is punished by being
revoked on the basis of the malicious server’s behaviour. The pool of available servers
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for future computations is therefore reduced in size and thus leads to a likely increase
in rewards for the malicious server since it may get assigned more work.
The notion of vindictive servers is formalised in Figure 3.6. The game starts with
the challenger maintaining a list of currently registered entities QReg, a list QServer of
servers for which the adversary was able to learn the signing key as well as initialising S
which represents the target server identity, initially set to ⊥, until the adversary selects
its target identity. The game proceeds from here on similarly to the previous notions
except that, on line 8 and 10, the adversary chooses the target server identity S and
then generates an encoded output that the adversary hopes will lead to the revocation
of S .
The adversary is given oracle access to FnInit(·,mk, pp), Register(·,mk, pp),
Certify(·, ·,mk, pp) and Revoke(·,mk, pp) which we denote by O. All oracles simply
run the relevant algorithm except for the Certify and the two additionally defined ora-
cles Register2 and Compute. The formal details are provided in the respective oracles
represented in Figure 3.6. In general, those oracles must ensure that the adversary is
never issued the signing key skS as the adversary would then be trivially able to act
like S and win the game. For the same reason, the adversary loses the game in line
9 if it has previously learnt the signing key skS for the target server chosen in line 8
meaning that S is listed on QServer. In line 10, the adversary is additionally provided
with access to a compute oracle OCompute(·, ek·,S , skS , pp) which enables the adversary
to observe evaluation results generated by the target server S . This oracle basically
models the adversary observing S before attacking.
In more detail, the Register oracle outputs ⊥ if it is queried with the target identity
S . Otherwise, if the queried server identity is not already recorded on the list of reg-
istered entities QReg, then the oracle adds the queried server identity to the lists QReg
and QServer as it will issue a signing key skS . On line 8, the adversary is additionally
provided with a modified Register oracle. This Register2 oracle performs similarly to
the Register oracle but does not return the resulting signing key skS . However, it may
update the public parameters to reflect any additional registered entities within the
system. The adversary may query any identity to Register2 including S . The purpose
of this oracle is to model the adversary observing uncorrupted servers within the RPVC
system which it can target for revocation. Formally, this means the adversary is able to
enrol servers within the system but unable to learn any server specific secrets. Those
restrictions need to be considered in the oracles as if the adversary corrupts a server
and learns its secret signing key, then the adversary would be able to trivially output
an incorrect result and cause the server to be revoked. However, this would contradict
the aim of this notion which is to cause an honest, uncorrupted server to be revoked.
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ExpVindSA
[RPVC, 1λ,F]
1 : QReg ← 
2 : QServer ← 
3 : S ←⊥
4 : (pp,mk)←$ Setup(1λ,F)
5 : (F, x?)←$ AO,Register2(pp)
6 : pkF ←$ FnInit(F,mk, pp)
7 : (σF,x? , vkF,x?)←$ ProbGen(x?, pkF , pp)
8 : S ←$ AO,Register2(σF,x? , vkF,x? , pkF , pp)
9 : if (S ∈ QServer) then return 0
10 : θ?←$ AO,Register2,Compute(σF,x? , vkF,x? , pkF , pp)
11 : (y, τθ?)← Verify(θ?, vkF,x? , pp)
12 : if (y, τθ?) = (⊥, (reject, S)) and (⊥8 Revoke(τθ? ,mk, pp)) then
13 : return 1
14 : else return 0
ORegister(S,mk, pp)
1 : if (S = S) then return ⊥
2 : if (S, ·) /∈ QReg then
3 : skS ←$ Register(S,mk, pp)
4 : QReg ← QReg ∪ (S, skS)
5 : QServer ← QServer ∪ S
6 : return skS
ORegister2(S,mk, pp)
1 : if (S, ·) /∈ QReg then
2 : skS ←$ Register(S,mk, pp)
3 : QReg ← QReg ∪ (S, skS)
4 : QServer ← QServer ∪ S
5 : return ⊥
OCompute(σF ′,x, ekF ′,S , skS , pp)
1 : if (F ′ = F ) and (x = x?) then
2 : return ⊥
3 : else return Compute(σF ′,x, ekF ′,S , skS , pp)
Figure 3.6: The ideal vindictive server experiment ExpVindSA
[RPVC, 1λ,F]
The oracles Register and Register2 are modified compared to the standard Register
oracle. Both oracles first check whether the queried server identity has already been
added to the list of registered entities QReg. If not, then both algorithms run the usual
Register algorithm and record the server identity and signing key to the list QReg. In
case that the server was already registered then the Register oracle returns the stored
signing key whilst the Register2 oracle returns ⊥. Thus, both oracles will generate
together a single singing key per server and output identical responses.
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In order to avoid a trivial win for the adversary in which the adversary simply forwards
prior outputs that were actually generated by S , we need to restrict queries to the
Compute oracle. The adversary is restricted to not being able to ask for the evaluation
key for the challenge computation F (x?) from S . Note that for all other servers than S ,
the adversary is able to run Compute itself using all parameters learnt from the other
queries.
Finally, the adversary wins if the challenger believes that S generated the encoded
output which does not verify correctly and therefore revokes S .
Definition 3.6. The advantage of a PPT adversary in the VindS game for a revocable
publicly verifiable outsourced computation scheme RPVC, for a family of functions F
is defined as:
AdvVindSA,RPVC(1
λ,F) = Pr
[
ExpVindSA
[
RPVC, 1λ,F
]
→ 1
]
.
We say that the revocable publicly verifiable outsourced computation scheme RPVC is
secure with respect to vindictive servers if for all PPT adversaries A, it holds that
AdvVindSA,RPVC(1
λ,F) ≤ negl(λ).
3.3.1.4 Vindictive Manager
The notion of vindictive manager is a natural extension of the public verifiability no-
tion to the manager model where a vindictive manager may attempt to provide a client
with an incorrect answer. In this notion, clients may subscribe to a pool of servers
managed by a manager. However, the manager may not wish to be responsible for
incorrect results in order to avoid losing business and also may not have the required
resources to re-compute a malformed result. Thus, occasionally, the manager may try
to send an incorrect result to the client on purpose claiming that it is correct.
We note that instantiations may vary depending on the level of trust given to the
manager. For example, a completely trusted manager may simply return the result to
a client, whilst an untrusted manager may have to provide the full output from the
server so that the client can perform the full verification step as well. Note that in
this case, security against vindictive managers will reduce to security against public
verifiability since the manager would need to forge an encoded output that passes a
full verification step. Here in our framework, we consider a middle ground where the
manager is semi-trusted but the clients would still like a final, efficient check.
The ideal notion of security against vindictive manager is defined in Figure 3.7. The
game starts with the challenger initialising the system as usual. The adversary receives
the resulting parameters and is given oracle access to FnInit(·,mk, pp), Register(·,mk, pp),
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ExpVindMA
[RPVC, 1λ,F]
1 : (pp,mk)←$ Setup(1λ,F)
2 : (F, x?)←$ AO(pp)
3 : pkF ←$ FnInit(F,mk, pp)
4 : S←$ UID
5 : skS ←$ Register(S,mk, pp)
6 : ekF,S ←$ Certify(S, F,mk, pp)
7 : (σF,x? , vkF,x?)←$ ProbGen(x?, pkF , pp)
8 : θF (x?)←$ Compute(σF,x? , ekF,S , skS , pp)
9 : (y, τθF (x?))←$ AO(σF,x? , θF (x?), vkF,x? , pkF , pp)
10 : if (y, τθF (x?)) 6= (⊥, (reject, S)) and (y 6= F (x?)) then
11 : return 1
12 : else return 0
Figure 3.7: The ideal vindictive manager experiment ExpVindMA
[RPVC, 1λ,F]
Certify(·, ·,mk, pp) and Revoke(·,mk, pp) which we denote by O. Each oracle simply
runs the relevant algorithms. After the adversary has finished its query phase, it out-
puts a challenge function F and challenge input x?. The challenger runs FnInit and
outputs the public delegation key. In the next step, the challenger randomly selects
a server identity from the space of all identities UID for which the challenge will be
created. The challenger runs Register and Certify for this server, creates a problem
instance by running ProbGen on x? and finally runs Compute on the generated encoded
input. The adversary is then given the encoded input, the verification key, the encoded
output from Compute, the usual parameters, as well as the usual oracle access as de-
tailed above, and eventually outputs the result y which corresponds to θF (x?) and an
acceptance token τθF (x?) . The adversary wins if the challenger accepts this output and
y 6= F (x?).
Definition 3.7. The advantage of a PPT adversary in the VindM game for a revoca-
ble publicly verifiable outsourced computation scheme RPVC, for a family of functions
F is defined as:
AdvVindMA,RPVC(1
λ,F) = Pr
[
ExpVindMA
[
RPVC, 1λ,F
]
→ 1
]
.
We say that the revocable publicly verifiable outsourced computation scheme RPVC is
secure with respect to vindictive managers if for all PPT adversaries A, it holds that
AdvVindMA,RPVC(1
λ,F) ≤ negl(λ).
83
3.3 Security Models
3.3.2 Restricted Security Properties
In this section we present the actual restricted security properties which we can prov-
ably achieve with the current primitives. In more detail, using the current primitives,
we cannot achieve the ideal notion of security for public verifiability, revocation and
vindictive manager. We are therefore required to introduce slightly weaker versions of
these security notions in order to reflect the similar restrictions placed on our construc-
tion by employing an IND-sHRSS indirectly revocable KP-ABE scheme as introduced
in Section 2.3.2. Since we use this primitive in a black-box manner, any achievement
with finding a fully secure primitive with the same functionality should easily lead to
achieve ideal security for our suggested notions.
These restricted security variants require up to two additional restrictions on the ad-
versary. Namely, a selective and a semi-static restriction. In more detail, firstly, a
selective restriction requires the adversary to choose the set of inputs for the challenge
stage before seeing the public parameters. This notion stands in contrast to the ideal
notion where the adversary can declare the set of inputs after it has seen the public
parameters as well as accessed the oracles to the system. This restriction has similarly
been used in many ABE schemes throughout the literature to give a heuristic level of
security when the ideal notion is difficult to achieve as it allows to initialise the system
with a particular attack target in mind.
Secondly, a semi-static restriction requires the adversary to declare a challenge list R of
servers that must be revoked from the system before ProbGen generates the challenge
encoded inputs and before the adversary is provided with oracle access. This restriction
is related to the revocation mechanism of the revocable KP-ABE scheme and means
that oracles are able to refuse to perform oracle queries that would lead to trivial wins
for the adversary, for example by issuing functional evaluation keys for servers that
should be revoked during the challenge time period. To formally accommodate this
semi-static restriction, we need to add some additional steps to each security notion.
In more detail, the challenger defines the parameter t which models the underlying
system time and is initially set to 1, and the second parameter is QRev which is a list
comprising all currently revoked server identities during the current time period. Note
that QRev is initialised to be empty when the system is set up describing that no server
has been revoked yet.
Whenever a revocation query has been made to the system both parameters are usually
updated. The time parameter is incremented for every revocation query indicating that
keys from prior time periods may no longer be valid. For the parameter QRev, every
revocation query means that servers are added to the list if it was queried with a
rejection token (reject, ·), and it can possibly mean that servers are removed from the
list in case they are re-certified for a function. Note that unless a server is added or
removed from QRev, the revocation list remains consistent over all consecutive oracle
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queries modelling a realistic system evolution. Recall that the semi-static restriction
forces the adversary to choose a list of revoked servers R for the challenge time period.
Note that if the current list of revoked servers QRev for the challenge time period t
?
is not a superset of R, i.e. there exists a server that the adversary claimed would be
revoked but actually is not revoked, then the adversary loses the game to avoid a trivial
win since the adversary has not made a suitable sequence of oracle queries.
To avoid other trivial wins we need to restrict the adversary’s oracle queries such that
it cannot obtain both a secret key and an update key, which together form a valid
evaluation key for a server that is revoked at the challenge time. Otherwise, if the
adversary can form a functional evaluation key it can evaluate the encoded input and
output a correct response. However, a revoked server would not have such an ability
in practice.
In the IND-sHRSS game [17], update keys are associated with a particular time period
and queries can be made for arbitrary time periods. However, in our RPVC setting, we
consider an interactive protocol and as such require that time increases monotonically.
The adversary in the IND-sHRSS game selects a time period for the challenge as well
as the challenge input. However, in our security notions, we parametrise the adversary
on the number of queries q it requests to the oracles and define security over all choices
of q. In particular, we restrict the adversary to make qt ≤ q queries to the Revoke oracle
in its first oracle query phase. After qt queries have been made the challenge needs to
be generated. Since the time parameter is only incremented whenever a Revoke query
has been made, the challenge occurs when t? = qt, and hence the challenger may select
t? as its challenge time in a reductive proof.
In order to remove the above restrictions we would require, on one hand, a fully secure
indirectly revocable KP-ABE scheme to overcome the selective restriction, and on the
other hand, an adaptive notion of revocation to overcome the semi-static restriction.
However, currently instantiating such a primitive is an open problem.1
3.3.2.1 Selective Public Verifiability
In Figure 3.8, we define a selective notion of public verifiability. The only difference
between the selective notion and the ideal notion, represented in Figure 3.3, is that in
the selective notion the adversary is required to provide its challenge inputs F and x?
before the challenger runs Setup. Otherwise, the game proceeds identical to the ideal
notion.
Note that in this security notion, the semi-static restriction is not required since the
revocation mechanism is not part of the winning condition.
1Attrapadung and Imai [17] defined a notion with adaptive queries but did not provide an instan-
tiation.
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ExpsPubVerifA
[RPVC, 1λ,F]
1 : (F, x?)←$ A(1λ,F)
2 : (pp,mk)←$ Setup(1λ,F)
3 : pkF ←$ FnInit(F,mk, pp)
4 : (σF,x? , vkF,x?)
$← ProbGen(x?, pkF , pp)
5 : θ?←$ AO(σF,x? , vkF,x? , pkF , pp)
6 : (y, τθ?)← Verify(θ?, vkF,x? , pp)
7 : if (y, τθ?) 6= (⊥, (reject, S)) and (y 6= F (x?)) then
8 : return 1
9 : else return 0
Figure 3.8: The selective public verifiability experiment ExpsPubVerifA
[RPVC, 1λ,F]
Definition 3.8. The advantage of a PPT adversary in the sPubVerif game for
a revocable publicly verifiable outsourced computation scheme RPVC, for a family of
functions F is defined as:
AdvsPubVerifA,RPVC (1
λ,F) = Pr
[
ExpsPubVerifA
[
RPVC, 1λ,F
]
→ 1
]
.
We say that the revocable publicly verifiable computation outsourced scheme RPVC is
secure with respect to selective public verifiability if for all PPT adversaries A, it holds
that
AdvsPubVerifA,RPVC (1
λ,F) ≤ negl(λ).
3.3.2.2 Selective, Semi-static Revocation
In Figure 3.9, we consider the selective, semi-static notion of revocation. Recall from
Section 3.3.1.2 that the winning condition against the security notion was formalised
in terms of the challenger accepting any result formed by a revoked entity. Since re-
vocation is a central requirement in the winning condition, we require here both the
selective and semi-static restrictions to accommodate the IND-sHRSS game.
The game begins with the adversary selecting the challenge function F and challenge
input x? to be outsourced. The challenger now initialises an initially empty list of cur-
rently revoked entities QRev as well as a time parameter t. Next, the challenger runs
Setup and FnInit to initialise the system and to derive the public delegation key pkF for
the function F . The adversary receives all public parameters and is required to output
a list R of servers that need to be revoked when the challenge is created. In the next
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ExpsssRevocA
[RPVC, 1λ,F , qt]
1 : (F, x?)←$ A(1λ,F , qt)
2 : QRev ← 
3 : t← 1
4 : (pp,mk)←$ Setup(1λ,F)
5 : pkF ←$ FnInit(F,mk, pp)
6 : R← A(pkF , pp)
7 : AO(pkF , pp)
8 : if (R 6⊆ QRev) then return 0
9 : (σF,x? , vkF,x?)←$ ProbGen(x?, pkF , pp)
10 : θ?←$ AO(σF,x? , vkF,x? , pkF , pp)
11 : (y, τθ?)← Verify(θ?, vkF,x? , pp)
12 : if (y, τθ?) = (y, (accept, S)) and (S ∈ R) then
13 : return 1
14 : else return 0
OCertify(S, F ′,mk, pp)
1 : if (F ′ = F and S /∈ R) or (t = qt and R 6⊆ QRev \ S) then return ⊥
2 : QRev ← QRev \ S
3 : return Certify(S, F ′,mk, pp)
ORevoke(τθF ′(x) ,mk, pp)
1 : t← t+ 1
2 : if (τθF ′(x) = (accept, ·)) then return ⊥
3 : if (t = qt and R 6⊆ QRev ∪ S) then return ⊥
4 : QRev ← QRev ∪ S
5 : return Revoke(τθF ′(x) ,mk, pp)
Figure 3.9: The selective, semi-static revocation experiment
ExpsssRevocA
[RPVC, 1λ,F , qt]
step, line 7, the adversary is given oracle access to FnInit(·,mk, pp), Register(·,mk, pp),
Certify(·, ·,mk, pp) and Revoke(·,mk, pp) which we denote by O. The oracles simply
run the usual algorithms except for queries to the Certify and Revoke oracles, which
the challenger replies to accordingly as specified in Figure 3.9. The challenger needs
to ensure that the revocation list QRev is permanently kept up-to-date by adding and
removing the queried entities. In case of revocation the challenger needs to ensure that
the time parameter is incremented to the next step and requires that no issued keys
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will lead to a trivial win. The latter part is handled by the Certify algorithm which
does not issue evaluation keys ekF,S for the challenge function F and a server S that
may not be revoked at the time the challenge is generated.
Recall that the adversary is, due to the semi-static restriction, parametrised to make
exactly qt revocation queries and the time parameter is only incremented during the
revocation algorithm. Thus, the challenge time period occurs when t = qt. Following
the second restriction of the Certify oracle in Figure 3.9, an evaluation key for a server
S should not be issued if requested during the challenge time period qt and if there
exists any server (other than S which is about to be certified) within the system that
according to the adversary’s chosen challenge revocation list R should be revoked but
has not actually been revoked, i.e. not listed in QRev. Intuitively, this restriction means
that Certify issues a valid and functional evaluation key within the current time period
and such a key can only be disabled by revoking the particular server which on the
other hand then leads to the requirement of incrementing the time period. Increment-
ing the time may be a problem if the challenge time period is already reached after
qt Revoke queries. Our particular construction may reveal generated update material
via Certify from the latest revocation procedure that enables the evaluation keys to be
functional for the current time period. If such update material is issued then this leads
to any non-revoked evaluation key being updated for the current challenge time period
qt and therefore can be used to perform computations and return valid results that
are accepted by the challenger. Therefore, if such an updated key belongs to a server
that was listed on R, then this would count as a trivial win for the adversary since the
adversary claimed that this server would be revoked for the challenge time period but
was not revoked.
Whenever the Revoke oracle is queried in Figure 3.9, first the time parameter t will
be incremented and the oracle returns ⊥ if the queried token corresponds to an ac-
ceptance token (accept, ·) which reflects that no server needs to be revoked. Since
the time parameter t is incremented for each query made to the oracle, the adversary
may query acceptance tokens to Revoke in order to progress the system time without
altering the revocation list if desired. However, in case a query is made at the challenge
time period t = qt, the challenger must return ⊥ if the chosen challenge revocation list
R is not a subset of the current revocation list including the queried S as it is about
to be revoked. In other words, the algorithm outputs ⊥ if there exists a server on the
challenge revocation list R that should be revoked, other than S, but is not on the
list of currently revoked servers QRev. This requirement is needed in order to avoid
a trivial win for the adversary, since otherwise the adversary can request an updated
evaluation key for a server listed on R which enables the adversary to create a valid
result which will be accepted by the challenger as it was generated by a non-revoked
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server.
The adversary finishes its oracles query phase (line 7) after making a polynomial number
of queries q, including qt many Revoke queries, and does not return a value other than
signalling to the challenger that it may proceed with the remainder of the game. The
challenger checks that all queries made by the adversary have indeed generated a list
of currently revoked servers that is a superset of the challenge revocation list R. If this
is not true, the challenger aborts the game and the adversary loses as it was not able
to choose its queries or the list R appropriately. Otherwise, the challenger continues
with the game and generates the challenge by running ProbGen on x? and provides
the resulting encoded input to the adversary. The adversary is again provided with
oracle access as above and eventually outputs its guess θ?. The adversary wins if the
challenger accepts any result θ?, i.e. a correct or malformed response, as a valid result
from any server that was revoked at the time of the challenge which were at least the
ones chosen by the adversary on the list R.
Definition 3.9. The advantage of a PPT adversary in the sssRevoc game for a
revocable publicly verifiable outsourced computation scheme RPVC, for a family of
functions F is defined as:
AdvsssRevocA,RPVC (1
λ,F , qt) = Pr
[
ExpsssRevocA
[
RPVC, 1λ,F , qt
]
→ 1
]
.
We say that the revocable publicly verifiable outsourced computation scheme RPVC is
secure with respect to selective, semi-static revocation if for all PPT adversaries A, it
holds that
AdvsssRevocA,RPVC (1
λ,F , qt) ≤ negl(λ).
3.3.2.3 Selective Vindictive Manager
Recall that the security notion of vindictive manager is a natural extension of the pub-
lic verifiability notion to the manager model where a vindictive manager may attempt
to provide a client with an incorrect answer. Note that the winning condition of vin-
dictive manager, as in the notion of public verifiability, does not rely on the revocation
mechanism and therefore we only require the selective restriction for this security no-
tion. In Figure 3.10, we formally consider the selective notion of vindictive manager.
The game starts with the adversary selecting its challenge function F and challenge
input x?. The challenger initialises the system as usual by running Setup and FnInit for
F . It then randomly selects a server from the space of server identities UID for which
the challenger generates the challenge parameters for the adversary. The challenger
runs Register and Certify for the chosen server and challenge function, runs ProbGen
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ExpsVindMA
[RPVC, 1λ,F]
1 : (F, x?)←$ A(1λ,F)
2 : (pp,mk)←$ Setup(1λ,F)
3 : pkF ←$ FnInit(F,mk, pp)
4 : S←$ UID
5 : skS ←$ Register(S,mk, pp)
6 : ekF,S ←$ Certify(S, F,mk, pp)
7 : (σF,x? , vkF,x?)←$ ProbGen(x?, pkF , pp)
8 : θF (x?)←$ Compute(σF,x? , ekF,S , skS , pp)
9 : (y, τθF (x?))←$ AO(σF,x? , θF (x?), vkF,x? , pkF , pp)
10 : if (y, τθF (x?)) 6= (⊥, (reject, S)) and (y 6= F (x?)) then
11 : return 1
12 : else return 0
Figure 3.10: The selective vindictive manager experiment ExpsVindMA
[RPVC, 1λ,F]
on the challenge input, and finally runs Compute to output an encoded output θF (x?).
The adversary is provided with all public parameters, the encoded input σF,x? and
its verification key vkF,x? , the encoded output θF (x?) as well as access to the oracles
FnInit(·,mk, pp), Register(·,mk, pp), Certify(·, ·,mk, pp) and Revoke(·,mk, pp) which we
denote by O. The adversary eventually outputs the result y which corresponds to
θF (x?) and an acceptance token τθF (x?) . The adversary wins if the challenger accepts
this output and y 6= F (x?).
Definition 3.10. The advantage of a PPT adversary in the sVindM game for a
revocable publicly verifiable outsourced computation scheme RPVC, for a family of
functions F is defined as:
AdvsVindMA,RPVC(1
λ,F) = Pr
[
ExpsVindMA
[
RPVC, 1λ,F
]
→ 1
]
.
We say that the revocable publicly verifiable outsourced computation scheme RPVC is
secure with respect to selective vindictive managers if for all PPT adversaries A, it
holds that
AdvsVindMA,RPVC(1
λ,F) ≤ negl(λ).
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3.4 Construction
In this section we provide an instantiation of a RPVC scheme. Our proposed construc-
tion follows the principles of Parno et al. [118] (summarised in Section 2.7.3) which
uses key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE) in a black-box manner to out-
source the computation of a monotone Boolean function. We restrict our attention
to Boolean functions, and in particular the complexity class NC1 which includes all
circuits of depth O(log n) [12] where n corresponds to the number of gates. Thus,
functions we can outsource can be built from common operations such as AND gates,
OR gates, NOT gates2, equality and comparison operators, arithmetic operators and
regular expressions. Note that our scheme only evaluates Boolean functions with single
bit output and therefore seems slightly limited.3 However, it is possible to outsource
the evaluation of functions with n-bit outputs by outsourcing n different functions each
returning a single bit in the ith position, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Let us recall from Section 2.7.3 the basic underlying principles required for a PVC
construction. Only instantiating a single ABE scheme leads to a PVC protocol with a
one-sided error since a computational server is able to return ⊥ in response to a com-
putational request and therefore the verifier is not able to determine whether F (x) = 0
or whether the server intentionally misbehaved and refused to decrypt. To overcome
this issue, we need to restrict the possible set of functions we can evaluate to be the
family of Boolean functions closed under complement F as well as we need to initialise
a second ABE scheme. In more detail, if the function F belongs to F then the com-
plement function F (x) = F (x) ⊕ 1 also belongs to F . The client then encrypts two
randomly chosen messages m0 and m1 under the same attribute representation of the
input and the server must decrypt each ciphertext using the keys associated with access
structures encoding F or F respectively. Since exactly one of F and F will be satis-
fied by any given input, exactly one message (plaintext) will be successfully returned
during the decryption procedure which enables the client to determine whether F (x)
is 1 or 0 according to the order of the well-formed response as detailed in equation (2.1).
As discussed earlier in this chapter, we aim to enhance current PVC proposals and
provide within our RPVC model the possibility to evaluate multiple functions in a se-
cure manner. Recall that the original scheme from Parno et al. is only initialised for a
single function. Therefore, it is necessary to initialise a new system in case the client
wishes to outsource the computation of a different function. Parno et al. may partially
overcome this limitation with introducing the notion of multi-function VC (Definition
2We are able to use NOT gates by swapping to the non-monotonic ABE scheme by Ostro-
vsky et al. [112]
3If we are interested to evaluate different function families then we will require different constructions
from that presented here for Boolean functions.
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2.38) offering the possibility to handle multiple functions. However, the drawback of
this solution is that it only works in the non-publicly verifiable setting, and the public
verifiable setting is left as an open problem.
Our proposed solution moves towards a solution for multi-function PVC but is ulti-
mately only an intermediate step towards a solution to the above problem. In contrast,
we take a slightly different point of view compared to Parno et al. and require that
the clients encode their input per computation they outsource. We introduce a simple
encoding trick which enables servers to be certified for multiple functions and this also
prevents the server from misusing the evaluation keys. Furthermore, we also apply
this trick in order to restrict the client’s input only being evaluated for the specified
function the client wishes to evaluate. We also wish to accommodate multiple servers
within our model that are certified to compute multiple functions.
In the remainder of this section, we discuss the necessary technical details we use for
our RPVC construction and provide details of our encoding trick and describe how we
are able to handle multiple certified servers within the system. Finally, we provide the
instantiation details and state our main theorem.
3.4.1 Technical Details
We use an indirectly revocable KP-ABE scheme for a class of monotone Boolean func-
tions F closed under complement (cf. Section 2.3.2) which comprises of the algorithms
ABE.Setup, ABE.KeyGen, ABE.KeyUpdate, ABE.Encrypt and ABE.Decrypt. We mainly
chose this notion as our building block as it enables us to implement the revocation
mechanism for our model and since the client’s device is computationally weak, the
indirect revocation mechanism reduces the client’s workload as she is not required
to maintain the revocation list. We also use a signature scheme with algorithms
Sig.KeyGen, Sig.Sign and Sig.Verify, and a one-way function g. Let U be the universe
of attributes for the indirectly revocable KP-ABE scheme which we need to slightly
extend compared to the original definition as stated in Section 2.3.2. In more detail,
let U = Uattr∪UID∪Utime∪UF be the universe of attributes for the indirectly revocable
KP-ABE scheme. It is formed as the union of the following sub-universes, where Uattr
consists of the attributes that form characteristic tuples for input data, UID comprises
attributes representing entity identifiers, Utime comprises attributes representing time
periods issued by the time source T and finally UF comprises attributes that represent
functions in F .
3.4.1.1 Handling Multiple Servers
The scheme of Parno et al. required a one-key IND-CPA notion of security for the
underlying KP-ABE scheme since it only permitted the evaluation of a single function.
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This is a more relaxed notion than considered in the vast majority of the ABE literature
where the adversary is limited to learning just one decryption key. Parno et al. could
use this property due to their restricted system model where the client is certified for
only a single function per set of public parameters which requires the client to set up
a new ABE environment per function and server.
Within our system model, we aim to accommodate multiple computational servers
being also certified for multiple functions and as such the adversary is provided with
a KeyGen oracle which enables to request and learn polynomial many decryption keys
for different servers and different functions. The scheme needs to ensure that collusions
between servers holding different decryption keys can be prevented as well as that a
malicious server is not able to use a decryption key for a particular function to claim
a computational result for another function and have the result accepted by the client.
Collusions can be prevented by the IND-CPA security of the ABE scheme. In order
to prevent the misuse of decryption keys for multiple functions we introduce our simple
encoding trick in the next section.
3.4.1.2 Handling Multiple Functions
Recall that Parno et al. introduced the notion of multi-function VC in the non-publicly
verifiable setting but requires a somewhat more complex notion of KP-ABE with Out-
sourcing as introduced by Green et al. [90]. In this thesis, we take a different approach
in order to handle multiple functions on the same input data within a single PVC
system for multiple servers and only require a simple encoding trick. We believe that
in practical environments it is unrealistic to expect a server to compute just a single
function, and we also believe that it is a reasonable cost expectation to prepare an
encoded input per computation, as long as the associated cost of doing so is relatively
low, especially given that the input data to different functions may well differ. Thus,
whereas Parno et al. use a more non-standard and complex primitive to enable this
functionality, we require only a simple encoding trick which allows servers to possess
different evaluation keys for multiple functions in the publicly verifiable setting and we
only require the standard and well-studied multi-key notion of security considered in
the literature.
First we remark that the PVC construction of Parno et al., as summarised in Sec-
tion 2.7.3, suffers a straightforward attack in case one extends the scheme by providing
the adversary with a KeyGen oracle to provide access to multiple evaluation keys. In
more detail, the client would encrypt as usual two randomly sampled messages both
under the attribute representation of the input within different ABE schemes. The ma-
licious server must successfully decrypt one of these messages by using its evaluation
key, which comprises the ABE decryption keys of some function G and its complement
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G, since either G or G is satisfied by the input data. Thus, even if the malicious server
does not hold an evaluation key for F , it can still successfully decrypt one message
and return the result of G(x) claiming it to be the correct outcome of F (x) which the
client accepts since the verification check (equality check using a one-way function g)
was successful.
To overcome this attack and to use more standard primitives when handling multiple
functions in the publicly verifiable setting, we now describe our simple encoding trick.
Let us define a bijective mapping Λ: F → UF that maps functions from the function
family F of a RPVC scheme to attributes in the sub-universe UF . Our encoding
trick basically adds a conjunctive clause, i.e. we add an additional AND gate, to each
monotone Boolean function F ∈ F . This resulting function label also needs to be
present in the input attribute set such that this input can only be used for a particular
function in order to prevent a misuse of evaluation keys since using a different evaluation
key would lead to the policy not being satisfied by the input attributes. In more
technical terms, we encode the monotone Boolean function F in a decryption key for
the policy F ∧ Λ(F ) and similarly encode the complement function F in a decryption
key for the policy F ∧ Λ(F ). Finally, the client wishes to restrict the evaluation of
her input data x exclusively for F . Thus, we need to add the label Λ(F ) ∈ UF also
to the attribute set Ax encoding her input data x resulting in a representation of the
input data as Ax ∪ Λ(F ). Note that decryption will only be successful if and only
if the policy is satisfied by the input data and additionally the same label is present
in both the policy and input data. This function label prevents the above mentioned
attack since a malicious server that is certified for multiple functions cannot use an
evaluation key for some function G computing on some data intended for F . More
precisely, the decryption components within the evaluation key are associated with
G ∧ Λ(G) and G ∧ Λ(G), whereas the client initially specified her input data being
associated with the function label for F , i.e. Ax ∪ Λ(F ). Neither policy is satisfied as
the label Λ(G) is not present in the attribute set representing the input and therefore
the malicious server cannot return any correct message that convinces the client to
accept the computation. In our setting, we also require the client to perform the
ProbGen procedure per computation as the function label may differ in case the client
wishes her input to be evaluated for a different function. On the other hand, if the
client wishes to receive an evaluation on some new input data for the same function,
she can just change the input data and keep the function label.
As a result of the above, and unlike the single function notion of Parno et al., we are
able to provide the adversary with oracle access in our security games.
3.4.2 Instantiation Details
Our RPVC scheme operates in the following way.
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1. Setup, presented in Algorithm 1, first forms the attribute universe as well as
establishes public parameters and a master secret key by calling ABE.Setup twice.
We require to establish two distinct ABE schemes to overcome the one-sided error
in the evaluation and also to enable the security proofs to go through. Informally,
one system will be linked to the function F and one to the complement function
F . The public parameters and master secret keys for the respective ABE systems
are distinguished with a superscript 0 or 1 respectively.
This Setup algorithm initialises a time source T.4 It also initialises a two-
dimensional array of registered servers LReg indexed by server identities. The
purpose of this array is to store required public information about the certified
servers within the system. For each server S, LReg[S][0] stores the respective
signature verification key while LReg[S][1] stores a list of functions the server is
authorised to compute. The algorithm also initialises a list of revoked servers
LRev that is initially empty as no server has been revoked from the system yet.
Finally, the public parameters pp are defined to contain both sets of ABE param-
eters mpk0ABE and mpk
1
ABE, the array LReg and the time source T such that each
entity within the system is able to check the current time period. The master
secret key mk comprises the ABE master secret msk0ABE and msk
1
ABE as well as
the list of revoked servers LRev.
Note that the public parameters may be implicitly updated throughout the ex-
ecution of all algorithms of a RPVC scheme accommodating any changes in the
system population.
Algorithm 1 (pp,mk)
$← Setup(1λ,F)
1 : U ← Uattr ∪ UID ∪ Utime ∪ UF
2 : (mpk0ABE,msk
0
ABE)←$ ABE.Setup(1λ,U)
3 : (mpk1ABE,msk
1
ABE)←$ ABE.Setup(1λ,U)
4 : for S ∈ UID do
5 : LReg[S][0]← 
6 : LReg[S][1]← {}
7 : endfor
8 : LRev ← 
9 : Initialise T
10 : pp← (mpk0ABE,mpk1ABE, LReg,T)
11 : mk ← (msk0ABE,msk1ABE, LRev)
4T can be seen as a counter that is maintained in the public parameters or a networked clock from
which the time period may be efficiently sampled as t← T.
95
3.4 Construction
2. FnInit, presented in Algorithm 2, simply outputs the public parameters and is the
same for all functions. This step is not required in our particular construction,
but we retain the algorithm for consistency with prior definitions as well as for
generality as other instantiations may require this step.
Algorithm 2 pkF
$← FnInit(F,mk, pp)
1 : pkF ← pp
3. Register, presented in Algorithm 3, creates a public-private key pair by calling
the KeyGen algorithm of the digital signature scheme. The algorithm provides
the server with its own secret signing key and updates LReg[S][0] to store the
verification key for S. This ensures that a server is not imitated and maliciously
revoked.
Algorithm 3 skS
$← Register(S,mk, pp)
1 : (skSig, vkSig)←$ Sig.KeyGen(1λ)
2 : skS ← skSig
3 : LReg[S][0]← LReg[S][0] ∪ vkSig
4. Certify, presented in Algorithm 4, aims to generate an evaluation key ekF,S for
a function F enabling a server to compute this function on behalf of the client.
The algorithm first removes the server from the list of revoked entities and then
updates the server’s array and includes the function F to the list of functions the
server is authorised to compute. It then checks the current time period t from the
time source T and calls both the ABE.KeyGen algorithm and the ABE.KeyUpdate
algorithm twice. Recall that we want to prevent a server that is certified for two
different functions F and G (that differ on their output) from using the key for
G to recover the plaintext and claiming it as a result for F . To prevent this,
we use the encoding trick from Section 3.4.1.2 and add an additional function
attribute label Λ(·) to the policy that corresponds to the function. Thus, we
run the two ABE algorithms once with the policy for the function and function
label F ∧ Λ(F ) using ABE system parameters with superscript 0, and once with
the policy for the complement function and function label F ∧ Λ(F ) using ABE
system parameters with superscript 1.
Finally, the evaluation key is formed by the decryption keys and two update keys
for the current time period.
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Algorithm 4 ekF,S
$← Certify(S, F,mk, pp)
1 : LRev ← LRev \ S
2 : LReg[S][1]← LReg[S][1] ∪ F
3 : t← T
4 : sk0ABE←$ ABE.KeyGen(S, F ∧ Λ(F ),msk0ABE,mpk0ABE)
5 : sk1ABE←$ ABE.KeyGen(S, F ∧ Λ(F ),msk1ABE,mpk1ABE)
6 : uk0LRev,t←$ ABE.KeyUpdate(LRev, t,msk0ABE,mpk0ABE)
7 : uk1LRev,t←$ ABE.KeyUpdate(LRev, t,msk1ABE,mpk1ABE)
8 : ekF,S ← (sk0ABE, sk1ABE, uk0LRev,t, uk1LRev,t)
5. ProbGen, presented in Algorithm 5, aims to create an encoded problem instance
σF,x that the server can use to evaluate the function as well as preparing a verifica-
tion key that enables anyone to verify the server’s computational result. The algo-
rithm first samples the current time period t from the time source T in the public
parameters pp. It then samples two messages m0 and m1 of equal length uni-
formly at random from the message space. The algorithm calls the ABE.Encrypt
algorithm twice each generating a ciphertext.
The first ciphertext c0 is formed by encrypting message m0 under the attribute
representation Ax∪Λ(F ) of the input data and the function label Λ(F ) ∈ UF . The
function label itself is an attribute representing the function for which the input
may be evaluated. Furthermore, the encryption algorithm requires the current
time period t and the public parameters mpk0ABE for the first ABE system for
finally forming c0. The second ciphertext c1 is formed similarly by encrypting
m1 under the attributes Ax ∪ Λ(F ), the current time period t and the public
parameters mpk1ABE for the second ABE system. Both ciphertexts together form
the problem instance (or encoded input) σF,x and will be sent to the server.
The algorithm also prepares a public verification key vkF,x. The key is simply
generated by applying a one-way function g to the each randomly sampled mes-
sage and also includes a copy of LReg from the public parameters that enables to
check whether the list is modified between the current time period and the time
of verification (e.g. a server is revoked).
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Algorithm 5 (σF,x, vkF,x)
$← ProbGen(x, pkF , pp)
1 : t← T
2 : (m0,m1)←$M×M
3 : c0←$ ABE.Encrypt(m0, (Ax ∪ Λ(F )), t,mpk0ABE)
4 : c1←$ ABE.Encrypt(m1, (Ax ∪ Λ(F )), t,mpk1ABE)
5 : σF,x ← (c0, c1)
6 : vkF,x ← (g(m0), g(m1), LReg)
6. Compute, presented in Algorithm 6, is performed by a server S and aims to return
the result of the evaluation of a function on some input data. The server parses
the problem instance σF,x and attempts to decrypt each ciphertext individually
by using ABE.Decrypt. The server tries to decrypt c0 by using the appropriate
material associated to the first ABE system in the public parameters and the
evaluation key, i.e. it uses sk0ABE, uk
0
LRev,t
and mpk0ABE, and returns d0. Similarly,
the server attempts to decrypt c1 by using the appropriate material related to the
second ABE system, i.e. it uses sk1ABE, uk
1
LRev,t
andmpk1ABE, and returns d1. Note
that the two plaintexts will follow the principle of a well-formed computational
response as detailed in equation (2.1). It returns (d0, d1) = (m0,⊥) if F (x) = 1
or (d0, d1) = (⊥,m1) if F (x) = 0. After the decryption procedure, the server uses
its personal signing key and signs the plaintexts including its own identity.
The server finally forms the computational result θF (x) comprising the two plain-
texts, the server identity and the server’s signature on the output.
Algorithm 6 θF (x)
$← Compute(σF,x, ekF,S , skS , pp)
1 : Parse σF,x as (c0, c1)
2 : d0 ← ABE.Decrypt
(
c0, sk
0
ABE, uk
0
LRev,t,mpk
0
ABE
)
3 : d1 ← ABE.Decrypt
(
c1, sk
1
ABE, uk
1
LRev,t,mpk
1
ABE
)
4 : γ←$ Sig.Sign(d0, d1, S, skS)
5 : θF (x) ← (d0, d1, S, γ)
7. Verify, presented in Algorithm 7, determines whether the returned computational
result is valid or not. The algorithm first parses the computational result θF (x)
as (d0, d1, S, γ) and the verification key vkF,x as (g(m0), g(m1), LReg). It checks
whether the function F is listed in LReg[S][1] meaning that the server that gen-
erated the computational result is authorised to compute F . If this check fails,
the result is immediately rejected.
98
3.4 Construction
If the check was successful, the verifier continues with verifying the server’s sig-
nature on the computational result using Sig.Verify to check its validity which
assures that the result was indeed generated by S. Those checks ensure whether
the list LReg in the public parameters and the one stored in the verification key
are identical and thus have not been modified throughout the execution of the
scheme. In case the signature verification fails, the result is immediately rejected.
Otherwise, the verifier continues with verifying whether the returned plaintext
is correct. The verifier starts with applying the one-way function g to the first
entry d0 and compares the result with the first entry of the verification key. If
both values match (i.e. g(m0) = g(d0)) then the verifier accepts the result and
is able to determine following equation (2.1) that the computational result y
corresponds to 1. If this is the case then it also creates an acceptance token
τθF (x) = (accept, S) indicating that the server indeed performed the computa-
tion correctly. If both values do not match (i.e. g(m0) 6= g(d0)) then the verifier
applies the one-way function g to the second entry d1 and compares the result
with the second element of the verification key.5 In case this is a match (i.e.
g(m1) = g(d1)) then the verifier accepts the result and following equation (2.1)
she is able to determine that the computational result y corresponds to 0 and
also outputs an acceptance token τθF (x) = (accept, S). If neither comparison is
successful the verifier rejects the result and reports S for revocation by forming
a rejection token τθF (x) = (reject, S).
Note that this algorithm can be run by any entity since the computational result
and verification key are publicly available.
Algorithm 7 (y, τθF (x))← Verify(θF (x), vkF,x, pp)
1 : Parse θF (x) as (d0, d1, S, γ) and vkF,x as (g(m0), g(m1), LReg)
2 : if F ∈ LReg[S][1] then
3 : if accept← Sig.Verify ((d0, d1, S), γ, LReg[S][0])
4 : if g(m0) = g(d0) return (y ← 1, τθF (x) ← (accept, S))
5 : elseif g(m1) = g(d1) return (y ← 0, τθF (x) ← (accept, S))
6 : else (y ←⊥, τθF (x) ← (reject, S))
7 : endif
8 : endif
9 : endif
10 : return (y ←⊥, τθF (x) ← (reject, S))
8. Revoke, presented in Algorithm 8, aims to revoke misbehaving servers by re-
5Note that g(⊥) =⊥.
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distributing fresh evaluation keys to all non-revoked servers. If the algorithm
receives as input a rejection token τθF (x) = (reject, S) for a server S, the KDC
first removes all functions from the list LReg[S][1] such that the server is no longer
authorised to perform any computations and additionally adds the server to the
list of revoked entities LRev. The algorithm then refreshes the time source T and
samples the new time period.6 Next the ABE.KeyUpdate algorithm is run twice,
i.e. it is run once for each ABE system. The algorithms generate new update
key material for the current time period with respect to the revocation list LRev.
Finally, for all non-revoked servers within the system, the KDC refreshes and
redistributes the updated evaluation keys.
If the algorithm receives a token not specifying any server to be revoked it returns
⊥ indicating that the algorithm did not update any keys.
Algorithm 8 um
$← Revoke(τθF (x) ,mk, pp)
1 : if τθF (x) = (reject, S) then
2 : LReg[S][1]← {}
3 : LRev ← LRev ∪ S
4 : Refresh T
5 : t← T
6 : uk0LRev,t←$ ABE.KeyUpdate(LRev, t,msk0ABE,mpk0ABE)
7 : uk1LRev,t←$ ABE.KeyUpdate(LRev, t,msk1ABE,mpk1ABE)
8 : for S′ ∈ UID do
9 : Parse ekF,S′ as (sk
0
ABE, sk
1
ABE, uk
0
LRev,t−1, uk
1
LRev,t−1)
10 : ekF,S′ ← (sk0ABE, sk1ABE, uk0LRev,t, uk1LRev,t)
11 : endfor
12 : return um← {ekF,S′}S′∈UID
13 : else
14 : return ⊥
Theorem 3.11. Given an indirectly revocable KP-ABE scheme secure in the sense
of indistinguishability against selective-target with semi-static query attacks ( IND-
sHRSS) for a class of monotone Boolean functions F closed under complement, an
EUF-CMA secure signature scheme and a one-way function g. Let RPVC be the re-
vocable publicly verifiable outsourced computation scheme as defined in Algorithms 1–8.
Then RPVC is secure in the sense of selective public verifiability (Figure 3.8), selec-
tive semi-static revocation (Figure 3.9), vindictive servers (Figure 3.6) and selective
vindictive managers (Figure 3.10).
6If the time source is a counter then refreshing leads to incrementing the time period.
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Informally, the proofs of selective public verifiability and selective vindictive man-
agers rely on the IND-sHRSS security of the underlying indirectly revocable KP-ABE
scheme and the one-wayness of the function g while the proof of revocation only relies
on the IND-sHRSS security. Security against vindictive servers relies in the EUF-
CMA security of the digital signature scheme such that a vindictive server cannot
return an incorrect result with a forged signature claiming to be formed by an honest
server. Note that the chosen message attack is required since the vindictive server could
act like a client and submit computation requests to get a valid signature.
In the description of the Setup algorithm (cf. Algorithm 1) we already discussed that
we require to initialise two distinct ABE systems. This is mainly in order to overcome
the possible one-sided error in the protocol in case only a single system is initialised
as well as to enable the security proofs to go through. Recall that we link one system
with the function F and the other system with the complement function F . To avoid
the adversary to trivially win in the security proofs, we need to restrict the type of
oracle queries the adversary can form when querying a KeyGen oracle. In particular,
we require that the adversary cannot query a KeyGen oracle for a function that is
satisfied by the challenge input (attribute set). Thus, we require to initialise two ABE
systems where one is maintained by the challenger and hence requires oracle access and
one is handled by the adversary itself. We need to choose these systems carefully such
that the system maintained by the challenger is associated to the unsatisfied function
F or F and hence appropriate keys can be obtained by querying the KeyGen oracle.
3.5 Proofs of Security
In this section we prove Theorem 3.11 by providing the full proofs of security for selec-
tive public verifiability, selective semi-static revocation, vindictive servers and selective
vindictive managers.
3.5.1 Selective Public Verifiability
Lemma 3.12. The RPVC scheme defined by Algorithms 1–8 is secure in the sense
of selective public verifiability (Figure 3.8) under the same assumptions as in Theo-
rem 3.11.
Proof. Suppose ARPVC is an adversary with non-negligible advantage against the se-
lective public verifiability game (Figure 3.8) when instantiated by Algorithms 1–8. We
begin by defining the following three games:
• Game 0. This is the selective public verifiability game as defined in Figure 3.8.
• Game 1. This is the same as Game 0 with the modification that in ProbGen,
we no longer return an encryption of m0 and m1. Instead, we choose another
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equal length random message m′ 6= m0,m1 and, if F (x?) = 1, we replace c1 by
the encryption of m′, and otherwise we replace c0. In other words, we replace
the ciphertext associated with the unsatisfied function with the encryption of
a separate random message unrelated to the other system parameters, and in
particular to the verification keys.
• Game 2. This is the same as Game 1 with the exception that instead of choosing
a random message m′, we implicitly set m′ to be the challenge input w in the
one-way function inversion game.
The proof partially follows in the fashion of Parno et al. [118] and we aim to show
that from the point of view of the adversary Game 2 is indistinguishable from Game
0 except with negligible probability. Thus, this means that an adversary against the
selective public verifiability game can be run against Game 2. We then finally show
that if an adversary has a non-negligible advantage against Game 2 then the adversary
can invert a one-way function.
Game 0 to Game 1. We begin by showing that there is a negligible distinguish-
ing advantage between Game 0 and Game 1. Suppose otherwise, that ARPVC can
distinguish the two games with non-negligible advantage δ. We then show that it is
possible to construct an adversary AABE that uses ARPVC as a sub-routine to break
the IND-sHRSS security of the indirectly revocable KP-ABE scheme. We consider a
challenger C playing the IND-sHRSS game (Figure 2.3) with AABE, and AABE in turn
acts as a challenger for ARPVC. Given the above parameters the entities interact in the
following way.
1. ARPVC declares its choice of challenge function F and challenge input x?.
2. AABE first computes F (x?) = r and transforms the challenge input from ARPVC
into its own challenge input for the IND-sHRSS game. It sets x? = Ax? ∪ Λ(F )
where Λ(F ) ∈ UF corresponds to the attribute representing the challenge function
F . Finally, AABE also sets its challenge for the time period t? = 1 for the IND-
sHRSS game and sends both challenge parameters x? and t? to the challenger
C.
3. C runs the ABE.Setup algorithm to generate mpkABE,mskABE and sends mpkABE
to AABE.
4. AABE initialises its target revocation list R which is initially empty and sends
it to C. Next, AABE runs RPVC.Setup in such a way that the ABE system
maintained by the challenger C is used as the ABE system with parameters
(mpkrABE,msk
r
ABE). The main reason for this is to avoid a trivial win for AABE
in the IND-sHRSS game. In more detail, since AABE does not receive the se-
cret parameters mskABE generated by C, the adversary AABE is required to issue
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queries to oracles handled by C in order to generate valid parameters for ARPVC.
However, we require to restrict AABE from querying the KeyGen oracle for a func-
tion that evaluates to 1 on the challenge input x?. This prevents the decryption
of the challenge ciphertext and thus avoids a trivial win by the adversary.
Recall that in the RPVC.Certify algorithm (cf. Algorithm 4), one decryption key
for a function F is generated using the parameters (mpk0ABE,msk
0
ABE) associated
with the first initialised ABE system, while another decryption key is generated
encoding the complement function F using the parameters (mpk1ABE,msk
1
ABE)
related to the second ABE scheme.
Depending on the outcome of the initial computation F (x?) = r we need to
ensure that the challenger C and adversary AABE are in possession of the correct
parameters. In more detail, if F (x?) = 1, then the policy F ∧ Λ(F ) will be
satisfied by AABE’s (transformed) challenge input x? = Ax? ∪ Λ(F ). Therefore,
AABE cannot make any KeyGen oracle queries to C for the policy F ∧Λ(F ). In this
case, it is required that we ensure that the ABE system parameters maintained
by the challenger corresponds to (mpk1ABE,msk
1
ABE) and the ones maintained by
AABE correspond to (mpk0ABE,msk0ABE). Thus, AABE is able to generate a key
for F ∧ Λ(F ) itself and queries to challenger’s KeyGen oracle are not trivially
satisfied by the input.
On the other hand, if F (x?) = 0, then the complement policy F ∧Λ(F ) may not
be queried to the KeyGen oracle as this would lead to a trivial win. Following
the RPVC.Certify algorithm (cf. Algorithm 4), then the decryption key associated
with the complement function uses the parameters (mpk1ABE,msk
1
ABE) and as
such we need to ensure that AABE maintains those parameters and the challenger
maintains the parameters (mpk0ABE,msk
0
ABE).
Thus, we need to ensure that the challenger maintains the parameters
(mpkrABE,msk
r
ABE) where r = F (x
?).
Now AABE simulates running the RPVC.Setup algorithm (cf. Algorithm 1) with
the exception that when ABE.Setup is called on line 2 and 3 it sets mpkrABE to
be the parameter provided by the challenger, and implicitly sets mskrABE to be
that held by the challenger.
5. AABE runs RPVC.FnInit as detailed in Algorithm 2.
6. AABE must generate a challenge problem instance for ARPVC as the output of
RPVC.ProbGen. To do so, AABE samples three distinct, equal length messages
m0, m1 and m
′ uniformly at random from the message space. AABE provides m0
and m1 as its choice of challenge for the IND-sHRSS game to C, and receives
back the encryption, ct?, of one of these messages (mb? for b
? $← {0, 1}, where b?
was chosen by the challenger), under attributes x? and time t?. More formally
103
3.5 Proofs of Security
this is ct?
$← ABE.Encrypt(mb? , x?, t?,mpkrABE). It needs to assign ct? to be one of
the ciphertexts c or c′ that form the challenge problem instance (encoded input)
σF,x? using the correct ABE system parameters. AABE chooses a random bit
s
$← {0, 1} which intuitively corresponds to its guess for the challenger’s choice
of b?. Therefore,
• If r = 0, then AABE sets c to be ct? and randomly generates the remaining
ciphertext as
c′ $← ABE.Encrypt(m′, x?, t?,mpk1ABE).
It sets vk = g(ms) and vk
′ = g(m′).
• If r = 1, then AABE randomly generates the ciphertext as
c
$← ABE.Encrypt(m′, x?, t?,mpk0ABE),
and sets c′ to be ct?. It sets vk = g(m′) and vk′ = g(ms).
Finally, AABE sets σF,x? = (c, c′) and vkF,x? = (vk, vk′, LReg).
7. ARPVC receives all outputs from the above RPVC.ProbGen algorithm, and then
is provided with oracle access to which AABE responds in the following way:
• Queries to RPVCFnInit and RPVC.Register are performed as specified in Al-
gorithms 2 and 3.
• Queries of the form RPVC.Certify(S, F ′,mk, pp) are handled by AABE run-
ning Algorithm 4 with the exception that the ABE.KeyGen and
ABE.KeyUpdate algorithms for the ABE system with the parameters main-
tained by the challenger are replaced by queries to the respective oracles
provided by C. AABE queries the ABE.KeyGen oracle in order to obtain a
decryption key skrABE. Here we need to distinguish two cases.
If r = 0, the query is formed over the parameters of the first ABE system
and is of the form OKeyGen(S, F ′ ∧ Λ(F ′),msk0ABE,mpk0ABE). If r = 1, then
the query is formed over the parameters of the second ABE system and is of
the form OKeyGen(S, F ′ ∧ Λ(F ′),msk1ABE,mpk1ABE). The challenger returns
for both cases a valid decryption key unless the challenge input x? satisfies
the queried policy. Note that in case the queried function F ′ does not
correspond to the challenge function F then due to the bijective mapping
Λ the attribute function labels do not coincide, i.e. Λ(F ′) 6= Λ(F ). Thus,
neither of the possible queries to the KeyGen oracle will be satisfied. On the
other hand, since we chose the ABE system maintained by the challenger
to be unsatisfied for F , any query for F will be rejected. Hence, if F ′ 6= F ,
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then the first clause of the “if” statement in the KeyGen oracle of the IND-
sHRSS game (Figure 2.3) will never be correct and therefore the challenger
will always return a valid decryption key in response to a query.
In order to generate a valid update key ukrLRev,t, AABE makes a query
to the ABE.KeyUpdate oracle which are of the form
OKeyUpdate(LRev, t,mskrABE,mpkrABE). The challenger returns a valid up-
date key if the current queried time period t does not coincide with the
challenge time period t? which AABE chose to be 1 and if the queried revo-
cation list LRev contains the challenge target revocation list R which AABE
chose initially to be empty. Since R =  is a subset of any revocation list
LRev, the second clause of the “if” statement in the KeyUpdate oracle of
the IND-sHRSS game (Figure 2.3) will not be satisfied and therefore the
challenger will always return a valid update key.
• Queries of the form RPVC.Revoke(τθF (x) ,mk, pp) are handled by AABE run-
ning Algorithm 8 with the exception of generating an update key ukrLRev,t on
line 6 and 7 which will be replaced with respective queries to the KeyUpdate
oracle provided by C. AABE queries the oracle for
OKeyUpdate(LRev, t,mskrABE,mpkrABE) and the challenger returns a valid key
if the queried time period t does not correspond to the challenge time period,
i.e. t 6= 1, and if the queried revocation list does not contain the challenge
target revocation list R. Since AABE chose R to be empty, the second clause
of the “if” statement in the KeyUpdate oracle will not be satisfied and the
challenger returns a valid update key.
8. Eventually ARPVC finishes its query phase and outputs a guess θ?. Let Y be the
non-⊥ plaintext contained in θ?. If g(Y ) = g(ms), AABE outputs a guess b′ = s.
Else, AABE guesses b′ = 1− s.
Note that if s = b? (the challenge bit chosen by C in the IND-sHRSS game in step 6),
then the distribution of the above coincides with Game 0 since the verification key
comprises g(m′) and g(ms) where m′ and ms are the two plaintexts corresponding to
the ciphertexts of the encoded input for which ARPVC recovers exactly one. Otherwise,
if s = 1 − b? then the distribution coincides with Game 1 since the verification key
comprises the one-way function g applied to a legitimate message m′ and a random
message m1−s that is unrelated to both ciphertexts.
Now, we consider the advantage of this constructed adversary AABE playing the IND-
sHRSS game for the revocable KP-ABE scheme. Recall that by assumption, ARPVC
has a non-negligible advantage δ in distinguishing between Game 0 and Game 1, that
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is ∣∣∣Pr [ExpGame 0ARPVC [RPVC, 1λ,F]→ 1]− Pr [ExpGame 1ARPVC [RPVC, 1λ,F]→ 1]∣∣∣ > δ
where ExpGame iARPVC
[RPVC, 1λ,F] denotes the output of running ARPVC in Game i.
Now we derive the probability of AABE guessing b? correctly and it follows:
Pr[b′ = b?] = Pr[s = b?] Pr[b′ = b?|s = b?] + Pr[s 6= b?] Pr[b′ = b?|s 6= b?]
=
1
2
Pr[g(Y ) = g(ms)|s = b?] + 1
2
Pr[g(Y ) 6= g(ms)|s 6= b?]
=
1
2
Pr
[
ExpGame 0ARPVC
[
RPVC, 1λ,F
]
→ 1
]
+
1
2
(1− Pr[g(Y ) = g(ms)|s 6= b?])
=
1
2
Pr
[
ExpGame 0ARPVC
[
RPVC, 1λ,F
]
→ 1
]
+
1
2
(
1− Pr
[
ExpGame 1ARPVC
[
RPVC, 1λ,F
]
→ 1
])
=
1
2
(
Pr
[
ExpGame 0ARPVC
[
RPVC, 1λ,F
]
→ 1
]
− Pr
[
ExpGame 1ARPVC
[
RPVC, 1λ,F
]
→ 1
]
+ 1
)
> 1
2
(δ + 1)
Hence,
AdvAABE >
∣∣∣∣Pr[b′ = b?]− 12
∣∣∣∣
>
∣∣∣∣12(δ + 1)− 12
∣∣∣∣
=
δ
2
Since δ is assumed to be non-negligible, δ2 is also non-negligible. IfARPVC has advantage
δ at distinguishing these games then AABE can win the IND-sHRSS game with non-
negligible probability. Thus since we assumed the ABE scheme to be IND-sHRSS
secure, we conclude that ARPVC cannot distinguish Game 0 from Game 1 with non-
negligible probability.
Game 1 to Game 2. The transition from Game 1 to Game 2 is to simply set the
value of m′ to no longer be random but instead to correspond to the challenge w in
the one-way function inversion game (Figure 2.8). We argue that the adversary has no
distinguishing advantage between these games since the new value is independent of
anything else in the system except the verification key g(w) and hence looks random
to an adversary with no additional information (in particular, ARPVC does not see the
challenge for the one-way function as this is played between C and AABE).
106
3.5 Proofs of Security
Final Proof. We now show that using ARPVC in Game 2, AABE can invert the one-
way function g – that is, given a challenge z = g(w) AABE can recover w. Specifically,
during ProbGen, AABE chooses the messages as follows:
• if F (x?) = 1, we implicitly set m1 to be w and the corresponding verification key
component to be z = g(w). We randomly choose m0 from the message space and
compute the remainder of the verification key as usual.
• if F (x?) = 0, we implicitly set m0 to be w and set the verification key component
to z = g(w). m1 is chosen randomly from the message space and the remainder
of the verification key is computed as usual.
Now, since ARPVC is assumed to be successful, it will output a forgery comprising the
plaintext that was encrypted under the unsatisfied function (F or F ). By construc-
tion, this will be w (and the adversary’s view is consistent since the verification key is
simulated correctly using z). AABE can therefore forward this result to C in order to
invert the one-way function with the same non-negligible probability that ARPVC has
against the selective public verifiability game.
We conclude that if the ABE scheme is IND-sHRSS secure and the one-way function
is hard-to-invert, then the RPVC as defined by Algorithms 1–8 is secure in the sense
of selective public verifiability.
3.5.2 Selective, Semi-static Revocation
Lemma 3.13. The RPVC scheme defined by Algorithms 1–8 is secure in the sense of
selective, semi-static revocation (Figure 3.9) under the same assumptions as in Theo-
rem 3.11.
Proof. In this proof, we aim to perform a reduction from the the selective, semi-static
revocation game (Figure 3.9) to the IND-sHRSS security of the underlying revoca-
ble KP-ABE scheme (Figure 2.3). We wish the prove this reduction by achieving a
contradiction and therefore we assume that ARPVC is an adversary with non-negligible
probability against the selective, semi-static revocation game when instantiated by Al-
gorithms 1–8. We show that we can construct an adversary AABE that uses ARPVC as
a sub-routine to break the IND-sHRSS security of the indirectly revocable KP-ABE
scheme. Let C be a challenger playing the IND-sHRSS game with AABE, and AABE
acts as a challenger for ARPVC. Given the security parameter λ, the function family
F and the number of queries qt the adversary ARPVC makes to the Revoke oracle, the
entities interact in the following way.
1. ARPVC declares its choice of challenge function F and challenge input x?.
2. AABE initialises an (empty) list QRev of currently revoked entities and sets the
current time period to t = 1. Next, AABE transforms the challenge input from
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ARPVC into its own challenge input for the IND-sHRSS game. It sets A? = Ax?∪
Λ(F ) where Ax? is the attribute encoding of the challenge input and Λ(F ) ∈ UF
corresponds to the attribute representing the function F . Finally, AABE also sets
its challenge for the time period t? = qt for the IND-sHRSS game and sends
both challenge parameters to the challenger C.
3. C runs ABE.Setup to create (mpkABE,mskABE) and sends the public parameter
mpkABE to AABE.
4. AABE simulates running the RPVC.Setup algorithm (cf. Algorithm 1) as specified
with the exception in line 2 where the first ABE system is initialised. There,
AABE sets mpk0ABE to be mpkABE which was generated by the challenger, and
msk0ABE is implicitly set to be the secret parameters held by C. Since AABE does
not possess mskABE, it will make use of oracle queries to C whenever msk0ABE is
required.
5. AABE runs RPVC.FnInit as detailed in Algorithm 2.
6. ARPVC receives all public parameters pkF and pp and chooses a challenge target
revocation list R which AABE receives and forwards to its challenger C.
7. ARPVC may now perform oracle queries which AABE handles as follows:
• Queries to RPVC.FnInit and RPVC.Register are run as written in Algorithms 2
and 3.
• Queries of the form RPVC.Certify(S, F ′,mk, pp) are handled by AABE by
running the Certify oracle as specified in Figure 3.9. If the queried function
F ′ corresponds to the challenge function F and if the queried identity S is not
listed on the challenge target revocation list, i.e. S /∈ R, then AABE returns
⊥ to ARPVC. Note that otherwise, the adversary would be issued with
an evaluation key that will not be revoked at the time of the challenge and
therefore would trivially win. AABE also returns ⊥ if the current time period
t is equal to the challenge time period qt and if there is a server (other than
S) that is not currently revoked but should be revoked in accordance with
ARPVC’s challenge target revocation list R. Otherwise, i.e. if this check failed
and the oracle has not returned ⊥, it removes S form the list of currently
revoked entities QRev and simulates running Certify. This is simulated by
running Algorithm 4 as detailed above with the exception of line 4 and 6
where the query needs to be passed to C since it only possesses the valid
parameters.
In more detail, in order to simulate line 4, AABE queries C for OKeyGen(S, F ′∧
Λ(F ′),msk0ABE,mpk
0
ABE). C returns the decryption key unless the policy
F ′ ∧Λ(F ′) is satisfied by A? and S /∈ R. Observe that the policy will never
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be satisfied unless F ′ = F (since Λ is a bijective mapping and Λ(F ′) needs
to be present such that the policy is satisfied). Hence, C will always return
a valid key if F ′ 6= F .
On the other hand, if the queried function F ′ = F , then by the checks
performed by AABE at the beginning of the Certify oracle (Figure 3.9), S
is included on R (else ⊥ would have been returned prior to this point).
Therefore, even if the challenge function is queried, C will return a key. In
particular, note that C never returns ⊥ in a manner inconsistent with that
expected by ARPVC in accordance with the Certify oracle.
In order to simulate line 6, AABE makes a query to
OKeyUpdate(QRev, t,msk0ABE,mpk0ABE). C returns a valid update key unless
the current time period t is the challenge time period qt and the queried
revocation list does not contain the challenge target revocation list R. How-
ever, if this was the case then AABE would already have returned ⊥ by the
second clause of the “if” statement in the Certify oracle. Therefore, C shall
always return an update key which AABE can use in the execution of Certify.
• Queries of the form RPVC.Revoke(τθF (x) ,mk, pp) are handled by AABE by
running the Revoke oracle as specified in Figure 3.9. Whenever a call is
made to the Revoke oracle, AABE first increments the time period t. If
the token does not identify a server to revoke, it outputs ⊥ (as would the
Revoke algorithm). Following line 3 of the oracle specification, in case the
current time period corresponds to qt (i.e. the maximal number to Revoke
queries), then AABE returns ⊥ if QRev does not contain all servers listed on
the challenge target revocation list R. Otherwise, S is added to QRev. AABE
now simulates running the RPVC.Revoke algorithm by running Algorithm 8
as specified with the exception of line 6. To simulate this line, AABE needs
to make a query to C of the form OKeyUpdate(QRev, t,msk0ABE,mpk0ABE). C
returns a valid update key unless t = qt and the queried revocation list does
not contain the challenge target revocation list R. However, if this would be
the case, then AABE would have returned ⊥ above, and so a valid update
key is returned which AABE can forward to ARPVC.
8. Eventually (after qt Revoke queries), ARPVC finishes its query phase. AABE checks
if ARPVC has made suitable Revoke queries. If there exists an entity in R that is
not currently revoked (listed in QRev), it returns 0 and aborts immediately.
9. AABE must now generate a challenge for ARPVC. AABE chooses three distinct,
equal length messages m0,m1 and m
′ uniformly at random from the message
space. It then sends m0 and m1 to C as its choice of challenge for the IND-sHRSS
game. C chooses a random bit b? $← {0, 1} and returns
ct?
$← ABE.Encrypt(mb? , A?, qt,mpk0ABE). AABE sets c = ct?, generates c′ $←
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ABE.Encrypt(m′, A?, qt,mpk1ABE) and forms the challenge problem instance σF,x? =
(c, c′). AABE selects a bit s $← {0, 1} and forms the verification key as vkF,x? =
(g(ms), g(m
′), LReg). Note that s intuitively corresponds to AABE’s guess for b?.
10. ARPVC receives the resulting parameters from ProbGen and is again provided with
oracle access. These queries are handled in the same way as before, and ARPVC
eventually outputs its guess θ?.
11. Let Y be the non-⊥ plaintext returned in θ?. If g(Y ) = g(ms), AABE guesses
b′ = s. Else, AABE guesses b′ = 1− s.
If g(Y ) = g(m′), AABE makes a random guess b′ = b˜ $← {0, 1} since ARPVC did
not forge a result for either m0 or m1 and therefore is of no use for AABE in order
to break the IND-sHRSS game.
Now we consider the advantage of AABE playing the IND-sHRSS game. By assump-
tion, ARPVC has a non-negligible advantage δ against the selective, semi-static revoca-
tion game. It follows
Pr[b′ = b?] = Pr[b′ = b?|s = b?] Pr[s = b?] + Pr[b′ = b?|1− s = b?] Pr[1− s = b?]
+ Pr[b′ = b?|b˜ = b?] Pr[b˜ = b?]
= Pr[g(Y ) = g(ms)|s = b?] Pr[s = b?]
+ Pr[g(Y ) 6= g(ms)|1− s = b?] Pr[1− s = b?]
+ Pr[g(Y ) = g(m′)|b˜ = b?] Pr[b˜ = b?]
=
1
2
Pr[g(Y ) = g(ms)|s = b?] + 1
2
Pr[g(Y ) 6= g(ms)|1− s = b?]
+
1
2
Pr[g(Y ) = g(m′)|b˜ = b?]
=
1
2
(
Pr[g(Y ) = g(ms)|s = b?] + (1− Pr[g(Y ) = g(ms)|1− s = b?])
+ Pr[g(Y ) = g(m′)|b˜ = b?]
)
=
1
2
(
Pr[g(Y ) = g(ms)|s = b?]− Pr[g(Y ) = g(ms)|1− s = b?]
+ Pr[g(Y ) = g(m′)|b˜ = b?] + 1
)
=
1
2
(δ + 1).
Hence,
AdvAABE >
∣∣∣∣Pr[b′ = b?]− 12
∣∣∣∣
>
∣∣∣∣12(δ + 1)− 12
∣∣∣∣
=
δ
2
.
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Since δ is non-negligible, δ2 is also non-negligible. If ARPVC has advantage δ at break-
ing the selective, semi-static revocation game then AABE can win the IND-sHRSS
game with non-negligible probability. However, since the ABE scheme was assumed
IND-sHRSS secure, such an adversary ARPVC cannot exist. Therefore, we conclude
that that if the ABE scheme is IND-sHRSS secure then RPVC as instantiated by
Algorithms 1–8 is secure in the sense of selective, semi-static revocation.
3.5.3 Vindictive Servers
Lemma 3.14. The RPVC scheme defined by Algorithms 1–8 is secure in the sense of
vindictive server (Figure 3.6) under the same assumptions as in Theorem 3.11.
Proof. For a contradiction let us assume thatARPVC is an adversary with non-negligible
advantage against the vindictive server game (Figure 3.6) when instantiated by Algo-
rithms 1–8. We show that an adversary ASig with non-negligible advantage δ in the
EUF-CMA signature game (Figure 2.7) can be constructed using ARPVC as a sub-
routine. ASig interacts with the challenger C in the EUF-CMA security game and
itself acts as the challenger for ARPVC in the security game for vindictive servers for a
function F as follows.
The basic idea is that ASig can create a RPVC instance and play the vindictive server
game with ARPVC by executing Algorithms 1–8 itself. ASig will guess a server identity
that it thinks the adversary ARPVC will select to vindictively revoke. The signature
signing key that would be generated during the Register algorithm for this server will
be implicitly set to be the signing key in the EUF-CMA game and any Compute oracle
queries for this identity will be forwarded to the challenger to compute. Then, assuming
that ASig guessed the correct server identity, ARPVC will output a forged signature that
ASig may output as its guess in the EUF-CMA game. Given the security parameter
and the the function family F , the entities interact in the following way.
1. The challenger C (in the EUF-CMA game) initialises an initially empty list Q
of messages queried to the Sig.Sign oracle. It runs Sig.KeyGen(1λ) to generate a
challenge signing key SK and verification key V K. C sends V K to ASig.
2. ASig starts with initialising two empty lists. The fist list QReg records all regis-
tered entities within the system as well as a list QServer which records all entities
for which the adversary has learnt a signing key. ASig also initialises the target
server identity S to be ⊥. Furthermore, ASig chooses a server identity from UID
denoted as S˜. This identity is ASig’s guess of the (final) target server identity
S that ARPVC will choose at some later point in the game. Note, if this guess
will be correct, then any signing operations related to S˜ can be performed using
the oracle provided by C and hence when ARPVC attacks this server identity, its
output can be used to break the EUF-CMA game.
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3. ASig runs RPVC.Setup and provides the resulting public parameters to ARPVC.
ARPVC is also provided with oracle access which ASig can respond in the following
way:
• All queries to the oracles FnInit, Certify, Revoke and the additional oracle
Register2 are handled as specified in the respective algorithm;
• Queries made for servers that do not correspond to ASig’s guess, i.e. S 6= S˜,
to the Register oracle are handled by ASig running the Register oracle as
specified in Figure 3.6. A query to the oracle returns ⊥ if the query is for
the target server identity S . If, on the other hand, queries are made for
servers that match to ASig’s guess, i.e. S = S˜, then C aborts the game to
avoid a trivial win for ASig. This is the case because ARPVC may not choose
its target server S to be a server for which it previously learnt the signing key
and which are recorded on the list QServer. Therefore, ARPVC cannot choose
S = S = S˜ and hence, ASig’s choice of target server identity was wrong and
thus the EUF-CMA challenge parameters were embedded incorrectly in the
reduction.
4. Eventually, ARPVC finishes its query phase and outputs its choice of challenge
function F and challenge input x?.
5. ASig runs RPVC.FnInit as detailed in Algorithm 2. It also runs RPVC.ProbGen on
the challenge input x? as specified in Algorithm 5.
6. ARPVC is provided with the resulting parameters and is given again oracle access
which is handled as above.
ARPVC eventually outputs its choice for a target server identity S . ASig returns
0 if ARPVC has previously queried this identity in the Register oracle and thus
the identity was listed on QServer.
7. If S 6= S˜, then ASig outputs ⊥ since it has guessed incorrectly the server identity.
Otherwise, ARPVC continues with access to the provided oracles as before and
additionally receives access to a Compute oracle as specified in Figure 3.6. ARPVC
submits queries to the Compute oracle of form OCompute(σF ′,x, ekF ′,S , skS , pp) for
some computation F ′(x) which does not correspond to F (x?). Recall that this
oracle enables ARPVC to observe S before attacking. If S 6= S˜ then ASig simply
follows Algorithm 6 using the decryption and signing keys generated during the
oracle queries. Otherwise, if S = S˜ then ASig does not have access to the signing
key SKS . Thus, it runs the ABE.Decrypt operations correctly to generate plain-
texts d0 and d1, and submits m = (d0, d1, S˜) as a Sig.Sign oracle query to C. The
challenger adds m to the list Q and returns γ ← Sig.Sign(m,SK), which ASig
uses to return θF (x) = (d0, d1, S˜, γ).
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8. ARPVC finally outputs θ? = (d?0, d?1, S, γ) which appears to be an invalid result
computed by S . Thus, RPVC.Verify will output a reject token for S , i.e. τθ? =
(reject, S), and accept ← Sig.Verify((d?0, d?1, S), γ, V K). Thus, γ is a valid
signature under key SK.
9. ASig outputs m? = (d?0, d?1, S) and γ? = γ to C.
Note that the Compute oracle was not simulated for the computation F (x?) due to
the “if” statement (line 1) in the oracle (cf. Figure 3.6) since ASig did not make any
query to the Sig.Sign oracle provided by C. Thus the forgery (m?, γ?) outputted by
ASig satisfies the requirement in the EUF-CMA game (Figure 2.7) that m? /∈ Q.
We argue that, assuming S = S˜ (i.e. ASig correctly guessed the challenge identity) then
ASig succeeds with the same non-negligible advantage δ as ARPVC. We assume that
n = |UID| is polynomial in the security parameter (else the KDC could not efficiently
search the list LReg). The probability that ASig correctly guesses S = S˜ is 1n and
AdvASig ≥
1
n
AdvARPVC
≥ δ
n
.
We conclude that, since n is polynomial in the security parameter, if ARPVC has a
non-negligible advantage in the vindictive servers game (Figure 3.6) then ASig has the
same advantage in the EUF-CMA game, but since the signature scheme is assumed
EUF-CMA secure, ARPVC may not exist.
We note that we lose a polynomial factor in the advantage due to having to guess the
server S˜ that the adversary will attempt to revoke. This factor could be removed if we
formulated the security model in a selective fashion such that ARPVC must declare up
front which server it will target, and then ASig can implicitly set the signing key for
that server (in the Register step) to be the challenge key in the EUF-CMA game and
forward any Compute oracle requests to the challenger.
3.5.4 Selective Vindictive Manager
Lemma 3.15. The RPVC scheme defined by Algorithms 1–8 is secure in the sense
of selective vindictive manager (Figure 3.10) under the same assumptions as in Theo-
rem 3.11.
Proof. Since the notion of vindictive manager is a natural extension of the public
verifiability notion in the framework of the manager model, the following security proof
follows similar to the proof of Lemma 3.12. We begin by defining the following three
games:
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• Game 0. This is the selective vindictive manager game as defined in Figure 3.10.
• Game 1. This is the same as Game 0 with the modification that in ProbGen, we
no longer return an encryption of m0 and m1. Instead, we choose another random
message m′ 6= m0,m1 and, if F (x?) = 1, we replace c1 by the encryption of m′,
and otherwise we replace c0. In other words, we replace the ciphertext associated
with the unsatisfied function with the encryption of a separate random message
unrelated to the other system parameters, and in particular to the verification
keys.
• Game 2. This is the same as Game 1 with the exception that instead of choosing
a random message m′, we implicitly set m′ to be the challenge input w in the
one-way function game.
We aim to show that from the the adversary’s point of view Game 2 is indistinguishable
from Game 0 except with negligible probability. Thus, this means that an adversary
against the selective vindictive manager game can be run against Game 2. We then
finally show that if an adversary has a non-negligible advantage against Game 2 then
the adversary can invert a one-way function.
Game 0 to Game 1. We begin by showing that there is a negligible distinguish-
ing advantage between Game 0 and Game 1. Suppose otherwise, that ARPVC can
distinguish the two games with non-negligible advantage δ. We then show that it is
possible to construct an adversary AABE that uses ARPVC as a sub-routine to break
the IND-sHRSS security of the indirectly revocable KP-ABE scheme. We consider a
challenger C playing the IND-sHRSS game (Figure 2.3) with AABE, and AABE in turn
acts as a challenger for ARPVC. Given the above parameters the entities interact in the
following way.
1. ARPVC declares its choice of challenge function F and challenge input x?.
2. AABE first transforms the challenge input from ARPVC into its own challenge
input for the IND-sHRSS game. It sets x? = Ax? ∪ Λ(F ) where Λ(F ) ∈ UF
corresponds to the attribute representing the challenge function F . Finally, AABE
also sets its challenge for the time period t? = 1 for the IND-sHRSS game
and sends both challenge parameters to the challenger C. AABE also computes
r = F (x?) which will determine which of the two ABE systems will be used for
functions and which for the complement functions. This is required since C will
not issue a decryption key for a function satisfied by the challenge input and so
AABE must be sure that it will only be queried for the non-satisfied function. In
the following, let us use the notation Fr as follows:
• If r = 0 then Fr = F and F1−r = F
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• If r = 1 then Fr = F and F1−r = F .
That is, we choose r such that Fr(x
?) = 0.
3. C runs the ABE.Setup algorithm to generate mpkABE,mskABE and sends mpkABE
to AABE.
4. AABE initialises an empty challenge target revocation list R.
5. AABE then simulates running RPVC.Setup by running Algorithm 1 as written,
with the exception that one of the sets of ABE system parameters is assigned to
be those generated by the challenger. Recall that r = F (x?). AABE sets mpkrABE
to be the public parameters issued by C and mskrABE is implicitly set to be that
held by C. It runs ABE.Setup to generate mpk1−rABE,msk1−rABE as usual.
6. AABE runs RPVC.FnInit as detailed in Algorithm 2. Later AABE needs to output
a challenge encoded output and therefore it needs to simulate a computation
server. To do so, AABE first needs to pick a server identity from the space UID
uniformly at random and runs the Register algorithm as detailed in Algorithm 3
to register S. AABE then needs to simulate running the Certify algorithm for S
and challenge function F . However, AABE does not hold the full master secret key
mk and therefore is required to make appropriate oracle calls to the challenger.
AABE will run Algorithm 4 as specified with exceptions to queries to KeyGen and
KeyUpdate oracles for which the challenger’s parameters are necessary. In more
detail:
• skrABE is generated by issuing an oracle query to the ABE.KeyGen oracle
of the form OKeyGen(S, Fr ∧ Λ(F ),mskrABE,mpkrABE). C will return a valid
decryption key unless x? ∈ Fr ∧Λ(F ) and S /∈ R. It is clear that S is never
listed in R as the list was chosen to be empty and therefore the second clause
in the “if” statement in the KeyGen oracle (Figure 2.3) is always satisfied.
However, r was specifically chosen such that Fr(x
?) = 0. Hence, x? /∈ Fr
and x? = Ax? ∪ Λ(F ) /∈ Fr ∧ Λ(F ). Thus, C will always be able to return a
valid decryption key skrABE.
• sk1−rABE is generated by AABE running ABE.KeyGen using msk1−rABE for the
function F1−r ∧ Λ(F ) as usual.
• ukrLRev,t is generated by making a query to the ABE.KeyUpdate oracle of the
form OKeyUpdate(LRev, t,mskrABE,mpkrABE). C will return a valid update key
unless the current time period t is the challenge time period t? and R 6⊆ LRev.
Note that t? was chosen to be 1 and since no Revoke queries were requested,
the time period t indeed corresponds to t?. On the other hand, the list R
was initially chosen to be empty and therefore it is indeed a subset of LRev
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(both lists are empty). Therefore, the second clause in the “if” statement in
the KeyUpdate oracle (Figure 2.3) is never satisfied and thus C will always
return a valid update key ukrLRev,t.
• uk1−rLRev,t is generated by AABE running ABE.KeyUpdate using msk1−rABE as
usual.
7. AABE must generate a challenge problem instance for ARPVC as the output of
RPVC.ProbGen for either Game 0 or Game 1. To do so, AABE samples three
distinct, equal length messages m0, m1 and m
′ uniformly at random from the
message space. AABE provides m0 and m1 as its choice of challenge to C, and
receives back the encryption, ct?, of one of these messages (mb? for b
? $← {0, 1},
where b? is chosen by the challenger), under attributes x?, time t? and public
parameters mpkrABE. It needs to assign ct
? to be one of the ciphertexts c or c′
that form the challenge problem instance (encoded input) σF,x? using the correct
ABE system parameters. AABE chooses a random bit s $← {0, 1} which intuitively
corresponds to its guess for the challenger’s choice of b?. Therefore,
• If r = 0, then AABE sets c to be ct? and randomly generates the remaining
ciphertext as
c′ $← ABE.Encrypt(m′, x?, t?,mpk1ABE).
It sets vk = g(ms) and vk
′ = g(m′).
• If r = 1, then AABE randomly generates the ciphertext as
c
$← ABE.Encrypt(m′, x?, t?,mpk0ABE),
and sets c′ to be ct?. Further it sets vk = g(m′) and vk′ = g(ms).
Finally, AABE sets σF,x? = (c, c′) and vkF,x? = (vk, vk′, LReg).
8. AABE now simulates the server S performing the computation to output θF (x?)
by running algorithm 6 as specified, since valid keys have been generated for S
in the preceding steps.
9. The resulting values σF,x? , θF (x?), vkF,x? , pkF and pp are sent to ARPVC that is
also additionally provided with oracle access to which AABE responds as follows:
• Queries to RPVC.FnInit and RPVC.Register are performed as specified in
algorithms 2 and 3.
• Queries of the form RPVC.Certify(S, F ′,mk, pp) are handled by AABE run-
ning algorithm 4 with the exception that the ABE.KeyGen and
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ABE.KeyUpdate algorithms for the ABE system with the parameters main-
tained by the challenger are replaced by queries to the respective oracles
provided by C.
AABE queries the ABE.KeyGen oracle in order to obtain a decryption key
skrABE with queries of the form OKeyGen(S, F ′r ∧ Λ(F ′),mskrABE,mpkrABE).
The challenger returns a valid decryption key unless the challenge input x?
satisfies the queried policy.
Note that in case the queried function F ′ does not correspond to the chal-
lenge function F then due to the bijective mapping Λ the attribute function
labels do not coincide, i.e. Λ(F ′) 6= Λ(F ). Thus, neither of the possible
queries to the KeyGen oracle will be satisfied. On the other hand, since we
chose the ABE system maintained by the challenger to be unsatisfied for F ,
any query for F will be rejected. Hence, if F ′ 6= F , then the first clause
of the “if” statement in the KeyGen oracle of the IND-sHRSS game (Fig-
ure 2.3) will never be correct and therefore the challenger will always return
a valid decryption key in response to a query.
In order to generate a valid update key ukrLRev,t, AABE makes a query
to the ABE.KeyUpdate oracle which are of the form
OKeyUpdate(LRev, t,mskrABE,mpkrABE). The challenger returns a valid up-
date key if the current queried time period t does not coincide with the
challenge time period which AABE chose to be 1 and the queried revocation
list LRev contains the challenge target revocation list R which AABE chose
initially to be empty. Since R =  is a subset of any revocation list LRev,
the second clause of the “if” statement in the KeyUpdate oracle of the IND-
sHRSS game (Figure 2.3) will not be satisfied and therefore the challenger
will always return a valid update key.
• Queries of the form RPVC.Revoke(τθF (x) ,mk, pp) are handled by AABE run-
ning Algorithm 8 with the exception of generating an update key ukrLRev,t on
line 6 and 7 which will be replaced with respective queries to the KeyUpdate
oracle provided by C. AABE queries forOKeyUpdate(LRev, t,mskrABE,mpkrABE)
and the challenger returns a valid key if the queried time period t does not
correspond to the challenge time period, i.e. t 6= 1, and if the queried re-
vocation list does not contain the challenge target revocation list R. Since
AABE chose R to be empty, the second clause of the “if” statement in the
KeyUpdate oracle will not be satisfied and the challenger returns a valid
update key.
10. Eventually ARPVC outputs its guess for the non-⊥ value Y and τθF (x) . If g(Y ) =
g(ms), AABE outputs a guess b′ = s. Else, AABE guesses b′ = 1− s.
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Notice that if s = b? (the challenge bit chosen by C in the IND-sHRSS game), then
the distribution of the above coincides with Game 0 since the verification key com-
prises g(m′) and g(ms) where m′ and ms are the two plaintexts corresponding to the
ciphertexts of the encoded input for which ARPVC recovers exactly one. Otherwise,
if s = 1 − b? then the distribution coincides with Game 1 since the verification key
comprises the one-way function g applied to a legitimate message m′ and a random
message m1−b? that is unrelated to both ciphertexts.
Now, we consider the advantage of this constructed AABE playing the IND-sHRSS
game for the revocable KP-ABE scheme. Recall that by assumption, ARPVC has a
non-negligible advantage δ in distinguishing between Game 0 and Game 1 – that is∣∣∣Pr [ExpGame 0ARPVC [RPVC, 1λ,F]→ 1]− Pr [ExpGame 1ARPVC [RPVC, 1λ,F]→ 1]∣∣∣ > δ
where ExpGame iARPVC
[RPVC, 1λ,F] denotes the output of running ARPVC in Game i.
Now we derive the probability of AABE guessing b? and it follows:
Pr[b′ = b?] = Pr[s = b?] Pr[b′ = b?|s = b?] + Pr[s 6= b?] Pr[b′ = b?|s 6= b?]
=
1
2
Pr[g(Y ) = g(ms)|s = b?] + 1
2
Pr[g(Y ) 6= g(ms)|s 6= b?]
=
1
2
Pr
[
ExpGame 0ARPVC
[
RPVC, 1λ,F
]
→ 1
]
+
1
2
(1− Pr[g(Y ) = g(ms)|s 6= b?])
=
1
2
Pr
[
ExpGame 0ARPVC
[
RPVC, 1λ,F
]
→ 1
]
+
1
2
(
1− Pr
[
ExpGame 1ARPVC
[
RPVC, 1λ,F
]
→ 1
])
=
1
2
(
Pr
[
ExpGame 0ARPVC
[
RPVC, 1λ,F
]
→ 1
]
− Pr
[
ExpGame 1ARPVC
[
RPVC, 1λ,F
]
→ 1
]
+ 1
)
> 1
2
(δ + 1)
Hence,
AdvAABE >
∣∣∣∣Pr[b′ = b?]− 12
∣∣∣∣
>
∣∣∣∣12(δ + 1)− 12
∣∣∣∣
=
δ
2
.
Since δ is assumed to be non-negligible, δ2 is also non-negligible. IfARPVC has advantage
δ at distinguishing these games then AABE can win the IND-sHRSS game with non-
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negligible probability. Thus since we assumed the ABE scheme to be IND-sHRSS
secure, we conclude that ARPVC cannot distinguish Game 0 from Game 1 with non-
negligible probability.
Game 1 to Game 2. The transition from Game 1 to Game 2 is to simply set the
value of m′ to no longer be random but instead to correspond to the challenge w in
the one-way function inversion game (Figure 2.8). We argue that the adversary has
no distinguishing advantage between these games since the new value is independent
of anything else in the system bar the verification key g(w) and hence looks random
to an adversary with no additional information (in particular, ARPVC does not see the
challenge for the one-way function as this is played between C and AABE).
Final Proof. We now show that using ARPVC in Game 2, AABE can invert the one-
way function g – that is, given a challenge z = g(w) AABE can recover w. Specifically,
during ProbGen, AABE chooses the messages as follows:
• if F (x?) = 1, we implicitly set m1 to be w and the corresponding verification key
component to be z = g(w). We randomly choose m0 from the message space and
compute the remainder of the verification key as usual.
• if F (x?) = 0, we implicitly set m0 to be w and set the verification key component
to z = g(w). m1 is chosen randomly from the message space and the remainder
of the verification key computed as usual.
Now, since ARPVC is assumed to be successful, it will output a forgery comprising the
plaintext that was encrypted under the unsatisfied function (F or F ). By construc-
tion, this will be w (and the adversary’s view is consistent since the verification key is
simulated correctly using z). AABE can therefore forward this result to C in order to
invert the one-way function with the same non-negligible probability that ARPVC has
against the selective vindictive manager game.
We conclude that if the ABE scheme is IND-sHRSS secure and the one-way function
is hard-to-invert, then the RPVC as defined by Algorithms 1–8 is secure in the sense
of selective vindictive manager.
Overall Theorem 3.11 follows as a Corollary of Lemmas 3.12–3.15.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have introduced the new notion of revocable publicly verifiable
outsourced computation (RPVC) and provided a rigorous framework that we believe
to be more realistic than the purely theory oriented models of prior work, especially
when the KDC is an entity responsible for user authorisation within a organisation. We
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believe our model more accurately reflects practical environments and the necessary
interaction between entities for PVC. Each server may provide services for many dif-
ferent functions and for many different clients. Additionally, in our model, any clients
may submit multiple requests to any available servers, whereas prior work considered
just the single server case.
The consideration of this new model leads to new functionalities as well as new se-
curity threats. We have shown that by using a revocable KP-ABE scheme we can
revoke misbehaving servers such that they receive a penalty for misbehaving. We have
extended previous notions of security to fit our new definitional framework, introduced
new models to capture additional threats (e.g. vindictive servers using revocation to
remove competing servers), and provided a provably secure construction. We believe
that this work is a useful step towards making PVC practical and provides a natural
set of baseline definitions from which to add future functionality.
As mentioned throughout the chapter, we believe that for future work it would be
interesting and beneficial to investigate the construction of a fully secure indirectly
revocable KP-ABE scheme with adaptive queries. Such a scheme would allow to over-
come the limitations of the selective and semi-static notions which are forced upon our
security models given the current primitives.
Furthermore, achieving a notion of output privacy via the informally discussed mecha-
nism of blind verification is yet another interesting problem which would enhance the
usability of our RPVC framework in practice.
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In this chapter, we investigate a different mode of publicly verifiable com-
putation. We study the problem in which an untrusted server holds a data
set in such a way that any client can ask the server to compute a func-
tion on any input portion of the data set. We show that ciphertext-policy
attribute-based encryption can provide this novel mode of computation and
see that this setting has natural applications such as verifiable queries on re-
mote data and verifiable MapReduce operations. The results of this chapter
appear in the full online version of [6].
4.1 Introduction
With the emergence of cloud computing, where clients and businesses rent computation
and storage resources from powerful cloud service providers, it is of great importance to
ensure the correctness of computations and the integrity of stored data. Let us consider
the following example scenario. A server possesses a static (authenticated) data set D
consisting of data points. For instance, each data point could correspond to a measured
temperature at fixed time intervals, e.g. every day at midday. The server now wishes
to specify a list of functions F for which it is willing to let entities query the data
set. Here, for example, the server could specify one function to compute the average
temperature over a portion of the data set, whereas another function could evaluate
the standard deviation. A client could now request the evaluation of a function from F
on the server’s data set in order to receive a result for which the client wants to ensure
correctness. However, as the data owner wishes to keep the data set confidential the
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crucial task is to ensure that verification of the result is successful even without the
client knowing the data.
In this chapter, we model the above scenario and introduce the notion of publicly ver-
ifiable delegable computation which we simply abbreviate as VDC. This proposal can
be considered as a reversed model to the problem of publicly verifiable outsourced
computation (PVC), where clients outsource requests for computations on their own
input data, as discussed in the previous chapter. In VDC, servers play the role of the
data owner possessing a static database over which any client can request computa-
tions/queries to be performed. Hence, compared to PVC, the entity relationship is
more akin to the traditional client-server model. In the previous chapter, we have seen
that key-policy attribute-based encryption can be used to provide a mechanism of prov-
ing correctness of an outsourced computation. Here, in this chapter, we study whether
ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) lends itself in any meaningful
way to the setting of outsourced computation. Note that CP-ABE is a reversed notion
of KP-ABE where the association of attribute sets and policies to ciphertexts and keys
are simply reversed. We answer in the affirmative and show that CP-ABE can be em-
ployed to build such a VDC scheme. We may embed the static data set in a server’s
secret key whilst the computation of functions can be requested by creating ciphertexts
using public information. In order to keep the data set confidential, as well as enabling
the client to query on any subsets of the data set, we let the server publish a unique de-
scription of each data point in form of a label. It suffices for the client to select servers
and data based only on the knowledge of these labels. The scheme enables clients to
publicly verify the computational results. Referring back to the battlefield example
from Chapter 3, local servers within a coalition may offer soldiers to query their stored
data. However, it is of great importance that soldiers in the proximity of the querying
soldier may also verify the returned result since the outcome may also influence their
own decisions. In case the results are of sensitive nature the querier needs to employ a
VC scheme that provides output privacy. Furthermore, we discuss that VDC has some
natural applications. For example, VDC enables to construct verifiable MapReduce
operations for parallel computing problems, and can also be used to perform verifiable
queries on remote databases without accessing the data itself.
The efficiency requirement for VDC is also very different from PVC: unlike PVC, out-
sourcing a computation is not merely an attempt to gain efficiency as the client never
possesses the input data and therefore cannot execute the computation herself (even
with the necessary resources). Thus, VDC does not have the stringent efficiency require-
ment present as in PVC. Recall that in PVC outsourcing and verifying computations
are required to be more efficient than performing the computation itself in order to
make outsourcing computations worthwhile. The efficiency requirement is simply that
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verification of a result is more efficient than computing it. We believe that CP-ABE
behaves reasonably well in this setting. More precisely, our solution achieves constant
time public verification and the size of the query depends on the function F , while the
size of the server’s response depends only on the size of the result itself and not on the
input size which may be large, particularly when querying remote databases.
Related Work
Work from the realm of authenticated data lends itself to the framework of verifi-
able computations over outsourced data (albeit for specific functions only). Backes
et al. [21] introduce a framework using privacy-preserving proofs over authenticated
data outsourced by a trusted client that enables other entities to execute computations
over the outsourced data. In more detail, a trusted source produces and authenticates
some data which is given to the (untrusted) server. Other entities are able to request
computations on this authenticated data and also efficiently verify the results whereas
they should not learn more than the computational result. In particular, the client
should not learn the data itself. The solution presented in [21] makes use of homo-
morphic MACs and succinct non-interactive arguments (SNARGs) [75, 108]. Similar
results are presented in [137] using public logs. It is notable that the solutions in [21],
[33] and [114] achieve public verifiability, and we note that the scheme in [114] only
achieves it for specific set operations.
Chung et al. [53] introduce the concept of memory delegation where a client uploads her
memory to a server that can update and compute a function F over the entire memory.
In contrast, the model we propose in this chapter does not consider the client to be the
data owner and we can enable computations to be performed on any subset of the input
data, but are restricted to the static data case. Backes et al. [22] consider a client that
outsources data and requests computations on a data portion. The client can efficiently
verify the correctness of the result without holding the input data. Most works require
the client to know the data in order to verify [73, 29, 33, 113]. Verifiable oblivious
storage [9] ensures data confidentiality, access pattern privacy, integrity and freshness
of data accesses. Etemad and Ku¨pc¸u¨ [64] show how to handle different types of queries
on hierarchical authenticated data structures. Ahn et al. [3] present a framework for
computing on authenticated data using the notion of P-homomorphic signatures.
Organisation of Chapter
In Section 4.2, we describe and provide a formal definition of our model of publicly verifi-
able delegable computation and we discuss some example applications, e.g. MapReduce,
in which our model can be applied. Next, in Section 4.3, we define security in terms of
public verifiability for our model and provide in Section 4.4 an example construction of
VDC based on ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption. In Section 4.5, we show
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that our given construction is secure according to the introduced security model. We
conclude the chapter in Section 4.6.
4.2 Publicly Verifiable Delegable Computation
In this section, we introduce a new PVC mode of computation called publicly verifiable
delegable computation (VDC). The model introduces a change in roles regarding the
data ownership. In more detail, in VDC the server initially holds a data set (gathered
over time or given by a trusted source) which it makes available for querying of specific
functions and the client is able to efficiently verify the result without ever having pos-
sessed the data set herself. Thus, this model reverses the roles of data owner compared
to Chapter 3.
We now first informally describe our VDC model. The scheme uses similarly to Chap-
ter 3 the notion of a key distribution centre (KDC) that handles the expensive pre-
processing operation and distributes the keys but is not responsible for performing
any computations itself. In more detail, a VDC scheme for a family of functions F
comprises n computational servers Si, i ∈ [n]. Each server owns a static data set Di
consisting of ki elements (Di = {xi,j}kij=1) and also specifies a list of functions Fi ⊆ F
that it is willing to compute on (specified) portions of the data set. To enable clients
to query specific portions of the data, Si publishes a unique descriptive label l(xi,j) of
each data point xi,j ∈ Di. Note that, to preserve confidentiality of the server’s data
set from the client, the labels should not reveal the value of the data, but may reveal
the semantic meaning of such data. The KDC authenticates the server’s data set by
providing an evaluation key ekDi,Si to Si. This key enables Si to compute any function
F in Fi on its data set Di. Clients can request computations of any function F ∈ Fi on
any set of data points X ⊆ Di (as long as X ∈ Dom(F )) by specifying the respective set
of labels {l(xi,j)}xi,j∈X . Note that the function has |X| inputs, e.g. if X = {x1, x2, x5}
then the server computes the function F (x1, x2, x5).
One could suggest that a server Si just simply caches the results of computations F ∈ Fi
on its data set. However, this is an unattractive solution as the choice of specific data
points X that are acceptable for each computation may vary and as such the number
of results that need to be cached could be large.
In Figure 4.1, we illustrate the entity population and respective interaction between
the entities within the VDC model.
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Figure 4.1: Operation of a VDC scheme
4.2.1 Formal Definition
A VDC scheme for a family of functions F begins with a key distribution centre (KDC)
running Setup to produce public parameters and a master secret key.1 Furthermore,
the KDC also registers each server Si, by providing an individual private signing key
skSi , and publishes a public delegation key pkF for each function of interest F ∈ F .
Each server Si registers their interest in performing computations on their data set Di.
This enrolment process is done by the KDC using the Certify algorithm to issue a sin-
gle evaluation key ekDi,Si enabling Si to perform computations on Di. Note that this
implicitly also enables Si to compute on any subsets of Di. Each data owner (server)
specifies a list of functions Fi ⊆ F that they are willing to evaluate on their data sets.
However, not all data points in the data set xi,j ∈ Di may be appropriate for each
function. Therefore, we define the set of functions Fi to consist of elements represented
in the form (F,
⋃
xi,j∈Dom(F ) l(xi,j)) listing the function and the associated permissible
inputs.
The client executes the ProbGen algorithm to request a computational result from a
server. The client specifies a function F ∈ Fi and a set of data points X ⊆ Dom(F )
represented by their unique labels {l(xi,j)}xi,j∈X . The algorithm outputs an encoded
input σF,X and a verification key vkF,X that enables anyone to verify the computa-
tional result later. In the Compute algorithm a server Si uses its evaluation key ekDi,Si
and the encoded input to output an encoded result θF (X) corresponding to the compu-
tational result F (X).
Finally any entity can verify the correctness of θF (X) using vkF,X . Verification outputs
the result y = F (X) indicating that the computation was performed correctly, or else
y =⊥ showing that the computational response is malformed. More formally this is
captured in the following definition.
Definition 4.1. A publicly verifiable delegable computation (VDC) scheme comprises
1Backes et al. [21] make use of a trusted source which can be thought of as the trusted KDC in our
model.
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the following algorithms:
1. (pp,mk)
$← Setup(1λ,F) : this randomised algorithm is run by the KDC to ini-
tialise the system. The inputs are the security parameter λ and the family of
functions F ;
2. pkF
$← FnInit(F,mk, pp) : this randomised algorithm is run by the KDC to gen-
erate a public delegation key pkF allowing clients to request computations of a
function F ∈ F ;
3. skSi
$← Register(Si,mk, pp) : this randomised algorithm is run by the KDC to
enrol a server Si within the system. It generates the server’s personalised signing
key skSi;
4. ekDi,Si
$← Certify(Si, Di, {l(xi,j)}xi,j∈Di ,Fi,mk, pp) : this randomised algorithm is
run by the KDC to generate an evaluation key ekDi,Si enabling the certified server
Si to perform computations of all functions F ∈ Fi ⊆ F , chosen by the server.
Those computations can be performed on the server’s input data Di = {xi,j}kij=1
consisting of ki data points each uniquely labelled by l(xi,j);
5. (σF,X , vkF,X)
$← ProbGen(F, {l(xi,j)}xi,j∈X , pkF , pp) : this randomised algorithm
is run by the client to request a computation of the function F evaluated on a set
of data points X ⊆ Di owned by the server Si. The inputs are the function F ,
a set of labels identifying each data point xi,j ∈ X that the client wishes F to be
evaluated on, as well as the public delegation key pkF and the public parameters
pp. The algorithm outputs an encoded input σF,X and a public verification key
vkF,X .
6. θF (X)
$← Compute(σF,X , ekDi,Si , skSi , pp) : this randomised algorithm is run by the
server Si to compute F (X). The inputs are the encoded input σF,X , an evaluation
key ekDi,Si enabling Si to compute on its data set Di, the server’s signing key
skSi and the public parameters pp. The algorithm outputs an encoded output
θF (X) representing F (X).
7. y ← Verify(θF (X), vkF,X , pp) : this algorithm can be run by any entity. The in-
puts are the encoded output θF (X) produced by Si, the verification key vkF,X and
the public parameters pp. The algorithm produces an output y = F (X) if the
result was computed correctly, or else y =⊥ indicating that the computation was
performed incorrectly.
In our VDC scheme we do not consider the mechanism of revocation but observe that
an indirectly revocable CP-ABE scheme could be employed in a similar fashion to the
indirectly revocable KP-ABE scheme as presented in Chapter 3. Although not explic-
itly mentioned, the KDC may update the public parameters pp during any algorithm
126
4.2 Publicly Verifiable Delegable Computation
and execution in order to reflect any changes in the entity population as e.g. servers
may be added or granted the ability to perform computations for additional functions.
Note that in the algorithm ProbGen, the data itself is not needed in order to form a
computational request for the server. The respective unique labels suffice as the client
never owned the data in the first place herself.
A VDC scheme is correct if verification succeeds with overwhelming probability when
all algorithms are run honestly. More formally this can be represented as follows.
Definition 4.2. A publicly verifiable delegable computation scheme is correct for a
family of functions F if, for all functions F ∈ F , servers Si and respective input data
sets Di, and all computational inputs X ⊆ Di, where X ∈ Dom(F ), the following holds:
Pr[(pp,mk)
$← Setup(1λ,F),
pkF
$← FnInit(F,mk, pp),
skSi
$← Register(Si,mk, pp),
ekDi,Si
$← Certify(Si, Di, {l(xi,j)}xi,j∈Di ,Fi,mk, pp),
(σF,X , vkF,X)
$← ProbGen(F, {l(xi,j)}xi,j∈X , pkF , pp),
θF (X)
$← Compute(σF,X , ekDi,Si , skSi , pp),
F (X)← Verify(θF (X), vkF,X , pp)]
= 1− negl(λ).
4.2.2 Possible Applications of VDC
We briefly discuss two example applications where our notion of VDC could be applied.
MapReduce [61] (or Hadoop) is a programming model for the parallel processing of
large computations using a cluster or grid of computers (nodes) which can take
advantage of the locality of data to decrease transmission costs. Each worker
node computes a sub-problem on a portion of the data and reports to a manager
who combines the results. VDC enables verifiable MapReduce such that only valid
results are combined. The manager acts as the KDC to distribute evaluation keys
for partitions of the data to workers, and then requests multiple sub-problems to
be solved over this partitioning.
Note that in the setting of MapReduce, the set of permissible functions Fi could
indeed correspond to the full set F since the client is the original data owner of
the entire input data and provides each server with only a static portion of input
data.
Verifiable queries on remote databases. Servers may also act as remote database
providers and register with a KDC to provide a verifiable querying service. Any
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client may use public information to query any function allowed by the server
on these databases. Data is remotely stored and a client sees nothing more than
the results of queries, which they are assured to be correct. Alternatively, in
this setting, the data owner could act as the KDC to outsource its data to an
untrusted server. Due to the public delegation and verification properties, other
data users can query the outsourced data and verify the correctness of the results.
The data owner does not need to retain any knowledge of the data after it has
been outsourced.
4.3 Security Model
In the context of VDC we consider security in the sense of public verifiability represented
as a game-based notion in Figure 4.2. This notion ensures that a server is not able
to return a malformed response without being detected even if it has corrupted other
servers and holds verification keys, as well as even if the client or verifier never possessed
the input data themselves. The notion can be seen as a natural extension to the one
discussed in Section 3.3 and since we do not consider revocation in this framework, we
do not require the other security notions as in Section 3.3.
4.3.1 Public Verifiability
In Figure 4.2, we present the security notion of public verifiability. The game begins
with the challenger C initialising the system and providing the resulting public pa-
rameters pp to the adversary A. The adversary is provided with oracle access to the
functions FnInit(·,mk, pp), Register(·,mk, pp) and Certify(·, ·, ·, ·,mk, pp), which we de-
note by O. The adversary A selects the challenge inputs consisting of the challenge
function F , the challenge data set X? and the respective labels l(xj) for each data
point xj ∈ X?. Note that as the adversary owns the challenge data set X? it may addi-
tionally query the Certify oracle for a data set D ⊇ X?. Next the challenger initialises
the challenge function F by running FnInit outputting the respective key pkF . The
challenger C then outputs a challenge by executing ProbGen on the challenge function
and input labels. The adversary receives the resulting parameters from the challenger
and is again provided with oracle access as above. A wins if it produces an encoded
output that verifies correctly but does not correspond to the actual result F (X?).
Definition 4.3. The advantage of a PPT adversary in the PubVerif game for a
VDC construction, for a family of functions F is defined as:
AdvPubVerifA,VDC (1
λ) = Pr
[
ExpPubVerifA
[
VDC, 1λ,F
]
→ 1
]
.
A VDC scheme, VDC, is secure against public verifiability if for all PPT adversaries
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ExpPubVerifA
[VDC, 1λ,F]
1 : (pp,mk)←$ Setup(1λ,F)
2 : (F,X?, {l(xj)}xj∈X?)←$ AO(pp)
3 : pkF ←$ FnInit(F,mk, pp)
4 : (σF,X? , vkF,X?)←$ ProbGen(F, {l(xj)}xj∈X? , pkF , pp)
5 : θ?←$ AO(σF,X? , vkF,X? , pkF , pp)
6 : y ← Verify(θ?, vkF,X , pp)
7 : if (y 6=⊥) and (y 6= F (X?)) then
8 : return 1
9 : else return 0
Figure 4.2: The public verifiability experiment ExpPubVerifA
[VDC, 1λ,F]
A, it holds that
AdvPubVerifA,VDC (1
λ) ≤ negl(λ).
4.4 Construction
4.4.1 Overview
In this section, we provide a construction of a VDC scheme. Our VDC scheme is based
upon ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption and enables the computation of the
family of (monotone) Boolean formulas closed under complement, operating similarly
to the RPVC scheme as introduced in Chapter 3.
The client will choose a random message from the message spaceM to act as a verifica-
tion token and encrypt this using a CP-ABE scheme under the Boolean function F to
be evaluated. Each server Si receives a decryption key for a set of attributes encoding
the data Di that they hold. Note that the following decryption procedure proceeds
similarly to the basic PVC principles as summarised in Section 2.7.3. In more detail,
the server attempts to decrypt the ciphertext and learns the chosen message if and only
if F (Di) = 1. By the security of the CP-ABE scheme, the server learns nothing about
the message if F (Di) = 0 since this corresponds to an access structure that is not sat-
isfied. Thus, if the correct message is returned, the client is convinced that F (Di) = 1.
If, however, F (Di) = 0, the decryption will return ⊥. This is insufficient for verification
since any server can return ⊥ to convince a client of a false negative result and therefore
the protocol suffers the same one-sided error problem as the scheme in Section 2.7.3.
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To overcome this problem, we produce two CP-ABE ciphertexts. As in the previous
chapter, one ciphertext corresponds to F , whilst the other ciphertext corresponds to
the complement function F = F (X) ⊕ 1 which always outputs the opposite result to
F for Boolean functions. Thus, if F (Di) = 0 then, necessarily, F (Di) = 1. Hence, the
server’s key for data Di will decrypt exactly one ciphertext and the returned message
will distinguish whether F or F was satisfied, and therefore the value of F (X), where
X ⊆ Di. Note that each function is encoded in terms of attributes, and is specific to
each input, i.e. the encoding of a function F will differ to compute F (X) and F (X ′) as
the input data set comprises different unique labels specifying data points. However, if
the function F is encoded in terms of the data set X but is then evaluated on an input
set X ′ ⊃ X the server simply evaluates the function only on data points in X and
discards all other data points that belong to X ′. Thus, the computation remains the
same and outputs F (X). Similarly to equation (2.1), a well-formed response (d0, d1)
in VDC satisfies the following:
(d0, d1) =
(m0,⊥), if F (Di) = 1;(⊥,m1), if F (Di) = 0. (4.1)
If the returned plaintext does not match one of the randomly chosen random messages
then the server has returned an incorrect result. Note that if both returned results cor-
respond to ⊥ also indicates that the server returned an incorrect result but a rational
malicious server would never return this.
Public verifiability is achieved by publishing a token comprising the output of a one-way
function g applied to each sampled plaintext. Any entity can apply g to the server’s
response and compare this result with the published token to check correctness. The
public parameters contain next to the public key a list about registered entities within
the system. That is a two-dimensional array LReg (indexed by server identities) where
the first dimension, LReg[Si][0], contains a signature verification key, whilst the second
dimension, LReg[Si][1], lists all functions and labels for which Si is certified.
Let U = Uattr ∪ Ul ∪ UID be the universe of attributes for the CP-ABE scheme. It is
formed over the union of three sub-universes, where Uattr consists of the attributes that
form characteristic tuples for input data, Ul is a disjoint (from Uattr) universe repre-
senting unique labels l(xi,j) for each attribute, and UID comprises server identities. We
assume in our instantiation that the algorithms check, in case it is applicable, that all
functions and input data are formed over Uattr and each additionally contains exactly
one attribute/clause over the label universe Ul. To encode an n-bit binary input string
x = x1x2 . . . xn as an attribute set Ax, we define Uattr = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} of n attributes
and let xi ∈ Ax if and only if the ith bit of the input string is 1, i.e. Ax = {xi : xi = 1}.
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Note that the inputs to our computations are sets of data points X ⊆ Di owned by
the server. We can think of the set X being the concatenation of the bit string repre-
sentation of each data point xi,j ∈ X and so we can encode X in the same way as above.
We consider adversaries that have access to multiple keys and therefore must ensure
that a key for different data sets cannot produce a valid looking response. We do this,
similarly to the previous chapter and label each data point xi,j with a unique label l(xi,j)
that is valid across the entire system, and assign each label with an attribute in Ul.
Note that we refer for simplicity to these attributes as l(xi,j) too. The decryption key
for a data set Di is formed over the attribute set (Ax∪
⋃
xi,j∈Di l(xi,j)). During ProbGen
for a computation F (X) on a subset of the data set X ⊆ Di, we first need to sample
two random messages m0 and m1 of equal length. The employed CP-ABE encryption
algorithm uses the access structure encoding of the conjunction (F ∧∧xi,j∈X l(xi,j)) to
encrypt m0 obtaining the first ciphertext c0. The same procedure can be applied for
the complement function F , i.e. a second CP-ABE encryption algorithm is executed
using the access structure encoding of the conjunction (F ∧∧xi,j∈X l(xi,j)) to encrypt
m1 obtaining the second ciphertext c1. Thus, the CP-ABE decryption algorithm only
succeeds if F (Di) = 1 and all labels l(xi,j) for xi,j ∈ X are matched in the key and
ciphertext. Note that since we wish to evaluate a subset X of a data set Di, F (Di) = 1
implies that F (X) = 1 where the decryption procedure ignores the remaining xi,j /∈ X.
Note that a generated secret key for a different data set Dj which does not contain X
as a subset will not include the correct labels and thus cannot be used for an attempt
to compute F (X).
Our instantiation of VDC is somewhat more efficient than that for PVC since we do
not require to setup two independent ABE systems and thus need to perform two
(expensive) key generations. The client needs to perform roughly the amount of work
of executing the computation twice by herself in order to prepare the encoded input.
That is, she needs to prepare the access structure encodings
(
F ∧∧xi,j∈X l(xi,j)) and(
F ∧∧xi,j∈X l(xi,j)) which will be used in the encryption algorithms to prepare the
encoded input. However, we believe that this is an acceptable workload for the client as
she never possessed the input data sets herself and wishes to learn the computational
result F (X) from the server.
4.4.2 Instantiation Details
Let CP-ABE = (ABE.Setup,ABE.KeyGen,ABE.Encrypt,ABE.Decrypt) define a CP-ABE
encryption scheme over the universe U for a class of Boolean functions F closed under
complement. We also make use of a signature scheme with algorithms Sig.KeyGen,
Sig.Sign and Sig.Verify, and a one-way function g. Then Algorithms 1–7 define a VDC
scheme for the class of functions F which works as follows:
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1. Setup, presented in Algorithm 1, first forms the attribute universe U for the
function family F . The attribute universe comprises of all input labels and server
identities. The algorithm then calls the ABE.Setup algorithm in order to initialise
the CP-ABE scheme. Next it initialises a two-dimensional array LReg indexed
by the server identities. For each server Si, the first dimension of the array
LReg[Si][0] stores a signature verification key for Si and the second dimension
LReg[Si][1] stores a list of functions that Si is willing to compute. Note that LReg
is initially empty. The output of the algorithm consists of the public parameters
pp and the master secret mk for the VDC system. The public parameters consist
of the master public key mpkABE of the CP-ABE scheme and the array LReg. The
master key comprises of the master secret key mskABE of the CP-ABE scheme.
Algorithm 1 (pp,mk)
$← Setup(1λ,F)
1 : U ← Uattr ∪ Ul ∪ UID
2 : (mpkABE,mskABE)←$ ABE.Setup(1λ,U)
3 : for Si ∈ UID
4 : LReg[Si][0]← 
5 : LReg[Si][1]← {}
6 : endfor
7 : pp← (mpkABE, LReg)
8 : mk ← mskABE
2. FnInit, presented in Algorithm 2, simply outputs the public parameters for the
VDC scheme and is therefore the same for all functions. This step is not par-
ticularly required in our construction as we make use of a public-key CP-ABE
scheme but we retain the algorithm for consistency with prior definitions as well
as for generality as other instantiations may require this step.
Algorithm 2 pkF
$← FnInit(F,mk, pp)
1 : pkF ← pp
3. Register, presented in Algorithm 3, registers a potential server’s interest in offering
computations. This is achieved by creating a key pair using the digital signature
Sig.KeyGen algorithm. The resulting signing key skSig is issued to Si while the
verification key vkSig is added to the first dimension of the public array LReg such
that anyone can verify signatures produced by Si.
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Algorithm 3 skSi
$← Register(Si,mk, pp)
1 : (skSig, vkSig)←$ Sig.KeyGen(1λ)
2 : skSi ← skSig
3 : LReg[Si][0]← LReg[Si][0] ∪ vkSig
4. Certify, presented in Algorithm 4, certifies a server Si for offering to execute
computations of functions in the set Fi ⊆ F on its data set Di. The data
set contains ki data points xi,j and each element is uniquely expressed by an
attribute l(xi,j) ∈ Ul. The algorithm first adds the pair (F,
⋃
xi,j∈Dom(F ) l(xi,j))
to the array LReg[Si][i] for each function F ∈ Fi. This publicises to prospective
clients what functions F the server Si is willing to compute on any set of its
data points xi,j ∈ Di ⊆ Dom(F ). The algorithm outputs a CP-ABE decryption
key skABE,Di for the data set Di. This key is formed over the attribute set
(ADi ∪
⋃
xi,j∈Di l(xi,j)) and the evaluation key ekDi,Si is set to be the CP-ABE
decryption key.
Algorithm 4 ekDi,Si
$← Certify(Si, Di, {l(xi,j)}xi,j∈Di ,Fi,mk, pp)
1 : for F ∈ Fi
2 : LReg[Si][1]← LReg[Si][1] ∪ (F,
⋃
xi,j∈Dom(F )
l(xi,j))
3 : endfor
4 : skABE,Di ←$ ABE.KeyGen((ADi ∪
⋃
xi,j∈Di
l(xi,j)),mskABE,mpkABE)
5 : ekDi,Si ← skABE,Di
5. ProbGen, presented in Algorithm 5, chooses two equal length messages m0 and m1
uniformly at random from the message space. For a computational request the
algorithm needs to form two CP-ABE ciphertexts c0 and c1 that encrypt the cho-
sen messages under the policies
(
F ∧∧xi,j∈X l(xi,j)) and (F ∧∧xi,j∈X l(xi,j))
respectively, and X ⊆ Di. Those two ciphertexts form the encoded input σF,X .
The verification key vkF,X is created by applying a one-way function g to each
message and g allows the key to be published.
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Algorithm 5 (σF,X , vkF,X)
$← ProbGen(F, {l(xi,j)}xi,j∈X , pkF , pp)
1 : (m0,m1)←$M×M
2 : c0←$ ABE.Encrypt(m0, (F ∧
∧
xi,j∈X
l(xi,j)),mpkABE)
3 : c1←$ ABE.Encrypt(m1, (F ∧
∧
xi,j∈X
l(xi,j)),mpkABE)
4 : σF,X ← (c0, c1)
5 : vkF,X ← (g(m0), g(m1), LReg)
6. Compute, presented in Algorithm 6, first attempts to decrypt both ciphertexts
using the issued evaluation key ekDi,Si . Decryption succeeds only if the function
evaluates to 1 on the input data set X, i.e. the policy is satisfied. Since F
and F output opposite results on the input data set, this ensures that exactly
one plaintext will correspond to a failure symbol ⊥. It then signs the resulting
plaintexts using the server’s signing key skSi . Finally the algorithm outputs the
encoded output containing the recovered plaintexts, the server’s identity and its
signature.
Algorithm 6 θF (X)
$← Compute(σF,X , ekDi,Si , skSi , pp)
1 : Parse σF,X as (c0, c1)
2 : d0 ← ABE.Decrypt (c0, ekDi,Si ,mpkABE)
3 : d1 ← ABE.Decrypt (c1, ekDi,Si ,mpkABE)
4 : γ←$ Sig.Sign(d0, d1, Si, skSi)
5 : θF (X) ← (d0, d1, Si, γ)
7. Verify, presented in Algorithm 7, first parses the encoded output θF (X) as
(d0, d1, Si, γ) and the verification key vkF,X as (g(m0), g(m1), LReg). The algo-
rithm first checks whether the function F is listed in LReg[Si][1], i.e. the respective
server that generated the computational result is authorised to compute F . If
this check fails, the result is immediately rejected.
If the check was successful, the verifier continues with verifying the signature
using the signature verification key vkSig stored in LReg. In case the signature
is accepted, it applies the one-way function g to each plaintext in θF (X) and
compares the results to the components in the verification key. If either compar-
ison is successful, this indicates that the server has indeed recovered a message.
Otherwise, it shows that the server provided a malformed response. Note, if m0
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was returned then F (X) = 1, and otherwise if m1 was returned then F (X) = 0
following equation (4.1).
Algorithm 7 y ← Verify(θF (X), vkF,X , pp)
1 : Parse θF (X) as (d0, d1, Si, γ) and vkF,X as (g(m0), g(m1), LReg)
2 : if F ∈ LReg[Si][1] then
3 : if accept← Sig.Verify (d0, d1, Si, γ, LReg[Si][0])
4 : if g(m0) = g(d0) return y ← 1
5 : elseif g(m1) = g(d1) return y ← 0
6 : else y ←⊥
7 : endif
8 : endif
9 : endif
10 : return y ←⊥
Theorem 4.4. Given an IND-CPA secure CP-ABE scheme for a class of Boolean
functions F closed under complement, a one-way function g, and a signature scheme
secure against EUF-CMA. Let VDC be the verifiable delegable computation scheme
as defined in Algorithms 1–7. Then VDC is secure in the sense of public verifiability
(Figure 4.2).
Informally, the proof relies on the IND-CPA property of the underlying CP-ABE
encryption scheme and the one-wayness of g. It proceeds by showing that an adversary
is not able to observe whether the plaintext has been altered for the unsatisfied function
F or F . Thus, the verification key can be the one-way function challenge g(w) and we
can set the plaintext implicitly to be w. A successful adversary finally returns w to
break the one-wayness of g.
4.5 Proof of Security
In this section we present the full proof of Theorem 4.4. The proof partially follows the
same principles as the proof of Lemma 3.12 in Chapter 3. The main proof differences
occur by using CP-ABE here rather than KP-ABE.
Proof. Suppose AVDC is an adversary with non-negligible advantage against the public
verifiability experiment (Figure 4.2) when instantiated with Algorithms 1–7. We begin
by defining the following three games:
• Game 0. This is the public verifiability game as defined in Figure 4.2.
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• Game 1. This is the same as Game 0 with the modification that in ProbGen,
we no longer return an encryption of m0 and m1. Instead, we choose another
equal length random message m′ 6= m0,m1 and, if F (X?) = 1, we replace c1
by ABE.Encrypt(m′, (F ∧∧xi,j∈X l(xi,j)),mpkABE). Otherwise, we replace c0 by
ABE.Encrypt(m′, (F ∧ ∧xi,j∈X l(xi,j)),mpkABE). In other words, we replace the
ciphertext associated with the unsatisfied function with the encryption of a sepa-
rate random message unrelated to the other system parameters, and in particular
to the verification keys.
• Game 2. This is the same as Game 1 with the exception that instead of choosing
a random message m′, we implicitly set m′ to be the challenge input w in the
one-way function game (Figure 2.8).
We show that an adversary with non-negligible advantage against the public verifiability
game can be used to construct an adversary that may invert the one-way function g.
Game 0 to Game 1. We begin by showing that there is a negligible distinguishing
advantage between Game 0 and Game 1. Suppose otherwise, that AVDC can distin-
guish the two games with non-negligible advantage δ. We then construct an adversary
AABE that uses AVDC as a sub-routine to break the IND-CPA security of the CP-
ABE scheme. We consider a challenger C playing the IND-CPA game (Figure 2.4)
with attribute universe U with AABE, that in turn acts as a challenger in the public
verifiability game for AVDC:
1. C runs the ABE.Setup algorithm on the security parameter and universe U to
generate mpkABE and mskABE. The challenger gives mpkABE to AABE.
2. AABE now simulates running VDC.Setup such that the outcome is consistent with
mpkABE. It initialises the list LReg and sets pp = (mpkABE, LReg). The master
key mk is implicitly set to mskABE.
3. AVDC is provided with the public parameters pp and oracle access to the following
functionalities, which are handled by AABE.
• VDC.FnInit(·,mk, pp) and VDC.Register(·,mk, pp) can be executed as speci-
fied in Algorithms 2 and 3.
• VDC.Certify(·, ·, ·, ·,mk, pp) can be run in order to generate the evaluation key
ekDi,Si for a queried data set Di. To do so, AABE makes use of the KeyGen
oracle OKeyGen in the CP-ABE game. First, it updates LReg according to the
specified procedure in the first two lines of the Certify algorithm. AABE then
sets the attribute data set D˜ to be (ADi∪
⋃
xi,j∈Di l(xi,j)) and makes an oracle
query to the challenger C of the form OKeyGen(D˜,mk, pp). The challenger
generates a CP-ABE decryption key sk
ABE,D˜
if and only if D˜ /∈ A?. C may
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generate the key ekDi,Si since A? is still {∅}, and provide AABE with the
key.
4. AVDC outputs the function F , its input data set X? and unique labels {l(xj)}
corresponding to the data points xj in X
? as its challenge parameters.
5. AABE also runs VDC.FnInit as given in the construction, cf. Algorithm 2.
6. To generate the challenge input, AABE begins by choosing three random equal
length messages m0, m1 and m
′ from the message space.
Now AABE needs to choose its challenge access structure A? for the CP-ABE
IND-CPA game. First, it computes r = F (X?). If r = 0, AABE sets A? =
(F ∧∧xj∈X? l(xj)). Else it sets A? = (F ∧∧xj∈X? l(xj)). Next it sends A? and
the messages m0 and m1 to C as its challenge parameters for the CP-ABE game.
We note that A? is a valid challenge access structure as the only queries made
to the KeyGen oracle OKeyGen of the CP-ABE IND-CPA game were initiated
by queries to the Certify oracle OCertify handled by AABE. Note that due to the
unique labels {l(xj)}xj∈X? present in the access structure, no requests to the
Certify oracle for input data points in X ′ ⊂ X? would result in a KeyGen query
for attributes that satisfy A?. If the oracle is queried for X ′ ⊇ X? then we can
observe that A? was chosen specifically such that it is unsatisfied on this input.
Thus, KeyGen is never queried for an attribute set that satisfies A?, and therefore
the challenge is valid.
C chooses a random bit b and returns ct? $← ABE.Encrypt(mb,A?,mpkABE). AABE
samples a random bit t which intuitively corresponds to its guess for the the
challenger’s choice of b.
• If r = 1 (that is, A? = (F ∧∧xj∈X? l(xj))), AABE generates
c
$← ABE.Encrypt(m′, (F ∧
∧
xj∈X?
l(xj)),mpkABE)
and sets c′ = ct? (formed over A? by C). It also sets vk = g(m′) and
vk′ = g(mt).
• Else r = 0, and AABE sets c = ct? and computes
c′ $← ABE.Encrypt(m′, (F ∧
∧
xj∈X?
l(xj)),mpkABE).
It sets vk = g(mt) and vk
′ = g(m′).
Finally, AABE sets σF,X? = (c, c′) and vkF,X? = (vk, vk′, LReg).
7. AABE sends the output from ProbGen along with the public information to AVDC
that is also given oracle access to which AABE responds as follows.
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• VDC.FnInit(·,mk, pp) and VDC.Register(·,mk, pp) can be executed as de-
tailed in the construction, cf. Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 3.
• VDC.Certify(·, ·, ·, ·,mk, pp): To generate the evaluation key for the queried
attribute set Di, AABE follows the same procedure as specified in step 3.
However, we note that by the definition of the access structure A?, D˜ satisfies
A? only if X? ⊆ Di. This follows from the uniqueness of the labels within the
whole system as it holds that {l(xj)}xj∈X? ⊆ {l(xi,j)}xi,j∈Di . Additionally
it follows that Di must satisfy either F or F as chosen in A?. However, this
was chosen specifically such that X? (and therefore Di, as F will simply
select the elements of X? to evaluate on) does not satisfy the function, and
therefore D˜ /∈ A? and C may generate the key, which AABE will receive as
ekDi,Si .
8. Eventually, AVDC outputs θF (X?) which it believes is a valid forgery, i.e. that the
output will be accepted yet does not correspond to the correct value of F (X?).
9. AABE parses θF (X?) as (d, d′, Si, γ). One of d and d′ will be ⊥ (by construction)
and we denote the other value (non-⊥) by Y . Observe that, since AVDC is
assumed to be a successful adversary against public verifiability, the non-⊥ value,
Y , that it will return will be the plaintext mt since the challenge access structure
was always set to be unsatisfied on the challenge input. Thus, if g(Y ) = g(mt),
AABE outputs a guess b′ = t and otherwise guesses b′ = (1− t).
If t = b (the challenge bit chosen by C), we observe that the above corresponds to Game
0 since the verification key comprises g(m′) where m′ is the message a legitimate server
could recover, and g(mb) where mb is the other plaintext.
Alternatively, t = 1 − b and the distribution of the above experiment is identical to
Game 1 since the verification key comprises the legitimate message and a random
message m1−t that is unrelated to the ciphertext.
Now, we consider the advantage of this constructed adversary AABE playing the IND-
CPA game for CP-ABE. Recall that by assumption, AVDC has a non-negligible advan-
tage δ in distinguishing between Game 0 and Game 1, that is∣∣∣Pr [ExpGame 0AVDC [VDC, 1λ,F]→ 1]− Pr [ExpGame 1AVDC [VDC, 1λ,F]→ 1]∣∣∣ > δ
where ExpGame iAVDC
[VDC, 1λ,F] denotes the output of running AVDC in Game i.
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The probability of AABE guessing b correctly is:
Pr[b′ = b] = Pr[t = b] Pr[b′ = b|t = b] + Pr[t 6= b] Pr[b′ = b|t 6= b]
=
1
2
Pr[g(Y ) = g(mt)|t = b] + 1
2
Pr[g(Y ) 6= g(mt)|t 6= b]
=
1
2
Pr
[
ExpGame 0AVDC
[
VDC, 1λ,F
]
→ 1
]
+
1
2
(1− Pr[g(Y ) = g(mt)|t 6= b])
=
1
2
Pr
[
ExpGame 0AVDC
[
VDC, 1λ,F
]
→ 1
]
+
1
2
(
1− Pr
[
ExpGame 1AVDC
[
VDC, 1λ,F
]
→ 1
])
=
1
2
(
Pr
[
ExpGame 0AVDC
[
VDC, 1λ,F
]
→ 1
]
− Pr
[
ExpGame 1AVDC
[
VDC, 1λ,F
]
→ 1
]
+ 1
)
> 1
2
(δ + 1)
Hence,
AdvAABE >
∣∣∣∣Pr[b = b′]− 12
∣∣∣∣
>
∣∣∣∣12(δ + 1)− 12
∣∣∣∣
=
δ
2
.
Therefore, if AVDC has advantage δ at distinguishing these games then AABE can
win the IND-CPA game for CP-ABE with non-negligible probability. Thus since we
assumed the CP-ABE scheme to be secure, we conclude that AVDC cannot distinguish
Game 0 from Game 1 with non-negligible probability.
Game 1 to Game 2. The transition from Game 1 to Game 2 is simply to set the
value of m′ to no longer be random but instead to correspond to the challenge w in the
one-way function inversion game. We argue that the adversary has no distinguishing
advantage between these games since the new value is independent of anything else
in the system bar the verification key g(w) and hence looks random to an adversary
with no additional information (in particular, AVDC does not see the challenge for the
one-way function as this is played between C and AABE).
Final Proof. We now show that using AVDC in Game 2, AABE can invert the one-
way function g – that is, given a challenge z = g(w) we can recover w. Specifically,
during ProbGen, we choose the messages as follows:
• if F (X?) = 1, we implicitly set m1 to be w and set the verification key component
vk′ = z = g(w). We choose m0 randomly from the message space and compute
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the remainder of the verification key as usual.
• if F (X?) = 0, we implicitly set m0 to be w and set the verification key component
vk = z = g(w). We choose m1 randomly from the message space and compute
the remainder of the verification key as usual.
Now, since AVDC is assumed to be successful, it will output a forgery comprising the
plaintext encrypted under the unsatisfied function (F or F ). By construction, this
will be w and the adversary’s view is consistent since the verification key is simulated
correctly using z. AABE can therefore forward this result to C in order to invert the
one-way function with the same non-negligible probability that AVDC has against the
public verifiability game.
We conclude that if the CP-ABE scheme is IND-CPA secure and the one-way function
is hard-to-invert, then VDC as defined by Algorithms 1–7 is secure in the sense of public
verifiability.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have introduced the notion of publicly verifiable delegable compu-
tation as a new mode of computation within the PVC setting. In particular, we have
shown that ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption can be used to achieve VDC
in a similar fashion to how we used revocable KP-ABE to construct RPVC in Chap-
ter 3. The obtained system model reverses the role of the client and server as the data
owner compared to the previous mode. In RPVC, the data owner is the client who
employs a server to evaluate a function on her data since she does not have the neces-
sary resources herself. In VDC, on the other hand, the server acts as the data owner
making the data available for specific queries, and the client can request a computation
and verify the correctness of the result even if the client never possessed the data herself.
We have presented a rigorous framework and a provably secure construction within our
security model. Furthermore, we discussed relevant natural applications of VDC and
showed that the use of alternative attribute-based encryption primitives can be also
used to provide a proof method.
In future work, we would like to compare the solution of Backes et al. [21] using SNARGs
and homomorphic MACs as a proof method of correct computation to ours more closely
and investigate whether ABE provides SNARG functionality. Another interesting di-
rection would be to investigate methods to allow dynamic updates of the data owned
by the servers as a result of computations. In our model, the cost of outsourcing a
computation depends on the functions and thus it would be interesting to focus on
reducing this cost.
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In this chapter we present a scheme that unifies the introduced proposals
of the previous chapters of this thesis capturing the modes of RPVC and
VDC within a single instantiated system. Furthermore, we introduce an-
other mode of publicly verifiable computation that enables us to enforce
(graph-based) access control policies over the delegators, servers and ver-
ifiers. We make use of a novel variant of dual-policy attribute-based en-
cryption to instantiate the unified umbrella scheme called hybrid publicly
verifiable computation. The results of this chapter appear in [6].
5.1 Introduction
Throughout this thesis so far, we enriched the achievable functionalities for publicly
verifiable outsourced computation schemes. In Chapter 3, we have extended the PVC
construction of Parno et al. [118] to accommodate a revocation mechanism into the
realm of PVC to revoke misbehaving servers from the system built on a revocable
KP-ABE scheme [17]. In Chapter 4, we changed the setting and considered a reversed
system model, compared to Chapter 3, wherein servers hold some data sets and make
them available for public, verifiable querying. Technically, this was achieved by switch-
ing the attribute-based encryption scheme, which acts as a proof mechanism, from
KP-ABE to CP-ABE. Thus, the VC schemes that arise can be seen as large, multi-user
systems comprising many servers and delegators. However, in such systems, the indi-
vidual user requirements may be diverse and thus require different forms of outsourced
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computations.
Let us consider the following scenarios: (i) employees with limited resources (e.g. using
mobile devices when out of the office) need to delegate computations to more powerful
servers. The workload of the employee may also involve responding to computation re-
quests to perform tasks for other employees or to respond to inter-departmental queries
over restricted databases; (ii) entities that invest heavily in outsourced computations
could find themselves with a valuable, processed data set that is of interest to other
parties, and hence want to selectively share this information by allowing others to query
the data set in a verifiable fashion; (iii) database servers that allow public queries may
become overwhelmed with requests, and need to enlist additional servers to help (es-
sentially the server acts as a delegator to outsource queries with relevant data). Finally,
(iv) consider a form of peer-to-peer network for sharing computational resources – as
individual resource availability varies, entities can sell spare resources to perform com-
putations for other users or make their own data available to others, whilst making
computation requests to other entities when resources run low.
Current PVC solutions (including the ones introduced in the previous chapters) do not
handle these flexible requirements particularly well; although there are several different
proposals in the literature that realise some of the requirements described above, each
requires an independent (potentially expensive) setup stage. Thus, in this chapter, we
unify these previous notions under an umbrella framework which we call hybrid publicly
verifiable computation (HPVC) which is a single mechanism with the associated costs
of a single setup operation and a single set of system parameters to be published and
maintained that simultaneously satisfies all of the above requirements. In other words,
we provide a system that is configured to support the modes RPVC and VDC depend-
ing on the individual user requirements. We show that yet another form of attribute-
based encryption, namely dual-policy attribute-based encryption (DP-ABE) [19] (cf.
Section 2.3.4), can be used to instantiate our HPVC system. DP-ABE has not at-
tracted much attention in the literature, which we believe is mainly due to applications
for this primitive being less obvious than for the single-policy schemes.
We also introduce another mode of computation, namely RPVC with access control.
Motivated in the above setting of multi-user VC systems, we may wish to (i) restrict the
computations that may be outsourced by delegators; and (ii) restrict the computations
a server may perform as it is generally unlikely that all participating entities within
the system have uncontrolled access to all functionalities. We show that by using the
full power of DP-ABE, i.e. using both forms of access policies simultaneously, we can
also enforce access control policies over the computations a server may perform in our
HPVC system.
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Related Work
In independent and concurrent work, Shi et al. [129] considered a similar use of DP-ABE
to combine keyword search on encrypted data with enforcing access control policies.
Two more notable works that have considered access control related to the VC setting
are the following. Clear and McGoldrick [55] considered access control policies over
delegators only and in a non-verifiable, multi-input outsourced computation setting
using homomorphic ciphertext-policy ABE and fully homomorphic encryption. Xu
and Tang [143] also addressed the necessity for access control in the setting of verifiable
computation, but limited their scope to non-public verifiable computation (i.e. not the
full multi-user setting) enforcing access control on delegators only.
Organisation of Chapter
In Section 5.2, we describe and provide a formal definition of our hybrid publicly veri-
fiable computation model and we discuss the possible different modes of computation
the scheme supports. Next, in Section 5.3, we define the main security notions for our
model. In order to implement the revocation functionality, we first develop a new form
of DP-ABE including the ability to revoke misbehaving entities and prevent them to
decrypt further ciphertexts. Thus, in Section 5.4, we combine the revocation techniques
from the indirectly revocable KP-ABE scheme (cf. Section 2.3.2) we used in Chapter 3
with the DP-ABE scheme [19] as summarised in Section 2.3.4 to define and construct
a new primitive called revocable key DP-ABE scheme. In the same section, we pro-
vide all relevant details including a definition, security model, as well as a concrete
construction and full proof of security. In Section 5.5, we use the recently constructed
primitive in a black-box manner and provide an example construction of HPVC. This
is followed, in Section 5.6, by showing that our given construction is secure according
to the introduced security models. We conclude this chapter in Section 5.7.
5.2 Hybrid Publicly Verifiable Outsourced Computation
In this section, we define our umbrella framework called hybrid publicly verifiable out-
sourced computation (HPVC). This is a single system that supports multiple modes of
computation with the associated cost of a single setup operation and system parame-
ters. We follow the previous chapters and enable a single KDC to initialise an HPVC
system that provides different functionalities for many clients with diverse requirements.
The presented unified (umbrella) construction, as detailed in Section 5.5, is based on a
novel use of DP-ABE (cf. Section 2.3.4). Given that DP-ABE conjunctively combines
KP-ABE and CP-ABE, we observe that by using special (“dummy”) attribute tokens,
we can also only implement KP-ABE and CP-ABE if necessary. Entities within an
HPVC scheme may play the role of both delegators and servers dynamically as re-
quired depending on the activated mode of computation. In more detail, our HPVC
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scheme captures the following modes of computations:
• Revocable PVC: in this setting, clients with limited resources outsource com-
putations on data of their choice to more powerful, untrusted servers using only
public information. This framework may accommodate multiple servers simulta-
neously within the system offering computations-as-a-service and they are able
to compute multiple different functions. Servers may try to cheat to persuade
verifiers of incorrect information or to avoid using their own resources. Misbehav-
ing servers can be detected and revoked so that further results will be rejected
and they will not be rewarded for their effort. This model was introduced in
Chapter 3.
• Publicly Verifiable Delegable Computation: in this setting, servers are the
data owners and make a static data set available to clients for verifiable querying.
Clients request computations on subsets of the data set using public, descriptive
labels and are able to efficiently verify the results even if the clients never owned
the data themselves. This model was introduced in Chapter 4.
• RPVC with Access Control: in this setting, we wish to restrict the set of
servers that may perform a particular computation. The set of servers that may
evaluate a computation for a client can therefore be restricted based on factors
such as sensitivity of input data or physical server location.
The last framework of RPVC with access control has not yet been formally introduced
within this thesis. We believe that such a model is highly beneficial in many situations
to limit the sets of entities that can view input data and results. Additionally, it is also
highly unlikely that all clients within a system (or an organisation) have identical and
uncontrolled access to all functionalities. A more detailed discussion about the individ-
ual modes, and in particular the third mode of computation, is provided in Section 5.2.3.
Note that such an HPVC scheme provides us with a flexible solution handling diverse
client requirements within a large system where individual workflows may require differ-
ent forms of outsourced computation. Thus, it is possible within the HPVC framework
that entities may play the role of both delegators and servers as required. For example,
let us consider a large company with many different departments that have contracted
cloud service providers offering computation-as-a-service. Employees can now use those
providers to outsource large computations but they may themselves need to provide
results from inter-departmental queries on local databases. Thus, an employee who
basically acts as a server in the VDC mode and is overwhelmed with local queries can
then change to the RPVC mode to contract a more powerful server to perform the
computation on their behalf. Such diverse requirements can be easily handled within
our HPVC system.
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5.2.1 Informal Overview
An HPVC system for a family of functions F begins (as before) with the key distribu-
tion centre (KDC) initialising the system by producing public parameters and a master
secret key. For each function of interest F , the KDC derives the appropriate delegation
key pkF . Then the KDC registers entities Si that wish to act as a server within the
system by providing each with an individual private signing key skSi .
In the next step, the server receives an evaluation key ek(O,ψ),Si that, depending on
the mode the algorithm is run in, either enables the evaluation of the function O or
the evaluation of input data ψ. Recall from the previous chapters that we aimed to
provide the server with the possibility to evaluate multiple functions and wished to
restrict specific input data to only being evaluated by specific functions. Thus, we have
introduced a simple encoding trick by issuing specific attribute labels. Now, in the
Certify algorithm where the server is issued with an evaluation key, the set of labels Li
the server chooses depends on the chosen mode. In more detail, the set of labels Li
in the modes RPVC and RPVC-AC uniquely represent the function F that a server is
certified to evaluate, and in the mode VDC the set of labels uniquely represents data
points contained in the data set Di held by Si. In either mode, the server also specifies
a list of computations Fi that it is willing to compute.
A delegator now runs the ProbGen algorithm where depending on the mode the respec-
tive inputs slightly differ. The delegator provides a set of labels LF,X ⊆ Li where, as in
the previous algorithm, those labels represent in the modes RPVC and RPVC-AC the
function F that should be computed on the provided input, and in the mode VDC the
labels represent the data points X ⊆ Di (X ⊆ Dom(F )) that should be computed on.
The algorithm finally outputs an encoded input σ(ω,S) and the respective verification
key vk(ω,S).
In the Compute algorithm, a server may use the encoded input and its evaluation key
to compute an encoded output corresponding to the computational result F (X). The
verification algorithm Verify inputs the encoded output, verification key and public
parameters and outputs a value y and a token τθF (X) . The token indicates whether
the result is correct and adds the server identity. If verification failed, the token is
sent to the KDC which then revokes the server to prevent it from performing further
computations within the system and hence incurs a penalty. Otherwise, the returned
value y is accepted as the correct result.
5.2.2 Formal Definition
We now present a formal definition of all necessary algorithms for an HPVC scheme.
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Definition 5.1. An hybrid publicly verifiable outsourced computation (HPVC) scheme
for a family of functions F comprises the following algorithms:
1. (pp,mk)
$← Setup(1λ,F) : this randomised algorithm is run by the KDC to es-
tablish public parameters pp and a master secret key mk for the system. The
inputs are the security parameter λ, and the family of functions F that may be
computed;
2. pkF
$← FnInit(F,mk, pp): this randomised algorithm is run by the KDC to gener-
ate a public delegation key, pkF , allowing entities to outsource, or request, com-
putations of F ;
3. skSi
$← Register(Si,mk, pp): this randomised algorithm is run by the KDC to
enrol an entity Si within the system to act as a server. It generates a personalised
signing key skSi;
4. ek(O,ψ),Si
$← Certify(mode, Si, (O, ψ), Li,Fi,mk, pp): this randomised algorithm is
run by the KDC to generate an evaluation key ek(O,ψ),Si enabling the entity Si to
compute on the pair (O, ψ). The algorithm also takes as input the mode in which
it should operate, a set of labels Li, a set of functions Fi, the master secret key
as well as the public parameters;
5. (σ(ω,S), vk(ω,S))
$← ProbGen(mode, (ω,S), LF,X , pkF , pp): this randomised algorithm
is run by an entity to request a computation of F (X) from Si. The inputs are
the mode, the pair (ω,S) representing the computation request, a set of labels
LF,X ⊆ Li, the delegation key for F and the public parameters. The algorithm
outputs an encoded input σ(ω,S) and a verification key vk(ω,S);
6. θF (X)
$← Compute(mode, σ(ω,S), ek(O,ψ),Si , skSi , pp): this randomised algorithm is
run by an entity Si to compute F (X). The inputs are the mode, an encoded
input σ(ω,S), an evaluation key ek(O,ψ),Si and a signing key for Si. The algorithm
outputs an encoded output θF (X) representing F (X);
7. (y, τθF (X)) ← Verify(θF (X), vk(ω,S), pp): this algorithm is run by any entity that
wants to verify whether the result was computed correctly or not. The inputs are
the encoded output θF (X), the verification key vk(ω,S) and the public parameters.
The algorithm outputs the actual result y. If the result y corresponds to F (x) it
additionally creates a token τθF (x) = (accept, Si) indicating that the result was
correctly computed. Otherwise, the result y corresponds to ⊥ and it creates a token
τθF (x) = (reject, Si) indicating that the result is malformed and Si misbehaved;
8. um
$← Revoke(τθF (X) ,mk, pp): this randomised algorithm is run by the KDC
inputting the token from the verification process, the master secret key and public
parameters. If τθF (X) = (reject, Si), the algorithm revokes all evaluation keys
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ek(·,·),Si of the server Si by rendering them non-functional and thereby preventing
Si from performing any further evaluations within the current system. The update
material um consists of a set of updated evaluation keys {ek(O,ψ),S′} which are
issued to all servers. Otherwise, in case τθF (X) = (accept, Si) then the algorithm
outputs ⊥ indicating that no update was necessary.
Although not explicitly stated, the KDC may update the public parameters pp during
any algorithm in order to address any changes in the entity population.
We say that an HPVC scheme is correct if the verifying party almost certainly accepts
the returned result generated by a non-revoked server using a valid generated verifi-
cation key and encoded output given the non-revoked server used a valid generated
encoded input and evaluation key in each of the respective modes. More formally this
can be represented as follows.
Definition 5.2. An hybrid publicly verifiable outsourced computation (HPVC) scheme
is correct for a family of functions F if, for all attribute sets ω and ψ, for all access
structures O and S defined for a computation F (X), for F ∈ F and X ∈ Dom(F ), if
ω ∈ O and ψ ∈ S, and for all non-revoked servers Si, then the following holds:
Pr[(pp,mk)
$← Setup(1λ,F),
pkF
$← FnInit(F,mk, pp),
skSi
$← Register(Si,mk, pp),
ek(O,ψ),Si
$← Certify(mode, Si, (O, ψ), Li,Fi,mk, pp),
(σ(ω,S), vk(ω,S))
$← ProbGen(mode, (ω,S), LF,X , pkF , pp),
θF (X)
$← Compute(mode, σ(ω,S), ek(O,ψ),Si , skSi , pp),
y ← Verify(θF (X), vk(ω,S), pp),
um
$← Revoke(τθF (X) ,mk, pp)]
= 1− negl(λ).
5.2.3 Modes of Computation
In this section, we discuss in more detail the requirements and approaches needed to
enable a specific mode of computation. As mentioned before, our HPVC scheme is
generically defined in terms of objective and subjective policies (O and S respectively)
as well as objective and subjective attribute sets (ω and ψ respectively). The value of
these parameters determine in which mode the algorithms are executed. In Table 5.1,
we specify these parameters and relate them to their respective mode. We define two
additional parameters TO and TS which are required in case we run the HPVC system
in a specific mode. For the moment it suffices to interpret them as “dummy” objects
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mode O ψ ω S
RPVC F {TS} X {{TS}}
VDC {{TO}} Di {TO} F
RPVC-AC F s X P
mode Li LF,X Fi
RPVC {l(F )} {l(F )} {F}
VDC {l(xi,j)}xi,j∈Di {l(xi,j)}xi,j∈X {(F, {l(xi,j)}xi,j∈Dom(F ))}F∈F
RPVC-AC {l(F )} {l(F )} {F}
Table 5.1: Parameter definitions for different modes of computation
which are able to satisfy {TO} ∈ {{TO}}. With this interpretation it is possible that we
set the objective policy O = {{TO}} which is always trivially satisfied by the objective
attribute set ω = {TO} as above. This similarly holds for TS. We use these parameters
in order to “disable” either the objective or subjective part within our HPVC system
to run the system in one of the possible modes. More details about these parameters
can be found in Section 5.5.
5.2.3.1 RPVC
In order to run the system in the RPVC mode (as introduced in Chapter 3), we only
require to input the objective policy O and the objective attribute set ω. Therefore, the
objective policy is set to be the function F and the objective attribute set corresponds
to the input X to outsource the computation of F (X). Note that the input set X
only contains a single input data point x which is chosen specifically per computation.
Since we wish here to run the system in the RPVC mode, the unneeded subjective
parameters S and ψ correspond to the dummy parameter TS such that S is trivially
satisfied by ψ. Furthermore, the set of functions Fi chosen in Certify corresponds in this
mode simply to the function F , and the sets of labels Li and LF,X both just comprise
a single element labelling F . In more detail, this label l(F ) corresponds to the label
derived from the bijective mapping Λ: F → UF defined in Section 3.4.1.2.
5.2.3.2 VDC
In order to run the system in the VDC mode (as introduced in Chapter 4), we only
require to input the subjective policy S and the subjective attribute set ψ. Here,
the subjective policy S represents the function F whilst the subjective attribute set ψ
corresponds to the data set Di held by server Si comprising ki data points. Similarly to
the previous mode, the unneeded objective parameters O and ω are set to correspond
to the dummy parameter TO such that O is trivially satisfied by ω. In this mode,
the set of functions Fi chosen in Certify corresponds to the set of functions a server is
willing to let a client query on its data set along with the labels of each permissible
input for the function. The set Li contains labels that label each data point xi,j ∈ Di
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held by the server, whilst the set LF,X specifically contains labels of data points for a
particular computation.
5.2.3.3 RPVC-AC
Before explicitly detailing the requirements to run the system in the RPVC-AC mode,
let us first motivate the necessity for an access control framework in the realm of pub-
licly verifiable outsourced computation.
In the previous chapters of this thesis, we have extended the system model to accom-
modate a large pool of servers and delegators. As with any multi-client setting, we
may wish to control access to resources in a verifiable computation system. In [5], we
show that not only is this setting of multi-user VC well-suited to the cryptographic
enforcement of access control policies, but that such policies fulfil a natural and vital
role in protecting outsourced computations. Specifically in the setting of multi-user
VC, we may wish on one hand to restrict the computations that may be outsourced by
delegators, and on the other hand to restrict the computations a server may perform.
The first need stems from separation of duties and the observation that, within an
organisation, it is extremely unlikely that all users have equal, uncontrolled access to
all functionalities. We may restrict the set of delegators that may outsource a compu-
tation to those that are authorised to compute it (if given sufficient resources) by the
organisation’s policies. The second requirement arises from the fact delegators may not
authenticate servers beforehand and have less control over which servers may operate
on their data. The sensitivity of the data or other requirements, such as the physical
location or resources of the server, may limit the servers that should be permitted to
perform the computation.
Another motivation for access control in the VC setting is that computational services
may be charged for (e.g. in subscription-based utility computing [85, 122]) and that
service providers may offer different levels of services to different clients (e.g. different
levels may provide access to different functions or computational resources). We must
ensure that only valid subscribers may access each tier of service.
In many multi-user settings for access control to stored data [32, 125], servers enforce
access control policies by authenticating users and granting or denying access based on
access control lists or capability lists. This approach is not appropriate in the multi-user
VC setting since the servers are assumed to be untrusted and may have a huge interest
in violating the policies. We instead use a cryptographic enforcement mechanism for
access control policies where cryptographic keys are used to protect objects and restrict
access, thus here the access control mechanism reduces to the appropriate distribution
of keys to authorised entities. In [5], we use the trusted key distribution centre (KDC)
as introduced in Chapter 3 for our RPVC model and extend its duties to instantiate
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the access control mechanism, i.e. we additionally require it to issue keys appropriate
to the access control policy that enable read and write access to certain components
of the system. For example, input data for particular functions may be protected such
that only authorised servers may read the data and hence perform the computation.
Note that in our RPVC scheme in Chapter 3, the KDC already implicitly provides
some access control in the sense that servers are certified to perform specific functions
through the generation of evaluation keys. However, no access control is applied to
delegators – any entity can outsource an evaluation of any function for which the
KDC has published delegation information (essentially due to the use of asymmetric
cryptographic primitives). Cryptographic enforcement mechanisms are particularly ap-
propriate when the objects and policies are relatively static such that additional keys
need not be generated and objects need not be re-encrypted as those are rare events.
In the context of VC, we may assume that the set of functions that may be evaluated
is fixed (a given VC construction can implement a specified family of functions) and
that the input data to each function is also static (limited to the set of ‘valid’ inputs
to that function). Thus, the set of objects (function evaluations in VC) is static, and
policies will primarily be specified in terms of these computations. Thus multi-user VC
is a very natural setting in which to use cryptographic access control.
We consider in [5] graph-based policies where “objects” to be protected are not data
files, as in traditional access control policies, but outsourced computations and their
results. Here the underlying entity population comprises the sets of delegators C, com-
putational servers S, and verifiers V. In detail, we discuss and specify concrete policies
that restrict (i) which functions a delegator may delegate, (ii) which computations a
server may evaluate, and (iii) which outputs a verifier may read. In our context, to
enforce policies restricting the computations that may be delegated to a server, a del-
egator must use an appropriate key to encrypt the input data. Without the correct
encryption, the input will be just discarded by the server. The enforcement of policies
for performing computations is achieved by distributing keys to servers that can be
used to decrypt encrypted inputs. Without decryption, the server will be unable to
read the input data and evaluate the function. The enforcement of (read) policies on
outputs uses cryptographic access control in a more conventional fashion, i.e. results
are published and protected via encryption with an appropriate key.
In order to realise the policies, we require a security labelling function. We define a
security labelling function in terms of a mapping λ : C∪S∪V∪O → L where C,S and V
are the respective sets from the entity population, O is the family of computations that
may be outsourced and (L,6) is a poset of security labels. Note that in this context
we refer to computations as o = (F,X, aux) ∈ O where each computation o specifies all
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required information in order to formulate the access control policy, i.e. the function F
to be computed, the input data X, and any other relevant contextual informations are
denoted by aux.1 This security labelling function assigns a label from L, representing
the security classification (clearance), to each delegator, server and computation in the
system. The access control policy requires that λ(E) ≥ λ(o) for an entity E ∈ C∪S∪V
attempting to evaluate a computation o ∈ O. Note that different types of policy can be
achieved by different choices for the sets O and L. In [5], we discuss in detail delegation
and computation policies, i.e. policies over functions and policies over function inputs,
as well as verification policies.
{F, G}
{F, H}
{G, H}
{F, G, H}
{G}
{F}
{H}
Figure 5.1: Example poset L = 2{F,G,H} for RPVC with access control
Let us provide here an example discussion about an access control policy over functions,
i.e. we examine the case where policies are formulated purely in terms of the functions
being computed. Thus, in this example objects correspond to functions O = F and
security labels are represented as sets of functions L = 2F . In simple terms, we associate
each delegator C and server S with a set of functions λ(C) ⊆ F and λ(S) ⊆ F
respectively. We define a correctness criterion that states that C should be able to
prepare inputs for all functions F ∈ λ(C) (and similarly for S), i.e. entities should
be able to perform all operations that they are authorised for. The security criterion
requires λ(C), λ(S) ⊇ λ(o) in order to delegate or compute F respectively, and that a
set of unauthorised entities cannot collude to perform an operation that any of them
could not perform alone.
More formally, we define the set of security labels L to be 2F (the power set of all con-
sidered functions). Then, λ(C) ⊆ F defines the set of functions that a delegator C may
outsource an evaluation of, λ(S) ⊆ F denotes the functions a server S may compute,
and λ(o) = {F} labels the computation of F ∈ F . Then, for any X,Y ∈ L we define
an order relation < such that X < Y if and only if X ∈ F , Y ⊆ F and X ∈ Y . The
1This notation for computations was chosen in reference to their role as protected objects in the
access control system.
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corresponding Hasse diagram with F = {F,G,H} is shown in Figure 5.1.2 Any entity
E authorised for λ(E) is, by the correctness criterion, authorised to operate on all
computations such that λ(o) < λ(E). For example, in Figure 5.1, an entity authorised
for the set λ(E) = {F,G} is authorised for the functions F and G as expected. Each
label l ∈ L will be associated with a key κl. To outsource a computation o of F (X), C
prepares the encoding of X using the key κo = {F} which, by the security criterion, C
knows if and only if λ(C) > λ(o), i.e. if and only if {F} ∈ λ(C). To compute F (X), S
uses the corresponding key κo. As before, S may do this if and only if {F} ∈ λ(S).
Furthermore, we presented in [5], a definition of a RPVC scheme with access control as
well as relevant novel security notions for the scheme. Finally, we provided a concrete
example instantiation based on the RPVC scheme as introduced in Chapter 3. In order
to enforce the policies in the instantiation, we make use of a key assignment scheme
(KAS) that assigns an appropriate key to each label. Thus, each entity is provided
with a key corresponding to their respective label, and they may derive keys for all
descendants.
Now we turn our attention to the case of running our HPVC scheme in the RPVC-
AC mode. In contrast to the previous discussion on access control, we are able to
slightly relax the access control framework within HPVC. The framework retains public
verifiability and public delegability but we limit the use of access control policies to
be restricted on the set of servers that may compute a given outsourced computation.
Informally, we use the objective policy O to evaluate an outsourced computation as in
the RPVC mode whilst we additionally use the subjective policy S to enforce access
control on the server. Servers receive an evaluation key ek(O,ψ),S in which the objective
policy corresponds to a function F and the subjective attributes correspond to a set
of descriptive attributes describing their authorisation rights s, where s ⊆ Uauth and
Uauth is an attribute universe that is solely used to authorisation. Using the above
terminology of the security labelling function, a server receives the label λC(S) =
(F, s) where λC(·) denotes a computation policy.3 The ProbGen algorithm for HPVC
inputs the objective attributes which correspond here to the input data X and the
subjective policy corresponds to an authorisation policy P ⊆ 2Uauth \ {∅} which specify
the necessary required authorisation attributes to perform the computation. In terms of
the security labelling function, the label for the computation o corresponds to λC(o) =
(X,P ). A server may produce a valid output that will be accepted by the verification
algorithm if and only if s ∈ P , i.e. the server satisfies the authorisation policy.
2Nodes for empty sets are excluded from the figure.
3In [5], we differentiate between computation policies over delegators and servers, denoted by λC(·),
and verification policies over delegators only, denoted by λV (·).
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5.3 Security Models
In this section we discuss the security notions we wish to achieve in our HPVC frame-
work. In more detail, we can achieve security in the sense of public verifiability, re-
vocation and authorised computation. Those notions follow the same motivations as
discussed in the previous chapters. We require, as in Chapter 3, to include some addi-
tional restrictions on the games that are placed from our current rkDPABE primitive
(which we introduce in Section 5.4) which acts as our main building block for our HPVC
construction in this chapter. For brevity, we do not discuss further the respective ideal
notions of security but it is straightforward to adapt those notions from Chapter 3 by
accommodating some additional HPVC parameters.
5.3.1 Selective Public Verifiability
In Figure 5.2, we define a selective notion of public verifiability. This notion is a combi-
nation of the public verifiability notions introduced in Chapters 3 and 4, to formalise in
the HPVC model that no server is able to return a malformed result for a computation
without being detected.
ExpsPubVerifA
[HPVC, 1λ,F]
1 : (ω?,O?, ψ?,S?, LF,X? , mode)←$ A(1λ,F)
2 : (pp,mk)←$ Setup(1λ,F)
3 : if mode = VDC then (F ← S?, X? ← ψ?)
4 : else (F ← O?, X? ← ω?)
5 : pkF ←$ FnInit(F,mk, pp)
6 : (σ?, vk?)←$ ProbGen(mode, (ω?,S?), LF,X? , pkF , pp)
7 : θ?←$ AO(σ?, vk?, pkF , pp)
8 : (y, τθ?)← Verify(θ?, vk?, pp)
9 : if (y, τθ?) 6= (⊥, (reject, S)) and (y 6= F (X?)) then
10 : return 1
11 : else return 0
Figure 5.2: The selective public verifiability experiment ExpsPubVerifA
[HPVC, 1λ,F]
The game begins with the adversary first selecting its challenge parameters. Note that
the adversary chooses the mode it wishes the challenge to be generated in and the re-
spective labels necessary for this mode. Furthermore, the adversary outputs choices for
ω?, O?, ψ? and S?, despite only ω? and S? are used to form the challenge input. This
notation was used mainly for notational convenience to allow us to define the challenge
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computation in terms of F and X? in line 3 or 4 depending on the mode. However, we
want to stress that this information can also be learnt from the set of labels LF,X? and
the chosen mode of computation. Thus, this notational convenience does not weaken
the game since the information has been already determined by the adversary’s choices.
After the adversary has chosen the parameters, the game proceeds with the challenger
running Setup to initialise the system and FnInit to return the public delegation key
pkF for the chosen challenge function. The challenger continues with running ProbGen
on the challenge inputs to output a challenge for the adversary. The adversary receives
the challenge and public information and is given oracle access to FnInit(·,mk, pp),
Register(·,mk, pp), Certify(·, ·, (·, ·), ·, ·,mk, pp) and Revoke(·,mk, pp) which we denote
by O. All oracles simply run the relevant algorithm. Finally, the adversary wins the
game if it is able to create an encoded output that verifies correctly but does not encode
the correct value F (X).
Definition 5.3. The advantage of a PPT adversary in the sPubVerif game for
an hybrid publicly verifiable outsourced computation scheme HPVC, for a family of
functions F is defined as:
AdvsPubVerifA,HPVC (1
λ,F) = Pr
[
ExpsPubVerifA
[
HPVC, 1λ,F
]
→ 1
]
.
We say that the hybrid publicly verifiable outsourced computation scheme HPVC is
secure with respect to selective public verifiability if for all PPT adversaries A, it
holds that
AdvsPubVerifA,HPVC (1
λ,F) ≤ negl(λ).
5.3.2 Selective, Semi-static Revocation
The notion of revocation requires that, if a server is detected as misbehaving, meaning
that a server Si returns a result such that the verification algorithm Verify outputs
(⊥, (reject, Si)), then any subsequent computations by Si should be rejected, even if
the result may be correct.
In Figure 5.3, we define a selective, semi-static notion of revocation which is similarly
defined to the notion in Section 3.3.2.2. As in the previous game, this notion starts
with the adversary choosing its challenge parameters which the challenger can parse to
determine F and X?. The challenger maintains a (initially empty) list QRev of currently
revoked entities as well as the current time period t which can be incremented during
Revoke oracle queries. The game proceeds with the challenger running Setup to initialise
the system and FnInit to return the public delegation key pkF for the chosen challenge
function. After this, on line 8, the adversary needs to declare (before receiving oracle
154
5.3 Security Models
ExpsssRevocA
[HPVC, 1λ,F , qt]
1 : (ω?,O?, ψ?,S?, LF,X? , mode)←$ A(1λ,F , qt)
2 : if mode = VDC then (F ← S?, X? ← ψ?)
3 : else (F ← O?, X? ← ω?)
4 : QRev ← 
5 : t← 1
6 : (pp,mk)←$ Setup(1λ,F)
7 : pkF ←$ FnInit(F,mk, pp)
8 : R← A(pkF , pp)
9 : AO(pkF , pp)
10 : if (R 6⊆ QRev) then return 0
11 : (σ?, vk?)←$ ProbGen(mode, (ω?,S?), LF,X? , pkF , pp)
12 : θ?←$ AO(σ?, vk?, pkF , pp)
13 : if ((y, (accept, S))← Verify(θ?, vkF,x? , pp) and (S ∈ R)) then
14 : return 1
15 : else return 0
OCertify(mode, Si, (O, ψ), Li,Fi,mk, pp)
1 : if (LF,X? ⊆ Li and Si /∈ R) or (t = qt and R 6⊆ QRev \ Si) then return ⊥
2 : QRev ← QRev \ Si
3 : return Certify(mode, Si, (O, ψ), Li,Fi,mk, pp)
ORevoke(τθF ′(X) ,mk, pp)
1 : t← t+ 1
2 : if (τθF ′(x) = (accept, ·)) then return ⊥
3 : if (t = qt and R 6⊆ QRev ∪ Si) then return ⊥
4 : QRev ← QRev ∪ Si
5 : return Revoke(τθF ′(X) ,mk, pp)
Figure 5.3: The selective, semi-static revocation experiment
ExpsssRevocA
[HPVC, 1λ,F , qt]
access) a list R of servers to be revoked at the time period where the challenge will be
generated which we assume will be at time period qt. The adversary is then provided
with oracle access to FnInit(·,mk, pp), Register(·,mk, pp), Certify(·, ·, (·, ·), ·, ·,mk, pp)
and Revoke(·,mk, pp) which we denote by O. Certify and Revoke oracle queries are
handled as specified in Figure 5.3. The adversary finishes its oracles query phase (line
9) after making a polynomial number of queries q, including qt many Revoke queries,
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and does not return a value other than signalling to the challenger that it may proceed
with the remainder of the game. The challenger checks that all queries made by the
adversary have indeed generated a list of currently revoked servers that is a superset of
the challenge revocation list R. If this is not true, the challenger aborts the game and
the adversary loses as it was not able to choose its queries or the list R appropriately.
Otherwise, the challenger continues with the game and generates the challenge by
running ProbGen. The adversary wins the game if it outputs any result, i.e. a correct
or malformed response, as a valid result from any server that was revoked at the time
of the challenge.
Definition 5.4. The advantage of a PPT adversary in the sssRevoc game for an hy-
brid publicly verifiable outsourced computation scheme HPVC, for a family of functions
F is defined as:
AdvsssRevocA,HPVC (1
λ,F , qt) = Pr
[
ExpsssRevocA
[
HPVC, 1λ,F , qt
]
→ 1
]
.
We say that the hybrid publicly verifiable outsourced computation scheme HPVC is
secure with respect to selective, semi-static revocation if for all PPT adversaries A, it
holds that
AdvsssRevocA,HPVC (1
λ,F , qt) ≤ negl(λ).
5.3.3 Selective Authorised Computation
In Figure 5.4, we define a selective notion of authorised computation. This notion en-
sures that only a server that satisfies an additional authorisation policy in the encoded
input should be able to perform a given computation on this encoded input. Thus, in
contrast, a result generated by an unauthorised server should always be rejected even
if the result is correct.
The game begins with explicitly setting the mode of computation to RPVC-AC and the
adversary chooses the parameters for the game accordingly as otherwise the parameters
would not be meaningful. Those parameters consist of a challenge function F , challenge
input X?, the authorisation policy P and the respective function labels for this mode.
The game proceeds with the challenger running Setup to initialise the system and FnInit
to return the public delegation key pkF for the chosen challenge function. It continues
with the challenger running ProbGen to create the challenge for the adversary. The
adversary receives the challenge and public information and is given oracle access to
FnInit(·,mk, pp), Register(·,mk, pp), Certify(·, ·, (·, ·), ·, ·,mk, pp) and Revoke(·,mk, pp)
which we denote by O. All oracles simply run the relevant algorithm with the exception
of Certify queries which are separately specified in Figure 5.4. The Certify oracle returns
⊥ if the queried attribute set ψ satisfies the authorisation policy P , as otherwise the
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ExpsAuthCompA
[HPVC, 1λ,F]
1 : mode = RPVC-AC
2 : (F,X?, P, {l(F )})←$ A(1λ,F)
3 : (pp,mk)←$ Setup(1λ,F)
4 : pkF ←$ FnInit(F,mk, pp)
5 : (σ?, vk?)←$ ProbGen(RPVC-AC, (X?, P ), {l(F )}, pkF , pp)
6 : θ?←$ AO(σ?, vk?, pkF , pp)
7 : (y, τ?)← Verify(θ?, vk?, pp)
8 : if τ? 6= (reject, ·) then
9 : return 1
10 : else return 0
OCertify(RPVC-AC, Si, (F,ψ), {l(F )},Fi,mk, pp)
1 : if (ψ ∈ P ) then return ⊥
2 : return Certify(RPVC-AC, Si, (F,ψ), {l(F )},Fi,mk, pp)
Figure 5.4: The selective authorised computation experiment
ExpsAuthCompA
[HPVC, 1λ,F]
adversary would be able to trivially produce a valid response as an authorised entity.
The adversary wins the game if it outputs a result and token that is accepted by a
verifier.
Definition 5.5. The advantage of a PPT adversary in the sAuthComp game for
an hybrid publicly verifiable outsourced computation scheme HPVC, for a family of
functions F is defined as:
AdvsAuthCompA,HPVC (1
λ,F) = Pr
[
ExpsAuthCompA
[
HPVC, 1λ,F
]
→ 1
]
.
We say that the hybrid publicly verifiable outsourced computation scheme HPVC is
secure with respect to selective authorised computation if for all PPT adversaries A,
it holds that
AdvsAuthCompA,HPVC (1
λ,F) ≤ negl(λ).
5.4 Revocable Dual-policy Attribute-based Encryption
Dual-policy attribute-based encryption, as described in Section 2.3.4, was introduced by
Attrapadung and Imai [19] and conjunctively combines KP-ABE and CP-ABE such
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that both the secret decryption key and the ciphertext comprise an access structure and
an attribute set. The same authors [17] have also introduced the notion of revocation
in ABE schemes (cf. Section 2.3.2) which we already have seen in Chapter 3 leads to
a PVC scheme which can revoke misbehaving servers from the system. Recall that
the notion of revocation supports two different modes, namely direct revocation and
indirect revocation. The former notion enables a client to specify a revocation list at
the point of encryption such that periodic re-keying is not necessary but the encryptors
must have the knowledge of the specific (current) revocation list. On the other hand,
indirect revocation requires a time period to be specified at the point of encryption and
needs an authority that issues update key material at each time period in order to en-
able entities to update their key to stay functional during the time period. Throughout
this thesis we have focused on the mode of indirect revocation, mainly as it minimises
the client’s workload as she is not required to maintain a synchronised revocation list.
This mode is implemented in the KP-ABE setting by amending the policy including an
entity identifier and by embedding the current time period into the ciphertext. Update
keys are issued only to non-revoked entities at each time period. Note that only the
combination of a secret key with an update key for a time period forms a functional
evaluation key that is able to decrypt a ciphertext formed using the time period.
In this section, we aim to implement a revocation mechanism for a DP-ABE scheme.
However, in this context, we are able to embed the revocation mechanism into the KP-
ABE functionality or the CP-ABE functionality. Recall that decryption in DP-ABE
is only successful if and only if both attribute sets satisfy their corresponding access
structure. Thus, in order to prevent the decryption functionality to be successful,
it suffices that at least one attribute set does not satisfy the corresponding access
structure. Here we present a formal definition of a revocable DP-ABE scheme using
indirect revocation in the key-policy.
5.4.1 Formal Definition
In the following we provide a formal definition of a revocable key dual-policy attribute-
based encryption scheme. Recall from Section 2.3.4 that we refer to the access structure
associated to a decryption key as an objective access structure, denoted as O, and the
attribute set associated with a ciphertext is referred to as an objective attribute set,
denoted as ω. Both the objective access structure and attribute set are associated with
the KP-ABE functionality. Similarly, we refer to the access structure associated with
a ciphertext as a subjective access structure, denoted as S, whereas we refer to the
attribute set associated to a decryption key as a subjective attribute set, denoted as
ψ. Thus, both the subjective access structure and attribute set are associated with the
CP-ABE functionality.
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An indirectly revocable key DP-ABE scheme defines the universe of attributes to be
U = Uattr ∪ Ul ∪ UID ∪ Utime ∪ TO ∪ TS. In more detail, Uattr is the “normal” attribute
universe for describing ciphertexts and forming access policies, Ul contains a set of
attributes (disjoint from Uattr) that uniquely label each function and each data item,
Utime comprises attributes for time periods, and UID contains attributes encoding entity
identities. TO and TS are additional (“dummy”) attributes that efficiently enable the
DP-ABE scheme to either function as a KP-ABE scheme or CP-ABE scheme. In Sec-
tion 5.5, we discuss in more detail how those dummy attributes influence the execution
of the different modes of computations within our unified HPVC construction.
More formally, an indirectly revocable key DP-ABE scheme is presented in the following
definition.
Definition 5.6. A revocable key dual-policy attribute-based encryption (rkDP-ABE)
scheme consists of the following algorithms:
• (pp,mk) $← Setup(1λ,U) : this randomised algorithm takes as input the security
parameter and the universe of attributes U and outputs public parameters pp and
master secret key mk;
• ct(ω,S),t $← Encrypt(m, (ω,S), t, pp) : this randomised encryption algorithm inputs
a message m, an objective attribute set ω, a subjective policy S, the current time
period t ∈ Utime and the public parameters pp. It outputs a ciphertext ct(ω,S),t that
is valid for time t;
• skid,(O,ψ) $← KeyGen(id, (O, ψ),mk, pp) : this randomised key generation algorithm
takes as input an identity id ∈ UID, an objective access structure O, a subjective
attribute set ψ, as well as the master secret key mk and public parameters pp. It
outputs a secret decryption key skid,(O,ψ);
• ukR,t $← KeyUpdate(R, t,mk, pp) : this randomised algorithm takes a revocation
list R ⊆ UID containing the identities of revoked entities, the current time period t,
as well as the master secret key mk and public parameters pp. It outputs updated
key material ukR,t which makes the decryption keys skid,(O,ψ), for all non-revoked
identities id /∈ R, functional to decrypt ciphertexts encrypted for the time period
t;
• pt ← Decrypt(ct(ω,S),t, (ω,S), skid,(O,ψ), (O, ψ), ukR,t, pp) : this decryption algo-
rithm takes as input a ciphertext ct(ω,S),t formed for the time period t and the
associated pair (ω,S), a secret decryption key skid,(O,ψ) for an entity id and the
associated pair (O, ψ), an update key ukR,t for the current time period t and the
public parameters pp. The algorithm outputs a plaintext pt which corresponds to
the correct message m, if and only if the objective attributes ω satisfy the objec-
tive access structure O and the subjective attributes ψ satisfy the subjective access
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structure S and the value of t in the update key matches the one specified during
encryption. If not, pt outputs ⊥.
Correctness of a revocable key DP-ABE scheme is defined as follows.
Definition 5.7. A revocable key DP-ABE scheme is correct if for all m ∈ M, all
id ∈ UID, all R ⊆ UID, all access structures O,S ⊆ 2Uattr \ {∅}, all attribute sets
ω, ψ ⊆ Uattr and all t ∈ Utime, if ω ∈ O and ψ ∈ S and id /∈ R, it holds that
Pr[(pp,mk)
$← Setup(1λ,U),
ct(ω,S),t
$← Encrypt(m, (ω,S), t, pp),
skid,(O,ψ)
$← KeyGen(id, (O, ψ),mk, pp),
ukR,t
$← KeyUpdate(R, t,mk, pp),
m← Decrypt(ct(ω,S),t, (ω,S), skid,(O,ψ), (O, ψ), ukR,t, pp)]
= 1− negl(λ).
5.4.2 Security Model
The security model for a rkDP-ABE scheme is a natural extension of the IND-sHRSS
security notion for an indirectly revocable KP-ABE scheme (cf. Section 2.3.2) and the
security notion is presented in Figure 5.5.
Definition 5.8. The advantage of a PPT adversary in the IND-sHRSS game for a
revocable key DP-ABE construction RKDPABE is defined as:
AdvIND-sHRSSA,RKDPABE(1
λ) = Pr
[
ExpIND-sHRSSA
[
RKDPABE , 1λ,U
]
→ 1
]
− 1
2
.
We say that the revocable key DP-ABE scheme is secure in the sense of indistin-
guishability against selective-target with semi-static query attack (IND-sHRSS) if for
all PPT adversaries A, it holds that
AdvIND-sHRSSA,RKDPABE(1
λ) ≤ negl(λ).
5.4.3 Construction of a rkDP-ABE scheme
Our revocable DP-ABE scheme will be based on a combination of DP-ABE [19], which
itself is a combination of CP-ABE [142] and KP-ABE [89], and an ABE scheme sup-
porting revocation [17]. We represent a subjective access structure S by a linear secret
sharing scheme (LSSS) which we denote by (M,ρ) and represent an objective access
structure O as a LSSS denoted by (N, pi).
Let Us and Uo be the universe of subjective and objective attributes respectively. The
objective attribute universe comprises disjoint sub-universes N , T ,M and UID referring
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ExpIND-sHRSSA
[RKDPABE , 1λ,U]
1 : (t?, (ω?,S?))←$ A(1λ,U)
2 : (pp,mk)←$ Setup(1λ,U)
3 : R←$ A(pp)
4 : (m0,m1)←$ AOKeyGen(·,·,mk,pp)KeyUpdate(·,·,mk,pp)(R, pp)
5 : if (|m0| 6= |m1|) then return 0
6 : b←$ {0, 1}
7 : ct?←$ Encrypt(mb, t?, (ω?,S?), pp)
8 : b′ ← AOKeyGen(·,(·,·)mk,pp),OKeyUpdate(·,·,mk,pp)(ct?, R, pp)
9 : if b′ = b then
10 : return 1
11 : else return 0
OKeyGen(id, (O, ψ),mk, pp)
1 : if ((ω? ∈ O) and (ψ ∈ S?) and (id /∈ R)) then
2 : return ⊥
3 : else KeyGen(id, (O, ψ),mk, pp)
4 : return skid,(O,ψ)
OKeyUpdate(R, t,mk, pp)
1 : if (t = t?) and (R 6⊆ R) then
2 : return ⊥
3 : else KeyUpdate(R, t,mk, pp)
4 : return ukR,t
Figure 5.5: The IND-sHRSS experiment ExpIND-sHRSSA
[RKDPABE , 1λ,U]
to standard ABE attributes, time periods, messages and entity identities respectively.
UID is set to be the set of leaves in a complete binary tree X = {1, . . . , n}. Without
loss of generality, we assume that T ∩ X = ∅ (e.g. by using a collision resistant hash
function and using distinct prefixes to map elements from T and X ). The attribute
set for the rkDP-ABE scheme is defined to be U = Us ∪ Uo. Let us define m to be the
maximum size of a subjective attribute set assigned to a key, i.e. we restrict |ψ| 6 m,
and similarly define n to be the maximum size of an objective attribute set associated
with a ciphertext, i.e. |ω| 6 n. Furthermore, we denote the maximum number of rows
of a subjective access structure matrix M to be ls,max. Now let m
′ = m + ls,max − 1
and n′ = n − 1. Finally, let d be the maximum of |Cover(R)| for all R ⊆ UID, where
Cover(R) is defined as in Section 2.3.5.3. We construct each algorithm of the rkDPABE
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scheme as follows:
1. Setup(1λ,U): The algorithm picks random exponents γ, α ∈ Zp and a generator
g ∈ G. It defines three functions Fs : Zp → G, Fo : Zp → G and P : Zp → G by
randomly choosing h0, . . . , hm′ , q1, . . . , qn′ , u1, . . . , ud and setting
Fs(x) =
m′∏
j=0
hx
j
j , Fo(x) =
n′∏
j=0
qx
j
j , P (x) =
d∏
j=0
ux
j
j . (5.1)
The public parameters are defined as
pp = (g, e(g, g)γ , gα, h0, . . . , hm′ , q1, . . . , qn′ , u1, . . . , ud).
For each node label x ∈ X in the tree, it randomly chooses ax ∈ Zp and rx ∈ Zp
to define a first degree polynomial fx(z) = axz + αrx + γ. The master key is
mk = (γ, α, {ax, rx}x∈X ).
2. Encrypt(m, (ω,S), t, pp): The encryption algorithm takes as input a LSSS access
structure (M,ρ) for the subjective policy S and an objective attribute set ω ⊂ Uo.
Denote the dimensions of M as ls × ks matrix. The algorithm randomly chooses
values s, y2, . . . , yks ∈ Zp and sets u = (s, y2, . . . , yks). It computes λi = Mi · u
(for i = 1, . . . , ls), where Mi is the vector corresponding to the ith row of M . The
ciphertext is then computed as ct(ω,S),t = (C,C
(1), {C(2)k }k∈ω, {C(3)i }i=1,...,ls , C(4)),
where
C = m · (e(g, g)γ)s, C(1) = gs,
C
(2)
k = Fo(k)
s, C
(3)
i = g
αλiFs(ρ(i))
−s,
C(4) = P (t)s.
Intuitively, C masks the message by a group element in the target group of the bilin-
ear map formed from the master secret γ and an encryption secret s (to randomise
the encryption procedure). Decryption will have to compute this mask to recover
the message.
C(1) provides the encryption secret s. C
(2)
k embeds each attribute in the objective set
ω into the ciphertext, incorporating the encryption secret s such that attributes from
prior ciphertexts cannot be combined with this encryption. Similarly, C
(3)
i embeds
the subjective policy S into the ciphertext using the shares of s divided according
to S, i.e. s is shared over the set of attributes such that any set of attributes that
satisfies S can reconstruct the encryption secret s. Finally, C(4) links the encryption
secret (and hence this particular ciphertext) to the specified time period t such that
an update key for t is required to decrypt the ciphertext; this enables the revocation
mechanism.
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3. KeyGen(id, (O, ψ),mk, pp): The key generation algorithm takes as input a LSSS
access structure (N, pi) for the objective policy O and a subjective attribute set
ψ ⊂ Us. Let the dimensions of N be denoted by lo × ko. The algorithm also takes
an identity id ∈ UID which is a leaf in the binary tree.
For all x ∈ Path(id), the algorithm shares fx(1) using the LSSS (N, pi). To do
so, it randomly chooses zx,2, . . . , zx,ko ∈ Zp and sets vx = (fx(1), zx,2, . . . , zx,ko).
For i = 1, . . . , lo, it calculates the share σx,i = Ni · vx, where Ni is the vector
corresponding to the ith row of N .
The algorithm then randomly chooses rx,1, . . . , rx,lo ∈ Zp and rx ∈ Zp for all x ∈
Path(id), and outputs the private key
skid,(N,pi) = ((D
(1)
x,i , D
(2)
x,i )x∈Path(id),i=1,...,lo , (Dx, {D(3)k }k∈ψ)x∈Path(id)),
where
Dx = g
rx , D
(1)
x,i = g
rx,i ,
D
(2)
x,i = g
σx,iFo(pi(i))
rx,i , D
(3)
k = Fs(k)
rx .
Intuitively, rx and rx,i for each x ∈ Path(id) randomises the key for the user id
so that users may not collude. Dx and D
(1)
x,i allow use of these random key values
during decryption. D
(2)
x,i embeds the shares of fx(1) = ax + αrx + γ such that only
the authorised sets according to O may reconstruct fx(1). Finally, D
(3)
k embeds the
attributes in ψ with the randomness chosen for this particular key. By linking these
parameters to the path in a tree, only users for whom a valid update key has been
issued (i.e. the non-revoked users) will be able to make use of these parameters to
compute fx(1) for a node x; fx(1) is required as it contains the master secret γ
which is used to cancel with the ciphertext component C to recover the message.
4. KeyUpdate(R, t,mk, pp): The algorithm first computes Cover(R) to find a minimal
node set that covers U \R. For each x ∈ Cover(R), it randomly chooses rx ∈ Zp and
sets the update key as ukR,t =
{
U
(1)
x , U
(2)
x
}
x∈Cover(R)
, where
U (1)x = g
fx(t)P (t)rx , U (2)x = g
rx .
Intuitively, each update key component is randomised by rx and linked to a partic-
ular node x in the tree (covering only non-revoked users). P (t) embeds the current
time period which will match with the ciphertext component C(4). We also embed
a point of the polynomial fx(t); given this point, and the point fx(1) (which can be
recovered from the decryption key components D
(2)
x,i given a satisfying set of objec-
tive attributes ω), one can perform Lagrange interpolation to recover the point fx(0)
which will yield use of the master secret γ to cancel with the ciphertext component
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C.
5. Decrypt(ct(ω,S),t, (ω,S), skid,(O,ψ), (O, ψ), ukR,t, pp): The decryption algorithm takes
as an input the ciphertext ct(ω,S),t which contains a subjective access structure (M,ρ)
for S and a set of objective attributes ω, and a decryption key skid,(N,pi) which
contains a set of subjective attributes ψ and an objective access structure (N, pi) for
O. Suppose that ψ satisfies (M,ρ), the set ω satisfies (N, pi), and that id /∈ R (so
that decryption is possible).
Let Is = {i : ρ(i) ∈ ψ} and Io = {i : pi(i) ∈ ω}. The algorithm computes sets of
reconstruction constants {(i, µi)}i∈Is and {(i, νi)}i∈Io using the LSSS reconstruction
algorithm. Since id /∈ R, the algorithm also finds a node x such that x ∈ Path(id) ∩
Cover(R). Finally, it computes the following
C ·
∏
i∈Is
(
e
(
C
(3)
i , Dx
)
· e
(
C(1), D
(3)
ρ(i)
))µi
(∏
j∈Io
(
e
(
D
(2)
x,j ,C
(1)
)
e
(
C
(2)
pi(j)
,D
(1)
x,j
)
)νj) tt−1 (
e
(
U
(1)
x ,C(1)
)
e
(
C(4),U
(2)
x
)
) 1
1−t
= m.
We verify the correctness of the decryption as follows. Let us write the decryption
computation as C · C′K , where K = (K ′)
t
t−1 (K ′′)
1
1−t , and then consider each part in turn.
Intuitively, C ′ is similar to a standard ABE decryption operation to match attributes
to policies, whilst K ′ and K ′′ combine the two components of a functional decryption
key (namely, a secret key and an update key) and perform a Lagrange interpolation to
form a group element e(g, g)s(γ+αrx) = e(g, g)sγ · e(g, g)sαrx . The second part of this
product will be the result of computing C ′ whilst the first will cancel with C to leave
only m.
C ′ =
∏
i∈Is
(
e
(
C
(3)
i , Dx
)
· e
(
C(1), D
(3)
ρ(i)
))µi
=
∏
i∈Is
(
e
(
gαλiFs(ρ(i))
−s, grx
)
· e (gs, Fs(ρ(i))rx)
)µi
=
∏
i∈Is
(
e (g, g)αλirx · e (g, Fs(ρ(i)))−rxs · e (g, Fs(ρ(i)))rxs
)µi
= e(g, g)αrx
∑
i∈Is µiλi
= e(g, g)αrxs.
In the above expression, the second equality follows by substituting the values from the
construction; the third equality follows from the properties of bilinear maps; the fourth
equality simply moves the product into the exponent; and the final equality follows
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from the reconstruction constants of the LSSS, namely that
∑
i∈Is µiλi = s.
K ′ =
∏
j∈Io
 e
(
D
(2)
x,j , C
(1)
)
e
(
C
(2)
x,pi(j), D
(1)
x,j
)
νj = ∏
j∈Io
(
e (gσx,jFo(pi(j))
rx,j , gs)
e (Fo(pi(j))s, grx,j )
)νj
=
∏
j∈Io
(
e (g, g)σx,js · e (g, Fo(pi(j)))rx,j ,s
e (g, Fo(pi(j)))
rx,j ,s
)νj
= e (g, g)s
∑
j∈Io νjσx,j = e(g, g)sfx(1).
In the above expression, the second equality follows directly from the construction; the
third one follows from the properties of bilinear maps; the fourth equality stems from
moving the product into the exponent; and the last one follows from the set of LSSS
reconstruction constants with
∑
j∈Io νjσx,j = fx(1) = ax + αrx + γ.
K ′′ =
e
(
U
(1)
x , C(1)
)
e
(
C(4), U
(2)
x
) = e (gfx(t)P (t)rx , gs)
e (P (t)s, grx)
=
e (g, g)fx(t)s · e (g, P (t)rxs)
e (g, P (t)rxs)
= e(g, g)fx(t)s
Then, it follows
K = (K ′)
t
t−1 (K ′′)
1
1−t =
(
e(g, g)sfx(1)
) t
t−1
(
e(g, g)fx(t)s
) 1
1−t
= (e(g, g)s)fx(1)
t
t−1+fx(t)
1
1−t
Notice that fx(1)
t
t−1 + fx(t)
1
1−t is in fact a Lagrange interpolation for the two points
(1, fx(1)), (1, fx(t)) for the first degree polynomial fx. Thus, fx(1)
t
t−1 + fx(t)
1
1−t =
fx(0) = αrx + γ. Hence, K = e(g, g)
s(αrx+γ). Combining all of these results, we obtain
the result of the decryption operation
C · C
′
K
= m · e(g, g)sγ · e(g, g)
αsrx
e(g, g)s(αrx+γ)
= m · e(g, g)sγ · e(g, g)
αsrx
e(g, g)sγ · e(g, g)αsrx = m.
5.4.4 Security Proof
Theorem 5.9. The rkDPABE construction is secure with respect to indistinguishability
against selective-target with semi-static query attack ( IND-sHRSS), as specified in
Figure 5.5, assuming that the decisional q-BDHE problem is hard.
The proof follows from a combination of [17] and [18] with some adjustment in the
simulation of the private keys. We show that if an adversary can win the IND-sHRSS
game with advantage  with a challenge subjective access structure matrix of size l?s×k?s ,
then a simulator with advantage  in solving the decisional q-BDHE problem can be
constructed, where m+ k?s 6 q.
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Proof. Suppose, to achieve a contradiction with Theorem 5.9, that there exists an ad-
versary A that has an advantage  in attacking the rkDPABE scheme. We build a
simulator B that solves the decisional q-BDHE problem (see Definition 2.24) in G. Re-
call that we abbreviate ga
j
by gj . The simulator B is given a random q-BDHE challenge
(g, h,yg,a,q, Z) where yg,a,q = (g1, . . . , gq, gq+2, . . . , g2q) and Z is either e(gq+1, h) or a
random element in G1. B acts as the challenger for A in the IND-sHRSS game as
follows.
1. A begins by selecting its challenge parameters (t?, ω?, S?) where S? is represented
by a LSSS (M?, ρ?). Let the matrix M? be of size l?s × k?s , where m+ k?s ≤ q and
let l?s = ls,max and |ω?| = n.
2. B now simulates running Setup for the rkDPABE scheme, and embeds the chal-
lenge policy into the public parameters. It first chooses γ′ $← Zp, sets gα = g1 =
ga, and implicitly defines γ = γ′ + aq+1 by defining
e(g, g)γ = e(g1, gq) · e(g, g)γ′ = e
(
ga, ga
q) · e (g, g)γ′
= e(g, g)γ
′+aq+1 .
It then must define the polynomials Fs, Fo and P (as in [17] and [18]). To define
Fs, B begins by defining Fs(x) = gp(x), where p is a polynomial in Zp[x] of degree
m+l?s−1 which is implicitly defined in the following manner. It chooses k?s+m+1
polynomials p0, . . . , pk?s+m in Zp[x], each of degree m + l
?
s − 1, such that for all
x = ρ?(i) for some i (i.e. all x in the image of ρ?, of which there are exactly l?s
since ρ? is an injective mapping):
pj(x) =
M?i,j for j ∈ [1, k?s ]0 for j ∈ [k?s + 1, k?s +m] (5.2)
The polynomial p0 is chosen randomly, and for all other x (not in the image of
ρ?), pj is defined randomly by randomly choosing values at m other points. By
writing the coefficients of each polynomial as pj(x) =
∑m+l?s−1
i=0 pj,i · xi, one can
define the polynomial p(x) to be
p(x) =
k?s+m∑
j=0
pj(x)a
j . (5.3)
Then, B sets hi =
∏k?s+m
j=0 g
pj,i
j for i ∈ [0,m+ l?s − 1]. Finally, as we assumed
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l?s = ls,max, note that m
′ = m+ ls,max − 1 = m+ l?s − 1,
Fs(x) =
m′∏
i=0
hx
i
i
=
m′∏
i=0
k?s+m∏
j=0
g
pj,i
j
xi
=
m′∏
i=0
k?s+m∏
j=0
gpj,ia
j
xi
= g
∑k?s+m
j=0
∑m′
i=0 pj,ix
iaj
= g
∑k?s+m
j=0 pj(x)a
j
= gp(x).
The first equality in the above expression follows from equation (5.1) whilst the
second follows by the above definition of hi. The third equality is obtained by
definition of gj = g
aj and the last one follows by equation (5.3).
To define Fo, B randomly picks a polynomial f ′(x) =
∑n−1
j=0 f
′
jx
j in Zp[x] of degree
n−1. It then defines f(x) = ∏k∈ω?(x−k) = ∑n−1j=0 fjxj (which can be computed
entirely from ω?); note that f(x) = 0 if and only if x ∈ ω?. It defines qj = gfjq gf ′j
for j = [0, n− 1]. Using the above we can finally compute
Fo(x) =
n−1∏
j=0
q
(xj)
j
=
n−1∏
j=0
g
fj
q · gf ′j
xj
= g
∑n−1
j=0 fjx
j
q · g
∑n−1
j=0 f
′
jx
j
= gf(x)q g
f ′(x).
To define P , B defines
pˆ(y) = yd−1 · (y − t?) =
d∑
j=0
pˆjy
j .
This ensures pˆ(t) = 0 if and only if t = t? for t ∈ T , and that for x ∈ X , pˆ(x) 6= 0
since we assumed T ∩ X = ∅.
B then randomly picks a degree d polynomial ρ(y) = ∑dj=0 ρjyj in Zp[x] and lets
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uj = (g
a)pˆjgρj for j = 0, . . . , d. Thus we can compute
P (y) =
d∏
j=0
uy
j
j
=
 d∏
j=0
(ga)pˆjgρj
yj
= (ga)
∑d
j=0 pˆjy
j
g
∑d
j=0 ρjy
j
= (ga)pˆ(y)gρ(y). (5.4)
The public key pk for the rkDP-ABE scheme is defined to be
pk = (g, e(g, g)γ , gα, h0, . . . , hm′ , q1, . . . , qn′ , u1, . . . , ud),
which is given to A. Note that the randomness of the q-BDHE challenge
(g, h,yg,a,q, Z) and the independently chosen randomness used in the construc-
tion of the polynomials pj , f
′, and ρ ensure the public parameters are distributed
as expected.
3. A declares its list R and is then given oracle access to the KeyGen and KeyUpdate
functions. Let XR = {x ∈ Path(id) : id ∈ R}. For each node label x ∈ X in the
tree, B randomly chooses a′x ∈ Zp and implicitly defines
ax =
a′x − αrx − γ if x ∈ XRa′x − αrx−γt? if x /∈ XR (5.5)
Hence,
fx(1) = ax + αrx + γ = a
′
x − αrx − γ + αrx + γ = a′x if x ∈ XR (5.6)
fx(t
?) = axt
? + αrx + γ = (a
′
x −
αrx − γ
t?
)t? + αrx + γ = a
′
xt
? if x /∈ XR (5.7)
To simulate KeyGen queries for an objective access structure (N, pi), a subjective
attribute set ψ and an identity id, we consider the following cases:
• (ω? ∈ O) and (id ∈ R) :
For each x ∈ Path(id), note that since id ∈ R, x ∈ XR. Hence, from (5.6),
B can compute fx(1) for all x ∈ Path(id). B can therefore compute the key
components precisely as in the construction by sharing the value of fx(1).
• (ω? /∈ O) and (id ∈ R) :
For each x ∈ Path(id), note that, since id ∈ R, x ∈ XR. Hence, from (5.6),
B can compute fx(1) for all x ∈ Path(id).
168
5.4 Revocable Dual-policy Attribute-based Encryption
B randomly chooses rx ∈ Zp. It then lets Dx = grx , and for all k ∈ ψ
lets D
(3)
k = Fs(k)
rx as in the construction. Recall that the dimensions of N
are lo × ko. Since ω? does not satisfy N for this case of the query, and by
Proposition 2.21, there exists a vector ax = (a1, . . . , ako) ∈ Zkop such that
a1 = −1 and Ni · ax = 0 for all i where pi(i) ∈ ω?.
B randomly chooses z′x,2, . . . , z′x,ko ∈ Zp and defines v′x = (0, z′x,2, . . . , z′x,ko).
It then implicitly defines a vector vx = −(a′x)ax+v′x (by using (5.2)) which
will be used for creating the share of fx(1) = γ + αrx + ax (note that the
first element of vx is indeed fx(1) by (5.6)), as in our construction.
Now, for all i such that pi(i) ∈ ω?, B randomly chooses rx,i ∈ Zp and
computes D
(1)
x,i = g
rx,i and
D
(2)
x,i = g
Ni·v′xFo(pi(i))rx,i
= gNi·(vx+(a
′
x)ax)Fo(pi(i))
rx,i
= gNi·vxFo(pi(i))rx,i ,
where the last equality holds because Ni · ax = 0. Note that σx,i = Ni · vx
in our construction and hence D
(2)
x,i is of valid form.
For all other i, where pi(i) /∈ ω?, B randomly chooses r′x,i ∈ Zp. Observe that
Ni · vx = Ni · (−(a′x)ax + v′x)
= Ni · (v′x − (a′x)ax)
Note that, unlike [18], due to our definition of ax, we do not have a term in
aq+1 here, and B can generate D(2)x,i = gNi·vxFo(pi(i))rx,i and D(1)x,i = grx,i .
• (ψ /∈ S?) and (id /∈ R) :
For each x ∈ Path(id), B does the following. Since ψ does not satisfy M?, by
Proposition 2.21, there exists a vector wx = (w1, . . . , wk?s ) ∈ Z
k?s
p such that
w1 = −1 and Mi ·wx = 0 for all i where ρ(i) ∈ ψ?. Now, by our definition
of pj(x) in (5.2), we have that (p1(x), . . . , pk?s (x)) · (w1, . . . , wk?s ) = 0.
B then computes one possible solution of variables wk?s+1, . . . , wk?s+m for the
system of |ψ| equations: for all x ∈ ψ
(p1(x), . . . , pk?s+m(x)) · (w1, . . . , wk?s+m) = 0,
which is possible as |ψ| 6 m.
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B then randomly chooses r′x ∈ Zp and implicitly defines
rx = r
′
x + w1
(
t?
t? − 1
)
· αq + w2
(
t?
t? − 1
)
· αq−1 + · · ·+
+ wk?s+m
(
t?
t? − 1
)
· αq−(k?s+m)+1
by setting the key Dx = g
r′x
∏k?s+m
k=1 (gq+1−k)
wk
(
t?
t?−1
)
= grx . Then, since
γ = γ′ + αq+1 and as x /∈ XR, we have
fx(1) = γ + αrx + ax
= γ′ + αq+1 + αrx + ax
= γ′ + αq+1 + αrx + a′x −
αrx − γ
t?
= γ′ + a′x +
γ
t?
+ αq+1 + (α(
t? − 1
t?
))rx
= γ′ + a′x +
γ
t?
+ αq+1 +
(
α
(
t? − 1
t?
)(
r′x + w1
(
t?
t? − 1
)
· αq
+w2
(
t?
t? − 1
)
· αq−1 + · · ·+ wk?s+m
(
t?
t? − 1
)
· αq−(k?s+m)+1
))
= γ′ + a′x +
γ
t?
+ αq+1 + α
(
t? − 1
t?
)
r′x + w1α
q+1 + w2α
q
+ · · ·+ wk?s+mαq−(k
?
s+m)+2
= γ′ + a′x +
γ
t?
+ α
(
t? − 1
t?
)
r′xw2α
q + · · ·+ wk?s+mαq−(k
?
s+m)+2,
where the αq+1 term in γ has cancelled out using Proposition 2.21 and the
third equality followed from using equation (5.5). The simulator now ran-
domly chooses zx,2, . . . , zx,ko ∈ Zp and implicitly lets the vector
vx = (γ + αrx + ax, zx,2, . . . , zx,ko) as in the construction.
B also randomly chooses rx,1, . . . , rx,lo ∈ Zp and computes for i = 1, . . . , lo
the key D
(1)
x,1 = g
rx,i . The other keys are computed in the following way. We
have
D
(2)
x,i =
gγ′+a′x+ γt? · gr′x1 k
?
s+m∏
k=2
(gq−k+2)wk
Ni,1 · ko∏
j=2
gNi,jzjFo(pi(i))
rx,i
which can be computed since gq+1 is not required and, by collecting the
exponents, it can be verified that D
(2)
x,i = g
Ni·vx · Fo(pi(i))ri .
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Recall that (p1(k), . . . , pk?s+m(k)) · (w1, . . . , wk?s+m) = 0 for all k ∈ ψ.
D
(3)
k = D
p0(k)
x
k?s+m∏
j=1
gr′xj ∏
k∈[1,k?s+m],k 6=j
(gq+1−k+j)wk
pj(k)
= (grx)p0(k)
k?s+m∏
j=1
(grx)α
jpj(k)
=
k?s+m∏
j=0
(grx)pj(k)α
j
= (grx)
∑k?s+m
j=0 pj(k)α
j
= (grx)p(k) = Fs(k)
rx ,
where the second equality holds by observing that
D
(3)
k = D
(3)
k (gq+1)
(p1(k),...,pk?s+m(k))·(w1,...,wk?s+m)
since (gq+1)
(p1(k),...,pk?s+m(k))·(w1,...,wk?s+m) = (gq+1)0 = 1 (see [18]).
• (ω? /∈ O) and (ψ ∈ S?) and (id /∈ R) :
For each x ∈ Path(id), B randomly chooses rx ∈ Zp. It then lets Dx = grx ,
and for all k ∈ ψ lets D(3)k = Fs(k)rx as in the construction. Recall that the
dimensions of N are l0× k0. Since ω? does not satisfy N for this case of the
query, and by Proposition 2.21, there exists a vector ax = (a1, . . . , ako) ∈ Zkop
such that a1 = −1 and Ni · ax = 0 for all i where pi(i) ∈ ω?.
B randomly chooses z′x,2, . . . , z′x,ko ∈ Zp and defines v′x = (0, z′x,2, . . . , z′x,ko).
It then implicitly defines a vector vx = −(a′x − αrx−γt? + αrx + γ)ax + v′x
which will be used to create the share of fx(1) = γ + αrx + ax (note that
the first element of vx is indeed fx(1) by (5.5)), as in our construction.
Now, for all i such that pi(i) ∈ ω?, B randomly chooses rx,i ∈ Zp and
computes D
(1)
x,i = g
rx,i and
D
(2)
x,i = g
Ni·v′xFo(pi(i))rx,i = gNi·vxFo(pi(i))rx,i ,
where the last equality holds because Ni · ax = 0. Note that σx,i = Ni · vx
in our construction and hence D
(2)
x,i is of the valid form.
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For all other i, where pi(i) /∈ ω?, B randomly chooses r′x,i ∈ Zp. Observe that
Ni · vx = Ni ·
(
−
(
a′x −
αrx − γ
t?
+ αrx + γ
)
ax + v
′
x
)
= Ni ·
(
−
(
a′x −
αrx − (γ′ + aq+1)
t?
+ αrx + (γ
′ + aq+1)
)
ax + v
′
x
)
= Ni ·
(
v′x −
(
a′x + γ
′
(
1
t?
+ 1
))
ax
)
+
(
rx
(
1
t?
− 1
)
Ni · ax
)
α
−
((
1
t?
+ 1
)
Ni · ax
)
aq+1
contains a term in aq+1 and hence we cannot compute this value (as aq+1
is the gap in the q-BDHE game). Instead, we will use the rx,i term in
Fo(pi(i))
rx,i to cancel the unknown value aq+1. B implicitly defines rx,i =
r′x,i −
a( 1
t?
+1)Ni·ax
f(pi(i)) . To do so, it defines
D
(2)
x,i = g
(
rx( 1t?−1)Ni·ax−( 1t?+1)
Ni·axf ′(pi(i))
f(pi(i))
)
1
· gNi·(v′x−(a′x+γ′( 1t?+1)))axFo(pi(i))r′x,i .
To see that D
(2)
x,i is valid, we observe
D
(2)
x,i = g
( 1t?+1)Ni·ax
q+1 ·D(2)x,i · g
−( 1t?+1)Ni·ax
q+1
= g
( 1t?+1)Ni·ax
q+1 · g
rx( 1t?−1)Ni·ax
1 · gNi·(v
′
x−(a′x+γ′( 1t?+1)))ax
·
(
g
−( 1t?+1)Ni·ax
q+1 g
−( 1t?+1)
Ni·axf ′(pi(i))
f(pi(i))
1
)
· Fo(pi(i))r′x,i
= gNi·vx
(
gf(pi(i))q g
f ′(pi(i))
)−a( 1t? +1)Ni·ax
f(pi(i)) · Fo(pi(i))r′x,i
= gNi·vx · Fo(pi(i))
−a( 1t? +1)Ni·ax
f(pi(i)) · Fo(pi(i))r′x,i
= gNi·vx · Fo(pi(i))rx,i ,
where the second last equality follows from equation (5.4).
B also defines
D
(1)
x,i = g
r′x,ig
−( 1t? +1)Ni·ax
f(pi(i))
1 = g
rx,i .
Note that f(pi(i)) 6= 0 since pi(i) /∈ ω?, and so D(1)x,i and D(2)x,i are well defined.
To simulate KeyUpdate queries for time period t and revocation list R, we consider
the following cases:
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• t = t? and R ⊆ R:
For each x ∈ Cover(R), B chooses a random rx ∈ Zp and computes U (1)x =
(ga
′
xt
?
)P (t?)rx and U
(2)
x = grx . Both keys are valid since R ⊆ R and thus for
all x ∈ Cover(R) we have x /∈ XR. Hence, by (5.7), fx(t?) = a′xt?.
• t 6= t?:
For each x ∈ Cover(R), B chooses a random r′x ∈ Zp
– If x ∈ Cover(R) ∩ XR, it defines
U (1)x = (g
a′x)t(gγ
′
)(1−t)(gr
′
x
1 )
(1−t)g
− ρ(t)(1−t)
pˆ(t)+1−t
q P (t)
r′x
U (2)x = (g
r′x)(gq)
− 1−t
pˆ(t)+1−t
Note that pˆ(t) 6= 0 for t 6= t? so this is well defined. We claim that these
keys look valid according to the construction with implicit randomness
rx = r
′
x − a
q(1−t)
pˆ(t)+1−t .
Note that, in this case, x ∈ XR and hence by (5.5)
fx(t) = axt+ αrx + γ = (a
′
x − αrx − γ)t+ αrx + γ
= a′xt+ αrx(1− t) + γ′(1− t) + aq+1(1− t).
Then,
U (1)x
(1)
= gfx(t)P (t)rx
(2)
= ga
′
xt+arx(1−t)+γ′(1−t)+aq+1(1−t)gapˆ(t)rxgρ(t)rx
= ga
′
xtgγ
′(1−t)ga
q+1(1−t)garx(1−t)gapˆ(t)rxgρ(t)rx
(3)
= ga
′
xtgγ
′(1−t)ga
q+1(1−t)ga(1−t)r
′
xg−a(1−t)Bgapˆ(t)r
′
x
g−apˆ(t)Bgρ(t)r
′
xg−ρ(t)B
(4)
= ga
′
xtgγ
′(1−t)ga
q+1(1−t)P (t)r
′
xga(1−t)r
′
xg−a(1−t)Bg−apˆ(t)Bg−ρ(t)B
= ga
′
xtgγ
′(1−t)ga
q+1(1−t)P (t)r
′
xga(1−t)r
′
xg−ρ(t)Bg−Ba((1−t)+apˆ(t))
(5)
= ga
′
xtgγ
′(1−t)ga
q+1(1−t)P (t)r
′
xga(1−t)r
′
x
g
−ρ(t)
(
aq(1−t)
pˆ(t)+1−t
)
(ga)
−
(
aq(1−t)
pˆ(t)+1−t
)
((1−t)+pˆ(t))
= ga
′
xtgγ
′(1−t)ga
q+1(1−t)P (t)r
′
xga(1−t)r
′
xg
−ρ(t)
(
aq(1−t)
pˆ(t)+1−t
)
(ga)−(a
q(1−t))
= ga
′
xtgγ
′(1−t)ga
q+1(1−t)P (t)r
′
xga(1−t)r
′
xg
−ρ(t)
(
aq(1−t)
pˆ(t)+1−t
)
g−a
q+1(1−t)
= ga
′
xtgγ
′(1−t)P (t)r
′
xga(1−t)r
′
xg
−ρ(t)
(
aq(1−t)
pˆ(t)+1−t
)
= (ga
′
x)t(gγ
′
)(1−t)(gr
′
x
1 )
(1−t)g
− ρ(t)(1−t)
pˆ(t)+1−t
q P (t)
r′x .
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Note that equality (1) follows by construction and (2) uses fx(t) from
above and equation (5.4). Equality (3) follows by replacing rx with
r′x − B and equality (4) follows from using (5.4). Equality (5) is valid
by using B = a
q(1−t)
pˆ(t)+1−t .
Then,
U (2)x = g
rx = gr
′
xg
− aq(1−t)
pˆ(t)+1−t
= (gr
′
x)(gq)
− 1−t
pˆ(t)+1−t .
Hence, these keys look valid according to the construction.
– If x ∈ Cover(R) \ XR, it defines
U (1)x = (g
a′x)t(gγ
′
)(
t
t?
+1)(g
r′x
1 )
(1− t
t?
)g
− ρ(t)(1+
t
t?
)
pˆ(t)+1− t
t?
q P (t)
r′x
U (2)x = (g
r′x)(gq)
− 1+
t
t?
pˆ(t)+1− t
t?
In this case, by (5.5), ax = a
′
x − αrx−γt? . By a similar argument as
above, these keys look valid according to the construction with implicit
randomness rx = r
′
x −− a
q(1+ t
t?
)
pˆ(t)+1− t
t?
.
4. A selects two messages m0 and m1. B chooses b $← {0, 1} and creates a ciphertext
C = mb · Z · e(h, gγ′), C(1) = h, and for k ∈ ω? we write C(2)k = hf
′(x). We
write h = gs for some unknown s. The simulator then chooses random elements
y′2, . . . , y′k?s ∈ Zp and lets y′ = (0, y′2, . . . , y′k?s ). It defines C
(3)
i = (g1)
M?i ·y′ ·
(gs)−p0(ρ?(i)) for i = 1, . . . , l′s and C(4) = (gs)ρ(t
?), to implicitly share the secret s
via the vector
vx = (s, sα+ y
′
2, sα
2 + y′3, . . . , sα
k′s−1 + y′k′s).
We claim that if Z = e(gq+1, h) then the created ciphertext is a valid challenge.
The validity of C(1) = h = gs comes from the implicit definition of h. To see that
C is valid, recall that γ = γ′ + aq+1. Then,
C = mb · Z · e(h, gγ′) = mb · e(gq+1, h) · e(h, gγ′) = mb · e(g, g)saq+1 · e(g, g)sγ′
= mb · e(g, g)s(γ′+aq+1) = mb · e(g, g)sγ .
For all k ∈ ω?, we defined f(k) such that f(k) = 0, and hence
C
(2)
k = h
f ′(k) = (gs)f
′(k) = (gf(k)q g
f ′(k))s = Fo(k)
s.
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For i = 1, . . . , l′s, we have
C
(3)
i = (g1)
M?i ·y′ · (gs)−p0(ρ?(i))
= (gα)M
?
i ·y′
k?s∏
j=1
gM
?
i,jsα
j · (gs)−p0(ρ?(i))
k?s∏
j=1
(gs)−M
?
i,jα
j
= gαM
?
i ·vx · (gs)−p(ρ?(i)) = gαM?i ·vx · Fs(ρ?(i))−s,
Finally, since pˆ(t?) = 0, we have C(4) = (gs)ρ(t
?) = ((ga)pˆ(t
?)gρ(t
?))s = P (t?)s.
5. The challenge ciphertext is given to A along with oracle access which is handled
as in Step 3.
6. A eventually outputs b′ ∈ {0, 1} as its guess of b. If b = b′ then B outputs 1 to
guess that Z = e(gq+1, h). Otherwise, B outputs 0 to guess that Z is random.
If (g, h,yg,a,q, Z) is sampled from RBDHE then Pr[B(g, h,yg,a,q, Z) → 0] = 12 since A
was given a malformed challenge and hence can only guess the value of b. On the
other hand if (g, h,yg,a,q, Z) is sampled from PBDHE then we formed a valid challenge
ciphertext and, as A is assumed to have non-negligible advantage  in the IND-sHRSS
game, |Pr[B(g, h,yg,a,q, Z)→ 0]− 12 | ≥ . It follows that B has advantage at least  in
solving q-BDHE problem in G. However, we assumed that this problem is hard, so an
adversary with non-negligible advantage in the IND-sHRSS game cannot exist.
5.5 Construction
In this section we provide a construction of an HPVC scheme for a family F of mono-
tone Boolean functions closed under complement using a revocable key dual-policy ABE
scheme RKDPABE in a black box manner comprising the algorithms DPABE.Setup,
DPABE.Encrypt, DPABE.KeyGen, DPABE.KeyUpdate and DPABE.Decrypt. We also use
a signature scheme with algorithms Sig.KeyGen, Sig.Sign and Sig.Verify, and a one-way
function g. Let U = Uattr ∪ Ul ∪ UID ∪ Utime ∪ TO ∪ TS be the universe of attributes
acceptable by the revocable key dual-policy ABE scheme, formed as the union of the
following sub-universes, where Uattr consists of the attributes that form characteristic
tuples for input data, Ul be a set of attributes (disjoint from Uattr) that uniquely label
each function and each data item, UID comprises attributes representing entity identi-
fiers, Utime comprises attributes representing time periods issued by the time source T
and finally TO and TS represent the objective dummy attribute and subjective dummy
attribute respectively.
We encode as usual Boolean functions in terms of access structures over Uattr. Com-
putations with n-bit outputs can be built from n Boolean functions returning each bit
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in turn. We can handle negations by either building rkDPABE from non-monotonic
ABE [112] or by adding negated attributes to the universe [142]. We choose to use the
latter approach and add negated attributes to Uattr. Thus, for the ith bit of a binary
input string X = x1 . . . xn, we define attributes A
0
X,i and A
1
X,i ∈ Uattr and X is encoded
as AX = {AjX,i ∈ Uattr : xi = j}.
In more detail, the dummy attributes TO and TS play generally a crucial role in a DP-
ABE scheme as they efficiently enable a DP-ABE scheme to function as either KP-ABE
or CP-ABE [19]. For KP-ABE, the subjective policy corresponds to S = {{TS}} and
is satisfied by the subjective attribute ψ containing the special attribute TS. Thus, S
is trivially satisfied and decryption (in KP-ABE) only depends on the objective policy
and attributes. Similarly, the same holds for CP-ABE where the objective policy corre-
sponds to O = {{TO}} that is trivially satisfied by the objective attribute ω containing
the special attribute TO. As discussed in Section 2.7.3 and Section 3.4, we require to
establish two distinct ABE schemes to overcome a possible one-sided error in the ver-
ification stage. Thus, we initialise two distinct rkDP-ABE systems over U and hence
we define a total of four additional dummy attributes where T 0O, T
0
S relate to the first
rkDP-ABE system, and T 1O, T
1
S relate to the second rkDP-ABE system. As summarised
in Table 5.1, the function corresponds in the modes RPVC and RPVC-AC to O = F
and S = {{T 0S}}. Thus, the complement function for those modes can be defined as
O = F and S = {{T 1S}}. Similarly, it follows for the mode VDC that O = {{T 0O}} and
S = F , and the the complement can be defined as O = {{T 1O}} and S = F . Each mode
operates by encrypting a pair of randomly chosen messages and issuing keys such that
the recovery of one message implies whether the encryption of a message was linked to
F or F , and thus whether F (X) = 1 or 0. Ciphertext indistinguishability ensures that
an adversary cannot cheat by returning the other message.
Our HPVC scheme operates in the following way.
1. Setup, presented in Algorithm 1, first forms the attribute universe U and ini-
tialises two rkDPABE schemes over the universe. It further creates an empty
two-dimensional array LReg to list registered entities, a (empty) list of revoked
entities LRev as well as a time source T (e.g. a networked clock or counter) to
index update keys. The algorithm finally outputs the public parameters pp and
master secret key mk comprising of public and secret rkDPABE parameters re-
spectively. Furthermore, the public parameters also contain LReg and the dummy
attributes enabling a client to flexibly switch between the modes of computations
by disabling certain parts of the rkDPABE scheme while the master secret key
additionally contains the list of revoked entities LRev. Note that the public pa-
rameters may be implicitly updated throughout the execution of all algorithms
of an HPVC scheme accommodating any changes in the system population.
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Algorithm 1 (pp,mk)
$← Setup(1λ,F)
1 : U ← Uattr ∪ Ul ∪ UID ∪ Utime ∪ TO ∪ TS
2 : (mpk0ABE,msk
0
ABE, T
0
O, T
0
S )←$ DPABE.Setup(1λ,U)
3 : (mpk1ABE,msk
1
ABE, T
1
O, T
1
S )←$ DPABE.Setup(1λ,U)
4 : for Si ∈ UID do
5 : LReg[Si][0]← 
6 : LReg[Si][1]← {}
7 : endfor
8 : LRev ← 
9 : Initialise T
10 : pp← (mpk0ABE,mpk1ABE, T 0O, T 0S , T 1O, T 1SLReg,T)
11 : mk ← (msk0ABE,msk1ABE, LRev)
2. FnInit, presented in Algorithm 2, sets the public delegation key pkF (for all func-
tions F ) to be the public parameters for the system (since we use public key
primitives). This step is not required in our particular construction, but we re-
tain the algorithm for consistency with prior definitions as well as for generality
as other instantiations may require this step.
Algorithm 2 pkF
$← FnInit(F,mk, pp)
1 : pkF ← pp
3. Register, presented in Algorithm 3, creates a public-private key pair by calling
the KeyGen algorithm of the digital signature scheme. The algorithm provides
the server with its own secret signature key and updates LReg[Si][0] to store the
verification key for Si. These prevent servers being impersonated and wrongly
revoked.
Algorithm 3 skSi
$← Register(Si,mk, pp)
1 : (skSig, vkSig)←$ Sig.KeyGen(1λ)
2 : skSi ← skSig
3 : LReg[Si][0]← LReg[Si][0] ∪ vkSig
4. Certify, presented in Algorithm 4, aims to generate an evaluation key ek(O,ψ),Si for
a server Si. The algorithm first adds an element (F,
⋃
l∈Li l) to the list LReg[Si][1]
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for each F ∈ Fi. This publicises the computations that Si can perform (either
functions in RPVC and RPVC-AC modes, or functions and data labels in VDC).
The algorithm removes Si from the revocation list, gets the current time period
from T and generates a decryption key for (O, Aψ ∪
⋃
l∈Li l) in the first DP-ABE
system and Aψ is the attribute set encoding ψ. The additional attributes for the
labels l ∈ Ul ensure that a key cannot be used to evaluate computations that do
not correspond to these labels. In RPVC and RPVC-AC, this means that a key
for a function G cannot evaluate a computation request for F (X). In VDC, it
means that an evaluation key must be issued for a dataset Di that includes (at
least) the specified input data X. It is sufficient to include labels only on the
subjective attribute set without also adding them to the objective policy. As these
labels are a security measure against a misbehaving server, we amend the servers
key but need not take similar measures against the delegator. Delegators are then
able to specify the required labels in their created subjective policy. Those labels
need to be present in the server’s key for a successful evaluation (decryption).
The KDC should check that the label corresponds to the input to ensure that
a server does not advertise data he does not own. It also generates an update
key for the current time period to prove that Si is not currently revoked. In
RPVC and RPVC-AC modes, another pair of keys is generated using the second
DP-ABE system for the complement inputs.
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Algorithm 4 ek(O,ψ),Si
$← Certify(mode, Si, (O, ψ), Li,Fi,mk, pp)
1 : for F ∈ Fi do
2 : LReg[Si][1]← LReg[Si][1] ∪ (F,
⋃
l∈Li
l)
3 : endfor
4 : LRev ← LRev \ Si
5 : t← T
6 : sk0ABE←$ DPABE.KeyGen(Si, (O, Aψ ∪
⋃
l∈Li
l),msk0ABE,mpk
0
ABE)
7 : uk0LRev,t←$ DPABE.KeyUpdate(LRev, t,msk0ABE,mpk0ABE)
8 : if (mode = RPVC) or (mode = RPVC-AC) then
9 : sk1ABE←$ DPABE.KeyGen(Si, (O, Aψ ∪
⋃
l∈Li
l),msk1ABE,mpk
1
ABE)
10 : uk1LRev,t←$ DPABE.KeyUpdate(LRev, t,msk1ABE,mpk1ABE)
11 : else
12 : sk1ABE ←⊥
13 : uk1LRev,t ←⊥
14 : endif
15 : ekF,S ← (sk0ABE, sk1ABE, uk0LRev,t, uk1LRev,t)
5. ProbGen, presented in Algorithm 5, aims to create a problem instance σ(ω,S) that
the server can use to evaluate the computation as well as preparing a verification
key that enables anyone to verify the server’s computational result. The algorithm
starts with choosing messages m0 and m1 randomly from the message space.
The message m0 is encrypted with (Aω, S ∧
∧
l∈LF,X l) in the first rkDPABE
system, whilst m1 is encrypted with the complement policy under either the first
rkDPABE system for VDC or the second one for RPVC and RPVC-AC depending
on the chosen mode of computation. Note that the attributes remain the same
as it is the same attribute T 0O or input data X respectively. The algorithm also
prepares a public verification key vk(ω,S). The key is simply generated by applying
a one-way function g to each randomly chosen message and also includes a copy of
LReg from the public parameters in case the list is modified between the current
time period and the time of verification.
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Algorithm 5 (σ(ω,S), vk(ω,S))
$← ProbGen(mode, (ω,S), LF,X , pkF , pp)
1 : (m0,m1)←$M×M
2 : t← T
3 : c0←$ DPABE.Encrypt(m0, (Aω,S ∧
∧
l∈LF,X
l), t,mpk0ABE)
4 : if (mode = VDC) then
5 : c1←$ DPABE.Encrypt(m1, (Aω,S ∧
∧
l∈LF,X
l), t,mpk0ABE)
6 : else
7 : c1←$ DPABE.Encrypt(m1, (Aω,S ∧
∧
l∈LF,X
l), t,mpk1ABE)
8 : endif
9 : σ(ω,S) ← (c0, c1)
10 : vk(ω,S) ← (g(m0), g(m1), LReg)
6. Compute, presented in Algorithm 6, is performed by a server Si and aims to return
the result of the evaluation of a function on some input data. The algorithm
attempts to decrypt both ciphertexts of the problem instance σ(ω,S), ensuring
that different modes of computation use the correct parameters. Decryption
succeeds only if the function evaluates to 1 on the input data X, i.e. the policy
is satisfied. Since F and F output opposite results on X, exactly one plaintext
will correspond to a failure symbol ⊥. The server signs the results using its
personal signing key. Finally, the algorithm outputs the computational result
θF (X) comprising the two plaintexts, the server id and the server’s signature on
the output.
Algorithm 6 θF (X)
$← Compute(mode, σ(ω,S), ek(O,ψ),Si , skSi , pp)
1 : Parse σ(ω,S) as (c0, c1) and ek(O,ψ),Si as (sk
0
ABE, sk
1
ABE, uk
0
LRev,t, uk
1
LRev,t)
2 : d0 ← DPABE.Decrypt
(
c0, sk
0
ABE, uk
0
LRev,t,mpk
0
ABE
)
3 : if (mode = VDC) then
4 : d1 ← DPABE.Decrypt
(
c1, sk
0
ABE, uk
0
LRev,t,mpk
0
ABE
)
5 : else
6 : d1 ← DPABE.Decrypt
(
c1, sk
1
ABE, uk
1
LRev,t,mpk
1
ABE
)
7 : endif
8 : γ←$ Sig.Sign(d0, d1, Si, skSi)
9 : θF (X) ← (d0, d1, Si, γ)
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7. Verify, presented in Algorithm 7, determines whether the returned computational
result is valid or not. The algorithm first checks whether the function F is listed
in LReg[S][1] to ensure that the server that generated the computational result is
authorised to compute F . If this check fails, the result is immediately rejected.
Next, the algorithm verifies the signature using the verification key for Si stored
in LReg. If correct, it applies the one-way function g to each plaintext in θF (X)
and compares the results to the components of the verification key. If either
comparison results in a match (i.e. the server successfully recovered a message),
the algorithm creates an acceptance token τθF (X) = (accept, Si) indicating that
the server indeed performed the computation correctly. Otherwise the result is
rejected, and the algorithm creates a rejection token τθF (X) = (reject, Si) and
Si is reported for revocation. If m0 was returned then F (X) = 1 as m0 was
encrypted for the non-complemented inputs. Otherwise m1 was returned and
thus F (X) = 0. Note that this algorithm can be run by any entity since the
computational result and verification key are publicly available.
Algorithm 7 (y, τθF (X))← Verify(θF (X), vk(ω,S), pp)
1 : Parse θF (x) as (d0, d1, Si, γ) and vk(ω,S) as (g(m0), g(m1), LReg)
2 : if F ∈ LReg[Si][1] then
3 : if accept← Sig.Verify ((d0, d1, Si), γ, LReg[Si][0])
4 : if g(m0) = g(d0) return (y ← 1, τθF (X) ← (accept, Si))
5 : elseif g(m1) = g(d1) return (y ← 0, τθF (X) ← (accept, Si))
6 : else return (y ←⊥, τθF (x) ← (reject, Si))
7 : endif
8 : endif
9 : endif
10 : return (y ←⊥, τθF (x) ← (reject, Si))
8. Revoke, presented in Algorithm 8, aims to revoke misbehaving servers by redis-
tributing fresh update keys to all non-revoked servers. The algorithm first checks
whether a server Si should in fact be revoked, i.e. whether it received as input
a rejection token τθF (X) = (reject, Si). If so, it deletes the list LReg[Si][1] of
computations that Si may perform such that the server is no longer authorised to
perform any computations within the system. Additionally, it also adds Si to the
revocation list LRev, and refreshes the time source T and samples the new time
period. The algorithm then generates new update keys for all non-revoked enti-
ties such that non-revoked keys are still functional in the new time period and
distributes them accordingly. If the algorithm receives as input an acceptance
token indicating that there is no need to revoke any server since computations
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were performed correctly, it outputs ⊥.
Algorithm 8 um
$← Revoke(τθF (X) ,mk, pp)
1 : if τθF (X) = (reject, Si) then
2 : LReg[Si][1]← {}
3 : LRev ← LRev ∪ Si
4 : Refresh T
5 : t← T
6 : uk0LRev,t←$ DPABE.KeyUpdate(LRev, t,msk0ABE,mpk0ABE)
7 : if (mode = RPVC) or (mode = RPVC-AC) then
8 : uk1LRev,t←$ ABE.KeyUpdate(LRev, t,msk1ABE,mpk1ABE)
9 : endif
10 : for S′ ∈ UID do
11 : Parse ekF,S′ as (sk
0
ABE, sk
1
ABE, uk
0
LRev,t−1, uk
1
LRev,t−1)
12 : ekF,S′ ← (sk0ABE, sk1ABE, uk0LRev,t, uk1LRev,t)
13 : endfor
14 : return um← {ekF,S′}S′∈UID
15 : else
16 : return ⊥
Theorem 5.10. Given an IND-sHRSS secure rkDPABE scheme for a class of mono-
tone Boolean functions F closed under complement, an EUF-CMA secure signature
scheme and a one-way function g. Let HPVC be the hybrid publicly verifiable out-
sourced computation scheme as defined in Algorithms 1–8. Then HPVC is secure in
the sense of selective public verifiability (Figure 5.2), and selective semi-static revoca-
tion (Figure 5.3) and selective authorised computation (Figure 5.4).
5.6 Proofs of Security
In this section we present the full proof of Theorem 5.10 by providing proofs of secu-
rity for the notions of selective public verifiability, selective semi-static revocation and
selective authorised computations.
5.6.1 Selective Public Verifiability
Lemma 5.11. The HPVC scheme defined by Algorithms 1–8 is secure in the sense
of selective public verifiability (Figure 5.2) under the same assumptions as in Theo-
rem 5.10.
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Proof. Note that this proof is a combination of the proofs presented in Sections 3.5.1
and 4.5. The reduction follows similarly and we basically update the notation to ac-
commodate an HPVC scheme.
Suppose AHPVC is an adversary with non-negligible advantage against the selective
public verifiability game (Figure 5.2) when instantiated by Algorithms 1–8. We begin
by defining the following three games:
• Game 0. This is the selective public verifiability game as defined in Figure 5.2.
• Game 1. This is the same as Game 0 with the modification that in ProbGen, we
no longer return an encryption of m0 and m1. Instead, we choose another random
message m′ 6= m0,m1 and, if F (X?) = 1, we replace c1 by the encryption of m′,
and otherwise we replace c0. In other words, we replace the ciphertext associated
with the unsatisfied function with the encryption of a separate random message
unrelated to the other system parameters, and in particular to the verification
keys.
• Game 2. This is the same as Game 1 with the exception that instead of choosing
a random message m′, we implicitly set m′ to be the challenge input w in the
one-way function game.
We show that from the adversary’s point of view Game 2 is indistinguishable from
Game 0 except with negligible probability. This means that an adversary against the
selective public verifiability game can be run against Game 2. We then finally show
that if an adversary has a non-negligible advantage against Game 2 then the adversary
can invert a one-way function.
Game 0 to Game 1. We begin by showing that there is a negligible distinguish-
ing advantage between Game 0 and Game 1, both with parameters (HPVC, 1λ,F).
Suppose otherwise, that AHPVC can distinguish the two games with non-negligible ad-
vantage δ. We then show that it is possible to construct an adversary AABE that uses
AHPVC as a subroutine to break the IND-sHRSS security of the (indirectly) revocable
key DP-ABE scheme formalised in Figure 5.5. Note that we only focus on the modes
RPVC and VDC, and the mode RPVC-AC can be seen as a special case of the mode
RPVC as we can assume the adversary being authorised to evaluate a challenge com-
putation. We consider a challenger C playing the IND-sHRSS game (Figure 5.5) with
AABE, and AABE in turn acts as a challenger for AHPVC. Given the above parameters
the entities interact in the following way.
1. AHPVC declares its choice of challenge parameters (ω?,O?, ψ?,S?, LF,X? , mode)
including a set of labels LF,X? and the mode of computation mode detailing in
which mode the challenge needs to be generated.
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2. AABE must send a challenge attribute set and policy (ω˜, S˜), and a challenge time
period t˜ to the challenger as AABE’s challenge input for the IND-sHRSS game
of the rkDP-ABE scheme. Recall from Table 5.1 that in case mode = VDC the
challenge subjective policy S? corresponds to the function F and the subjective
attribute set ψ corresponds to the challenge input data X? ⊆ Di. Also following
Table 5.1, in case mode = RPVC the challenge objective policy O? corresponds
to the function F and the objective attribute set ω corresponds to the challenge
input data X?. In either mode, the other challenge input parameters correspond
to either dummy attributes or dummy policies, and these dummy policies are
trivially satisfied by the dummy attributes (cf. Section 5.5). As usual, AABE
computes r = F (X?).
• If mode = VDC, we need to set the challenge input pair to the IND-sHRSS
game of the rkDP-ABE scheme such that the pair is not satisfied by the
challenge input X? and thus need to set S˜ to be unsatisfied.
– If r = 1: we set
ω˜ = Aω? = {TO},
and
S˜ = S? ∧
∧
lj∈LF,X?
lj = F ∧ {l(xi,j)}xi,j∈X? .
– If r = 0: we set
ω˜ = Aω? = {TO},
and
S˜ = S? ∧
∧
lj∈LF,X?
lj = F ∧ {l(xi,j)}xi,j∈X? .
• If mode = RPVC, then we set
ω˜ = Aω? = AX? ,
and
S˜ = S? ∧
∧
lj∈LF,X?
lj = {{TS}} ∧ {l(F )}.
Finally, AABE also sets its challenge (ω˜, S˜) for the time period t˜ = 1 for the
IND-sHRSS game and sends all challenge parameters to the challenger C.
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3. C runs the DPABE.Setup algorithm to generate mpkABE,mskABE and sends
mpkABE to AABE.
4. AABE initialises its target revocation list R which is initially empty and sends it
to C, and simulates running HPVC.Setup such that the outcome is consistent with
the previously generated mpkABE. If mode = VDC, it sets mpk
0
ABE ← mpkABE
as provided by the challenger and implicitly sets msk0ABE ← mskABE. Note
that any use of msk0ABE will be simulated using oracle calls to the challenger. If
mode = RPVC, it sets mpkrABE ← mpkABE as issued by C, and implicitly sets
mskrABE ← mskABE to be the key held by the challenger. In either case, AABE
executes DPABE.Setup itself to generate a second DP-ABE system.
5. AABE runs HPVC.FnInit as detailed in Algorithm 2.
6. AABE must generate a challenge problem instance for AHPVC as the output of
HPVC.ProbGen. To do so, AABE samples three distinct, equal length messages
m0, m1 and m
′ uniformly at random from the message space. AABE provides m0
and m1 as its choice of challenge to C, and receives back the encryption, ct?, of
one of these messages (mb? for b
? $← {0, 1}, where b? is chosen by the challenger),
under the challenge attribute set and policy (ω˜, S˜) and challenge time period
t˜. More formally, ct?
$← DPABE.Encrypt(mb? , (ω˜, S˜), t˜,mpkABE). It needs to
assign ct? to be one of the ciphertexts c or c′ that form the challenge problem
instance (encoded input) σF,X? using the correct ABE system parameters. AABE
chooses a random bit s
$← {0, 1} which intuitively corresponds to its guess for the
challenger’s choice of b?.
• If mode = VDC, we need to distinguish the following cases.
– If r = 1, AABE generates
c
$← DPABE.Encrypt(m′, ω˜,S? ∧
∧
lj∈LF,X?
lj , t˜,mpk
0
ABE)
and sets c′ = ct?. It also sets vk = g(m′) and vk′ = g(ms).
– If r = 0, AABE sets c = ct? and generates
c′ $← DPABE.Encrypt(m′, ω˜,S? ∧
∧
lj∈LF,X?
lj , t˜,mpk
0
ABE).
It also sets vk = g(ms) and vk
′ = g(m′).
• If mode = RPVC, AABE sets c = ct? and generates
c′ $← DPABE.Encrypt(m′, ω˜,S? ∧
∧
l∈LF,X?
l, t˜,mpk1ABE).
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It also sets vk = g(m′) and vk′ = g(ms).
Finally, AABE sets σF,X? = (c, c′) and vkF,X? = (vk, vk′, LReg).
7. AHPVC receives all outputs from the above HPVC.ProbGen algorithm, and then
is provided with oracle access to which AABE responds in the following way:
• HPVC.FnInit(·,mk, pp) and HPVC.Register(·,mk, pp) are executed as speci-
fied in Algorithms 2 and 3.
• HPVC.Certify(mode, Si, (O, ψ), Li,Fi,mk, pp) : in order to generate an eval-
uation key for the queried parameters, AABE needs to request queries to the
KeyGen oracle in the rkDP-ABE game formalised in Figure 5.5. AABE up-
dates first the usual list entries and then sets O′ = O and ψ′ = Aψ∪
⋃
lj∈Li lj
and requests an oracle query to the challenger forOKeyGen(Si, (O′, ψ′),mk, pp)
as specified in Figure 5.5. The challenger shall generate a rkDP-ABE de-
cryption key if and only if ω˜ /∈ O′ or ψ′ /∈ S˜ or Si ∈ R. Note that Si /∈ R is
fulfilled since we chose R to be empty. By construction, the condition ψ′ ∈ S˜
is satisfied only if the labels {lj}lj∈Li ⊇ {lk}lk∈LF,X? . As specified above, if
the labels do not satisfy this relation then ψ′ /∈ S˜ and the challenger may
generate the key, which AABE will receive as sk0ABE.
If, on the other hand, the labels do satisfy this relation then we have the
following cases depending on the chosen mode.
– If mode = VDC, then from the above relation {lk}lk∈LF,X? ⊆ {lj}lj∈Li
it follows that {l(xi,k)}xi,k∈X? ⊆ {l(xi,j)}xi,j∈Di and thus it follows that
X? ⊆ Di. Thus, this means that by the uniqueness of the labels within
the system, AHPVC has requested an evaluation key for a superset of the
challenge input set X?, i.e. the set Di that contains the challenge input
set X? and possibly some more additional data points. If X? ⊆ Di,
then the data set Di must satisfy either F or F in order to satisfy S˜.
However, S˜ was chosen in such a way that it is not satisfied by X? and
thus also not by Di. Hence, the challenger may generate a valid key
which AABE stores as sk0ABE.
– If mode = RPVC, then (as specified in Table 5.1) both sets Li and
LF,X? are singleton sets. Thus, from {lj}lj∈Li ⊇ {lk}lk∈LF,X? it follows
that Li = LF,X? = {l(F )}. By the uniqueness of the labels within
the system, it then follows that O = O? which means that AHPVC has
requested an evaluation key for the challenge function F . However, in
step 4, the challenger got assigned the ABE system with master secret
key mskrABE such that O? is not satisfied by the challenge input ω˜.
Therefore, also O′ is not satisfied either by the challenge input ω˜ and
186
5.6 Proofs of Security
hence the challenger may generate a valid key which AABE stores as
skrABE.
AABE needs further to make queries to a KeyUpdate oracle OKeyUpdate to the
challenger in order to obtain an update key. The challenger returns a valid
key if and only if t 6= t˜ or R ⊆ QRev. Observe that the second condition is
satisfied since R =  and hence is a subset of QRev. Hence a challenger may
generate a valid update key.
Also if mode = RPVC, then AABE additionally generates a secret key sk1−rABE
by itself using the parameters of the second DP-ABE system which it owns
for the pair (O, ψ).
• HPVC.Revoke(τθF (X) ,mk, pp) : whenever a Revoke query is requested, AABE
executes Algorithm 8 as specified except it requires to make a KeyUpdate
oracle query to the challenger for the update key that relates to the ABE
system owned by C. If mode = RPVC, this is the key ukrLRev,t, and if
mode = VDC, this is the key uk0LRev,t. The challenger may create a valid
update key if and only if t 6= qt or R ⊆ QRev. Since R was defined to be an
empty list and hence is a subset of QRev the challenger may always return
a valid update key.
EventuallyAHPVC finishes its query phase and outputs a guess θ? which it believes
to be a valid forgery.
8. AABE parses the guess θ? as (d, d′, Si, γ). One of the values d and d′ will be ⊥
(by construction) and we denote the other value (non-⊥) by Y . Observe that,
since AHPVC is assumed to be a successful adversary against selective public
verifiability, the non-⊥ value, Y , that it will return will be the plaintext ms since
the challenge access structure was always set to be unsatisfied on the challenge
input. Thus, if g(Y ) = g(ms), AABE outputs a guess b′ = s and otherwise guesses
b′ = (1− s).
Notice that if s = b? (the challenge bit chosen by C in the IND-sHRSS game in Fig-
ure 5.2), then the distribution of the above coincides with Game 0 since the verification
key comprises g(m′) and g(ms) where m′ and ms are the two plaintexts corresponding
to the ciphertexts of the encoded input for which AHPVC recovers exactly one. Other-
wise, if s = 1 − b? then the distribution coincides with Game 1 since the verification
key comprises the one-way function g applied to a legitimate message m′ and a random
message m1−b? that is unrelated to both ciphertexts.
Now, we consider the advantage of this constructed AABE playing the IND-sHRSS
game for the revocable key DP-ABE scheme. Recall that by assumption, AHPVC has
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a non-negligible advantage δ in distinguishing between Game 0 and Game 1, that is∣∣∣Pr [ExpGame 0AHPVC [HPVC, 1λ,F]→ 1]− Pr [ExpGame 1AHPVC [HPVC, 1λ,F]→ 1]∣∣∣ > δ
where ExpGame iAHPVC
[HPVC, 1λ,F] denotes the output of running AHPVC in Game i.
Now we derive the probability of AABE guessing b? correctly. It follows:
Pr[b′ = b?] = Pr[s = b?] Pr[b′ = b?|s = b?] + Pr[s 6= b?] Pr[b′ = b?|s 6= b?]
=
1
2
Pr[g(Y ) = g(ms)|s = b?] + 1
2
Pr[g(Y ) 6= g(ms)|s 6= b?]
=
1
2
Pr
[
ExpGame 0AHPVC
[
HPVC, 1λ,F
]
→ 1
]
+
1
2
(1− Pr[g(Y ) = g(ms)|s 6= b?])
=
1
2
Pr
[
ExpGame 0AHPVC
[
HPVC, 1λ,F
]
→ 1
]
+
1
2
(
1− Pr
[
ExpGame 1AHPVC
[
HPVC, 1λ,F
]
→ 1
])
=
1
2
(
Pr
[
ExpGame 0AHPVC
[
HPVC, 1λ,F
]
→ 1
]
− Pr
[
ExpGame 1AHPVC
[
HPVC, 1λ,F
]
→ 1
]
+ 1
)
> 1
2
(δ + 1)
Hence,
AdvAABE >
∣∣∣∣Pr[b′ = b?]− 12
∣∣∣∣
>
∣∣∣∣12(δ + 1)− 12
∣∣∣∣
=
δ
2
Since δ is assumed non-negligible, δ2 is also non-negligible. If AHPVC has advantage δ
at distinguishing these games then AABE can win the IND-sHRSS game with non-
negligible probability. Thus since we assumed the ABE scheme to be IND-sHRSS
secure, we conclude that AHPVC cannot distinguish Game 0 from Game 1 with non-
negligible probability.
Game 1 to Game 2. The transition from Game 1 to Game 2 is to simply set the
value of m′ to no longer be random but instead to correspond to the challenge w in
the one-way function inversion game (Figure 2.8). We argue that the adversary has no
distinguishing advantage between these games since the new value is independent of
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anything else in the system except the verification key g(w) and hence looks random
to an adversary with no additional information (in particular, AHPVC does not see the
challenge for the one-way function as this is played between C and AABE).
Final Proof. We now show that using AHPVC in Game 2, AABE can invert the one-
way function g – that is, given a challenge z = g(w) AABE can recover w. Specifically,
during HPVC.ProbGen, AABE chooses the messages as follows:
• if F (X?) = 1, we implicitly set m1 to be w and the corresponding verification
key component to be z = g(w). We randomly choose m0 from the message space
and compute the remainder of the verification key as usual.
• if F (X?) = 0, we implicitly set m0 to be w and set the verification key component
to z = g(w). m1 is chosen randomly from the message space and the remainder
of the verification key computed as usual.
Now, since AHPVC is assumed to be successful, it will output a forgery comprising the
plaintext that was encrypted under the unsatisfied function (F or F ) that evaluates
to 0. By construction, this will be w (and the adversary’s view is consistent since the
verification key is simulated correctly using z). AABE can therefore forward this result
to C in order to invert the one-way function with the same non-negligible probability
that AHPVC has against the selective public verifiability game.
We conclude that if the rkDP-ABE scheme is IND-sHRSS secure and the one-way
function is hard-to-invert, then the HPVC as defined by Algorithms 1–8 is secure in
the sense of selective public verifiability.
5.6.2 Selective, Semi-static Revocation
Lemma 5.12. The HPVC scheme defined by Algorithms 1–8 is secure in the sense of
selective, semi-static revocation (Figure 5.3) under the same assumptions as in Theo-
rem 5.10.
Proof. Note that this proof follows in a similar manner to the proof presented in Sec-
tion 3.5.2 and we mainly update the notation to accommodate an HPVC scheme.
In this proof, we aim to perform a reduction from the the selective, semi-static re-
vocation game (Figure 5.3) to the IND-sHRSS security of the underlying revocable
key DP-ABE scheme (Figure 5.5). We wish the prove this reduction by achieving a
contradiction and therefore we assume that AHPVC is an adversary with non-negligible
probability against the selective, semi-static revocation game when instantiated by
Algorithms 1–8, and making qt Revoke queries. We show that we can construct an
adversary AABE that uses AHPVC as a sub-routine to break the IND-sHRSS security
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of the indirectly revocable key DP-ABE scheme. Note that as in the previous proof,
we only focus on the modes RPVC and VDC, and the mode RPVC-AC can be seen
as a special case of the mode RPVC as we can assume the adversary being authorised
to evaluate a challenge computation. Let C be a challenger playing the IND-sHRSS
game with AABE, and AABE acts as a challenger for AHPVC.
1. ARPVC declares its choice of challenge input parameters
(ω?,O?, ψ?,S?, LF,X? , mode) for a challenge computation F (X?) including a set
of labels LF,X? and the mode of computation mode detailing in which mode the
challenge needs to be generated.
2. AABE initialises an (empty) list QRev of currently revoked entities and sets the
current time period t = 1. Next, AABE needs to form its own challenge input for
the IND-sHRSS game. AABE sets its challenge for the time period t˜ = qt, and
it forms ω˜ = Aω? and S˜ = S? ∧
∧
lj∈LF,X? lj . Finally, it sends (t˜, (ω˜, S˜)) to the
challenger.
3. C runs the DPABE.Setup algorithm to generate mpkABE,mskABE and sends
mpkABE to AABE.
4. AABE simulates running HPVC.Setup such that the outcome is consistent with
the previously generated mpkABE from C. It executes the algorithm as detailed
with the exception of line 2, since msk0ABE and mpk
0
ABE were already generated
by the challenger.
5. AABE runs HPVC.FnInit as detailed in Algorithm 2.
6. AHPVC chooses a challenge revocation list R, which AABE forwards to C.
7. AHPVC is provided with oracle access to which AABE responds in the following
way:
• HPVC.FnInit(·,mk, pp) and HPVC.Register(·,mk, pp) are executed as speci-
fied in Algorithms 2 and 3.
• Queries of the form HPVC.Certify(mode, Si, (O, ψ), Li,Fi,mk, pp) are han-
dled by AABE by running the Certify oracle as specified in Figure 5.3. AABE
executes Algorithm 4 as detailed except lines 6 and 7, as these rely on
the master secret key msk0ABE held by the challenger. In order to sim-
ulate line 6, AABE requires to make a KeyGen oracle query of the form
OKeyGen(Si, (O, Aψ ∪
⋃
lk∈Li lk),msk
0
ABE,mpk
0
ABE). The challenger responds
by running the KeyGen oracle as detailed in Figure 5.5 which returns a
valid key if and only if ω˜ /∈ O or Aψ ∪
⋃
lk∈Li lk /∈ S˜ or Si ∈ R. Now
if (Aψ ∪
⋃
lk∈Li lk /∈ S˜) is fulfilled then the challenger can return a valid
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decryption key. By construction, we observe that the condition ψ ∈ S˜ is sat-
isfied only if {lk}lk∈Li ⊇ {lj}lj∈LF,X? . By the uniqueness of the label within
the system this implies LF,X? ⊆ Li. However, in this case, the first condition
in the “if” statement in the Certify oracle in Figure 5.3 is satisfied and thus
AABE would have returned ⊥ without querying KeyGen if Si /∈ R to avoid
certifying AHPVC for the challenge computation. If (Aψ ∪
⋃
lk∈Li lk ∈ S˜) is
satisfied at the point of making a KeyGen query, then Si ∈ R, and thus the
challenger can respond to all queries made to it during this phase with a
valid key.
In order to simulate line 7, AABE makes a query to the challenger of the
form OKeyUpdate(QRev, t,msk0ABE,mpk0ABE). Here the challenger responds as
detailed in Figure 5.5 which returns a valid update key if and only if t 6= t˜
or R ⊆ QRev. Recall that AABE chose t˜ = qt, and at the point of calling
the KeyUpdate oracle, the list of currently revoked entities corresponds to
QRev ← QRev \Si. Therefore, if the challenger returns ⊥ in response to this
query, then AABE would already have returned ⊥ as a response to the Certify
oracle (Figure 5.3) as a result of the second condition in the “if” statement.
Hence, for all queries made to the challenger, a valid update key is returned.
• Queries of the form HPVC.Revoke(τθF (X?) ,mk, pp) are handled by AABE by
running the Revoke oracle as specified in Figure 5.3. In order to simulate run-
ning the algorithm, AABE executes Algorithm 8 with the exception of line 6.
Here AABE is required to make KeyUpdate oracle calls to the challenger of
the form OKeyUpdate(QRev, t,msk0ABE,mpk0ABE). Note that the Revoke ora-
cle in Figure 5.3 returns ⊥ if t = qt and R 6⊆ QRev \ Si. This corresponds
directly to the conditions that C cannot form a valid update key through a
KeyUpdate oracle call (Figure 5.5) since t = t˜ and R 6⊆ QRev. However, since
Si was already removed from the list of currently revoked entities QRev, C
can form a valid update key and AABE can simulate the remainder of the
algorithm.
8. Eventually (after qt Revoke queries), AHPVC finishes the query phase. AABE
checks if AHPVC has made suitable Revoke queries. If there exists an entity in R
that is not currently revoked (listed in QRev), it returns 0 and aborts immediately.
9. AABE must now generate a challenge for AHPVC. AABE chooses three distinct,
equal length messages m0,m1 and m
′ uniformly at random from the message
space. It then sends m0 and m1 to C as its choice of challenge for the IND-sHRSS
game. C chooses a random bit b? $← {0, 1} and returns
ct?
$← ABE.Encrypt(mb? , ω˜,S? ∧
∧
lj∈LF,X? lj , t˜,mpk
0
ABE). AABE sets c = ct? and
generates depending on the chosen mode the second ciphertext. If mode = VDC,
then c′ $← ABE.Encrypt(m′, ω˜,S? ∧ ∧lj∈LF,X? lj , t˜,mpk0ABE). In case mode =
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RPVC, then c′ $← ABE.Encrypt(m′, ω˜,S?∧∧lj∈LF,X? lj , t˜,mpk1ABE). Finally, AABE
forms the challenge problem instance σ? = (c, c′). AABE selects a bit s $← {0, 1}
and forms the verification key as vk? = (g(ms), g(m
′), LReg). Note that s intu-
itively corresponds to AABE’s guess for b?.
10. AHPVC receives the resulting parameters from ProbGen and is again provided
with oracle access. These queries are handled in the same way as previously, and
eventually AHPVC outputs its guess θ?.
11. Let Y be the non-⊥ plaintext returned in θ?. If g(Y ) = g(ms), AABE guesses
b′ = s. Else, AABE guesses b′ = 1− s.
If g(Y ) = g(m′), AABE makes a random guess b′ = b˜ $← {0, 1} since AHPVC did
not forge a result for either m0 or m1 and therefore is of no use for AABE in order
to break the IND-sHRSS game.
Now we consider the advantage of AABE playing the IND-sHRSS game. By assump-
tion, AHPVC has a non-negligible advantage δ against the selective, semi-static revoca-
tion game. It follows
Pr[b′ = b?] = Pr[b′ = b?|s = b?] Pr[s = b?] + Pr[b′ = b?|1− s = b?] Pr[1− s = b?]
+ Pr[b′ = b?|b˜ = b?] Pr[b˜ = b?]
= Pr[g(Y ) = g(ms)|s = b?] Pr[s = b?]
+ Pr[g(Y ) 6= g(ms)|1− s = b?] Pr[1− s = b?]
+ Pr[g(Y ) = g(m′)|b˜ = b?] Pr[b˜ = b?]
=
1
2
Pr[g(Y ) = g(ms)|s = b?] + 1
2
Pr[g(Y ) 6= g(ms)|1− s = b?]
+
1
2
Pr[g(Y ) = g(m′)|b˜ = b?]
=
1
2
(
Pr[g(Y ) = g(ms)|s = b?] + (1− Pr[g(Y ) = g(ms)|1− s = b?])
+ Pr[g(Y ) = g(m′)|b˜ = b?]
)
=
1
2
(
Pr[g(Y ) = g(ms)|s = b?]− Pr[g(Y ) = g(ms)|1− s = b?]
+ Pr[g(Y ) = g(m′)|b˜ = b?] + 1
)
=
1
2
(δ + 1).
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Hence,
AdvAABE >
∣∣∣∣Pr[b′ = b?]− 12
∣∣∣∣
>
∣∣∣∣12(δ + 1)− 12
∣∣∣∣
=
δ
2
.
Since δ is non-negligible, δ2 is also non-negligible. If AHPVC has advantage δ at breaking
the selective, semi-static revocation game then AABE can win the IND-sHRSS game
with non-negligible probability. However, since the indirectly revocable key DP-ABE
scheme was assumed to be IND-sHRSS secure, such an adversary AHPVC cannot exist.
Therefore, we conclude that if the revocable key DP-ABE scheme is IND-sHRSS secure
then HPVC as instantiated by Algorithms 1–8 is secure in the sense of selective, semi-
static revocation.
5.6.3 Selective Authorised Computation
Lemma 5.13. The HPVC scheme defined by Algorithms 1–8 is secure in the sense
of selective authorised computation (Figure 5.4) under the same assumptions as in
Theorem 5.10.
Proof. In this proof, we aim to perform a reduction from the selective authorised com-
putation game (Figure 5.4) to the IND-sHRSS security of the underlying revocable
key DP-ABE scheme (Figure 5.5). We wish to prove this reduction by achieving a
contradiction and therefore we assume that AHPVC is an adversary with non-negligible
probability against the selective authorised computation game when instantiated by Al-
gorithms 1–8. We show that we can construct an adversary AABE that uses AHPVC as a
subroutine to break the IND-sHRSS security of the indirectly revocable key DP-ABE
scheme. Note that the notion of selective authorised computation is only meaningful
as long as the system is run in the RPVC-AC mode. Let C be a challenger playing the
IND-sHRSS game with AABE, and AABE acts as a challenger for AHPVC.
1. AHPVC begins by declaring its choice of challenge input parameters for the RPVC-
AC mode consisting of F , X?, the authorisation policy P and the function label
{l(F )}.
2. AABE needs to form its own challenge input for the IND-sHRSS game. Thus,
AABE sets its challenge for the time period t˜ = 1, and it forms ω˜ = AX? and
S˜ = P ∧ {l(F )}. Finally, it sends (t˜, (ω˜, S˜)) to the challenger.
3. C runs the DPABE.Setup algorithm to generate mpkABE,mskABE and sends
mpkABE to AABE.
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4. AABE simulates running HPVC.Setup such that the outcome is consistent with
the previously generated mpkABE from C. It executes the algorithm as detailed
with the exception of line 2, since msk0ABE and mpk
0
ABE were already generated
by the challenger. AABE chooses an empty list of currently revoked entities R
and sends it to the challenger.
5. AABE runs HPVC.FnInit as detailed in Algorithm 2.
6. AABE must now generate a challenge for AHPVC. AABE chooses three distinct,
equal length messages m0,m1 and m
′ uniformly at random from the message
space. It then sends m0 and m1 to C as its choice of challenge for the IND-sHRSS
game. C chooses a random bit b? $← {0, 1} and returns
ct?
$← ABE.Encrypt(mb? , ω˜, P ∧{l(F )}, t˜,mpk0ABE). AABE sets c = ct? and gener-
ates itself the second ciphertext by encrypting m′ as c′ $← ABE.Encrypt(m′, ω˜, P ∧
{l(F )}, t˜,mpk1ABE). Finally, AABE forms the challenge problem instance σ? =
(c, c′). AABE selects a bit s $← {0, 1} and forms the verification key as vk? =
(g(ms), g(m
′), LReg). Note that s intuitively corresponds to AABE’s guess for b?.
7. AHPVC receives the resulting parameters from ProbGen and is provided with oracle
access to which AABE responds in the following way:
• HPVC.FnInit(·,mk, pp) and HPVC.Register(·,mk, pp) are executed as speci-
fied in Algorithms 2 and 3.
• Queries of the form HPVC.Certify(RPVC-AC, Si, (F,ψ), {l(F )},Fi,mk, pp)
are handled by AABE by running the Certify oracle as specified in Figure 5.4.
In case the queried set of subjective attributes ψ satisfy the challenge au-
thorisation policy then AABE returns ⊥. Otherwise, AABE executes Algo-
rithm 4 as detailed with the exception in lines 6 and 7, as these rely on
the master secret key msk0ABE held by the challenger. In order to sim-
ulate line 6, AABE requires to make a KeyGen oracle query of the form
OKeyGen(Si, (F,Aψ ∪
⋃
lk∈Li lk),msk
0
ABE,mpk
0
ABE). The challenger responds
by running the KeyGen oracle as detailed in Figure 5.5 which returns a valid
key if and only if ω˜ /∈ O or Aψ ∪
⋃
lk∈Li lk /∈ S˜ or Si ∈ R. However, for the
query to have been made to KeyGen, AABE must not have returned ⊥ in the
Certify oracle request in Figure 5.4 and therefore ψ /∈ P , and hence ψ /∈ S˜.
Therefore, the challenger can always return a valid decryption key sk0ABE.
In order to simulate line 7 in the Certify algorithm, AABE makes a query to
the challenger of the form OKeyUpdate(QRev, t,msk0ABE,mpk0ABE). Here the
challenger responds as detailed in Figure 5.5 which returns a valid update
key if and only if t 6= t˜ or R ⊆ QRev. Since R was initially chosen to be
empty and thus R ⊆ QRev for any QRev. Therefore, the challenger can create
a valid update key.
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• Queries of the form HPVC.Revoke(τθF (X?) ,mk, pp) are handled by AABE ex-
ecuting Algorithm 8 with the exception of line 6. Here AABE is required to
make KeyUpdate oracle calls to the challenger of the form
OKeyUpdate(QRev, t,msk0ABE,mpk0ABE). The challenger returns a valid up-
date key through a KeyUpdate oracle call (Figure 5.5) if and only if t 6= t˜ or
R ⊆ QRev. Since R was initially chosen to be empty and thus R ⊆ R for
any R and in particular LRev. Therefore, the challenger can always create a
valid update key.
8. Eventually AHPVC finishes its oracle query phase and outputs its guess θ? which
corresponds to the result of F (X?) protected by an authorisation policy P . Note
that AHPVC never received a key for a set of authorisation attributes s ∈ P .
9. As θ? should appear valid, by construction it should contain a non-⊥ plaintext
which we denote by Y . If g(Y ) = g(ms), AABE guesses b′ = s. Else, AABE
guesses b′ = 1− s.
If g(Y ) = g(m′), AABE makes a random guess b′ = b˜ $← {0, 1} since AHPVC did
not forge a result for either m0 or m1 and therefore is of no use for AABE in order
to break the IND-sHRSS game.
Now we consider the advantage of AABE playing the IND-sHRSS game. By assump-
tion, AHPVC has a non-negligible advantage δ against the selective authorised compu-
tation game. It follows
Pr[b′ = b?] = Pr[b′ = b?|s = b?] Pr[s = b?] + Pr[b′ = b?|1− s = b?] Pr[1− s = b?]
+ Pr[b′ = b?|b˜ = b?] Pr[b˜ = b?]
= Pr[g(Y ) = g(ms)|s = b?] Pr[s = b?]
+ Pr[g(Y ) 6= g(ms)|1− s = b?] Pr[1− s = b?]
+ Pr[g(Y ) = g(m′)|b˜ = b?] Pr[b˜ = b?]
=
1
2
Pr[g(Y ) = g(ms)|s = b?] + 1
2
Pr[g(Y ) 6= g(ms)|1− s = b?]
+
1
2
Pr[g(Y ) = g(m′)|b˜ = b?]
=
1
2
(
Pr[g(Y ) = g(ms)|s = b?] + (1− Pr[g(Y ) = g(ms)|1− s = b?])
+ Pr[g(Y ) = g(m′)|b˜ = b?]
)
=
1
2
(
Pr[g(Y ) = g(ms)|s = b?]− Pr[g(Y ) = g(ms)|1− s = b?]
+ Pr[g(Y ) = g(m′)|b˜ = b?] + 1
)
=
1
2
(δ + 1).
195
5.7 Conclusion
Hence,
AdvAABE >
∣∣∣∣Pr[b′ = b?]− 12
∣∣∣∣
>
∣∣∣∣12(δ + 1)− 12
∣∣∣∣
=
δ
2
.
Since δ is non-negligible, δ2 is also non-negligible. If AHPVC has advantage δ at breaking
the selective authorised computation game then AABE can win the IND-sHRSS game
with non-negligible probability. However, since the indirectly revocable key DP-ABE
scheme was assumed to be IND-sHRSS secure, such an adversary AHPVC cannot exist.
Therefore, we conclude that if the revocable key DP-ABE scheme is IND-sHRSS
secure then HPVC as instantiated by Algorithms 1–8 is secure in the sense of selective
authorised computations.
5.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have introduced an umbrella notion for PVC called hybrid publicly
verifiable outsourced computation. HPVC supports three different modes of computa-
tion (RPVC, VDC, and RPVC-AC) that we have introduced throughout this thesis so
far, and thus meets diverse user requirements of a large multi-user system. In other
words, our model enables entities to request computations from other users, restrict
which entities can perform computations on their behalf, perform computations for
other users, and make data available for queries from other users, all in a verifiable
manner. We provide an instantiation of HPVC built from a novel use of DP-ABE.
DP-ABE has previously attracted relatively little attention in the literature, which we
believe to be primarily due to its applications being less obvious than for the single-
policy ABE schemes. Whilst KP- and CP-ABE are generally considered in the context
of cryptographic access control, it is unclear that the policies enforced by DP-ABE are
natural choices for access control. Thus an interesting side-effect of this chapter is to
show that additional applications for DP-ABE do exist.
In future work, one may further investigate our revocable DP-ABE scheme to compare
the efficiency of revoking the key- and ciphertext-policies. Furthermore, it would be
beneficial to investigate techniques in order to enable the stored data at the server to
be updated.
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In this chapter we use verifiable outsourced computation techniques from the
previous chapters to enable a wider family of queries in verifiable searchable
encryption. We introduce a scheme based upon ciphertext-policy attribute-
based encryption that permits a user to verify that search results are correct
and complete. Our scheme also permits verifiable computational queries
over keywords and specific data values, that go beyond the standard key-
word matching queries, to allow functions such as averaging or counting
operations. The results of this chapter appear in [7].
6.1 Introduction
With the emergence of cloud computing, it is now common practice for data owners
to outsource their data to public servers providing storage on a pay-as-you-go basis.
This can reduce the costs of data storage compared with that of running a private data
centre (e.g. hardware, construction, air conditioning and security costs), making this a
cost effective solution. If the server is not fully trusted and the data is of a sensitive
nature, the data owner may wish to encrypt the data to ensure confidentiality. Un-
fortunately, this prevents the efficient retrieval of specific portions of the data as the
server is unable to identify the relevant information.
The above setting has been studied intensively in recent years. For example, searchable
encryption as introduced in Section 2.4 addresses this issue by indexing the encrypted
data in such a way as to allow a server to execute a search query (formed by the data
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owner or an authorised data user) over the encrypted data and return the identifiers
of any file that satisfies the search query. In this chapter, we study whether techniques
from the area of publicly verifiable outsourced computation lend themselves in any
meaningful way to the setting of searchable encryption. We answer in the affirma-
tive and show that techniques from publicly verifiable delegable computation (VDC)
as developed in Chapter 4 can be used to build a verifiable searchable encryption
(VSE) scheme that is able to handle a wider class of queries compared to current VSE
approaches. Concretely, we use CP-ABE to build an extended verifiable searchable en-
cryption (EVSE) scheme and embed the static data set (documents) in a server’s secret
key whilst the queries can only be requested by authorised users being in possession
of a secret user key. In more detail, the server holds an outsourced database from the
data owner which is made available for being searched over by authorised users. It is
crucial to have a verification mechanism in this context since the users querying the
database never possessed the data themselves and wish to obtain an assurance that the
server has not cheated by returning malformed search results. Note that by employing
techniques from Chapter 4, we achieve the scheme being publicly verifiable enabling
anyone to verify the correctness and completeness of the query results but the scheme
is not publicly delegable.
By adapting techniques from VDC to VSE, our scheme is able to perform a wider
family of queries including some types of computations. We can form the following
queries.
• More expressive queries: our scheme supports queries such as boolean formulas
involving conjunctions, disjunctions and negations, threshold operations, polyno-
mials, arbitrary CNF and DNF formulas, and fuzzy search.1
• Evaluation of computations: our scheme supports the evaluation of some com-
putations over the encrypted data, such as averaging and counting operations.
As well as assigning keywords to label data, we propose to also assign keywords
representing certain data values that may be computed over (either in the form
of single keywords or as a string of keywords encoding binary data).
Related Work
The scheme by Zheng et al. [148] also uses ABE primitives in their construction. This
scheme is able to achieve multi-level access, where users can be restricted to searching
only certain parts of the database. Keywords are grouped with respect to their access
control policies, and the search time is linear in the number of groups. However, their
scheme is restricted to only achieve a single keyword equality search. Sun et al. [136]
introduced a dynamic SE scheme that can support conjunctive queries and is based
upon ABE in order to create the indexes. Each user in the system has a separate
1Depending on the choice of underlying ABE scheme; see Section 6.4.1.
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public key to create their indexes which can be added to the server at anytime. This
scheme uses a combination of bloom filters and signatures to achieve verifiability of
search results. Curtmola et al. [57] extended the SE system model to allow multiple
users to query the data, using broadcast encryption to manage user access privileges.
We will make use of broadcast encryption in a similar way to authorise users to query
data stored at the server. Abdalla et al. [1] raised the issue of building a searchable
encryption scheme that enables a user to form more advanced queries, such as Boolean
formulas for keywords. The schemes presented in [37, 84, 116] also provide solutions
towards this issue by enabling users to form queries for conjunctive combinations of
keywords, range queries, and subset queries. We believe that our work also contributes
to achieving richer query functionality on encrypted data.
Organisation of Chapter
In Section 6.2, we describe and provide a formal definition of our verifiable search-
able encryption model with extended functionalities and discuss the possible types of
queries that are captured by our scheme. Next, in Section 6.3, we define three notions
of security that are relevant in our context, and in Section 6.4 we provide an exam-
ple construction of EVSE based on ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption. In
Section 6.5, we show that our given construction is secure according to the introduced
security models. We conclude this chapter in Section 6.6.
6.2 Extended Verifiable Searchable Encryption
In this section, we introduce a model for verifiable searchable encryption using verifiable
computation techniques from the previous chapters in order to enable a wider family of
queries, and some types of computations, to be performed over outsourced encrypted
data with (publicly) verifiable query results.
6.2.1 Informal Overview
Our system model comprises the same entity population as previously considered in
the literature, i.e. it comprises a data owner, a remote storage server, and a set of
authorised data users. The data owner wishes to outsource documents and controls
which additional users are able to query its encrypted data. Following the accepted
format used in searchable encryption, queries may be formulated over keywords which,
for example, may identify documents that are associated with a given set of keywords.
However, in our setting, we also allow computational queries of functions in the class
NC1, which consists of Boolean functions computable by circuits of depth O(log n)
where each gate has a fan-in of two, over encoded data values.
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As a motivating practical scenario for our work, consider workgroups within an organ-
isation. The manager or system administrator acts as the data owner for the organisa-
tion and outsources a shared encrypted database to a remote server. Authorisation is
granted by issuing a secret key to each user within the organisation which is required
when creating a query token qtQ (or trapdoor) for a particular query Q. The token is
sent to the server that evaluates the query on the encoded index to generate a search
result θQ. We allow any entity to verify the correctness and completeness of the re-
sult and thus achieve public verifiability. That is, we also permit the server to verify
correctness to avoid the rejection problem (cf. Section 2.7), where a server may learn
some useful information by observing if results are accepted.
Throughout this chapter, we assume a strict separation between queriers (the data
owner and users) and the remote server storing the data. We do not enable the server
to issue queries itself since it would trivially be able to learn the encoding of the index
and queries. In contrast, legitimate users know this encoding and are able to obtain
meaningful results.
6.2.2 Formal Definition
An EVSE scheme for a family of queries F begins with the data owner initialising the
scheme by running Setup to create the public parameters and the master secret key.
The data owner wishes to outsource data D which is considered to be a collection of n
documents. Prior to outsourcing, the data owner specifies a pre-index for D, denoted
by δ(D), which assigns a set of descriptive labels to each document, for example key-
words contained in the document or specific data values that may be computed upon.
The encoded form of the data, including the descriptive labels, is referred to as the
index of D and generated by running the algorithm BuildIndex. The algorithm outputs
the index ID and the data owner stores it at the server.
In order to be able to form a valid query, a data owner first authorises a user by issuing
her with a secret key. An authorised user executes the Query algorithm to request a
search over the encrypted data from the server. The user specifies a query Q and uses
the authorisation key, and the algorithm outputs the query token qtQ for Q as well as
a verification key vkQ that enables anyone to verify the search result. In the Search
algorithm the server S uses its index ID and the encoded query token to output an
encoded search result θQ corresponding to the actual underlying result.
Any entity is able to verify the correctness of θQ using vkQ. Verification outputs the
result r = Q(δ(D)) indicating that the search was performed correctly, or else r =⊥
showing that the search result is malformed.
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Given that the data owner enrolled multiple users to query its outsourced database, it
may well be desirable that misbehaving users, or in terms of the above example where
users may leave an organisation, are prevented from further querying the database and
as such being revoked from the system. In order to revoke a user the data owner could
simply initialise a new system and provide each authorised user within this system
with a new secret key. However, this is an expensive solution given that the data
owner needs to invest a large amount of resources to process the data and keys yet
again. Thus, in our scheme revocation is based on provided states between authorised
users and the server, i.e. the states serve as a proof that each entity within the system
is authorised to form queries. In case a user is revoked, the data owner simply updates
and re-distributes the respective states to all non-revoked entities.
Note that we slightly change algorithm names for our scheme compared to “classical”
searchable encryption schemes to accommodate the blend between searchable encryp-
tion and publicly verifiable outsourced computation. Our multi-user (single-server)
EVSE scheme is more formally captured in the following definition.
Definition 6.1. An extended verifiable searchable encryption (EVSE) scheme com-
prises the following algorithms:
1. (mk, pp)
$← Setup(1λ,U) : this randomised algorithm is run by the data owner to
initialise the system. It takes as input the security parameter λ and a universe
of attributes U representing keywords and data points. The algorithm outputs the
data owner’s master secret key mk that is used for further administrative tasks
and public parameters pp, both of which are provided to the remaining algorithms
where required;
2. (ID, sts, sto) $← BuildIndex(δ(D), l(δ(D)), G,mk, pp) : this randomised algorithm
is run by the data owner to output a searchable index ID for the data D, as well
as a server state sts and data owner state sto.
2 The algorithm uses as input the
master secret key and public parameters, the pre-index of the data δ(D) and a
unique label l(δ(D)) representing the pre-index, as well as the set G of authorised
users;
3. skid
$← AddUser(id, G,mk, pp) : this randomised algorithm is run by the data
owner to authorise a user id to enable them to form valid queries for querying
the data. The algorithm authorises a user id by issuing them a secret key skid.
The inputs are a user id, the current set of authorised users, as well as the public
parameters and master secret key;
4. (qtQ, vkQ)
$← Query(Q, sts, sto, skid, pp) : this randomised algorithm is run by an
authorised user using its secret key, public parameters and both states to generate
2The data owner shares its state with each authorised user and thus sto = stu. For simplicity we
will only use the notation sto.
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a query token qtQ for a query Q she wishes to search for over the data. It further
also outputs a public verification key vkQ;
5. θQ
$← Search(ID, qtQ, sts, skS, pp) : this randomised algorithm is run by the server
to execute a query specified by the query token qtQ on the index ID. It generates
an encoded result θQ which can be returned to the querying user or published;
6. r ← Verify(θQ, vkQ, pp) : this algorithm can be run by any entity. The inputs are
the encoded output θQ produced by the server, the verification key vkQ and the
public parameters pp. The algorithm produces an output r = Q(δ(D)) if the search
was performed correctly, or else r =⊥ indicating that the search was performed
incorrectly;
7. (st′s, st′o)
$← RevokeUser(id, G,mk, pp) : this randomised algorithm is run by the
data owner using its master secret key to revoke a user’s authorisation to form
further queries. It does so by generating new server and data owner states and
distributes them accordingly.
Although not explicitly mentioned, the data owner may update the public parameters
pp during any algorithm in order to reflect any changes in the entity population as
new users may have been added and granted the ability to perform searches over the
outsourced database. The algorithms AddUser and RevokeUser can be run at any point
in the scheme after the system was initialised and the index was created. Note that we
assume throughout this chapter that the server does not collude with revoked users.
An EVSE scheme is correct if there is a negligible probability that verification does not
succeed when all algorithms are run honestly. More formally this can be represented
as follows.
Definition 6.2. An extended verifiable searchable encryption scheme is correct for a
family of queries F if for all queries Q ∈ F and all non-revoked entities, the following
holds:
Pr[(mk, pp)
$← Setup(1λ,U),
(ID, sts, sto) $← BuildIndex(δ(D), l(δ(D)), G,mk, pp),
skid
$← AddUser(id, G,mk, pp),
(qtQ, vkQ)
$← Query(Q, sts, sto, skid, pp),
θQ
$← Search(ID, qtQ, sts, skS, pp),
r ← Verify(θQ, vkQ, pp)
(st′s, st
′
o)
$← RevokeUser(id, G,mk, pp)]
= 1− negl(λ).
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qtQ1 qtQ2
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vkQ1 vkQ2
Figure 6.1: Operation of an EVSE scheme
We consider the following two main types of queries in this chapter:
• Keyword matching queries: Queries of this type have formed the basis of
most prior work in SE. Suppose there exists a universe (dictionary) of keywords.
Each encrypted data item is associated with an index of one or more keywords
to describe the contents. Queries are formed over the same universe of keywords.
In this work, we permit Boolean formulas over keywords (e.g. ((a∧ b)∨ c) where
a, b, c are keywords). We return an identifier for each data item whose associated
keywords in the index satisfy this formula. Thus we can perform very expressive
search queries over keywords.
• Computational queries: Queries of this type are similar to the operations
commonly discussed in the context of outsourced computation. We allow statis-
tical queries over keywords, e.g. counting the number of data items that satisfy
a keyword matching query, as well as operations over selected data values that
have been encoded using additional portions of the keyword universe. It is pos-
sible to encode the entire database in such a way to enable computations over
all data fields, but it would usually be more efficient to select a (small) subset of
fields that are most useful or most frequently queried. Clearly, keyword matching
queries can be seen as a special case of computational queries where the function
operator is equality testing.
We can also combine both the functionalities of the aforementioned query types and
provide mixed queries. For example, such a query could be formulated as finding the
average of data values contained in all documents associated with a particular keyword.
All presented types of queries are performed in a verifiable manner to ensure that results
are correct and complete. Furthermore, each type of query can be formed either by a
single, authorised user or by a set of authorised users that may each contribute different
clauses to the search query. We discuss this type of query more detailed in Section 6.4.4.
In Figure 6.1, we illustrate the entity population and respective interaction within our
EVSE model.
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6.3 Security Models
In the context of EVSE we consider three different notions of security, namely public
verifiability, index privacy and query privacy. As usual, we represent the security
definitions in terms of a game-based notion. Throughout the following, the notation
AO denotes the adversary being provided with oracle access to the following algorithms:
BuildIndex(·, ·, ·,mk, pp), AddUser(·, ·,mk, pp), Query(·, ·, ·, ·, pp) and Search(·, ·, ·, ·, pp).
We assume that oracle queries are performed in a logical order such that all required
information is generated from previous queries.
6.3.1 Public Verifiability
In Figure 6.2, we present the notion of public verifiability. This notion ensures that a
server cannot cheat by returning an incorrect result without being detected. The game
begins with the challenger C initialising the system and providing the resulting public
parameters pp to the adversary A. The adversary is provided with oracle access as
detailed above. The adversary A selects the challenge inputs consisting of the challenge
ExpPubVerifA
[EVSE , 1λ]
1 : (pp,mk)←$ Setup(1λ,U)
2 : (Q, δ(D?), l(δ(D?)), sts, sto)←$ AO(pp)
3 : G ⊆ Users
4 : id←$ Users
5 : skid←$ AddUser(id, G,mk, pp)
6 : (qtQ, vkQ)←$ Query(Q, sts, sto, skid, pp)
7 : θ?←$ AO(qtQ, vkQ, pp)
8 : r ← Verify(θ?, vkQ, pp)
9 : if (r 6=⊥) and (r 6= Q(δ(D?))) then
10 : return 1
11 : else return 0
Figure 6.2: The public verifiability experiment ExpPubVerifA
[EVSE , 1λ]
query Q, the challenge pre-index δ(D?), respective pre-index label l(δ(D?)) as well
as server and data owner states. In the next step, the challenger runs AddUser on a
randomly chosen id from the user space enrolling a querier into the system by providing
them with a secret key. The challenger C then outputs a challenge by executing Query
on the challenge query. The adversary receives the resulting parameters from the
challenger and is again provided with oracle access as above. A wins if it produces
an encoded output that verifies correctly but does not correspond to the actual result
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Q(δ(D?)).
Definition 6.3. The advantage of a PPT adversary in the PubVerif game for an
EVSE construction, EVSE, is defined as:
AdvPubVerifA,EVSE (1
λ) = Pr
[
ExpPubVerifA
[
EVSE , 1λ
]
→ 1
]
.
An EVSE scheme, EVSE, is secure in the sense of public verifiability if for all PPT
adversaries A, it holds that
AdvPubVerifA,EVSE (1
λ) ≤ negl(λ).
6.3.2 Selective Index Privacy
In Figure 6.3, we present the notion of index indistinguishability against a selective
chosen keyword attack, which ensures no information regarding the attributes is leaked
from the index. The game begins with the adversary outputting two sets of documents
D0 and D1 that it wishes to be challenged on, with the restriction that |D0| = |D1|. The
challenger runs Setup initialising the system and providing the resulting public param-
eters pp to the adversary A, and initialises a set G of authorised users. The challenger
selects a bit b uniformly at random selecting which set of documents to encode into the
index. Before the index is created, the challenger needs to create the pre-index from the
ExpsIndPrivA
[EVSE , 1λ]
1 : (D0, D1)←$ A(1λ,U)
2 : if (|D0| 6= |D1|) then return 0
3 : (pp,mk)←$ Setup(1λ,U)
4 : b←$ {0, 1}
5 : G ⊆ Users
6 : (δ(Db), l(δ(Db)))← Encode(Db)
7 : (IDb , sts, sto)←$ BuildIndex(δ(Db), l(δ(Db)), G,mk, pp)
8 : b′←$ AO(IDb , sts, pp)
9 : if b′ = b then
10 : return 1
11 : else return 0
Figure 6.3: The selective index privacy experiment ExpsIndPrivA
[EVSE , 1λ]
set of documentsDb. This is done using an Encode mechanism that takes the elements of
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Db as input and outputs the pre-index δ(Db) with respective label l(δ(Db)).
3 The chal-
lenger then runs BuildIndex using δ(Db) and l(δ(Db)) to produce the index IDb , which
is given to A. The adversary is then given oracle access to the following algorithms:
BuildIndex(·, ·, ·,mk, pp), AddUser(·, ·,mk, pp), Query(·, ·, ·, ·, pp) and Search(·, ·, ·, ·, pp)
which we denote by O. However, we require the restriction that the query results
are identical for each index ID0 , ID1 , i.e. if θQ0 ← Search(ID0 , qtQ, sts, skS, pp) and
θQ1 ← Search(ID1 , qtQ, sts, skS, pp) then we need θQ0 = θQ1. After this query phase, A
outputs a guess b′ and wins the game if its guess corresponds to the randomly chosen
bit b. In other words, A wins the game if it can identify which document set (D0 or
D1) was encoded into the index IDb .
Definition 6.4. The advantage of a PPT adversary in the sIndPriv game for an
EVSE construction, EVSE, is defined as:
AdvsIndPrivA,EVSE (1
λ) = Pr
[
ExpsIndPrivA
[
EVSE , 1λ
]
→ 1
]
− 1
2
.
An EVSE scheme, EVSE, is secure in the sense of selective index privacy if for all
PPT adversaries A, it holds that
AdvsIndPrivA,EVSE (1
λ) ≤ negl(λ).
6.3.3 Selective Query Privacy
In Figure 6.4, we present the notion of selective query privacy that captures that the
queries themselves should not leak any information about the queries. Note the queries
only reveal the logical make-up (gates). This notion is formalised in a similar fashion
to the notion of index privacy (Figure 6.3).
The game begins with the adversary outputting two queries Q0 and Q1 that use the
same gates. We denote the gate structure of a query Q by GQ and require that
GQ0 = GQ1 , otherwise the challenger aborts the game. The challenger runs Setup,
initialising the system and providing the resulting public parameters pp to the adver-
sary A. Additionally the challenger selects a bit b uniformly at random and initialises
a set G of authorised users. In the next step, the challenger runs BuildIndex using δ(D)
and l(δ(D)) to produce the index ID as well as the server and data owner state. The
challenger provides the index and server state toAEVSE. In the next step, the challenger
runs AddUser on a randomly chosen id from the user space providing the entity with
a secret key. The challenger uses an Encode mechanism in order to prepare the query
Qb that will be used as input to Query, and runs the algorithm outputting an encoded
query token qtQb and verification key vkQb that is provided to the adversary. The adver-
sary is then given oracle access to the following algorithms: BuildIndex(·, ·, ·,mk, pp),
3Encode is not required in our instantiation as the pre-indexes can be chosen directly from U˜ as the
user knows the permutation Π and the mapping from U ′ to U˜ ; the adversary however does not.
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ExpsQueryPrivA
[EVSE , 1λ]
1 : (Q0, Q1)←$ A(1λ,U)
2 : if (GQ0 6= GQ1) then return 0
3 : (pp,mk)←$ Setup(1λ,U)
4 : b←$ {0, 1}
5 : G ⊆ Users
6 : (ID, sts, sto)←$ BuildIndex(δ(D), l(δ(D)), G,mk, pp)
7 : id←$ Users
8 : skid←$ AddUser(id, G,mk, pp)
9 : Q˜b ← Encode(Qb)
10 : (qtQ˜b , vkQ˜b)←$ Query(Q˜b, sts, sto, skid, pp)
11 : b′←$ AO(qtQ˜b , vkQ˜b , ID, sts, pp)
12 : if b′ = b then
13 : return 1
14 : else return 0
Figure 6.4: The selective query privacy experiment ExpsQueryPrivA
[EVSE , 1λ]
AddUser(·, ·,mk, pp), Query(·, ·, ·, ·, pp) and Search(·, ·, ·, ·, pp) which we denote by O.
Eventually, after the query phase it outputs its guess b′ for b, and wins the game if the
guess was correct.
Definition 6.5. The advantage of a PPT adversary in the sQueryPriv game for an
EVSE construction, EVSE, is defined as:
AdvsQueryPrivA,EVSE (1
λ) = Pr
[
ExpsQueryPrivA
[
EVSE , 1λ
]
→ 1
]
− 1
2
.
An EVSE scheme, EVSE, is secure in the sense of selective query privacy if for all
PPT adversaries A, it holds that
AdvsQueryPrivA,EVSE (1
λ) ≤ negl(λ).
6.4 Construction
6.4.1 Overview
In this section, we provide a construction of an EVSE scheme and we base its instantia-
tion on a ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption scheme. As shown in Chapter 4,
CP-ABE can be used to verifiably request computations to be performed on data held
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by a server, and we referred to this mode of computation as VDC. In VDC, a trusted
key distribution centre (KDC) initialises the system and issues a CP-ABE decryption
key to the server pertaining to the data it holds. Here in the setting of EVSE, we use
a similar technique but have the data owner act as the KDC. Thus, we do not require
the data to be revealed to an external KDC and our underlying entity population cor-
responds to that in the searchable encryption literature. In our EVSE setting, the data
owner issues a CP-ABE decryption key to the server that corresponds to the index of
the data. The particular encoding method is described in Section 6.4.2.
We consider the family F of Boolean functions closed under complement, i.e. if F ∈ F
then F (X) = F (X)⊕ 1 is also in F . A query Q is represented as a Boolean function of
keywords and computational data points. If a monotonic CP-ABE scheme is used then
queries can be comprised of AND and OR gates (and negation can inefficiently be han-
dled by including both a positively and negatively labelled attribute in the universe and
requiring the presence of exactly one of them in the query). A non-monotonic CP-ABE
scheme enables queries formed from AND, OR and NOT gates, which is a universal set
of gates, and fuzzy CP-ABE enables fuzzy keyword search. We can achieve all func-
tions in the class NC1, which includes common arithmetic and comparison operators
useful in queries. An n-bit result can be formed by performing n Boolean queries, each
of which returns the ith bit of the output.
The query token qtQ for a query Q ∈ F comprises two CP-ABE ciphertexts for access
structures representing Q and Q ∈ F respectively. To perform the search, the server
attempts to decrypt each ciphertext under the secret decryption key and outputs the
result. Each decryption succeeds if and only if the query evaluates correctly on the
pre-index. Any entity within the system may perform the verification operation using
the public verification key to determine the search result and whether the search was
performed correctly.
6.4.2 Data Encoding
Defining the Index
Searchable encryption schemes usually operate on the level of documents with lists of
keywords. In this chapter, we have moved more towards a practice-oriented setting
where we operate on databases. That is, we suppose the database D to be outsourced
comprises n documents, i.e. D = D1, . . . , Dn. In the following we discuss how to form a
pre-index δ(D), which represents the keywords and data fields that may be queried over.
Let us denote by D a dictionary of keywords that describes the documents within the
data. D alone suffices for keyword matching queries but for computational queries,
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we also need to be able to encode data values such that they can be input to queries
represented as access structures encoding Boolean functions. Thus, for each data field
x that may be input to a computational query, let the maximum size of the data value
be mx bits. We define mx additional attributes Ax,1, Ax,2, . . . , Ax,mx , and define the
universe C = ⋃x∈D ∪mxi=1Ax,i to be the union of these attributes over all data fields.
Let y be a value stored in the data field x and let the binary representation of y be
y1, . . . , ymx . We view y as a characteristic tuple (cf. Section 2.7.3) of an attribute set
Ay ⊆ C, where Ay = {Ax,i : yi = 1}. In other words, we include an attribute for
position i in the set if and only if the ith bit of y equals 1.
Finally, in order to enable the index for all n documents to be encoded within a sin-
gle CP-ABE key (and hence for computations to be performed simultaneously on all
documents), and to ensure that the correct index data is used for each query, we must
encode a labelling of the document that each attribute pertains to. We define our
attribute universe U for the CP-ABE scheme to be U = {D ∪ C} × [n], i.e. we take n
copies of D and C and assume that all documents have the same fields. Each element
of {D∪C} describes a particular keyword or data value, and each copy relates to a dif-
ferent document in D. We index each copy of an attribute w ∈ {D∪C} as {wi}ni=1 and
then wi denotes the presence of w in document Di. In practice, it may be desirable to
use a ‘large universe’ CP-ABE scheme, wherein arbitrary textual strings are mapped to
attributes (group elements), e.g. using a hash function H. Thus, for a keyword or data
value w in the ith document, the attribute could be defined as H(w||i). Finally, the
pre-index of the data D is a set of attributes δ(D) ⊆ U . The index that is outsourced
will be a CP-ABE key generated over this attribute set.
Let us consider the following example that shows how we define the pre-index within our
system model. Suppose we have three documents D = D1, D2, D3 with the following
characteristics:
• Document 1: Keywords: Male, Vaccinated. Data: Age = 7 = 1112.
• Document 2: Keywords: Female. Data: Age = 4 = 1002.
• Document 3: Keywords: Male, Vaccinated. Data: -
Then, we can define the dictionary of keywords that describes those documents as
D = {Male, Female, Vaccinated}.
To enable computational queries on the documents, we need to define three additional
attributes that provide us with
C = {AAge,1, AAge,2, AAge,3}.
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Next we need to form our attribute universe as
U ={D ∪ C} × [n]
={MaleDoc1, MaleDoc2, MaleDoc3,
FemaleDoc1, FemaleDoc2, FemaleDoc3,
VaccinatedDoc1, VaccinatedDoc2, VaccinatedDoc3,
A(Age,1),Doc1, A(Age,1),Doc2, A(Age,1),Doc3,
A(Age,2),Doc1, A(Age,2),Doc2, A(Age,2),Doc3,
A(Age,3),Doc1, A(Age,3),Doc2, A(Age,3),Doc3}.
We can now form the pre-index δ(D) ⊆ U of the data D that represents the available
keywords and data fields. Thus, the pre-index corresponds to
δ(D) ={MaleDoc1, VaccinatedDoc1, A(Age,1),Doc1, A(Age,2),Doc1, A(Age,3),Doc1,
FemaleDoc2, A(Age,1),Doc2,
MaleDoc3, VaccinatedDoc3},
and the index given to the server is a CP-ABE decryption key over this attribute set.
Hiding the Index
In general, CP-ABE schemes do not hide the attributes within the decryption key. This
is usually expected behaviour since CP-ABE is often used to cryptographically enforce
access control policies [67, 93] and it is natural to assume that an entity is aware of their
access rights. However, in this setting we are using CP-ABE not to protect objects
from unauthorised access, but instead to prove the outcome of a function evaluation
as in previous chapters. The decryption keys in our setting are formed over attributes
encoding the index of outsourced data, as opposed to encoding access rights. Since the
server should not learn any information about the data, including the index, we must
implement a mechanism by which the decryption key hides the associated attributes.
In many CP-ABE schemes, the public parameters comprise an ordered set of group el-
ements [142], each associated with an attribute from the universe. In more detail, that
is, for all i ∈ U , choose ti $← Zp, then form the encoded attribute set {gti}i∈U . Thus,
given a key (or ciphertext) that comprises gti , it is possible, based on the ordering of
this set, to determine the attribute i ∈ U it relates to. In addition, the attributes may
be listed in the clear, and attached to keys and ciphertexts to indicate which group
elements should be applied at each point. Clearly, this is unsuitable for our requirement
to hide the index.
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To this end, we first apply a random permutation to the universe of attributes U
such that the position of the group elements within the ordered set does not reveal
the attribute string (unless the permutation is known). We then use a symmetric
encryption scheme to encrypt each attribute x ∈ U under a key k, and instantiate the
CP-ABE scheme on this universe of encrypted attributes. Thus, without knowledge
of the key k, the server should be unable to determine the attribute x that a given
group element corresponds to. We assume that only the keywords or data items being
searched and computed over are considered sensitive, and not the logical make-up of
the Boolean function (in terms of gates).
6.4.3 Formal Details
The data owner initialises the system and encodes the data as an index which is pushed
to the server. Each authorised user will be issued with a personalised secret key enabling
them to form queries. Note that forming a query is similar to preparing a computational
request in VDC (cf. Section 4.4). In order to form a query Q, a user chooses a message
uniformly at random from the message space M to act as a verification token, and
encrypt this using the CP-ABE scheme under the access structure encoding Q. The
server attempts to decrypt the ciphertext and recovers the chosen message if and only
if Q(δ(D)) = 1. Note that this decryption procedure proceeds similarly to the basic
PVC principles as introduced in Section 2.7.3. By the indistinguishability security of
the CP-ABE scheme, the server learns nothing about the message if Q(δ(D)) = 0
since this corresponds to an access structure not being satisfied. Thus, if a server
returns the correct message, the user is assured that the query evaluated to 1 on the
data. If, however, Q(δ(D)) = 0, then decryption will return ⊥. This is insufficient for
verification purposes since the server can return ⊥ to convince a user of a false negative
search result. Thus, the user must produce two CP-ABE ciphertexts to overcome this
one-sided error. As in the previous chapters, one ciphertext corresponds to the query
Q, whilst the other ciphertext corresponds to the complement query Q (which always
outputs the opposite result to Q as the query is represented as a Boolean function).
Thus, if Q(δ(D)) = 0 then, necessarily, Q(δ(D)) = 1. Hence, the server’s key will
decrypt exactly one ciphertext and the returned message will distinguish whether Q or
Q was satisfied, and therefore the value of Q(δ(D)). A well-formed response (d0, d1)
from a server satisfies the following:
(d0, d1) =
(m0,⊥), if Q(δ(D)) = 1;(⊥,m1), if Q(δ(D)) = 0. (6.1)
If the returned plaintext does not match one of the randomly chosen messages then the
server has returned an incorrect result. This is also the case if both returned results
are ⊥ but a rational malicious server would never return this.
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Public verifiability is achieved by publishing a token comprising a one-way function g
applied to each plaintext. Any entity can apply g to the server’s response and compare
with this token to check correctness.
Our adversarial model allows the adversary (and hence servers in our system) to hold
more than one index (key) as the data owner may have outsourced multiple data sets,
and therefore we must ensure that a key cannot produce a valid looking response
to a query on a different index. Similarly to the previous chapters, we achieve this
by labelling each pre-index with a label l(δ(D)) and define an attribute for each label.
Then, for a pre-index δ(D), the decryption key is formed over the attribute set (Aδ(D)∪
l(δ(D))).4 Recall that encoded data stored on the server’s side is a collection of n
documents, which we label D1, . . . , Dn. When making a query Q(δ(D)), a sub-query
Qi may be formed for each document (e.g. to check if a given keyword is contained in
each document). In this case, during Query the CP-ABE encryption algorithm uses the
access structure encoding of the conjunction (Qi ∧ l(δ(D))) for i ∈ [n]. A valid result
can only be formed by applying the sub-query to the specified document, which is also
labelled by Di ∈ D. Thus, the CP-ABE decryption algorithm succeeds if and only if
the query is satisfied and the label l(δ(D)) is matched in the key and ciphertext. Note
that a key for a different pre-index will not include the correct label and thus cannot
be used to compute search results for other data sets. Inputs to the Query algorithm
are assumed to be of this form.
6.4.4 Instantiation Details
Let CP-ABE = (ABE.Setup,ABE.KeyGen,ABE.Encrypt,ABE.Decrypt) define a CP-ABE
encryption scheme over the universe U for a class of queries F closed under com-
plement. Let SE= (SE.KeyGen, SE.Encrypt, SE.Decrypt) be a symmetric encryption
scheme secure in the sense of IND-CPA. Let BE = (BE.KeyGen, BE.Encrypt, BE.Add,
BE.Decrypt) be a broadcast encryption scheme that retains IND-CPA security against
a coalition of revoked users. Finally, let g be a one-way function, and let Π and φ be
pseudo-random permutations (PRPs). Then Algorithms 1–7 define an EVSE scheme
for a class of queries F .
1. Setup, presented in Algorithm 1, aims to initialise the scheme. It starts with run-
ning BE.KeyGen to create a broadcast encryption key mkBE as well as SE.KeyGen
to output a symmetric encryption key kSE. It also chooses a random key κ serv-
ing as the key to the PRP Π. Since we aim to hide the index, we apply a PRP
Π to the universe of attributes U such that the position of elements within the
ordered set does not reveal the attribute string and thus we obtain U ′. We then
4Note that Aδ(D) = δ(D). We chose to use this notation to emphasise that the key is formed over
the attribute set as well as to keep consistency throughout this thesis with the used notation in the
previous chapters.
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use a symmetric encryption scheme to encrypt each attribute in U ′ under a key
kSE obtaining an encrypted universe U˜ . The algorithm then calls the ABE.Setup
algorithm in order to initialise the CP-ABE scheme on this universe of encrypted
attributes U˜ . The output of the algorithm consists of the public parameters pp
and the master secret mk for the EVSE system. The public parameters consist
of the master public key mpkABE of the CP-ABE scheme and U˜ . The master
secret comprises of the master secret key mskABE of the CP-ABE scheme, the
broadcast encryption key mkBE, the symmetric encryption key kSE as well as the
PRP Π and its key κ.
Algorithm 1 (mk, pp)
$← Setup(1λ,U)
1 : mkBE←$ BE.KeyGen(1λ)
2 : kSE←$ SE.KeyGen(1λ)
3 : κ←$ {0, 1}λ
4 : U ′ ← Πκ(U)
5 : for i ∈ U ′ do
6 : ui←$ SE.Encrypt(i, kSE)
7 : endfor
8 : U˜ ← {ui}i∈U ′
9 : (mskABE,mpkABE)←$ ABE.Setup(1λ, U˜)
10 : pp← (mpkABE, U˜)
11 : mk ← (mskABE,mkBE, kSE, κ,Π)
2. BuildIndex, presented in Algorithm 2, aims to generate a searchable index in
form of a CP-ABE decryption key. This key is formed over the attribute set
(Aδ(D) ∪ l(δ(D))) where Aδ(D) expresses the pre-index δ(D) of the outsourced
data D which corresponds to a set of attributes in the universe U˜ that represent
the available keywords and data fields. The algorithm outputs the index which
is then given to the server. Next the algorithm samples a key j from {0, 1}λ that
is used to generate the server state sts. The server state simply consists of a
broadcast encryption of j and the set of authorised users that includes the server.
Finally the algorithm outputs an owner state sto which simply gets the key j
assigned. Note that this state is also provided to all authorised users within G.
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Algorithm 2 (ID, sts, sto) $← BuildIndex(δ(D), l(δ(D)), G,mk, pp)
1 : ID ←$ ABE.KeyGen((Aδ(D) ∪ l(δ(D))),mskABE,mpkABE)
2 : j←$ {0, 1}λ
3 : sts←$ BE.Encrypt(G, j,mkBE)
4 : sto ← j
3. AddUser, presented in Algorithm 3, aims to enrol entities within the system.
To add an entity, the algorithm generates an entity key ukid for the broadcast
encryption scheme running BE.Add. In case the entity is a user, then the user’s
secret key consists of the 5-tuple (uku, kSE, κ,Π, sto) that enables her to form
queries as well as being able to link back search results to the outsourced data.
In case the entity is a server, it simply gets the entity key uks assigned as its
secret key.
Algorithm 3 skid
$← AddUser(id, G,mk, pp)
1 : ukid←$ BE.Add(id,mkBE)
2 : if id is a user then
3 : sku ← (uku, kSE, κ,Π, sto)
4 : else
5 : sks ← uks
6 : endif
4. Query, presented in Algorithm 4, aims to prepare the user’s search request which
is sent to the server. Before forming the search query token, an authorised user
first retrieves the latest server state sts and uses her user key uku to recover j˜. If
j˜ 6= sto, then the algorithm aborts. Otherwise, a successful check indicates that
the user is in the correct state and thus authorised to form queries to search over
the outsourced database. When making a query Q, we may form sub-queries Qi
for each document of the database. Thus, for each sub-query Qi the algorithm
chooses two equal length messages m0,i and m1,i uniformly at random from the
message space. To form a search request (a query token qtQi) the algorithm needs
to form two CP-ABE ciphertexts c0,i and c1,i that encrypt the chosen messages
under the access structures Qi and Qi respectively. Those two ciphertexts form
the encoded query token qtQi , and the algorithm then encrypts them using a
PRP φ under key j outputting γi. Note that the user makes use of the PRP
in order to prove to the server that she possesses the valid current state and
thus is indeed authorised to send queries. The verification key vkQi is created
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by applying a one-way function g to each message and g allows the key to be
published. Finally the algorithm outputs the set of γi as the query token qtQ,
and the set of verification keys as vkQ.
Algorithm 4 (qtQ, vkQ)
$← Query(Q, sts, sto, sku, pp)
1 : j˜ ← BE.Decrypt(sts, uku)
2 : if j˜ 6= sto then return 0
3 : for i = 1 to |Q| do
4 : (m0,i,m1,i)←$M×M
5 : c0,i←$ ABE.Encrypt(m0,i, Qi,mpkABE)
6 : c1,i←$ ABE.Encrypt(m1,i, Qi,mpkABE)
7 : qtQi ← (c0,i, c1,i)
8 : γi ← φj(qtQi)
9 : vkQi ← (g(m0,i), g(m1,i))
10 : endfor
11 : qtQ ← {γi}|Q|i=1
12 : vkQ ← {vkQi}|Q|i=1
5. Search, presented in Algorithm 5, evaluates the search on the database returning
a search result. The algorithm first decrypts the current server state sts with
its server key uks to recover the key j. The algorithm uses the key j to recover
the query tokens by computing φ−1j (γi). Note that the key j currently used for
φ is only known to the data owner and the set of currently authorised entities
(including the server), and thus this PRP evaluation determines whether the
request was formed by an authorised user and whether the server is authorised to
evaluate this request. Next the algorithm attempts to decrypt both ciphertexts
using the index ID. Decryption succeeds only if the query evaluates to 1 on the
input database represented in terms of the pre-index, i.e. the access structure is
satisfied. Since Qi and Qi output opposite results on the pre-index, this ensures
that exactly one plaintext will correspond to a failure symbol ⊥. Finally the
algorithm outputs the set of all encoded search results denoted by θQ.
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Algorithm 5 θQ
$← Search(ID, qtQ, sts, skS, pp)
1 : j ← BE.Decrypt(sts, ukS)
2 : for i = 1 to |Q| do
3 : (qtQi)← φ−1j (γi)
4 : qtQi = (c0,i, c1,i)
5 : d0,i ← ABE.Decrypt(c0,i, ID,mpkABE)
6 : d1,i ← ABE.Decrypt(c1,i, ID,mpkABE)
7 : θQi ← (d0,i, d1,i)
8 : endfor
9 : θQ ← {θQi}|Q|i=1
6. Verify, presented in Algorithm 6, first parses each encoded output θQi as (d0,i, d1,i)
and each verification key vkQi as (g(m0,i), g(m1,i)). The algorithm applies the
one-way function g to each plaintext in θQi and compares the results to the compo-
nents in the verification key. If either comparison is successful, this indicates that
the server has indeed recovered a message. Otherwise, it shows that the server
provided a malformed response. Note, if m0,i was returned then Qi(δ(D)) = 1,
and otherwise if m1,i was returned then Qi(δ(D)) = 0 following equation (6.1).
Algorithm 6 r ← Verify(θQ, vkQ, pp)
1 : for i = 1 to |Q| do
2 : if g(m0,i) = g(d0,i) return ri ← 1
3 : elseif g(m1,i) = g(d1,i) return ri ← 0
4 : else r ←⊥
5 : endif
6 : endfor
7 : r ← {ri}|Q|i=1
7. RevokeUser, presented in Algorithm 7, aims to revoke a user in case the data
owner wishes to cancel her authorisation. The algorithm samples a new key j′
and creates a new updated server state. The updated server state st′s simply
consists of a broadcast encryption of j′ and the set of authorised users (including
the server) excluding the user to be revoked. The algorithm also outputs an
updated owner state st′o which simply gets the key j′ assigned. The data owner
sends st′s to the server and to all non-revoked users st′o.
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Algorithm 7 (st′s, st′o)
$← RevokeUser(id, G,mk, pp)
1 : j′←$ {0, 1}λ
2 : st′s←$ BE.Encrypt(G \ id, j′,mkBE)
3 : st′o ← j′
Theorem 6.6. Given an IND-CPA secure CP-ABE scheme, an authenticated sym-
metric encryption scheme and a broadcast encryption scheme, both secure in the sense
of IND-CPA, pseudorandom permutations Π and φ, and a one-way function g. Let
EVSE be the extended verifiable searchable encryption scheme defined in Algorithms 1–
7. Then EVSE is secure in the sense of public verifiability (Figure 6.2), index privacy
(Figure 6.3) and query privacy (Figure 6.4).
The formal security proofs can be found in Section 6.5.
Note that in the algorithm RevokeUser the new state st′s is given to the server that
uses it to replace the old state. Thus, for all subsequent queries, the server uses the
new key j′ when inverting the PRP φ. Since revoked users (and unauthorised users)
are not able to recover j′, with overwhelming probability, their queries will not yield
valid query tokens after the server applies φ−1j′ (γi). In other words, users receive their
keys for the broadcast encryption scheme only when they are authorised to search by
the data owner. However, a user who has not joined the system yet could retrieve
(by sending a request) the current server state sts from the server, i.e. the broadcast
encryption of j′, but since the user does not possess a correct authorisation key she
will not be able to recover j′. Thus, the user is not able to form valid query tokens.
Similarly, this works for the case that a user is revoked as she cannot recover j′ because
she is not part of the authorised set of users. Note that even if a re-authorised user may
be able to recover out-dated values of j that were used throughout searches while she
was was revoked this does not provide the user with any advantage against the server
since the values are no longer of interest. Furthermore, note that upon receiving the
query token, the server only needs to evaluate the PRP in order to determine whether
a user is revoked. In case we wish to implement additional contextual access control
for authorisation, we can follow the discussion in Section 5.2.3 and replace the PRP φ
with a key assignment scheme as introduced in [5].
In terms of the number of rounds of communication required per search, our EVSE
scheme requires only one round of communication. The search time and size of the
search results in our scheme is linear in n, i.e. it is linear in the amount of data items
stored on the server. To this end, EVSE may be more suited to smaller databases to
prevent these features from being prohibitively expensive. Our scheme hides the access
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Scheme Data type Query type Publicly
Verifiable
Leakage Computations
[140] Static Ranked equality No AP,SP No
[104] Dynamic Equality No AP No
[135] Static Conjunctive, Disjunctive No AP No
[136] Dynamic Conjunctive No AP No
[133] Dynamic Equality No AP, SP No
[148] Static Equality No AP No
[141] Static Fuzzy No AP, SP No
[70] Static Semantic No AP, SP No
[48] Static Equality No AP, SP No
[51] Static Conjunctive Yes AP, SP No
Our
scheme
Conjunctive, Disjunctive,
Static Arbitrary CNF/DNF Yes GQ Yes
formulae, NC1
Table 6.1: Comparison of functionalities in searchable encryption schemes
pattern as all search results are of the same form, regardless of what type of query was
submitted.
As pointed out in Section 6.2.2, in some settings it might be desirable for multiple users
to form a joint query. For example, it could be that a query should be formed from
search terms arising from the expertise of multiple departments within an organisation.
Thus, each department could contribute additional terms to narrow the filter of search
results. Let us briefly consider three possible solutions to provide this functionality.
Firstly, one could use multi-input functional encryption [79] which extends CP-ABE
to permit multiple users to create partial ciphertexts and for a single key to decrypt
the union of these. Clearly, this provides a natural extension to our CP-ABE based
instantiation, but current constructions of multi-input FE require complex and expen-
sive primitives such as indistinguishability obfuscation. Instead, it could be possible
to assume all data users are provided with access to a shared common reference string
upon joining the system. This could simply be a random integer x along with a shared
hash key for a hash function H : Zp → Zp. Then, when forming a ciphertext, all users
compute x = H (x) and use the new value of x as the secret encryption exponent for
a CP-ABE scheme. Thus, all users are essentially using the same random coins in a
distributed version of the CP-ABE encryption algorithm.
Another solution is based on the use of oblivious transfer to allow one distinguished user
to collect CP-ABE ciphertext fragments from all other users relating to their input.
One implementation of this requires an ABE scheme with the local encoding property
as described by Gordon et al. [88].
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In Table 6.1 we provide a brief comparison between our scheme and those in the lit-
erature as discussed throughout this chapter and in the background Section 2.4. The
abbreviation AP stands for access pattern, SP stands for search pattern and GQ denotes
the gate structure of a query Q.
6.5 Proofs of Security
In this section we present the full proof of Theorem 6.6 by providing proofs of security
for the notions of public verifiability, index privacy and query privacy.
6.5.1 Public Verifiability
Lemma 6.7. EVSE as defined in Algorithms 1–7 is secure in the sense of public veri-
fiability (Figure 6.2) under the same assumptions as in Theorem 6.6.
Proof. This proof is similar to the public verifiability proof presented in Section 4.5.
Suppose AEVSE is an adversary with non-negligible advantage against the public veri-
fiability experiment (Figure 6.2) when instantiated with Algorithms 1–7. We begin by
defining the following three games:
• Game 0. This is the public verifiability game as defined in Figure 6.2.
• Game 1. This is the same as Game 0 with the modification that in Query, we
no longer return an encryption of m0 and m1. Instead, we choose another equal
length random message m′ 6= m0,m1 and, if Q(δ(D?)) = 1, we replace c1 by
ABE.Encrypt(m′, Q ∧ l(δ(D?)),mpkABE). Otherwise, we replace c0 by
ABE.Encrypt(m′, Q∧l(δ(D?)),mpkABE). In other words, we replace the ciphertext
associated with the unsatisfied query with the encryption of a separate random
message unrelated to the other system parameters, and in particular to the veri-
fication keys.
• Game 2. This is the same as Game 1 with the exception that instead of choosing
a random message m′, we implicitly set m′ to be the challenge input w in the
one-way function game (Figure 2.8).
We show that an adversary with non-negligible advantage against the public verifiability
game can be used to construct an adversary that may invert the one-way function g.
Game 0 to Game 1. We begin by showing that there is a negligible distinguishing
advantage between Game 0 and Game 1. Suppose otherwise, that AEVSE can distin-
guish the two games with non-negligible advantage δ. We then construct an adversary
AABE that uses AEVSE as a sub-routine to break the IND-CPA security of the CP-
ABE scheme. We consider a challenger C playing the IND-CPA game (Figure 2.4)
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with attribute universe U˜ with AABE, who in turn acts as a challenger in the public
verifiability game for AEVSE:
1. The challenger starts with initialising A? to be {∅}. C continues by running
the ABE.Setup algorithm on the security parameter and attribute universe U˜ to
generate mpkABE and mskABE. The challenger gives mpkABE to AABE.
2. AABE now simulates running EVSE.Setup such that the outcome is consistent
with mpkABE. The master key mk is implicitly set to mskABE.
3. AEVSE is provided with the public parameters and oracles access to the following
functionalities, which are handled by AABE.
• EVSE.BuildIndex(·, ·, ·,mk, pp) can be run to generate the index for a queried
database D. To do so, AABE makes use of the KeyGen oracle OKeyGen
in the CP-ABE game. AABE then sets the attribute data set D˜ to be
(Aδ(D) ∪ l(δ(D))) and makes an oracle query to the challenger C of the
form OKeyGen(D˜,mk, pp). The challenger generates a CP-ABE decryption
key sk
ABE,D˜
if and only if D˜ /∈ A?. C may generate the index ID as, up to
this point, A? is still {∅}, and provide AABE with the key.
• All other oracles run according to their respective algorithms.
4. AEVSE outputs the query Q, its choice of pre-index δ(D?), the respective unique
label l(δ(D?)) as well as the server and data owner states as its challenge param-
eters.
5. AABE chooses the set of authorised users G.
6. AABE chooses a random id from the user space Users which will be used as input
for the algorithm AddUser. It simulates running EVSE.AddUser for the chosen id
creating a valid key for the Query algorithm.
7. To generate the challenge input, AABE begins by choosing three random equal
length messages m0, m1 and m
′ from the message space.
Now AABE needs to choose its challenge access structure A? for the CP-ABE
IND-CPA game. First, it computes r = Q(δ(D?)). If r = 0, AABE sets A? =
(Q ∧ l(δ(D?))). Else it sets A? = (Q ∧ l(δ(D?))). Next it sends A? and the
messages m0 and m1 to C as its challenge parameters for the CP-ABE game.
We note that A? is a valid challenge access structure as the only queries made
to the KeyGen oracle OKeyGen of the CP-ABE IND-CPA game were initiated by
queries to the BuildIndex oracle OBuildIndex handled by AABE. Note that due to
the uniqueness of the labels present in the access structure, no requests to the
BuildIndex oracle for input documents D′ ⊂ D? would result in a KeyGen query
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for attributes that satisfy A?. If the oracle is queried for D′ ⊇ D? then we can
observe that A? was chosen specifically such that it is unsatisfied on this input.
Thus, KeyGen is never queried for an attribute set that satisfies A?, and therefore
the challenge is valid.
C chooses a random bit b and returns ct? $← ABE.Encrypt(mb,A?,mpkABE). Upon
receiving ct?, AABE chooses a random bit t which corresponds to AABE’s guess
for the challenger’s choice of b.
• If r = 1, AABE generates
c
$← ABE.Encrypt(m′, Q ∧ l(δ(D?)),mpkABE)
and sets c′ = ct? (formed over A? by C). It also sets vk = g(m′) and
vk′ = g(mt).
• Else r = 0, and AABE sets c = ct? and computes
c′ $← ABE.Encrypt(m′, Q ∧ l(δ(D?)),mpkABE).
It sets vk = g(mt) and vk
′ = g(m′).
Finally, AABE sets qtQ = (c, c′) and vkQ = (vk, vk′).
8. AABE sends the output from Query along with the public information to AEVSE,
which is also given oracle access to which AABE responds as follows.
• EVSE.BuildIndex(·, ·, ·,mk, pp): To generate the index for the queried database
D, AABE follows the same procedure as specified in step 3. However, we note
that by the definition of the access structure A?, D˜ satisfies A? only if the
unique labels in D˜ and A? match. Furthermore, it follows that δ(D?) must
satisfy either Q or Q as chosen in A?. However, this was chosen specifically
such that δ(D?) does not satisfy the query, and therefore D˜ /∈ A? and C may
generate the key which corresponds to the index.
• All other oracles run according to their respective algorithms.
9. Eventually, AEVSE outputs θ? which it believes is a valid forgery (i.e. that the
output will be accepted yet does not correspond to the correct value of Q(δ(D?))).
10. AABE parses θ? as (d, d′). One of d and d′ will be ⊥ (by construction) and we
denote the other value by Y . Observe that, since AEVSE is assumed to be a
successful adversary against public verifiability, the non-⊥ value, Y , that it will
return will be the plaintext mt since the challenge access structure was always set
to be unsatisfied on the challenge input. Thus, if g(Y ) = g(mt), AABE outputs a
guess b′ = t and otherwise guesses b′ = (1− t).
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If t = b (the challenge bit chosen by C), we observe that the above corresponds to Game
0 (since the verification key comprises g(m′) where m′ is the message a legitimate server
could recover, and g(mb) where mb is the other plaintext).
Alternatively, t = 1 − b and the distribution of the above experiment is identical to
Game 1 (since the verification key comprises the legitimate message and a random
message m1−b that is unrelated to the ciphertext).
Now, we consider the advantage of this constructed adversary AABE playing the IND-
CPA game for CP-ABE. Recall that by assumption, AEVSE has a non-negligible ad-
vantage δ in distinguishing between Game 0 and Game 1, that is∣∣∣Pr [ExpGame 0AEVSE [EVSE , 1λ]→ 1]− Pr [ExpGame 1AEVSE [EVSE , 1λ]→ 1]∣∣∣ > δ
where ExpGame iAVDC
[EVSE , 1λ] denotes the output of running AEVSE in Game i.
The probability of AABE guessing b correctly is:
Pr[b′ = b] = Pr[t = b] Pr[b′ = b|t = b] + Pr[t 6= b] Pr[b′ = b|t 6= b]
=
1
2
Pr[g(Y ) = g(mt)|t = b] + 1
2
Pr[g(Y ) 6= g(mt)|t 6= b]
=
1
2
Pr
[
ExpGame 0AEVSE
[
EVSE , 1λ
]
→ 1
]
+
1
2
(1− Pr[g(Y ) = g(mt)|t 6= b])
=
1
2
Pr
[
ExpGame 0AEVSE
[
EVSE , 1λ
]
→ 1
]
+
1
2
(
1− Pr
[
ExpGame 1AEVSE
[
EVSE , 1λ
]
→ 1
])
=
1
2
(
Pr
[
ExpGame 0AEVSE
[
EVSE , 1λ
]
→ 1
]
− Pr
[
ExpGame 1AEVSE
[
EVSE , 1λ
]
→ 1
]
+ 1
)
> 1
2
(δ + 1).
Hence,
AdvAABE >
∣∣∣∣Pr[b = b′]− 12
∣∣∣∣
>
∣∣∣∣12(δ + 1)− 12
∣∣∣∣
=
δ
2
.
Therefore, if AEVSE has advantage δ at distinguishing these games then AABE can
win the IND-CPA game for CP-ABE with non-negligible probability. Thus since we
assumed the CP-ABE scheme to be secure, we conclude that AEVSE cannot distinguish
Game 0 from Game 1 with non-negligible probability.
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Game 1 to Game 2. The transition from Game 1 to Game 2 is simply to set the
value of m′ to no longer be random but instead to correspond to the challenge w in the
one-way function inversion game. We argue that the adversary has no distinguishing
advantage between these games since the new value is independent of anything else
in the system bar the verification key g(w) and hence looks random to an adversary
with no additional information (in particular, AEVSE does not see the challenge for the
one-way function as this is played between C and AABE).
Final Proof. We now show that using AEVSE in Game 2, AABE can invert the
one-way function g – that is, given a challenge z = g(w) we can recover w. Specifically,
during Query, we choose the messages as follows:
• if Q(δ(D?)) = 1, we implicitly set m1 to be w and set the verification key com-
ponent vk′ = z. We choose m0 randomly from the message space and compute
the remainder of the verification key as usual.
• if Q(δ(D?)) = 0, we implicitly set m0 to be w and set the verification key com-
ponent vk = z. We choose m1 randomly from the message space and compute
the remainder of the verification key as usual.
Now, since AEVSE is assumed to be successful, it will output a forgery comprising the
plaintext encrypted under the unsatisfied query (Q or Q). By construction, this will
be w (and the adversary’s view is consistent since the verification key is simulated
correctly using z). AABE can therefore forward this result to C in order to invert the
one-way function with the same non-negligible probability that AEVSE has against the
public verifiability game.
We conclude that if the CP-ABE scheme is IND-CPA secure and the one-way function
is hard-to-invert, then EVSE as defined by Algorithms 1–7 is secure in the sense of
public verifiability.
6.5.2 Index Privacy
Lemma 6.8. EVSE as defined in Algorithms 1–7 is secure in the sense of index privacy
(Figure 6.3) under the same assumptions as in Theorem 6.6.
Proof. Suppose AEVSE is an adversary against the selective index privacy game (Fig-
ure 6.3) when instantiated with Algorithms 1-7. We begin by defining the following
two games:
• Game 0. This is the selective index privacy game as defined in Figure 6.3.
• Game 1. This is the same as Game 0 with the modification that we use a
random permutation in Algorithm 1 to construct U˜ .
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As a first step of the proof, we show that there is a negligible function negl such that∣∣∣Pr [ExpGame 0AEVSE [EVSE , 1λ]→ 1]− Pr [ExpGame 1AEVSE [EVSE , 1λ]→ 1]∣∣∣ ≤ negl(λ).
We use AEVSE to construct a distinguisher D for the permutation Π, and its goal is
to determine whether this permutation is “pseudorandom” or “random” by observing
whether AEVSE succeeds. The distinguisher is provided with oracle access O to some
function which either outputs a pseudorandom permutation or random permutation
during any invocation. If the adversary AEVSE succeeds then D guesses that its ora-
cle must be a pseudorandom permutation, whereas if AEVSE does not succeed then D
guesses that its oracle must be a random permutation.
The distinguisher D starts by simulating the selective index privacy game for AEVSE,
and queries the oracle O for any invocation in line 4 of the EVSE.Setup algorithm. The
game proceeds as specified and eventually AEVSE outputs a bit b′, and the distinguisher
outputs 1 if b′ = b indicating that the adversary wins and 0 otherwise.
Now if D’s oracle is a pseudorandom permutation, then the adversary’s view when run
as a sub-routine by the distinguisher is distributed identically to the adversary’s view
in Game 0, and hence
Pr
κ←$ {0,1}λ
[
DΠκ(·)(1λ)→ 1
]
= Pr
[
ExpGame 0AEVSE
[
EVSE , 1λ
]
→ 1
]
.
Similarly, it follows that if D’s oracle is a random permutation, then the adversary’s
view when run as a sub-routine by the distinguisher is distributed identically to the
adversary’s view in Game 1, and hence
Pr
Π˜←$ Perm
[
DΠ˜(·)(1λ)→ 1
]
= Pr
[
ExpGame 1AEVSE
[
EVSE , 1λ
]
→ 1
]
.
By the assumption that Π is a pseudorandom permutation, it holds that∣∣∣Pr [DΠκ(·)(1λ)→ 1]− Pr [DΠ˜(·)(1λ)→ 1]∣∣∣ ≤ negl(λ),
and hence it follows that the adversary’s advantage in distinguishing which game it
plays is negligible.
Reduction to IND-CPA. Now let AEVSE be an adversary with non-negligible ad-
vantage δ against Game 1. We then construct an adversary ASE that uses AEVSE as a
sub-routine to break the IND-CPA security of the symmetric encryption scheme SE .
We consider a challenger C playing the IND-CPA game (Figure 2.1) with ASE, that
in turn acts as a challenger in Game 1 for AEVSE:
1. AEVSE chooses its two challenge data sets, namely D0 = (d0,1, d0,2, ..., d0,q) and
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D1 = (d1,1, d1,2, ..., d1,q) ⊆ U such that both contain the same number of elements
(|D0| = |D1|). Note that a rational adversary will always choose the two sets in
such a way that they differ by at least one element. AEVSE submits these challenge
sets to ASE.
2. ASE aborts the game in case the challenge data sets do not contain the same
number of elements and AEVSE loses immediately.
3. ASE simulates running EVSE.Setup and is provided with oracle calls to the LoR
encryption oracle by C. The adversary ASE passes both sets D0 and D1 to the
challenger as its challenge input parameters for the IND-CPA game. In more
detail, the challenger handles the LoR oracle call in the following way.
• C samples a random bit b˜ which it uses for the LoR encryption oracle.
• The challenger inputs every pair (d0,i, d1,i) ∈ D0 × D1 to the LoR oracle
OLoR(d0,i, d1,i, kSE, b˜) outputting challenge ciphertexts ctb˜,i. All returned
ciphertexts then form the set D?.
4. ASE simulates the ABE.Setup algorithm to generate mpkABE,mskABE and sends
mpkABE to AEVSE. It retains mskABE and sets the public parameters to pp ←
(mpkABE, U˜).
5. ASE chooses a random bit b $← {0, 1}.
6. ASE initialises the set of authorised users G from the user space.
7. ASE needs to create the attribute representation of the data set D?, i.e. it requires
to create a pre-index δ(D?) to encode it into the challenge index for AEVSE. This
is done using the algorithm Encode, which takes as input the elements from the
challenge set D? and maps them to elements in U˜ . It further also outputs an
attribute label for the pre-index l(δ(D?)).
8. ASE runs BuildIndex using the pre-index created in the previous step to create the
challenge index ID? for AEVSE. In more detail, ASE executes
ID? ←$ ABE.KeyGen((Aδ(D?) ∪ l(δ(D?))),mskABE,mpkABE) and provides AEVSE
with the challenge index. BuildIndex continues as specified and generates sts and
sto. sts is shared with AEVSE and sto is retained by ASE.
9. AEVSE receives all relevant outputs from above, and then is provided with oracle
access to which ASE responds. All oracles are executed as specified in their
respective algorithm. The only relevant restriction is that AEVSE cannot request
an index via a BuildIndex oracle query for the initial choice of data sets D0 and
D1.
10. Eventually AEVSE outputs its guess b′ for b.
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11. If b′ = b, then ASE guesses b = b as its guess for the IND-CPA game.
Else b′ 6= b, then ASE makes a random guess b = bˆ $← {0, 1} since AEVSE is of no
use for ASE to break the IND-CPA game.
Now we consider the advantage of ASE playing the IND-CPA game. By assumption,
AEVSE has a non-negligible advantage against the selective index privacy game, i.e.
Pr[b′ = b] ≥ δ + 12 . Therefore it follows:
Pr[b = b˜] = Pr[b = b˜|b′ = b] Pr[b′ = b] + Pr[b = b˜|b′ 6= b] Pr[b′ 6= b]
= Pr[b = b˜] Pr[b′ = b] + Pr[bˆ = b˜] Pr[b′ 6= b]
=
1
2
Pr[b′ = b] +
1
2
Pr[b′ 6= b]
=
1
2
(
Pr[b′ = b] + Pr[b′ 6= b])
≥ 1
2
(
δ +
1
2
+
1
2
)
=
1
2
(δ + 1).
Hence,
AdvASE >
∣∣∣∣Pr[b = b˜]− 12
∣∣∣∣
>
∣∣∣∣12(δ + 1)− 12
∣∣∣∣
=
δ
2
.
Since δ is non-negligible, δ2 is also non-negligible. If AEVSE has advantage δ at breaking
the selective index privacy game then ASE can win the IND-CPA game with non-
negligible probability. However, since the SE scheme was assumed IND-CPA secure,
such an AEVSE cannot exist. Therefore, we conclude that if the SE scheme is IND-
CPA secure then EVSE as instantiated by Algorithms 1–7 is secure in the sense of
selective index privacy.
6.5.3 Query Privacy
Lemma 6.9. EVSE as defined in Algorithms 1–7 is secure in the sense of query privacy
(Figure 6.4) under the same assumptions as in Theorem 6.6.
Proof. This proof is very similar to the proof of Lemma 6.8. We begin by assuming
that AEVSE is an adversary with non-negligible advantage against the query privacy
game (Figure 6.4) when instantiated with Algorithms 1–7. We begin similarly to the
previous proof by defining the following two games:
• Game 0. This is the selective query privacy game as defined in Figure 6.4.
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• Game 1. This is the same as Game 0 with the modification that we use a
random permutation in Algorithm 1 to construct U˜ .
As a first step of the proof, we show that there is a negligible function negl such that∣∣∣Pr [ExpGame 0AEVSE [EVSE , 1λ]→ 1]− Pr [ExpGame 1AEVSE [EVSE , 1λ]→ 1]∣∣∣ ≤ negl(λ).
We use AEVSE to construct a distinguisher D for the permutation Π, and its goal is
to determine whether this permutation is “pseudorandom” or “random” by observing
whether AEVSE succeeds. The distinguisher is provided with oracle access O to some
function which either outputs a pseudorandom permutation or random permutation
during any invocation. If the adversary AEVSE succeeds then D guesses that its ora-
cle must be a pseudorandom permutation, whereas if AEVSE does not succeed then D
guesses that its oracle must be a random permutation.
The distinguisher D starts by simulating the selective index privacy game for AEVSE,
and queries the oracle O for any invocation in line 4 of the EVSE.Setup algorithm. The
game proceeds as specified and eventually AEVSE outputs a bit b′, and the distinguisher
outputs 1 if b′ = b indicating that the adversary wins and 0 otherwise.
Now if D’s oracle is a pseudorandom permutation, then the adversary’s view when run
as a sub-routine by the distinguisher is distributed identically to the adversary’s view
in Game 0, and hence
Pr
κ←$ {0,1}λ
[
DΠκ(·)(1λ)→ 1
]
= Pr
[
ExpGame 0AEVSE
[
EVSE , 1λ
]
→ 1
]
.
Similarly, it follows that if D’s oracle is a random permutation, then the adversary’s
view when run as a sub-routine by the distinguisher is distributed identically to the
adversary’s view in Game 1, and hence
Pr
Π˜←$ Perm
[
DΠ˜(·)(1λ)→ 1
]
= Pr
[
ExpGame 1AEVSE
[
EVSE , 1λ
]
→ 1
]
.
By the assumption that Π is a pseudorandom permutation, it holds that∣∣∣Pr [DΠκ(·)(1λ)→ 1]− Pr [DΠ˜(·)(1λ)→ 1]∣∣∣ ≤ negl(λ),
and hence it follows that the adversary’s advantage in distinguishing which game it
plays is negligible.
Reduction to IND-CPA. Now let AEVSE be an adversary with non-negligible ad-
vantage δ against Game 1. We then construct an adversary ASE that uses AEVSE as a
sub-routine to break the IND-CPA security of the symmetric encryption scheme SE .
We consider a challenger C playing the IND-CPA game (Figure 2.1) with ASE, that
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in turn acts as a challenger in Game 1 for AEVSE:
1. AEVSE chooses its two challenge queries Q0 and Q1 with the restriction that the
gate structures match in both queries, i.e. GQ0 = GQ1 . Note that in case GQ0 6=
GQ1 then ASE aborts the game and AEVSE loses immediately. The queries itself
are formed over attributes and a rational adversary will choose those queries in
such a way that they differ in at least one position. We denote the used attributes
for the challenge queries as q0 = (q0,1, q0,2, ..., q0,q) and q1 = (q1,1, q1,2, ..., q1,q) ⊆
U , respectively. AEVSE submits these challenge queries to ASE.
2. ASE simulates running EVSE.Setup and is provided with oracle calls to the LoR
encryption oracle by C. The adversary ASE passes both queries Q0 and Q1 to the
challenger and the underlying attributes (of the queries) are used as its challenge
input parameters for the IND-CPA game. In more detail, the challenger handles
the LoR oracle call in the following way.
• C samples a random bit b˜ which it uses for the LoR encryption oracle.
• The challenger inputs every pair (q0,i, q1,i) ∈ q0 × q1 to the LoR oracle
OLoR(q0,i, q1,i, kSE, b˜) outputting challenge ciphertexts ctb˜,i. All returned ci-
phertexts then form the attribute set q? of the query Q?.
3. ASE simulates the ABE.Setup algorithm to generate mpkABE,mskABE and sends
mpkABE to AEVSE. It retains mskABE and sets the public parameters to pp ←
(mpkABE, U˜).
4. ASE chooses a random bit b $← {0, 1}.
5. ASE initialises the set of authorised users G from the user space.
6. ASE runs BuildIndex to create the challenge index ID for AEVSE. In more detail,
ASE executes ID←$ ABE.KeyGen((Aδ(D) ∪ l(δ(D))),mskABE,mpkABE) and pro-
vides AEVSE with the index. BuildIndex continues as specified and generates sts
and sto. sts is shared with AEVSE and sto is retained by ASE.
7. ASE selects randomly a new identity id from the user space that it wishes to add
into the system. It runs AddUser to produce skid.
8. ASE needs to prepare the query Q? such that it can be used as an input in the
query algorithm. This is done using the algorithm Encode, which takes as input
the elements and maps them to elements in U˜ such that it forms a valid query Q˜.
9. ASE inputs Q˜ to the query algorithm Query and runs it as specified. The algorithm
outputs qt
Q˜
and vk
Q˜
which are both given to AEVSE.
228
6.6 Conclusion
10. AEVSE receives all relevant outputs from above, and then is provided with oracle
access to which ASE responds. All oracles are executed as specified in their
respective algorithms. The only relevant restriction is that AEVSE cannot request
query tokens via a Query oracle query for the initial choice of challenge queries
Q0 and Q1.
11. Eventually AEVSE outputs its guess b′ for b.
12. If b′ = b, then ASE guesses b = b as its guess for the IND-CPA game.
Else b′ 6= b, then ASE makes a random guess b = bˆ $← {0, 1} since AEVSE is of no
use for ASE to break the IND-CPA game.
Now we consider the advantage of ASE playing the IND-CPA game. By assumption,
AEVSE has a non-negligible advantage against the selective query privacy game, i.e.
Pr[b′ = b] ≥ δ + 12 . Therefore it follows:
Pr[b = b˜] = Pr[b = b˜|b′ = b] Pr[b′ = b] + Pr[b = b˜|b′ 6= b] Pr[b′ 6= b]
= Pr[b = b˜] Pr[b′ = b] + Pr[bˆ = b˜] Pr[b′ 6= b]
=
1
2
Pr[b′ = b] +
1
2
Pr[b′ 6= b]
=
1
2
(
Pr[b′ = b] + Pr[b′ 6= b])
≥ 1
2
(
δ +
1
2
+
1
2
)
=
1
2
(δ + 1).
Hence,
AdvASE >
∣∣∣∣Pr[b = b˜]− 12
∣∣∣∣
>
∣∣∣∣12(δ + 1)− 12
∣∣∣∣
=
δ
2
.
Since δ is non-negligible, δ2 is also non-negligible. If AEVSE has advantage δ at breaking
the selective query privacy game then ASE can win the IND-CPA game with non-
negligible probability. However, since the SE scheme was assumed IND-CPA secure,
such an AEVSE cannot exist. Therefore, we conclude that if the SE scheme is IND-
CPA secure then EVSE as instantiated by Algorithms 1–7 is secure in the sense of
selective query privacy.
6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have introduced a model of multi-user verifiable searchable encryp-
tion with extended functionality enabling a querier to form a wider family of queries
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including some type of computations, i.e. we extended the expressiveness of queries
that can be achieved in VSE. With this work we have begun to consider the applica-
tion of VC techniques from Chapter 4 in the setting of searchable encryption. On the
searchable encryption side, this enables additional functionality in the form of compu-
tational queries (e.g. computing the average of outsourced data fields that are linked
to a specific set of keywords), whilst on the VC side, this introduces additional privacy
concerns regarding the outsourced data and computations. No other VSE schemes to
our knowledge are able to perform the range of search queries or include negation of
keywords in their search queries. Additionally our scheme leaks neither the access nor
the search pattern to the server whilst executing a search. The choice of using VC
techniques based on ABE stems from the natural correspondence between attributes
and keywords in an index. We provided an instantiation of EVSE based on CP-ABE
and presented relevant security models in this context.
In future work, we will investigate whether other forms of VC enable us to achieve
different classes of functionality and especially improve efficiency. We would also like
to consider a model whereby multiple data owners can store data on a server without
each having to initialise their own scheme. In practice, this could result in employing
the KDC from the previous chapters setting up the system and publishing public pa-
rameters that any data owner can use, but enabling each data owner to generate their
own CP-ABE decryption keys for the data they hold to authorise users to query their
data without the need to involve the KDC. Furthermore, our scheme currently only
supports static data and in future work we wish to investigate extending our scheme
to support a dynamic data set as in the schemes [104, 133, 136].
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This chapter deals with the setting of providing provable data storage guar-
antees. One possible concept achieving such guarantees is known as proofs of
retrievability (PoR). We propose extensions and improvements to the cur-
rent PoR proposal in order to accommodate a more practical and applicable
framework. Thus, we introduce the notion of a storage container enabling
a client to store multiple different-sized files and propose a provably secure
instantiation checking retrievability of all files simultaneously. We discuss
different strategies a client can use in order to obtain a statement about
the retrievability from a server and finally evaluate the performance of our
scheme. The results of this chapter are currently under submission [97].
7.1 Introduction
Cloud service providers (CSPs) are gaining continuous importance over the last few
years as they offer various services in numerous application domains such as storage
services, computing services and key management services. Well-known examples of
providers are Amazon S3, Google Cloud Platform and Windows Azure. The huge suc-
cess of the cloud model is based on offering various benefits such as flexible scalability
and accessibility offered to companies and individuals to employ cloud services in a
cost effective manner. However, to fulfil the client’s expectation, the providers need to
build applications that are highly available. This can be a daunting process in prac-
tice. Therefore, the underlying key assumption for designing such applications is to
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assume that every component of the system will fail at some point in time. It is obvious
that based on this assumption, there is a need to create highly available services and
amongst other things we also require data consistency strategies for the cloud model.
Proofs of retrievability(PoR) [98, 126] offer such a strategy for the cloud’s storage
domain as they offer mechanisms in order to provide provable outsourced storage guar-
antees. We have introduced the concept of PoR in Section 2.8 and it has been subject to
a vast amount of research over the past decade. In PoR the guarantees are formulated
in terms of a checkable statement whether the client’s outsourced data is authentic
and retrievable. The first property expresses that the client wishes to verify that the
received data is correct whereas the latter property reflects the need to assure that no
data loss has occurred on the server. Unfortunately, CSPs do not offer those guar-
antees provably yet. Facing current trends where clients and companies produce and
outsource a vast amount of data every day [60] forces the provider to invest in a large
storage infrastructure as it seems to be common practice to produce triplicas (triple
replication) [8, 76] to compensate against data loss. To reduce the storage overhead
incurred by replicas, providers may transition to erasure codes [94, 102]. Therefore,
there is an actual need to employ PoR in the realm of cloud storage and increasing
their practicability will play a crucial role in the near future of cloud security.
CSPs offer cheap storage and computing solutions for clients. Thus, it is tempting for
a client to outsource all her (different-sized) files to a provider as it is easy to access the
files through various different (computational and storage restricted) devices. However,
by outsourcing the data, a client somehow loses the “control” over it and thus would
naturally wish to receive a provable assurance from a provider that the data is intact
and retrievable at any time. To provide such an assurance, a cloud service provider
could easily adapt the notion of a PoR into its architecture. Current PoR systems can
indeed provide such an assurance however, they are limited to check a single file at a
time. Thus, in this chapter, we introduce a new notion called cloud storage proofs of
retrievability (CSPoR) that is designed to efficiently provide an assurance that all files
are simultaneously retained by a server.
First, let us recall that current PoR schemes only provide a probabilistic assurance to
a client that the data is retained by arguing that deleted file blocks can be found with
overwhelming probability, i.e. a cheating server will be caught with very high probabil-
ity. In contrast, we believe that such an assurance does not suffice in practice where a
client wishes to receive a concrete retrievability assurance, i.e. an assurance that enough
portions of data are available such that reconstruction of the underlying (original) file
is possible. This assurance cannot usually be obtained with a single check but rather
requires several checks until the client checked sufficiently many data portions. Second,
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in case a verifier would reject a PoR instance, it currently seems that a client engages
in an immediate download of her file in order to protect the data from further harm,
reflecting a loss of trust in the provider. This “strategy” of downloading, however,
is impractical as already a detected single bit erasure may lead to a reject decision
within a PoR scheme and a client loses all benefits of outsourcing the data in the first
place. This propagates to an even bigger problem in our cloud storage scenario where
a client stores many different-sized files: already a small erasure in any one file would
then lead to download all files as a client is not aware which file(s) is corrupted, and
this behaviour renders the PoR functionality to be impractical for providing real-life
provable storage guarantee. However, we believe that both arguments are linked, and
show throughout this chapter that a CSPoR system is able to provide a retrievability
assurance about the files. We also discuss in detail different strategies that, on one
hand, provide the client with a flexible way to form valid PoR requests, and on the
other hand, provide a strategy to handle invalid instances differently than downloading
all files.
Our main contribution in this chapter is to introduce the new notion of Cloud Storage
PoR (CSPoR). Our scheme has the following features:
• our scheme captures the client’s need to store many (different-sized) files and
enables her to efficiently check whether all files (or any subsets) are still retained
by the server. To store several files we introduce the notion of a storage container
which represents the underlying storage structure of cloud storage systems;
• in order to obtain a retrievability assurance we need to perform several audit steps.
Therefore, we investigate the natural relation between the cost of computation
(choosing challenges) and communication (sending and receiving challenges and
replies respectively). We provide different strategies enabling the client to assess
the involved costs. Furthermore, we discuss a strategy, other than immediate
downloading of all files, that a client can employ in case a PoR verification has
failed;
• our solution is realisable in terms of an abstract API that encompasses cloud APIs
(e.g. from Amazon, Google and Windows) as special cases. Therefore, CSPoR
can be translated into the cloud storage framework without huge amendments
for the CSP;
• we evaluate the performance of CSPoR showing two examples where we out-
sourced per example 480 different-sized files. In the first example, the files are of
size at most 32 MiB with an overall outsourced file size of 7.5 GiB and our scheme
requires at most 7 seconds to obtain a retrievability assurance about those files.
In the second example, the outsourced files are of size at most 512 GiB where
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the overall outsourced storage volume is 65 TiB. Unfortunately, for large files the
performance suffers and it takes hours to check retrievability.
We provide a rigorous definitional framework for CSPoR that we believe more ac-
curately reflects real cloud environments than previously considered in the realm of
PoR.
Related Work
In a recent and concurrent work, Paterson et al. [120] introduce a multiple server PoR
system capturing new security models as the underlying entity population is different
compared to classical PoR frameworks. The authors use the same idea of employing
a statistical hypothesis test in order to evaluate whether the responses of the prover
are sufficient to permit successful extraction. Since Paterson et al. consider a multiple
server PoR system where the success probability between different provers for the same
event may differ, the total number of successes follow a Poisson-binomial distribution
and thus they use different statistical techniques compared to our approach.
Organisation of Chapter
In Section 7.2 we introduce our new system model framework for our cloud storage
PoR scheme. This new model leads to an updated and extended security model which
we discuss in detail in Section 7.3. This is followed, in Section 7.4, by a concrete
instantiation of our CSPoR scheme and the respective security proof. In Section 7.5
we discuss different audit strategies a client could use in order to check the files. In
Section 7.6 we provide a performance evaluation for our scheme showing that the scheme
behaves reasonably. We conclude the chapter in Section 7.7.
7.2 Cloud Storage Proofs of Retrievability
The essential components of a cloud storage proofs of retrievability system are natu-
ral generalisations of “classical” PoR systems. We aim to enhance the current PoR
models to enable a client to store f multiple (different-sized) files F (1), . . . , F (f) with a
provider. However, trivial extensions of known solutions do not support the multiple
files case well. In more detail, one may simply perform a separate PoR for each file
which is infeasible due to the increased workload which scales in the number of files
over all procedures and requires the client to check each file individually. Another
simple approach could be to concatenate all files into one file F̂ = F (1)‖F (2)‖ . . . ‖F (f)
and execute a PoR scheme for the composed file F̂ . Unfortunately, the type of ECC
encoding required in this context becomes the bottleneck rendering this approach to
be infeasible. One type of encoding over all files at once results in a processed file
of the form F = F (1)‖F (2)‖ . . . ‖F (f)‖P (1,...,f) where P (1,...,f) denotes the added re-
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dundancy generated over the concatenation of the files. In this particular case it is
possible to use existing PoR notions, however they suffer other drawbacks such that
one should avoid using them. For example, in case one wishes to update a single file
F (i), i ∈ [f ] := {1, . . . , f}, then she is required to download the whole processed file F
since the redundancy was generated over all files present in the concatenation and thus
makes updating files an expensive endeavour. Furthermore, in case a PoR check fails it
is unclear in which file(s) the error has occurred and thus forces the client to download
the whole processed file and therefore she looses her initial advantage of outsourcing the
files in the first place. Another type of ECC encoding results in obtaining a processed
file of the form F = F (1)‖P (1)‖F (2)‖P (2)‖ . . . ‖F (f)‖P (f) where each original file F (i),
i ∈ [f ], is initially processed before all files are concatenated and thus all parity parts
P (i) are independent from each other. In this context, updating a file F (i) is easier since
we can solely download the required one while simultaneously this approach suffers the
small file problem. In more detail, if some file F (i) of the processed file F is small (e.g.
the file solely consists of a password) then there is a non-negligible probability that the
employed random checking mechanism does not examine this file at all and hence even
a successful PoR check does not provide sufficient assurance about the retrievability of
all files. Yet another drawback of this approach is that in case any file and respective
parity blocks are deleted then this specific file is completely irrecoverable.
We overcome the above problem using our new PoR notion called cloud storage proofs
of retrievability (CSPoR) scheme. In more detail, our scheme first enables a client to
store multiple different-sized files in a set of storage containers located at the cloud
service provider and the client may form an aggregated challenge query checking all
files simultaneously. The server evaluates the challenge query and returns verification
values which enable the client to form a PoR answer.
Following previous works on PoR, we also utilise an erasure-correction code (ECC) in
our system requirements. ECC is a process that adds redundant data to the original
data in such a way that a receiver may recover the processed data even when a number
of erasures were introduced, either during the transmission of the file, or while storing
the file. Furthermore, in the context of PoR, ECC boosts the probability to detect a
misbehaving server since the server is required to delete more data than the original
file initially consisted of in order to make the file irrecoverable. We require the ECC to
be a systematic code to maximise data output whilst also being a maximum distance
separable (MDS) code which yields maximum reliability with a minimum amount of
storage overhead. We denote the erasure-correction code rate by 0 < ρ ≤ 1 and note
that incorrect data can be recovered by the decoding procedure if no more than (1−ρ)
of the data have been deleted. 1 Reed-Solomon codes meet those properties for any
1One can think of (1− ρ) as an abbreviation for (1− ρ) · 100 percent where 0 < ρ ≤ 1.
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size of code and data words. A notable fast variant like Cauchy-Reed-Solomon codes
[102] may be used to enhance the involved encoding time of processing the data.
We consider a rational malicious server that may try to delete bits, blocks, or rearrange
files in order to make storage space available and to obtain financial benefits. We call
this an adversarial erasure strategy in contrast to a purely random erasure strategy
which may lead to make the file completely irretrievable for a client. To prevent suc-
cessful adversarial erasure a client may encrypt and permute the parity part of the file,
for example cf. [14].
In the remainder of this section we introduce the notion of storage container which
is the underlying storage unit for our scheme. We also provide a generic definition of
CSPoR.
7.2.1 Storage Container
Let us first introduce the notion of a storage container which acts as a storage unit
being able to store multiple files within one location, also providing a client with a
file system structure. This notion is motivated upon real-world cloud storage practices
where common CSPs use a similar notion of storage containers called Buckets [8, 86]
or Blobs [109].
Let a storage container be denoted by S storing multiple arbitrary files F ∈ {0, 1}∗.
Throughout this chapter, we assume that a client may possess several storage containers
S(c) hosted at a cloud service provider. This describes the client’s potential need to
handle different types of data in different storage containers, e.g. a client wishes to
store important documents separately from her picture library. This also captures the
common cloud storage practice where each storage container’s storage space (size) is
upper bounded by S
(c)
max which corresponds to the maximum number of storable files
within a container, and thus we need the possibility to create multiple containers. We
denote the total number of different storage containers by Γ ∈ N. The set of all storage
containers is denoted by Ŝ and is called a cloud storage.
7.2.2 Formal Definition of CSPoR
We now present a formal definition of CSPoR. This scheme enables a client to check
whether all files within a cloud storage are retained and retrievable from a cloud service
provider.
Definition 7.1. A cloud storage proofs of retrievability (CSPoR) scheme comprises
the following procedures:
• (pk, sk, Ŝ, Ŝid, γ̂) $← CSPoRSetup(1λ): this randomised algorithm generates a
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public-private key pair and takes as input the security parameter λ. Additionally,
it creates a cloud storage (i.e. a set of Γ storage containers) Ŝ := {S(c) | c ∈ [Γ]}
and their set of respective associated unique identifiers Ŝid := {S(c)id | c ∈ [Γ]}.
Furthermore, some metadata γ̂ := {γ(c) | c ∈ [Γ]} is created for each storage
container;
• (F̂ , τ̂ , Ŝ, γ̂) $← CSPoRStore(sk, F̂ , Ŝid): this randomised data storing algorithm
takes as input a secret key sk, Ŝid and the set of all files F̂ := {F̂S(c)id | c ∈ [Γ]} a
client wishes to store at the cloud service provider. Each F̂
S
(c)
id
consists of K
S
(c)
id
∈
N files that will be stored within a particular S(c) where F̂
S
(c)
id
:= {F (k) | F (k) ∈
{0, 1}∗, k ∈ [K
S
(c)
id
]} for c ∈ [Γ]. Each file within each storage container gets
processed yielding the set of all processed files for this storage container F̂
S
(c)
id
:=
{F (k) | k ∈ [K
S
(c)
id
]} and a respective set of file tags is generated τ̂
S
(c)
id
:= {τ (k) |
k ∈ [K
S
(c)
id
]} where each tag contains additional information (e.g. metadata) about
the processed file. Finally the algorithm outputs the set of all such processed files
F̂ := {F̂
S
(c)
id
| c ∈ [Γ]}, tags τ̂ := {τ̂
S
(c)
id
| c ∈ [Γ]} and the updated cloud storage
Ŝ. The metadata γ̂ is also updated;
• δ $← [CSPoRVerify(pk, sk, τ̂ ′, Ŝid) 
 CSPoRProve(pk, F̂ ′, τ̂ ′, Ŝ)]: this challenge-
response protocol defines a protocol for proving cloud storage retrievability. The
prover algorithm takes as input the public key pk, the file tag set τ̂ ′ := {τ̂ ′
S
(c)
id
|
τ̂ ′
S
(c)
id
= {τ (k) | k ∈ K ′
S
(c)
id
}, c ∈ Γ′} and the set of the processed files F̂ ′ := {F̂ ′
S
(c)
id
|
F̂ ′
S
(c)
id
:= {F (k) | k ∈ K ′
S
(c)
id
}, c ∈ Γ′}, where K ′
S
(c)
id
⊆ [K
S
(c)
id
] and Γ′ ⊆ [Γ]. The
verification algorithm uses as input the key pair (pk, sk), the file tag set τ̂ ′ and
identifiers Ŝid. Algorithm CSPoRVerify outputs at the end of the protocol execu-
tion a binary value δ which equals accept if the verification succeeds, indicating
the files in F̂ ′ are being stored and retrievable from S, and reject otherwise.
At the beginning of the CSPoRSetup procedure, the involved parties agree on the storage
containers in the set Ŝ. Similarly, they agree on the files in the set F̂ at the beginning
of the CSPoRStore procedure. Note this does not require the files being given in clear
within the agreement. An agreement could also consist of hashes of these files.
Note that the cloud storage Ŝ may already contain data from previously performed
CSPoRStore procedures. Furthermore, observe that F̂ may not be exactly equal to F̂
but it must be guaranteed that F̂ can be recovered from F̂ .
We wish to remark that the involved file tag set τ̂ ′ in the challenge-response protocol
can correspond to either the full set of file tags τ̂ or any subset of file tags that enable a
CSPoR scheme to flexibly check any subset of files by specifying the appropriate tags.
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Definition 7.2. We denote the challenge-response procedure
[
CSPoRVerify(pk, sk, τ̂ ′, Ŝid)
 CSPoRProve(pk, F̂ ′, τ̂ ′, Ŝ)
]
by CSPoRP. A single challenge-response step of a CSPoRP is called an audit.
Our CSPoR scheme captures the same probabilistic assurance about the retrievability
of the data as classical PoR schemes. However, as mentioned in the introduction, such
a probabilistic assurance may not suffice in practice. Therefore, our scheme aims to
provide a retrievability assurance about the files, i.e. informally we need to sample a
certain minimum amount of file block information (depending on the file size and the
ECC rate) per file in order to be assured about the retrievability of the files. Basically,
to receive such an assurance we begin to execute CSPoRP several times on different
challenge inputs and we denote the output as the ith audit by δi ∈ {accept, reject}.
Note that if the ith audit fails, i.e. δi = reject, then the CSPoRP procedure is alto-
gether not valid and outputs δ = reject. However, even if some audit fails, this may
not reflect whether the data is actually deleted or if simply not enough valid file blocks
have been checked. Thus, we provide different audit strategies capturing, on the one
hand, approaches to form flexible verification requests depending on a client’s current
resources in order to evaluate whether the responses of the prover are sufficient to per-
mit successful extraction, and on the other hand, we discuss approaches a client can
employ to detect which file(s) have been corrupted in case an audit has failed. Those
approaches can be found in Section 7.5.
Informally, a CSPoR protocol is correct if all processed files F outputted by the store
procedure will be accepted by the verification algorithm when interacting with a valid
prover. More formally this is captured as follows.
Definition 7.3. A CSPoR protocol is correct if there exists a negligible function negl
such that for every security parameter λ, every key pair (pk, sk) and set of storage
containers Ŝ with respective identifiers Ŝid and metadata γ̂ generated by CSPoRSetup,
for all sets of files F̂ (containing files F (k) ∈ {0, 1}∗), and for all (F̂ , τ̂ , Ŝ, γ̂) generated
by CSPoRStore, it holds that
Pr
[ (
CSPoRVerify(pk, sk, τ̂ ′, Ŝid)
 CSPoRProve(pk, F̂ ′, τ̂ ′, Ŝ)
)
9 accept
]
= negl(λ).
In Figure 7.1, we illustrate the execution of a CSPoR scheme between a client and a
server as well as represent a model of a storage container S(c). A client C is able to
access the storage container held by a CSP S via a secure channel. The storage con-
tainer can contain an arbitrary set of files F̂ which were uploaded by a client during a
CSPoRStore procedure, and a CSP may hold an arbitrary amount Γ of storage contain-
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Client C
Cloud Storage Provider S
Storage Container S(c)
F¯ (1) F¯ (2) F¯ (3)
F¯ (4) F¯ (5)
F¯ (6) F¯ (7) F¯ (8) F¯ (9)
. . .
CSPoR
...
Figure 7.1: Model of a CSPoR scheme with a detailed representation of a generic
storage container
ers. In more detail, F¯ (k) := (F (k)||τ (k)) for k ∈ [K
S
(c)
id
] denotes a processed file with
respective file tag stored in a storage container S(c) located at a cloud storage provider.
Note that in practice the processed files and file tags may be stored separately.
7.3 Security Model
In this section we discuss security within our CSPoR model. We do not explicitly
consider confidentiality of a file F , but assume that a client may encrypt the files before
the initiation of the CSPoR protocol. The adversary aims to convince a client with
overwhelming probability that the outsourced files are still fully intact and retrievable.
In the following we define the security notion of extractability for our CSPoR scheme
following existing security notions for PoR models as introduced in Section 2.8.
Extractability
Intuitively, we wish to formalise and say that a CSPoR protocol is secure if any cheat-
ing prover that convinces the verification algorithm to accept is indeed storing all files
in F̂ with a sufficient level of probability. In other words, we wish to guarantee that,
whenever a malicious prover is in a position of successfully passing a CSPoRP instance,
it must know the entire file content of all files. We now follow the PoR security for-
malisation from Section 2.8 and extend it slightly to adjust the notion for our CSPoR
system. As in Section 2.8, we require an extractor algorithm E(pk, sk, τ̂ ,P ′) taking as
input the generated key pair, the set of file tag τ̂ as well as a description of the machine
implementing the prover’s role in the CSPoR protocol. The extractor’s output is the
set of files F̂ . As noted above, the extractor is given (non black-box) access to P ′ and
in particular can rewind it. Furthermore, we require that the algorithm is efficient, i.e.
E ’s running time needs to be polynomial in the security parameter.
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Consider the following extractability game ExpExtractA,
[CSPOR, 1λ] between a mali-
cious adversary A, an extractor E , and a challenger C.
1. The challenger initialises the system by running CSPoRSetup to generate the
public and private key pairs. The public keys are provided to A. It also generates
a set of storage containers Ŝ, a set of respective storage container identifiers Ŝid as
well as metadata for each storage container γ̂ which are all given to the adversary
A.
2. The adversary A is now able to interact with the challenger that takes the role
of an honest client. A is allowed to request executions to a CSPoRStore oracle
by providing, for each query, a set of files F̂ = {F̂
S
(c)
id
| c ∈ [Γ]} and the storage
container identifiers Ŝid basically indicate in which container the files should be
stored.
3. Likewise, A can request executions of the CSPoRP procedure for any set of files
on which it previously made a CSPoRStore query by specifying the corresponding
tags τ̂ . In the procedures, the challenger will play the role of the honest verifier V
and the adversary the role of the corrupted prover, i.e. V(pk, sk, τ̂ , Ŝid)
 A. In
the end of the execution the adversary is provided with the output of the verifier.
Furthermore, the CSPoRStore oracle queries and the executions of CSPoRP can
be interleaved arbitrarily.
4. Finally, the adversary outputs a set of challenge tags τ̂ ′ returned from some
CSPoRStore query and the description of a prover P ′.
5. Run the extractor algorithm F̂ ′ ← E(pk, sk, τ̂ ′,P ′) inputting the challenge tags τ̂ ′
and description P ′ where E gets black-box rewinding access to P ′, and attempts
to extract the file content of all files as F̂ ′.
6. If Pr
[ (
V(pk, sk, τ̂ , Ŝid)
 P ′
)
→ accept
]
≥  and F̂ ′ 6= F̂ then output 1, else
0.
Note that we say a malicious prover P ′ is -admissible if the probability that it convinc-
ingly answers verification challenges is at least , i.e. if Pr
[ (
V(pk, sk, τ̂ , Ŝid)
 P ′
)
→
accept
]
≥ . Here the probability is over the coins of the verifier and prover.
Definition 7.4. We say that a CSPOR scheme is -extractable (or secure) if there
exists an efficient extraction algorithm E such that, for all PPT adversaries A it holds
that Pr
[
ExpExtractA,
[CSPOR, 1λ]→ 1] is negligible in the security parameter.
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7.4 Construction
In this section we provide a concrete instantiation of CSPoR. We start by outlining our
main building blocks and then provide details about our instantiation. We choose to
build our construction upon the private-key PoR scheme of Shacham and Waters [126]
mainly due to its ability to handle an unbounded number of verification queries. In
case a better communication complexity is required, one may build upon the scheme
presented in [40]. However, in our particular case we believe that an unbounded num-
ber of verification queries is more beneficial since processing the files already involves
using the client’s valuable resources and it is not a task the client wishes to repeat reg-
ularly. Our CSPoR instantiation overcomes the identified limitations as discussed in
Section 7.2, when employing existing schemes straightforwardly to prove retrievability
for multiple different-sized files simultaneously.
Building Blocks
Unless otherwise specified all operations are performed in the finite field F = Zp where
p is a λ-bit prime with λ being the security parameter. As we instantiate a private-key
CSPoR system it suffices to make use of a symmetric encryption scheme and we set the
public key pk =⊥. We make use of a pseudo-random function g : {0, 1}∗×{0, 1}φprf → F,
where φprf is the key length of the PRF
2, and a MAC scheme. Furthermore, we make
use of storage containers S(c), c ∈ [Γ], as introduced in Section 7.2.1.
Specification of the CSPoRSetup Procedure
In the CSPoRSetup procedure the client derives its keys. First the client chooses a
random symmetric key κenc
$← Kenc and a random MAC key κmac $← Kmac. The client
keeps the secret key sk = (κenc, κmac) and requests creating a cloud storage Ŝ, i.e. a
set of storage containers located at the server S.
Specification of the CSPoRStore Procedure
The CSPoRStore procedure is initiated by a client holding files F̂ = {F̂
S
(c)
id
| c ∈ [Γ]}
that she wishes to store in Ŝ. The following steps are carried out for each file F (k),
k ∈ [K
S
(c)
id
]c∈[Γ], in parallel:
• First we apply an information dispersal algorithm (i.e. an erasure code) with code
rate ρ over the file F (k). The resulting processed file is denoted by F (k);
• Next we process a processed file F (k) into n˜ ∈ N blocks being s symbols long.
That is F (k) = {f (k)ij }, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n˜, 1 ≤ j ≤ s and k ∈ [KS(c)id ]c∈[Γ]. Note
that s is constant for all files while the number of blocks n˜ varies depending on
2Note that we use the shorthand g
κ
(k)
prf
(i) := g(κ
(k)
prf , i).
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the respective underlying original file size. Each symbol f
(k)
ij is encoded in terms
of elements in F;
• We sample uniformly at random a PRF key κ(k)prf
$← {0, 1}φprf . We also sample s
random elements from the finite field F which are kept private by the client, that
is α
(k)
1 , . . . , α
(k)
s
$← F;
• Next we compute for each file block of an outsourced file i ∈ [n˜] an authentication
tag σi as follows
σ
(k)
i ← gκ(k)prf (i) +
s∑
j=1
α
(k)
j f
(k)
ij ∈ F;
• Now we wish to compute a file tag τ (k) = τ (k)0 ‖MACκmac(τ (k)0 ) where τ (k)0 has the
form n˜‖Encryptκenc
(
κ
(k)
prf‖α(k)1 ‖ . . . ‖α(k)s
)
. Note that the cloud service provider
will also receive each file tag τ (k). However, this does not enable the server to
make use of the random elements as they are encrypted and it is not in possession
of the respective secret key but it only learns the size of the outsourced file.
Finally, the client combines all file tags into the set of tags τ̂ and all processed files
are aggregated as the set F̂ and will be uploaded to the respective storage container
in Ŝ located at the cloud service provider. Each processed file itself is of the form
F (k) :=
(
{f (k)ij }, {σ(k)i }
)
1≤i≤n˜,1≤j≤s
.
Specification of the CSPoRP Procedure
The CSPoRP procedure consists of executing several audit steps to obtain an assurance
about the retrievability of the files. In Section 7.5, we discuss various strategies a client
can follow in order to execute the audit steps. In the following we describe the technical
details of a single audit step (providing a reply δi) which will be repeated A times in
order to obtain a final answer δ from the the CSPoRP procedure capturing our desired
assurance:
• The client first verifies the MAC on each τ (k) within τ̂ . If the MAC is invalid the
client aborts the protocol and outputs 0. Otherwise, she parses all τ (k) from τ̂ and
uses κenc in order to recover n˜
(k), κ
(k)
prf and α
(k)
1 , . . . , α
(k)
s for all k ∈ [KS(c)id ]c∈[Γ];
• Next the client C generates for each file a challenge by picking a random subset
I(k) ⊆$ [n˜(k)] of size `(k);
• Next C chooses for each i ∈ I(k) a random element from the finite field ν(k)i $← F
and aggregates this sampling per file to a set Q(k) = {(i, ν(k)i )i∈I(k)} of size `(k).
All sets Q(k) per storage container can be aggregated as Q
S
(c)
id
:= {Q(k) | k ∈
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[K
S
(c)
id
], c ∈ [Γ]}. Finally, C sends as her challenge the combined set over all
containers Q̂ := {Q
S
(c)
id
| c ∈ [Γ]} to the server.
The cloud service provider now parses all files from F̂ as {f (k)ij } and {σ(k)i }, and the
corresponding challenges Q(k) from Q̂. Then for 1 ≤ j ≤ s, the provider computes
µ
(k)
j ←
∑
(i,ν
(k)
i )∈Q(k)
ν
(k)
i f
(k)
ij and σ
(k) ←
∑
(i,ν
(k)
i )∈Q(k)
ν
(k)
i σ
(k)
i .
This execution is repeated for all files in all storage containers contained in Q̂. Then
S accumulates all responses and authentication tags asµ˜1 := ∑
c∈[Γ]
∑
k∈[K
S
(c)
id
]
µ
(k)
1 , . . . , µ˜s :=
∑
c∈[Γ]
∑
k∈[K
S
(c)
id
]
µ(k)s , σ˜ :=
∑
c∈[Γ]
∑
k∈[K
S
(c)
id
]
σ(k)
 .
Finally, the client parses the provider’s accumulated response and checks
σ˜
?
=
∑
c∈[Γ]
∑
k∈[K
S
(c)
id
]
 ∑
(i,ν
(k)
i )∈Q(k)
ν
(k)
i gκ(k)prf
(i) +
s∑
j=1
α
(k)
j µ˜j
 . (7.1)
If this equality check is successful, the verifier outputs δi = accept, and otherwise she
outputs reject.
If a check fails (δi = reject), a client assumes that the cloud service provider is mali-
cious and takes actions in either immediately downloading all files or follows another
strategy called reduced CSPoR as introduced in Section 7.5. However, we want to
emphasise that downloading is very impractical as a client loses the advantage of out-
sourcing the files in the first place. Furthermore, we want to stress that if CSPoRP
is successful then we have obtained a retrievability assurance that all files in Ŝ are
retained by the cloud service provider.
Correctness of the Instantiation
Now we present that our above scheme is correct. Let the PRF key be κ
(k)
prf and
α
(k)
1 , . . . , α
(k)
s
$← F be the secret coefficients for all k ∈ [K
S
(c)
id
]c∈[Γ]. Let the file sym-
bols be denoted by {f (k)ij }, and the block authenticators are expressed as gκ(k)prf (i) +∑s
j=1 α
(k)
j f
(k)
ij . For a prover that responds honestly to queries from Q̂ such that
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µ˜j =
∑
c∈[Γ]
∑
k∈[K
S
(c)
id
] µ
(k)
j and σ˜ =
∑
c∈[Γ]
∑
k∈[K
S
(c)
id
] σ
(k) then we have
σ˜ =
∑
c∈[Γ]
∑
k∈[K
S
(c)
id
]
σ(k) =
∑
c∈[Γ]
∑
k∈[K
S
(c)
id
]
 ∑
(i,ν
(k)
i )∈Q(k)
ν
(k)
i σ
(k)
i

=
∑
c∈[Γ]
∑
k∈[K
S
(c)
id
]
 ∑
(i,ν
(k)
i )∈Q(k)
ν
(k)
i
g
κ
(k)
prf
(i) +
s∑
j=1
α
(k)
j f
(k)
ij


=
∑
c∈[Γ]
∑
k∈[K
S
(c)
id
]
 ∑
(i,ν
(k)
i )∈Q(k)
ν
(k)
i gκ(k)prf
(i) +
∑
(i,ν
(k)
i )∈Q(k)
ν
(k)
i
s∑
j=1
α
(k)
j f
(k)
ij

=
∑
c∈[Γ]
∑
k∈[K
S
(c)
id
]
 ∑
(i,ν
(k)
i )∈Q(k)
ν
(k)
i gκ(k)prf
(i) +
s∑
j=1
α
(k)
j
∑
(i,ν
(k)
i )∈Q(k)
ν
(k)
i f
(k)
ij

=
∑
c∈[Γ]
∑
k∈[K
S
(c)
id
]
 ∑
(i,ν
(k)
i )∈Q(k)
ν
(k)
i gκ(k)prf
(i) +
s∑
j=1
α
(k)
j µ
(k)
j
 ,
which shows that verification is satisfied.
Now we formulate our main theorem capturing the security of our CSPoR scheme.
Theorem 7.5. If the MAC scheme is unforgeable, the symmetric encryption scheme
is semantically secure, and the PRF is secure, then no adversary (except with negligible
probability) against the extractability game Extract of our CSPoR scheme ever causes
the verifier to accept a cloud storage proofs of retrievability protocol instance, except by
responding with correctly computed responses µ˜j (1 ≤ j ≤ s) and authentication tag σ˜.
Proof. The security of our proposed scheme follows immediately from the security of
the private-key SW scheme [126] as we base our construction on their scheme and thus
inherit the security property. The only main difference in the proof is that we have to
ensure the correctness of the aggregated set of responses {µ˜j}.
First, we need to argue that the verification algorithm will reject answers except if the
answers {µ˜j} were computed correctly by the prover. This can be shown via a sequence
of games for which we argue that the adversary’s distinguishing advantage between two
consecutive games is negligible. The analysis follows via the same game hops as in [126]
while adapting the notion of having aggregated answers {µ˜j} from all outsourced files.
Secondly, we need to argue that the extraction procedure can efficiently reconstruct a ρ
fraction of file blocks when interacting with a prover that provides correctly computed
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responses for a non-negligible fraction of the query space. The same arguments as
in [126] apply to our scheme. Here we only need to slightly change the proof details
when showing that a well-behaved -admissible cheating prover P ′ as the output of the
extractability game (cf. Section 7.3) can be turned into an -polite adversary B (imple-
mented as a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine). Note that we say an adver-
sary is -polite if it responds with probability  to given queries Q covering an  fraction
of the query- and randomness-tape space. P ′ can be used to construct the adversary
B. For a query Q, P ′ interacts with the verifier according to V(pk, sk, τ̂ , Ŝid)
 P ′. If
the interaction is successful the responses (µ˜1, . . . , µ˜s) will be written to its output tape
while a wrong interaction leads to writing ⊥ on the tape. Note that after k interactions
we can represent all responses as a (k × s) matrix. Each time the adversary B runs
the prover P ′ it is able to effectively rewind the prover. Since P ′ is well-behaved a
successful interaction computes valid (µ˜1, . . . , µ˜s) and given that P ′ is -admissible we
know that an  fraction of the answers are computed correctly. Having this we can
further follow SW and can represent the extractor’s knowledge by a row in the matrix
for each audit step, i.e. as (µ˜
(t)
1 , . . . , µ˜
(t)
s ) where t ∈ [A], and thus have sampled enough
information to permit successful extraction.
Lastly, we argue that following the ECC reconstruction property it suffices to positively
check any n blocks of a processed file consisting of n˜ blocks to recover the original file
F (k) with all but negligible probability. This is trivially fulfilled by employing Reed-
Solomon codes of rate ρ, since any ρ fraction of encoded file blocks suffice in order to
reconstruct the underlying file. Note, however, that this does not protect a client from
revealing correlations between the plaintext blocks and redundant blocks through the
access pattern. This can be avoided if a client encrypts and permutes the parity part
of the file following Ateniese et al. [14].
Armknecht et al. [11] introduced the notion of an Outsourced PoR. In their model, an
external entity called an auditor joins the system and offers to audit the server on behalf
of a client whereas a client is able to efficiently check whether the auditor performs a
PoRP execution correctly. Their proposed scheme is also based upon the private-key
PoR scheme of [126]. Hence, by replacing the single-file scheme with a CSPoR scheme
leads to an outsourced CSPoR scheme.
7.5 Practicability of CSPoR
In this section, we discuss different audit strategies a client could use throughout a
CSPoRP procedure.
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7.5.1 Strategies for CSPoRP
As discussed throughout this chapter, we wish to specify concrete strategies a client
may use within a CSPoR system. Recall that a “standard” PoR provides the client with
a probabilistic assurance whether the data is retained or not. The usage of erasure-
correcting codes in the realm of PoR was introduced to boost the probability to detect
a malicious server as well as a mechanism to recover the original file in case some file
blocks are deleted. However, in practice a probabilistic assurance about the retained
data is not sufficient as it is not clear whether enough data is available to reconstruct the
file and thus we provide strategies that enable the client to obtain such an assurance.
We receive this assurance in case the client is able to determine that a sufficient part
of the file is retained by the server. Recall that a processed file F (k) consists of the
original file plus some redundancy specified via the ECC, i.e. F (k) consists of n˜ = n/ρ.
Due to the ECC it suffices to sample any n from n˜ blocks to recover the file using the
decoding algorithm. Thus, this property assures that a file is available if a client is able
to check successfully any n from n˜ valid file blocks. Note that this holds as long as the
adversary does not delete more than (1− ρ) · 100 percent of n˜ outsourced data blocks.
However, we also wish to stress that in case a client detects that data has been deleted
repeatedly she would lose all trust in the cloud service provider and would decide to
change to a new provider. Since this would incur a financial penalty, we assume that
this is usually a rare event.
7.5.2 Audit Strategies for CSPoRP
In this section, we discuss different strategies that enable a client to obtain a retriev-
ability assurance about the original files through CSPoRP.
7.5.2.1 Workload Partition
In order to receive a retrievability-assurance, a client needs to execute several audit
steps (within CSPoRP) in order to obtain a valid proof. Therefore, we believe that it
would be beneficial for a client to be able to determine a priori the average number
of required audits to prove retrievability, i.e. we wish to derive a formula computing
the number of audits A based on a fixed challenge size `. We show that this task is
related to a new variant of the well-known Coupon Collector’s Problem [124] to which
we provide a detailed solution and finally argue that this approach is a possible solution
for the above task. Furthermore, we also provide a solution for the reversed task, i.e.
we derive a formula that computes the appropriate challenge size given a pre-defined
number of audits A. We also show that a statistical hypothesis test may be used to
argue whether the received responses suffice to obtain the required assurance.
Recall that our scheme checks ` different file blocks per audit and generally a CSPoRP
246
7.5 Practicability of CSPoR
execution depends on n, n˜, ρ, `, and A. Since ρ is given as a system parameter, we
can derive the size of the processed file using the code rate combined with the size of
the original file, and thus it remains to follow the above goal and compute the values
for ` and A. Recall, for each audit step the values for the challenge of size ` are
chosen randomly without replacement from the set of processed file blocks [n˜].3 We
note that both values A and ` depend on each other. For example, if a client increases
the challenge size per audit then the required number of audits decreases as a client
checks more file blocks per request. Thus, this provides a client with a flexible trade-off
between communication and computation depending on her current resources.
Computing the Number of Audits
In this part, we aim to derive a formula that computes the (average) number of required
audits based on a fixed challenge size, the block identifiers for the original and pro-
cessed file as well as the erasure-correction code rate. Obtaining such a formula enables
a client to gain a priori knowledge about the necessary communication cost in order to
perform CSPoRP such that it provides an assurance about the data retrievability. In
other words, a client wishes to perform A audits of size ` in order to determine if any
n of n˜ blocks are intact to be convinced that the original file is retrievable.
Computing the average required number of audits A can be expressed as a new variant
of the Coupon Collector’s Problem (CCP) [124].
Coupon Collector’s Problem
The classical CCP describes a solution to compute the required (average) waiting time
to obtain all coupons of a collection while drawing one coupon at a time whereas all
coupons appear equally likely. In our context, the waiting time corresponds to the
required number of audits, and the challenge size corresponds to the number of drawn
coupons at a time while the collection size corresponds to the total number of blocks
of a processed file, that is n˜. In order to derive our required (average) number of
audits from the CCP, we need to reformulate the above problem as follows. We wish
to compute the average waiting time A to obtain any partial collection of n coupons
from the full collection of size n˜ while drawing ` coupons at a time with the restriction
that ` ≤ n. Note that all coupons are drawn from the full collection, i.e. from the
set [n˜], and all coupons appear equally likely. In other words, we need to evaluate the
expected number of groups of coupons to obtain at least n different coupons. Ferrante
and Frigo [65] present a solution of yet another variant of the above problem where
they compute the waiting time to obtain all coupons of the collection while drawing
` coupons at a time. We follow their approach using kth order statistics to derive a
3This is mainly done to prevent an adversarial cloud service provider deleting queried blocks since
the probability of choosing the same block again is equally likely to sampling a new block.
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solution for our problem. A good overview about the Coupon Collector’s Problem can
be found in [66].
We begin by considering that coupons are drawn in groups of constant size `, where
1 ≤ ` ≤ n, with the types of items in any group of coupons being independent random
variables.4 In our context, we require that each group does not contain more than one
coupon of any type. Thus, the total number of groups will be
(
n˜
`
)
and each group G can
be identified with a vector (g1, . . . , g`) ∈ {1, . . . , n˜} with gi < gi+1 for i ∈ {1, . . . , `−1}.
Definition 7.6. We denote by qk the probability of drawing (at any given time) the
kth group of coupons in lexicographical order, where i ∈ {1, . . . , (n˜`)}.
We consider the case of uniform probabilities and thus we have that the probability
corresponds for any group k to qk =
1
(n˜`)
. We set Vi to be a random variable which
equals the number of groups to be drawn in order to obtain the first coupon of type
i. Following Ferrante and Frigo [65], these random variables follow a geometric law
with parameter 1 − (
n˜−1
` )
(n˜`)
. The random variables min(Vi, Vj) follow a geometric law
with parameter 1− (
n˜−2
` )
(n˜`)
and this continues the same way up to the random variables
min(Vi1 , . . . , Vin˜−`) having a geometric law with parameter 1 − 1(n˜`) . Note that the
minimum of more random variables min(Vi1 , . . . , Vik) for k > n˜ − ` + 1 equals to the
constant random variable 1. Applying the Maximum-Minimum principle provides us
with the expected number of groups of coupons to complete the collection as
∑
1≤i1<i2<...<iφ≤n˜
E[min(Vi1 , Vi2 , . . . , Viφ)] =
(
n˜
φ
)
1
1− (
n˜−φ
` )
(n˜`)
=
(
n˜
φ
) (n˜
`
)(
n˜
`
)− (n˜−φ` ) . (7.2)
We denote by V(n˜) the n˜th order statistic and following the usual convention we have
V(n˜) = max(V1, . . . Vn˜) and V(1) = min(Vi1 , . . . , Vin˜) = min(V1, . . . , Vn˜). Then we can
derive the 2nd order statistic as
V(2) =
∑
1≤i1<...<in˜−1≤n˜
min(Vi1 , . . . , Vin˜−1)− (n˜− 1) min(V1, . . . , Vn˜),
4Similarly to above, those groups of coupons are sampled randomly without replacement.
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and the 3rd order statistic can be obtained as
V(3) =
∑
1≤i1<...<in˜−2≤n˜
min(Vi1 , . . . , Vin˜−2)− (n˜− 2)V(2) −
(
n˜− 1
n˜− 3
)
V(1)
=
∑
1≤i1<...<in˜−2≤n˜
min(Vi1 , . . . , Vin˜−2)
− (n˜− 2)
∑
1≤i1<...<in˜−1≤n˜
min(Vi1 , . . . , Vin˜−1)
+ (n˜− 2)(n˜− 1) min(V1, . . . , Vn˜)
− (n˜− 1)(n˜− 2)
2
min(Vi1 , . . . , Vin˜)
=
∑
1≤i1<...<in˜−2≤n˜
min(Vi1 , . . . , Vin˜−2)
− (n˜− 2)
∑
1≤i1<...<in˜−1≤n˜
min(Vi1 , . . . , Vin˜−1)
+
(n˜− 1)(n˜− 2)
2
min(V1, . . . , Vn˜).
The general formula can be derived for any 1 ≤ n ≤ n˜ as
V(n) =
∑
1≤i1<...<in˜−(n−1)≤n˜
min(Vi1 , . . . , Vin˜−(n−1))
− (n˜− (n− 1))
∑
1≤i1<...<in˜−(n−2)≤n˜
min(Vi1 , . . . , Vin˜−(n−2))
+
(n˜− (n− 1))(n˜− (n− 2))
2!
∑
1≤i1<...<in˜−(n−3)≤n˜
min(Vi1 , . . . , Vin˜−(n−3)) + . . .
+ (−1)n+1 (n˜− (n− 1))(n˜− (n− 2)) . . . (n˜− (n− (n− 1)))
(n− 1)! min(V1, . . . , Vn˜)
=
n∑
j=1
(−1)j+1(n˜− n+ j − 1
j − 1
) ∑
1≤i1<...<in˜−n+j≤n˜
min(Vi1 , . . . , Vin˜−n+j )
 .
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We can finally compute the expectation as follows
E
[
X`n(n˜)
]
= E
[
V(n)
]
= E
 n∑
j=1
(−1)j+1(n˜− n+ j − 1
j − 1
) ∑
1≤i1<...<in˜−n+j≤n˜
min(Vi1 , . . . , Vin˜−n+j )

=
n∑
j=1
(−1)j+1(n˜− n+ j − 1
j − 1
) ∑
1≤i1<...<in˜−n+j≤n˜
E
[
min(Vi1 , . . . , Vin˜−n+j )
]
=
n∑
j=1
[
(−1)j+1
(
n˜− n+ j − 1
j − 1
)(
n˜
n˜− n+ j
) (n˜
`
)(
n˜
`
)− (n˜−(n˜−n+j)` )
]
=
(
n˜
`
) n∑
j=1
[
(−1)j+1
(
n˜− n+ j − 1
j − 1
)(
n˜
n˜− n+ j
)
1(
n˜
`
)− (n−j` )
]
. (7.3)
This expected value corresponds to the number of audits we initially aimed to compute,
i.e. A = E
[
X`n(n˜)
]
. However, the precise computation of this value involves a huge
amount of computation and thus renders a quick computation for a computationally
weak client to be infeasible. Thus, we wish to obtain an approximation for A. Starting
from a classical version of the CCP, we argue that each draw of a new set of coupons
(consisting of elements in the size of the challenge `) increases the overall amount of
drawn sets and is also likely to provide us with new coupons we have not seen before.
For example, in the first draw all coupons are new and have not been seen before.
However, in the next draws this changes since the drawn sets of coupons may contain
coupons that we have already seen before. We stop drawing new groups of coupons
after a total of n different coupons have been seen. The (constant) size of the drawn
sets of coupons plays a crucial role and thus results in a modulo operation in the
formula. Note that this approach does not take into account all possible overlaps of
the groups but results in an expected value which is very easy to compute and may
suffice as a good approximation. Since the expected value corresponds to the number
of block identifiers which have been sampled, we divide the value by the challenge size
` to obtain the required number of groups and thus the number of audits. Hence, the
derived approximation for A can be expressed as
A ≈ A′ := 1
`
n−1∑
i=0
n˜− (i mod `)
n˜− i . (7.4)
For practical usage, one may use dA′e for the number of audits.
Before providing an example to obtain a better understanding of the concept of audits,
we wish to emphasise that in order to form a PoR request the client needs to sample the
block identifiers uniformly at random, as opposed to only asking blocks which have not
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been queried before. This prevents the adversary from deleting blocks after they have
been queried, and the client ensures that all blocks are still equally likely to be checked
to prevent the adversary from cheating. We illustrate the concept of audits in form of
an example in Table 7.1. The number of rows of a CSPoRP represent the number of
performed audits A while the number of bullets per row represents the challenge size
`.
CSPoRP Audit Sampled Block Identifiers of F Overall Distinct Block
No. No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Ids Requested B
1
1 • • • 3
2 · • • • 4
3 · · • · • • · 7 ≥ 6 = n
2
1 • • • 3
2 • · • · • · 6 ≥ 6 = n
3 • · • · · • · · 8 ≥ 6 = n
3
1 • • • 3
2 • · • • 4
3 • • · • · · 6 ≥ 6 = n
4
1 • • • 3
2 • · • • 4
3 • · • · • 5 < 6 = n
Table 7.1: An example of four randomised CSPoRP procedures each consisting of three
audits using the same parameters
For the above example, we choose the original file F to consist of n = 6 blocks and
the ECC code rate to be ρ = 1/2. Thus, the processed file F consists of n˜ = 12
blocks and we choose the challenge size as ` = 3. Using equation (7.4), we compute the
average required number of audits in order to obtain a retrievability assurance about
the original file. We obtain A′ = 2.3789 which becomes for a practical use dA′e = 3.
As we chose ` = 3, we sample three different block identifiers per audit uniformly at
random from the set of processed block identifier. Those block identifier are illustrated
as a bullet • while in the following audit steps we use a small dot · to illustrate that
this block identifier has been already sampled. As soon as we sample enough available
blocks, i.e. B ≥ n, CSPoRVerify should return accept indicating that enough block
information are obtained and F can be reconstructed, cf. Section 2.8. In the above
example, we present four randomised CSPoRP procedures for the same file showing
that the randomised sampling has an impact on the number of sampled block identifier
B. The first three CSPoRP procedures sample overall enough block identifier to ensure
that the file is retained by the cloud service provider. However, the last CSPoRP
procedure does not sample enough block identifier and CSPoRVerify returns reject.
Thus, either the file is corrupted and the client may not be able to reconstruct the file
even using the ECC decoding algorithm or the file is retained by the provider but the
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client was “unlucky” with the random sampling as too many same block identifier were
checked. Therefore, as a strategy, the client may run a new CSPoRP procedure and
increase the number of audits to ensure that it is more likely to query enough different
block identifier.
Computing the Challenge Size
In this part, we derive a formula that computes the challenge size ` for the query set
given a fixed number of audits A, the block identifiers of the original file n and of the
processed file n˜.
Let us now derive an approximation for the challenge size ` starting from equation
(7.4). We can write n˜ = m`+ r where r < `,m ∈ N0, and thus it follows
A
{1}
<
1
`
n∑
i=1
n˜− n˜− i
i
{2}
≤ 1
`
n∑
i=1
n˜− n˜+ i
i
=
1
`
n∑
i=1
m`+ r − r + i
i
=
1
`
n∑
i=1
m`
i
+
1
`
n∑
i=1
i
i
=m
n∑
i=1
1
i︸ ︷︷ ︸
=mHn
+
1
`
n∑
i=1
i
i︸ ︷︷ ︸
<Hn
< (m+ 1)Hn,
where Hn denotes the nth harmonic number and the term i is an abbreviation for
(i mod `).
Let us remark that the first inequality {1} may evaluate to equality in case ρ = 1. This
means that the processed file corresponds to the original file and thus no redundancy
was encoded into the file. Note that the second inequality {2} evaluates to equality
if either ` = n = n˜ or ` = 1. Furthermore, in case we restrict ourselves to the case
n = n˜, then in the above equation we would have n˜− i ≤ n˜ + i + 1. The “+1” term
propagates to an additional term y := 1`
∑n
i=1
1
i in the above equation which results
later into a slightly different approximation of the upper bound. However, we do not
restrict ourselves to this case and can therefore proceed with the above and conclude
that
mHn ≤ A < (m+ 1)Hn. (7.5)
Rearranging the first inequality of equation (7.5) yields a lower bound for ` as follows.
Recall that n˜ = m`+ r and therefore we obtain
mHn ≤ A⇔ n˜
`
− r
`
≤ A
Hn
⇔ n˜
`
<
A
Hn
+ 1
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since r` < 1. This yields the lower bound to be
n˜Hn
A+Hn
< `.
Next we rearrange the right inequality of (7.5) to obtain an upper bound. We get
A < (m+ 1)Hn ⇔ A
Hn
− 1 < n˜
`
− r
`
≤ n˜
`
.
This yields the upper bound to be
` <
n˜Hn
A−Hn .
Note that, as mentioned above, in case n = n˜, the additional “+1” term results into a
slightly different upper bound with A− 2Hn in the denominator. However, altogether
it follows that the bounds for ` can be approximated as
n˜Hn
A+Hn
< ` <
n˜Hn
A−Hn .
Finally, a good choice in practice would be to choose the arithmetic mean of the bounds,
that is
` =
⌈
1
2
(
n˜Hn
A+Hn
+
n˜Hn
A−Hn
)⌉
. (7.6)
7.5.2.2 Statistical Hypothesis Testing
Another auditing strategy can be achieved by determining whether the success prob-
ability of a prover is sufficiently high. This can be done using a statistical hypothesis
test. In more detail, we wish to determine whether the average success probability ξ of a
prover P is at least µ where the success probability is defined as ξ(P) = Pr[P(Q̂)→ δi]
and Q̂ represents the combined challenges for all files. Thus, we formulate the null
hypothesis as
H0 : ξ(P) < µ
and the alternative hypothesis is formulated as
H1 : ξ(P) ≥ µ.
The goal is now to distinguish both hypotheses from each other. Suppose the client
sends k randomly chosen challenges to the server. 5 If the server now has a success
probability ξ(P) then the number of correct challenge responses received from the
5Note that we can combine the statistical hypothesis test with the previous strategy “workload
partition”, i.e. the number of challenges k can be identical to the number of audits A.
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server follows the binomial distribution Binom(k, ξ(P)). Further let us assume that the
server’s failure rate is minimal and we note that if the average success probability is
high enough then extraction will be successful. Since the success probability ξ(P) is
unknown, we can estimate it using the k randomly chosen challenges to the server, i.e.
ξ̂(P) = δaccept
k
where δaccept = |{δi | δi = accept, i ∈ [k]}|. Following standard literature in statistical
sciences [46], we know that the probability of the estimation corresponding exactly to
the success probability is 0, that is more formally Pr[ξ̂(P) = ξ(P)] = 0. Therefore, we
approach the problem by estimating a confidence interval CI for the success probability.
It follows
CI =
{
ξ(P) : ξ̂(P)− ξ(P)√
ξ(P)(1− ξ(P))/k ≤ z1−α
}
(7.7)
where z1−α being the 1 − α quantile of a Normal(0, 1) distribution and α is referred
to as the error level. The probability that the true success probability ξ is covered by
CI is approximately γ = 1 − α which is usually denoted as the confidence parameter.
Hence, we can reject the null hypothesis if
β :=
ξ̂(P)− µ√
µ(1− µ)/k > z1−α. (7.8)
Note that if we are able to reject the null hypothesis, this enables us to argue that our
average success probability is significantly larger than µ and therefore extraction of the
files should be successful.
Let us consider the following examples. First we fix µ = 0.95 and the client sends
k = 1000 challenges to the server. We use the typical error level α = 0.05 and thus
z0.95 = 1.6449.
δaccept ξ̂(P) CI δ
Example 1 600 3/5 [0.57428, 1) reject
Example 2 970 97/100 [0.95978, 1) accept
In Example 1, the client received 600 valid replies from a server and thus ξ̂(P) = 3/5.
Using equation (7.7), we obtain a confidence interval in which the success probability
ξ(P) will be contained with a probability of 95%. Now we can use inequality (7.8) to
check whether the null hypothesis may be rejected. It follows that β = −50.7833. Thus
β ≯ z0.95 and we cannot reject the null hypotheses as the success probability is low.
This means that extraction of the files will not be successful and CSPoRP will output
reject.
254
7.5 Practicability of CSPoR
Similarly, in Example 2, we have that the client receives 970 valid replies from a server
and thus ξ̂(P) = 97/100. The client can compute the respective confidence interval
and derives β = 2.9019. Here β > z0.95 and thus the null hypothesis can be rejected
and thus the success probability is significantly higher than µ. Therefore, extraction
of the files will be successful and CSPoRP outputs accept.
Note that other approaches can also be considered to calculate the confidence interval.
A good overview of them can be found in [2]. For example, a well-known approach
was introduced by Clopper and Pearson [56] which uses a relationship between the
cumulative binomial distribution and the beta distribution in order to state an easy
formula to calculate the confidence interval.
7.5.2.3 Certificates
In this strategy the client wishes to receive a certificate from the server proving the
retrievability of her files. Note that this certificate is not meant to be a cryptographic
certificate. It is meant as a certificate that attests the validity and quality of the server
storing data appropriately. A certificate basically consists of a single audit step where
C chooses the challenge to be of size n, i.e. `(k) = n(k) for all k ∈ [K
S
(c)
id
]. If CSPoRP is
successful the server may create a certificate indicating that the request was executed
correctly and thus leading to a valid proof stating the retrievability of the outsourced
data. Additionally, the server may include a time stamp to state the validity of the
certificate. Note that this certificate may be valid for a longer time interval than a usual
audit request (e.g. one month) and makes the server liable for any data loss within this
time interval.
7.5.2.4 Scheduled CSPoR
A different strategy could be implemented by a scheduled CSPoR. Here a client may
wish to perform CSPoRP within a specific time frame (e.g. five hours) or may addi-
tionally label the files with tags indicating their classification levels. For example, a
client may tag all her bank and insurance files with the classification level secret while
her music library is tagged with unrestricted. Since our CSPoR system also enables
to check any specified subset of the cloud storage, the client is able audit files with a
classification tag secret more frequently than files tagged with unrestricted to ensure
that data loss in valuable files is detected immediately.
7.5.3 Handling Erasure Detection Using CSPoR
In this section, we develop methods a client can use in case a CSPoRP execution has
failed and thus the outsourced data may be damaged but not yet irrecoverable. In this
context, we say that files are irrecoverable if more than (1 − ρ) of the data have been
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deleted, and thus the ECC decoding procedure cannot recover the underlying file.
7.5.3.1 Immediate Download
The approach of downloading all files in case an error is detected (that is, at least
one of the audit steps returned reject) is the most cautious one a client could follow.
It seems that this approach is the only strategy other PoR works have considered so
far. However, this approach has enormous drawbacks for a client. Since C does not
know which file contains an error she would be required to download all files within our
cloud storage model. This is impractical for a client and she loses her initial benefits
of outsourcing the files in the first place. In order to avoid downloading all files, we
present in the following section a different strategy called reduced CSPoR.
7.5.3.2 Reduced CSPoR
In case a CSPoRP procedure fails (that is, at least one of the audits returned reject)
we engage in a reduced CSPoR as we do not know in which file(s) an error occurred.
Here, we present the strategy reduced CSPoR where a client runs a b-ary search to
detect in which branch the CSPoRP failed. However, note that always all branches of a
node need to be tested, since multiple files may be damaged. In case the corrupted files
have been found, a download or repair can be initiated. Note that errors only occur
rarely compared to successful audits, and thus files are usually retrievable. Otherwise,
the client may subscribe to a new CSP. Note that simultaneously executed reduced
CSPoRP are slower than a single CSPoRP since we are required to increase the amount
of communication with the server in the number of simultaneously executed CSPoRP.
This is acceptable since we assume that errors only occur very rarely. In Figure 7.2, we
provide two examples where each node represents a CSPoRP over all its children and
the leaves represent the respective files. A completely black node illustrates a corrupted
file whereas a thick black circled node represents a failed CSPoRP as an error occurred.
The left figure represents a scheme with no errors, thus a single CSPoRP is sufficient to
prove that all files are retrievable. The right figure contains errors in the files F (1) and
F (6). Thus, the initial CSPoRP over all files will fail. To find the corrupted files, we
need to execute three CSPoRP at the same time, each over three different file sets. The
first and second check will fail and hence we know that an error must be in at least two
files. In order to locate the corrupted files, we execute six CSPoRP at the same time
over each leaf, i.e. an individual check over each file F (1) to F (6). This finally identifies
the corrupted files and the client can proceed to recover the damaged files. Note that
the client only needs to recover the corrupted files and can leave all intact files with the
server. Thus, with CSPoR the client still possesses the benefit of initially outsourcing
the files and in case an error is detected only a small number of files need to be fixed.
Another strategy could be to initially split the received responses from CSPoRProve
into subsets and compare the smaller replies to determine immediately which files may
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F (1)F (2)F (3)F (4)F (5)F (6)F (7)F (8)F (9) F (1)F (2)F (3)F (4)F (5)F (6)F (7)F (8)F (9)
Figure 7.2: Illustration of the strategy reduced CSPoR
be corrupted. We believe that this may be an interesting strategy to investigate in
future work.
7.5.4 Communication Model
The above introduced CSPoR system can be translated straightforwardly into present
cloud architectures. This can be achieved by introducing procedures that capture the
communication steps between a client and a cloud service provider.
The expression
Π: [C : inC ; S : inS ] −→ [C : outC ; S : outS ]
denotes the event that a client C and a provider S run an interactive protocol Π where
inX and outX denote the input and output of entity X (either C or S), respectively.
In the following we describe the execution of the required procedures. Following the
order of our algorithms in Definition 7.1, we first need to run the procedure Create
between C and S in order to create a storage container S(j) located at the server in
which the client stores her files. Note that a storage container is upper-bounded by
S
(c)
max, i.e. C and S need to engage in another Create procedure to create a new storage
container as soon as the storage capacity is reached or a client wishes to store different
types of data in different storage containers. In more detail, the procedure
Create : [C : pk; S : pk] −→ [C : S(j)id , γC ; S : S(j), γS ]
takes no other inputs than the public keys of both parties and outputs the identifierS
(j)
id
to identify the storage container S(j) and a tag γC which contains metadata related to
S(j) for the client. The CSP initialises the storage container S(j) on its infrastructure
and obtains a tag γS as its output.
After the successful generation of a storage container a client wishes to store her files
by executing a Store procedure as follows
Store : [C : F̂ ,S
(j)
id ; S : S
(j)] −→ [C : κ̂, τ̂ ; S : F̂ ,S(j), τ̂ ].
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A client needs to provide as input her set of files F̂ and the respective storage container
identifier S
(j)
id to store the files in S
(j). The procedure outputs the set of processed
files F̂ and the updated storage container S(j) for the server. Furthermore, the client
receives a set κ̂ which contains keys for file dependent functions (e.g. MACs or PRFs)
and a set of verification tags τ̂ which are computed on the client side. Those tags are
also provided to S and used to check consistency of the file sizes.
Finally, a client C and cloud service provider S engage in a CSPoRP procedure.
CSPoRP : [C : τ̂ , Ŝid; S : τ̂ , Ŝ] −→ [C : δ; S : ⊥].
In this procedure, a client provides her file tags τ̂ and her respective set of storage
container identifier Ŝid. Note that in general our CSPoR scheme enables a client
to check whether all outsourced files in Ŝ are intact and retrievable. However, it
is also possible for a client to check only a subset of her outsourced files by simply
choosing a subset of tags τ̂ ′ from τ̂ . The server inputs Ŝ and the file tags τ̂ . The
protocol run is accepted by the verifier if δ = accept, or rejected otherwise. More
precisely, the CSPoRP procedure uses additional locally computed values in order to
be executed. Following our instantiation in Section 7.4, a client prepares her challenge
set Q̂ according to the file tags τ̂ and sends the challenge set to S.
SendChallenge : [C : Q̂; S : ⊥] −→ [C : ⊥; S : Q̂].
The server uses the challenge set and computes the authentication tags σ and responses
µ as its replies which are returned to C.
Response : [C : ⊥; S : Ŝ, τ̂ , I] −→ [C : σ, µ; S : ⊥].
Finally, a client uses the authentication tags and response values to verify the CSPoRP
procedure as in Section 7.4. The client outputs a binary decision value δ indicating
whether she accepts or rejects the CSPoRP procedure.
Realisation of Procedures
The introduced procedures are easily translated into current cloud architectures. We
assume that a CSP exposes to its client a standard interface offering a handful of com-
mands in order to execute some basic operations such as storing a file, downloading a
file, as well as other commands. To implement such an interface for our CSPoR system,
we can use currently employed APIs from Amazon [8], Google [87] or Microsoft [109].
Following those APIs, it suffices to use only two commands to implement the above
procedures for a CSPoR system in current cloud architectures, namely POST and GET.
These commands can achieve different functionalities by simply specifying different
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parameters as detailed in their respective APIs.
7.5.5 Dynamic Updates
Our CSPoR scheme can achieve dynamic updates in its simplest form which seems
to be inherent in current cloud storage implementations [8, 87, 109]. In more detail,
current architectures do not support updating specific blocks of an outsourced file
stored at a cloud service provider. Thus, a local file update on the provider’s side is
not possible, and a client needs to first retrieve the whole file, perform an update locally
and upload the updated file back to the provider. Following the notion of procedures
from Section 7.5.4, this can formally be described as
Download : [C : τ (k), Ŝid; S : Ŝ] −→ [C : F (k); S : ⊥].
Here, a client obtains the processed file F (k) from the cloud service provider. Now she
first needs to use the ECC decoding algorithm to obtain the original file F (k). After
the file is updated locally by the client, she encodes F (k) again with the ECC encoding
algorithm and uses the Store procedure to upload and store the file with the provider.
Note that most CSPs [8, 87, 109] also support versioning, i.e. the CSP still holds all
old version of the files even after the files have been updated, and a client is able to
retrieve any old version of the file by specifying a pointer in the command to the old
file.
7.6 Evaluation
In this section we evaluate the trade-off between computation and communication.
While the execution of each strategy can be different depending on each client’s in-
dividual resources, we provide an example execution of the above strategy “workload
partition”. We denote each specific execution of a strategy as an audit plan.
We evaluate the audit plan “Fixed Audits”. Another notable audit plan may be to
leverage a table with a column for each file and the number of audits for the largest
file is the number of rows. Then, instead of checking all files at the beginning, this
strategy may distribute the workload of checking the files more evenly.
Let us fix the following main parameters for this evaluation. Each file block consists
of s = 512 bytes (4096 bits) and each sector is a symbol in F. Hence, the size of two
blocks is one kibibyte (1 KiB, 1024 bytes). For simplicity, we store the files in only one
storage container (Γ = 1) and choose the ECC rate ρ = 1/2.
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Audit Plan: Fixed Audits
In this audit plan we wish to execute a CSPoRP procedure within a (previously) fixed
number of audits and wish to evaluate the respective communication and computation
cost for the client and server. For simplicity, we assume the following file structure.
Each file F (k) consists of n(k) = 2k blocks, i.e. with increasing k we obtain a larger
file. In Table 7.2 and Table 7.3, we provide two example evaluations over 480 files with
different-sized files for various different fixed number of audits ranging from A = 1 to
A = 10000. Furthermore, the tables provide information about the sum of required
challenge sizes of all files and provide details about the respective overall communi-
cation cost (payload) from client to server (P[C → S]), and vice versa (P[S → C]),
for executing a CSPoRP. We also detail the portion of transmitted data in relation to
the overall outsourced data which we denote as Datasize% and finally we compute the
required time T to execute a CSPoRP. Note, for simplicity, we omit disk read times
and possible latencies for a client and cloud service provider.
In Table 7.2, we provide our first example evaluation and describe the procedure of
obtaining the respective values. The table describes an evaluation of 480 outsourced
Data A L Audit size P[C → S] Datasize% P[S → C] T
480 files: 7.5 GiB 1 7202070 54.9 MiB 54.9 MiB 0.72 2 KiB 0.5 sec
480 files: 7.5 GiB 5 5392050 41.1 MiB 206 MiB 2.68 10 KiB 2.6 sec
480 files: 7.5 GiB 10 4105920 31.3 MiB 313 MiB 4.08 20 KiB 3.1 sec
480 files: 7.5 GiB 30 2103150 16 MiB 481 MiB 6.26 60 KiB 4.8 sec
480 files: 7.5 GiB 60 1214970 9.27 MiB 556 MiB 7.24 120 KiB 5.6 sec
480 files: 7.5 GiB 120 658830 5.03 MiB 603 MiB 7.85 240 KiB 6 sec
480 files: 7.5 GiB 180 452010 3.45 MiB 621 MiB 8.08 360 KiB 6.2 sec
480 files: 7.5 GiB 500 169200 1.29 MiB 645 MiB 8.4 0.98 MiB 6.5 sec
480 files: 7.5 GiB 1000 85680 669 KiB 654 MiB 8.51 1.96 MiB 6.6 sec
480 files: 7.5 GiB 2500 34710 271 KiB 662 MiB 8.62 4.89 MiB 6.7 sec
480 files: 7.5 GiB 6000 14730 115 KiB 674 MiB 8.78 11.7 MiB 6.8 sec
480 files: 7.5 GiB 10000 8940 69.8 KiB 682 MiB 8.88 19.6 MiB 7 sec
Table 7.2: All parameters for a CSPoRP execution with 480 files with a total size of 7.5
GiB
files consisting of sixteen different files with increasing file sizes ranging from 1 KiB
to 32 MiB where we outsource 30 different files of each size, i.e. 30 times F̂ = {F (k) |
F (k) ∈ {0, 1}∗, k ∈ [16]}. The overall number of file blocks can be computed as n =
30
∑
k n
(k) = 30(2k+1 − 2) and corresponds here to n = 3932100 blocks. Next we
apply the erasure-correcting code with rate ρ = 1/2 to the files and thus n˜ = 2n.
Furthermore, we need to generate authentication tags σ for each file block of all n˜
blocks. Thus, the overall number of blocks we outsource to a server consists of 4n
blocks which corresponds to 7.5 GiB. We calculate the challenge sizes for the respective
files using equation (7.6) for different fixed number of audits and calculate the sum of
all challenge sizes of one audit as L := 30
∑16
k=1 `
(k).
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Figure 7.3: Payload P from C to S for different number of audits for outsourced data
of size 7.5 GiB
In Figure 7.3, we illustrate the respective payload from a client to a cloud service
provider for different fixed number of audits in order to execute a CSPoRP procedure.
The figure shows that the entire payload for a client increases the more audit steps she
uses to execute a CSPoRP. This is the expected behaviour since we enable a client to
choose the number of audits depending on her current resources. Figure 7.4 illustrates
that the more audit steps are performed the smaller is the size of a single audit step
itself. For example in Table 7.2 we show that if a client chooses to check all outsourced
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Figure 7.4: Single audit size for different number of audits for outsourced data of size
7.5 GiB
files within a single audit step A = 1 then the challenge size corresponds to 54.9 MiB
whereas in case she wishes to check all outsourced files within ten thousand audit steps
A = 10000 the respective challenge size per audit step is only 69.8 KiB.6 Thus, CSPoR
enables a client to flexibly choose the number of audits depending on her resources
(this may also depend on the device she uses) determining whether she samples small
or large challenges.
6The example with A = 1 corresponds to the discussed strategy of certificates as introduced in
Section 7.5.2.3.
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Figure 7.5: Payload P from S to C for different number of audits for outsourced data
of size 7.5 GiB
In Figure 7.5, we illustrate the respective payload from a cloud service provider to a
client. The provider’s payload is very small compared to the client’s payload and ranges
from 2 KiB to 19.6 MiB as it only returns s+ 1 aggregated values per file.
In Figure 7.6, we illustrate the overall required time for executing a CSPoRP procedure
over 480 files of a total size of 7.5 GiB assuming a communication throughput of 100
MiB/s. Depending on the number of audits the required time to obtain a retrievability
assurance ranges between 0.5 seconds and 7 seconds.
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Figure 7.6: Required time T for a full CSPoRP execution for different number of audits
for outsourced data of size 7.5 GiB
In Table 7.3, we provide our second example evaluation. Similarly to the previous
example, the table describes an evaluation of 480 outsourced files consisting of thirty
different files of increasing file size ranging from 1 KiB to 512 GiB, and we outsource
16 different files of each size, i.e. 16 times F̂ = {F (k) | F (k) ∈ {0, 1}∗, k ∈ [30]}. The
overall number of file blocks can be computed as n = 16
∑
k n
(k) = 16(2k+1 − 2) and
corresponds here to n = 34359738336 blocks. Next we apply the error correcting code
with rate ρ = 1/2 to the files and thus n˜ = 2n and we need to generate authentication
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Data A L Audit size P[C → S] Datasize% P[S → C] T
480 files: 65 TiB 1 65542267808 488.33 GiB 488.33 GiB 0.75 2 KiB 5000.47 sec
480 files: 65 TiB 5 55317309232 412.15 GiB 2.012 TiB 3.14 10 KiB 21101.88 sec
480 files: 65 TiB 10 46294897296 344.92 GiB 3.368 TiB 5.26 20 KiB 35320.2 sec
480 files: 65 TiB 30 28023896624 208.79 GiB 6.12 TiB 9.56 60 KiB 64141.61 sec
480 files: 65 TiB 60 17605552992 131.17 GiB 7.69 TiB 12.01 120 KiB 80591 sec
480 files: 65 TiB 120 10098261536 75.24 GiB 8.82 TiB 13.78 240 KiB 92452.35 sec
480 files: 65 TiB 180 7079565040 52.75 GiB 9.27 TiB 14.49 360 KiB 97223.03 sec
480 files: 65 TiB 500 2728924896 20.33 GiB 9.93 TiB 15.51 0.98 MiB 104100.22 sec
480 files: 65 TiB 1000 1392163536 10.37 GiB 10.13 TiB 15.83 1.96 MiB 106213.65 sec
480 files: 65 TiB 2500 563732864 4.2 GiB 10.25 TiB 16.02 4.89 MiB 107523.51 sec
480 files: 65 TiB 6000 236020816 1.76 GiB 10.30 TiB 16.1 11.7 MiB 108041.87 sec
480 files: 65 TiB 10000 141807840 1.06 GiB 10.31 TiB 16.12 19.6 MiB 108190.99 sec
Table 7.3: All parameters for a CSPoRP execution with 480 files with a total size of 65
TiB
tags σ for each of n˜ blocks. Thus, the overall number of blocks we outsource to a
server consists of 4n blocks which corresponds to 65 TiB. We calculate the challenge
sizes for the respective files using equation (7.6) for different fixed number of audits
and calculate the sum of all challenge sizes of one audit as L := 16
∑30
k=1 `
(k).
As in the previous example, in Figure 7.7 we evaluate the payload from a client to
a cloud service provider for different fixed number of audits in order to execute a
CSPoRP procedure. Figure 7.7 looks similar to Figure 7.3 while the main difference is
that the client needs to sample more blocks per audit step since she outsourced larger
files and thus requires to check more blocks in order to obtain an assurance about the
retrievability of the files. Thus, the client’s payload ranges from approximately 0.5 TiB
to 10.31 TiB whereas before the maximum payload was 682 MiB.
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Figure 7.7: Payload P from C to S for different number of audits for outsourced data
of size 65 TiB
In Figure 7.8, we illustrate as in the previous example that the more audit steps are
performed for a CSPoRP procedure the smaller is the challenge size of a single audit
itself.
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Figure 7.8: Single audit size for different number of audits for outsourced data of size
65 TiB
We illustrate in Figure 7.9 the payload from the cloud service provider to a client. This
figure is exactly the same as Figure 7.5 from the above example and thus the provider’s
payload does not change at all even if a client outsources more data. The reason is
that the provider needs always to compute s + 1 aggregated values per file which are
independent of the file size.
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Figure 7.9: Payload P from S to C for different number of audits for outsourced data
of size 65 TiB
Lastly, in Figure 7.10, we evaluate the overall required time for executing a CSPoRP
procedure over 480 files of a total size of 65 TiB assuming a communication through-
put of 100 MiB/s. The performance of CSPoRP is in magnitudes slower than in the
above example due to the large outsourced files. Here the required time to obtain an
information-theoretical assurance ranges between 5000 seconds and 108190 seconds, or
in other words it takes between 1.38 hours and 30.05 hours. Thus, we conclude that
the performance of CSPoR is very good as long as a lot of small files are checked. In
future work, we wish to enhance the performance of the scheme for large files.
264
7.7 Conclusion
100 101 102 103 104
0
0.5
1
·105
Audits A
T
im
e
in
S
ec
o
n
d
s
T for 100 MiB/s
Figure 7.10: Required time T for a full CSPoRP execution for different number of audits
for outsourced data of size 65 TiB
7.7 Conclusion
We introduced in this chapter an extension to the traditional PoR concept which we
call a cloud storage proofs of retrievability scheme. A CSPoR enables a client to check
whether all outsourced files at a cloud storage provider are still intact and retriev-
able. Our model introduces and uses the notion of a storage container modelling the
underlying storage structure which plays a crucial practical role in today’s cloud ser-
vice provider’s infrastructure. We proposed an efficient instantiation of CSPoR based
on well-known constructions and argue in detail about possible strategies in order to
obtain a retrievability assurance about all files. Our proposed solution overcomes short-
comings in current models when a client wishes to audit all files simultaneously.
We evaluated the performance of the scheme and showed that, for example, CSPoR
can check the retrievability of 480 different-sized files (of size at most 32 MiB) in be-
tween 0.5 seconds and 7 seconds depending on the number of performed audit steps.
Unfortunately, the performance of the scheme gets of magnitudes slower as soon as we
outsource large files of size 512 GiB. We provide a discussion about the required API
to lift CSPoR into a cloud system (e.g. Amazon’s S3).
In future work we believe it would be interesting and beneficial to consider other entity
populations such as a multi-server scheme similarly to Bowers et al. [39] who considered
this case for PDP. This scenario has been recently considered by Paterson et al. [120]
in the realm of PoR, although limited to the single file case. We also envisage that the
case of multiple clients outsourcing a vast amount of files to a cloud service provider
being interesting to investigate as other concepts such as storage deduplication may
play a crucial role. Since the performance of CSPoR was of magnitudes slower as soon
as a client outsourced large files, it would be interesting to investigate ways to enhance
the performance. One possible solution may be to split large files in smaller ones.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
In this thesis we have considered systems and solutions regarding the verification of
computations and data retrievability.
The main part of this thesis is devoted to the setting of publicly verifiable outsourced
computation which allows computationally weak devices to delegate computations to a
more powerful but yet untrusted server, and to verify the correctness of returned results
based on public information. It has been shown by Parno et al. [118] that KP-ABE
can be used as a verifiable proof mechanism for the satisfaction of Boolean functions
in PVC.
We began in Chapter 3 to consider the notion of PVC in a more practical framework in
which we accommodated multiple servers offering a computational service for multiple
functions simultaneously. Servers offering such a service may be rewarded per compu-
tation, and as such have an incentive to cheat by returning malformed responses rather
than devoting resources and time to compute a valid result. Thus, we implemented a
revocation mechanism into the PVC setting to remove misbehaving servers from the
system. This can be seen as a mechanism to save other delegators resources since they
do not need to waste their valuable resources by outsourcing to a misbehaving server
in the first place.
In Chapter 4 we considered a setting in which an untrusted server holds a data set in
such a way that any client can ask the server to compute a function on any input por-
tion of the data set. We showed that ciphertext-policy ABE can be used as a building
block in order to instantiate this mode of computation called publicly verifiable dele-
gable computation (VDC). This model can be seen as a reversed system architecture in
comparison to the proposal in Chapter 3. VDC is more akin to the traditional client-
server model and we showed that the model has some interesting possible applications
to verifiable queries to remote databases and verifiable processing of large data sets.
In Chapter 5 we brought together the previous notions and unified them into a sin-
gle publicly verifiable outsourced computation system called hybrid PVC. This model
only requires a single setup stage in order to provide a flexible outsourced computa-
tion solution capturing both previous systems. This was achieved by a novel use of
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dual-policy ABE which combines KP-ABE and CP-ABE. We briefly introduced yet
another mode of publicly verifiable computation in this chapter that enables us to en-
force (graph-based) access control policies over the delegators, servers and verifiers.
This mode was motivated on the observation that even in a publicly verifiable setting
it is unlikely that all entities will have unrestricted access to all functionalities of the
system and thus we may enforce access control policies to restrict the access accordingly.
In Chapter 6 we investigated the possibility of using techniques developed mainly for
PVC in the realm of verifiable searchable encryption. We introduced an extended verifi-
able searchable encryption scheme based upon CP-ABE and techniques from Chapter 4
that permits a user to verify that search results are correct and complete. Our scheme
enables the client to perform a wider class of queries, i.e. it permits verifiable compu-
tational queries over keywords and specific data values, that go beyond the standard
keyword matching queries to allow functions such as averaging or counting operations.
In Chapter 7 we turned our attention to the setting of providing provable outsourced
data storage guarantees. We introduced a new proofs of retrievability (PoR) model
called cloud-storage PoR which enables a client to outsource multiple different-sized
files to a cloud service provider and we use homomorphic properties to efficiently check
whether all outsourced files are still retained and intact. This proposed extension aims
to provide a more practical approach to this problem and overcomes limitations in the
literature where only a single file can be checked. We discussed different strategies a
client may use in order to obtain a statement about the retrievability and also evalu-
ated the performance of our scheme.
Throughout this thesis we have emphasised in each chapter on possible future research
problems and we believe that both areas will continue being very active in the next
coming years.
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